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ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA

AS EXPOUNDED IN THE Ś'IVAJÑĀNA-SIDDHIYAR
AND ITS SIX COMMENTARIES

BY

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ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA

AS EXPOUNDED IN THE ŚIVAJÑĀNA-SIDDHIYĀR AND ITS
SIX COMMENTARIES

FOREWORD

The basic text of Śaiva-siddhānta is Meykaṇḍa's *Śivajñānabodham* which consists of twelve aphorisms (*sūtra*) with a short explanatory commentary (*vārtika*). As this work is all too brief, the need for a detailed systematic exposition was felt quite early, and this was fulfilled by Meykaṇḍa's family-preceptor turned pupil, Arulnandi-śivācārya, who wrote the *Śivajñāna-siddhiyār* at the command of his youthful master. The *Siddhiyār* is in two parts, *parapakkam* (skt. *parapakṣa*) and *supakkam* (skt. *svapakṣa*), the former criticizing the other views and the latter expounding the Siddhānta. The method here followed is the standard one in Indian Philosophy, viz. that of establishing one's metaphysical standpoint through a criticism of the rival views arranged in their order of progressive satisfactoriness. For those who wish to acquaint themselves with merely the doctrines of Śaiva-siddhānta, however, the second part of the *Siddhiyār* is enough. The present work seeks to expound this part in the light of six old commentaries thereon.

Dr. V. A. Devasenapathi undertook this study as a research student of this Department in the year 1935 under the guidance of the late Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. Subsequently in the year 1946 he was awarded a Fellowship by the University, and this enabled him to complete his work and submit it for the award of the Ph.D. Degree. It is the thesis as approved for the Degree that is now being issued as a publication of the Department of Philosophy.

Dr. Devasenapathi sets forth in these pages the leading concepts of Śaiva-siddhānta in a clear and consecutive manner. Following the maxim that the establishment of the objects of knowledge depends on the means of knowledge (*mānādhinā*

meva—siddhiḥ), the *pramāṇas* (Tamil: *aḷavai*) are first explained. Then follow in sequence the exposition of the three *padārthas* (categories) recognized in all the Śaiva schools viz., *pati* (God), *pāśa* (bonds), and *paśu* (soul). Having expounded the theoretic doctrines, the author turns to the practical teaching relating to the means to release and the conception of release itself. An interesting point that deserves to be noted is that the commentaries on the *Siddhiyār* differ among themselves in regard to certain aspects of the doctrine of Śaivism, which only shows that in matters spiritual, there are bound to be doctrinal differences, and that these instead of importing any defect into a tradition, indicate its strength and vitality.

It is hoped that the present study will add to the interest that is now increasingly being shown by scholars in the comparatively virgin field of Śaiva-siddhānta.

Madras,
September 19, 1960. }

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

PREFACE

The exposition of Śaiva Siddhānta attempted in the following pages is based on a study of the *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār* in the light of six commentaries. The only complete edition available contains many mistakes, thus making the study more than usually arduous. Recently two of the six commentaries, those of Maraijñāna Deśikar and Nirambavaḷagiār, were published by the Tiruvāvaḍuturai math. It is expected that two other commentaries, those of Śivāgra Yogin and Jñānaprakāśar also would be soon published by them. These two commentaries have distinctive features and so a good edition of these will be of great help in appreciating their contribution to the richness of the Śiddhānta. Especially in regard to Epistemology (Aḷavai), the need for an edition free from mistakes, is keenly felt.

This study of the *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār* was undertaken in 1935 when I joined the Department of Philosophy, University of Madras as a research student. Under the guidance of the late Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, M.A., B.Sc., Bar-at-Law, I completed a study of the *Siddhiyār* and gathered material for an exposition in English. But for the skill and sympathy with which he guided my work, the work could hardly have been carried out. Particularly where transliteration of Sanskrit words into Tamil has led to many puzzling mistakes, the Professor's guidance was invaluable. Subsequently, I had the privilege of working under the guidance of Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan, M.A., Ph.D. to prepare my thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Madras University. I remember with gratitude the lectures on Indian Philosophy delivered by Professor P. N. Srinivasachari, M.A., whose handling of the subject led me to take it up for further study. I express my gratitude to all these scholars. I am grateful to Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan for the Foreword he has written.

I am thankful to the Vice-Chancellor and the other authorities of the University for publishing this book under their auspices.

It is a pleasure to record my grateful thanks to Mr. P. N. Shanmugasundaram, M.A., M.Litt., for valuable assistance given at the time the thesis was submitted to the University for the Ph.D. degree.

I thank Mr. A. Sivaramalingam M.A., and Mr. C. V. Nadanasabapathi, M.A., for preparing the Index. My thanks are also due to the G. S. Press for their neat execution of the work.

I am painfully aware of the many imperfections in this work. I shall be grateful to scholars interested in the Siddhānta if they are pleased to draw my attention to inaccuracies in the exposition.

Madras,
September 19, 1960. }

V. A. DEVASENAPATHI

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Śaiva religion is one of the most ancient — if not the most ancient — of the several religions in India. Its glory has not ceased with the past but continues even today. It is the religion of vast numbers of people throughout the length and breadth of India. In fact it 'stretches out across the sea to Farther India and the Archipelago and beyond the mountain to Central Asia'.¹ While it is difficult to trace the origins of Śaivism, scholars are of the view that two sources can be said to have contributed to the growth of this religion — one Aryan or Vedic and the other pre-Aryan.² Such has been the vitality of this religion that it has given rise to numerous sects, differing from each other in matters of detail but agreeing in the fundamental belief regarding God, soul and the bonds (*pati*, *paśu* and *pāśa*) and the thirty six *tattvas*. Thus we find all shades of difference in the exposition of the Śaiva philosophy, ranging from the idealistic monism of the Kashmir school to the pluralistic realism³ of the Śaiva Siddhānta. The philosophy of Śaivism, in this respect, has been said to be typical of the entire range of Hindu thought.⁴

Śaiva Siddhānta claims to be, not just one system among other systems, but the system *par excellence*. It claims to be the Siddhānta, the accomplished end.⁵ Opinion is divided as to the origin of this school of Śaivism. Some scholars claim that Śaiva Siddhānta is of entirely Tamil origin and that the basic text of this

1. A Historical Sketch of Śaivism by Prof. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri—Cultural Heritage of India, Vol II, p. 18.

2. *Ibid.*

3. It will be pointed out elsewhere in the pages of this book that terms like pluralism are not used here in the same sense in which they are used in Western Philosophy.

4. The Philosophy of Śaivism by Prof. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri—Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. II, p. 35.

5. While the other Śāstras are the parts and the *pūrvapakṣa*, the Siddhānta śāstras are the whole and, thus the title Śaiva Siddhānta, bears a *yoga rūḍhi* significance, not merely that it just happens to be called the final position but it is really the final position, the other systems preparing the way for this — this is how the Śaiva Siddhānta Paribhāṣa (p. 6) explains this title. Cf. also pp. 128–9 and pp. 518–19 of *Māpāḍīyam*.

school, *Meykaṇḍār's Śivajñāna Bodham*, is an original Tamil work, not a translation.* Though this work, giving the first systematic exposition of the Siddhānta belongs to the thirteenth century, Siddhānta concepts and doctrines are found in earlier philosophical works like *Tiruvundiyaṛ* and the *Tirukkaḷiṟṟuppaḍiyāṛ* and *Tirumandiram* as well as in the devotional utterances of the Śaiva saints, like the *Tevāram* and the *Tiruvācagam*.⁷ In fact, references to Śaivism are found in the classical Sangam literature, belonging to the early centuries of the Christian era, like the *Ainkuṟunūṟu*. Nakkīrar, a poet of the 1st century A.D. is reputed to be a Śaivite. The *Tolkāppiyam*, the earliest extant Tamil work speaks of the Aṟivārs or the seers. Whether the Siddhānta is an original Tamil system or borrowed from other sources, this much is conceded by scholars that it bears the distinctive marks of the Tamil genius.

Literature :

The Vedas and the Āgamas are generally accepted as authoritative Scriptures. While some times the Āgamas are claimed as the only authority for the Siddhānta, and an opposition is set up between the Vedas and the Āgamas, the generally accepted view is that of Tirumūlar who says that both are divinely inspired and that the difference between them amounts only to this—that the Vedas are general and the Āgamas are special.

Twenty-eight Āgamas are recognised by the Siddhāntin. The chief among these is the *Kāmika*. Among the Tamil sources, the devotional utterances of the Śaivite saints collectively known as the *Pannirutirumuṟai*⁸ and the doctrinal exposition in the fourteen

6. Śaiva Siddhānta Uṇmai Varalāṟu by K. Subramanīa Pillai.

7. 'It must not be forgotten that Tamil Śaivism had a long religious and literary development before the appearance of the schools of Kashmir and much common terminology may be traced for centuries before Meykaṇḍa wrote. Śaṅkara argued against Śaivism with which he must have been acquainted in South India; and his visit to Kashmir, if tradition may be trusted, apparently coincides with the first beginnings of the northern scholastic philosophy'. Carpenter, N.—Theism in Mediaeval India, p. 360.

8. Pannirutirumuṟai as follows: Sambandhar's *Tevāram* (three) *Tirumuṟai* 1 to 3; Appar's *Tevāram* (three) *Tirumuṟai* 4 to 6; Sundarar's *Tevāram* *Tirumuṟai* 7; Mānikkavācagar's *Tiruvācagam* and *Tirukkovaīyār* *Tirumuṟai* 8; Tirumāligai Devar & others—*Tiruvīsaippā* *Tirumuṟai* 9; *Tirumandiram*, *Tirumuṟai* 10; Works of saints like Paṭṭinattār, 11; Sekkilar's *Periyapurāṇam* *Tirumuṟai* 12.

works entitled *Meykaṇḍa Śāstras*⁹ are considered most authoritative.

The chief among the *Meykaṇḍa Śāstras* is the Śivajñāna Bodham. It is the basic text book of the Siddhānta. This important work is so terse that its author, Meykaṇḍār, is said to have commanded his disciple to write a commentary on it so that people could easily understand it. That commentary is the *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār*.

The author of the *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār* is Aruṇandi Śivācārya who lived in the thirteenth century A.D. in *Tiruttuṇṇaiyūr* on the north bank of the River Peṇṇaiyār. He belonged to a respectable Ādiśaiva family. His original name appears to have been Sadāśiva Ācāryā.¹⁰ The profound knowledge of the Scriptures that he had acquired gained for him the honorific title, *Sakalāgamapaṇḍita*. It is said¹¹ that he went about from place to place, visiting Cidambaram, Tiruvaṇṇāmalai, Kāsi, Nepal and other centres and established Śaivism by overcoming his adversaries in philosophical contests.

Sakalāgamapaṇḍita was originally the preceptor of Meykaṇḍār's father. According to the traditional story, Meykaṇḍār, when he was little more than a child, received instruction in Śaiva Siddhānta from *Paranjoti munivar* and became a teacher at a very tender age. *Sakalāgamapaṇḍita* expected his pupil's son, *Meykaṇḍār* to go to him for instruction but was disappointed. He decided to go to Meykaṇḍār's place in the hope that at least then the boy would make amends and accept him as his teacher. But this hope was also frustrated. It is said that one day when Meykaṇḍār was discoursing to his pupils on āṇava (egoism, the root evil), Sakalāgamapaṇḍita went to him and, filled with his own self-importance, asked him to indicate the form of āṇava. In reply, Meykaṇḍār pointed his finger at Sakalāgamapaṇḍita himself. This reply opened

9. 1. Tiruvundiyār; 2. Tirukkaliṟṟuppaḍiyār; 3. Śivajñāna Bodham; 4. Śivajñāna Siddhiyār; 5. Irupāvirupatu; 6. Uṇmai viḷakkam; 7. Śiva-prakāśam; 8. Tiruvaruṇṇayan; 9. Vināveṇba; 10. Poṟṟipahṟoḍai; 11. Koḍikkavi; 12. Nenjuviḍu tūtu; 13. Uṇmaineṟiviḷakkam; 14. Saṅkar-panirākaranam.

10. Vide the biographical sketch in the *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār*, *Iruvarurai*—South Indian Saiva Siddhanta Publishing Works (p. 5). In the commentary on *Sivaprakāśam*, the author of the Siddhiyār is referred to as சைவபுரம் தலைவராயனார். Siddhānta Śastiram Padinānku, p. 744.

11. Muthia Pillai's edition of the Siddhiyār. This statement is interesting but no authority is cited therefor.

the eyes of the family preceptor to his ignorant condition and the need to learn first before he could teach others. He fell at the feet of Meykaṇḍār and begged him to take him as his pupil. Meykaṇḍār accepted him¹² as his chief pupil and conferred the name Aruṇandi on him.

The Śivajñāna Siddhiyār, written by Aruṇandi at the bidding of his master consists of two parts—parapakkam and supakkam. The former takes up the views of other schools of philosophy, examines and refutes them from the standpoint of the Siddhānta; the latter sets forth in detail in 328 verses, the fundamentals of the Siddhānta with incidental references to the views of other schools. Exposition of the Siddhānta attempted in these pages is based on the *Supakkam*.

The Siddhiyār (supakkam) consists of 328 verses as under :

Invocatory verse	...	1
Prefatory verses	...	5
Aḷavai	...	14
Sūtra I	...	70
„ II	...	96
„ III	...	4
„ IV	...	40
„ V	...	9
„ VI	...	9
„ VII	...	4
„ VIII	...	39
„ IX	...	12
„ X	...	6
„ XI	...	12
„ XII	...	7
		<hr/> 328 <hr/>

The sūtras are classified as under :

Pramāṇa Iyal	...	Sūtras I to III
Iḷakkaṇa Iyal	...	„ IV to VI
Sādana Iyal	...	„ VII to IX
Payan Iyal	...	„ X to XII

12. cf. “என்னை யிப்பவத்திற் சேராவகை யெடுத்தென் சித்தத்தே
தன்னை வைத்தருளிஞலே தாளினை தலைமேற் தூட்டும்
மின்னம்ர் பொழில்தூழ் வெண்ணெய் மேவிவாழ்மெய்

[கண்டான் நூல்
சென்னியிற் கொண்டு சைவத்திறத்தினைத் தெரிக்கலுற்றும்”

It will be seen that of the 328 verses, Aḷavai and Sūtras I and II together consist of 180 verses—more than half the total number.

Maraijñāna Deśikar, one of the commentators on the Siddhiyār¹³ says that Aruṇandi based his *parapakkam* on the following works :

- (i) Śaṅkarācārya's Sarva Darśana¹⁴ Saṅgraha.
- (ii) Śarvamatopanyāsa.
- (iii) Rāmanādācārya's Paramatanirākaraṇa.
- (iv) Sarvānma Śambhu's Siddhānta Dīpikā.
- (v) Aghoraśivācārya's Siddhāntārtha Samuccaya

and his supakkam on

- (i) the *Śivajñāna Bodha*
- (ii) its derivative (evidently the Tamil Bodham) consisting of sūtras, cūrṇi and veṇḇa
- and (iii) The Śivāgamas.

Maraijñāna Deśikar says¹⁵ that the author writes his work in Tamil, when there are the different dialects of Śanskrit like Prākṛt, Paisāci, etc., because Tamil is the language of the region between Veṅḡadam in the north and Kumari in the South. (*Tirupati Hills and Cape Camorin*).

The *Siddhiyār* is written for the benefit of the *Vainayikas*, the classification of souls here being into *Sāmsiddhas*, *Vainayikas*, and *Prākṛtas*.¹⁶ *Sāmsiddhas* are granted salvation by Śiva directly without their seeking it through the Scriptures. *Prākṛtas* have neither the required intelligence nor love. Thus the *Vainayikas* alone need enlightenment through a written work. Nirambavaḷagiār, another commentator, says that the author has written for the *madhyamas* not for the *uttamas* or the *adhamas*. Realising the magnitude of his task, Aruṇandi says that his attempt to indicate the nature

13. Pp. 20–21 Siddhiyār Aṟuvarurai.

14. 'The full name of this work, as may be made out from colophon given at the end of the chapters and also from the last stanza of the last chapter in it, is Sarvadarśana Siddhānta Saṅgraha. Nevertheless, it appears to have been known by the comparatively shorter title of Sarva Siddhānta Saṅgraha also, as it is, for instance, found mentioned in the Pramāṇathiraṭṭu of Manavāla māmuni, a well-known religious teacher of the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas of South India'.

Preface to Sarva Siddhānta Saṅgraha Ed. by M. Rangacharya.

15. Aṟuvarurai, pp. 61–62.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

of God whom the Scriptures, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and the human faculties all fail to reach, will call forth the ridicule of the wise ones. However, he adds, an attempt must be made to know of God, through the instruction of a preceptor well-versed in the Āgamas. This instruction may be reinforced by the appropriate means of valid knowledge and, God's nature may be intuited in one's own intelligence with the help of Śivajñāna.

Aruṇandi's Śivajñāna Siddhiyār has come to rank as a standard exposition Śaiva Siddhānta and as a great literary classic in Tamil. It has won the esteem of saints¹⁷ and scholars alike ever since its composition. Its verses have a fine, flowing quality. It combines loftiness of thought with lucidity of expression and is a model for all philosophical compositions.

There are six old commentaries on the *Siddhiyār* and two modern ones.¹⁸ It is possible that there might have been some others also, lost through the course of centuries. The six old commentators are Nirambavaḷagiār, Maraijñāna Deśikar, Śivāgra yogin, Jñānaprakāsar, Śivajñāna yogin, and Subrahmaṇya Deśikar. Of these, the last does not attempt any original interpretation but merely follows Śivajñāna yogin closely, giving the word meaning (pada urai) of verses whose general sense (poḷippurai) is given by Śivajñāna yogin.

The earliest of the commentators seems to have been Nirambavaḷagiār. The editor of *Siddhiyār Aṟuvururai*, K. Shanmukhasundara Mudaliar¹⁹ says that, in the opinion of some, Nirambavaḷagiār was the earliest commentator. He explains that he has given the fifth place to this commentator in his edition so that the difference between his commentary and those of others could be clearly seen. But Nirambavaḷagiār's commentary does not differ markedly from the orthodox exposition of the Siddhānta. The only peculiarity of this commentary consists in fixing a particular pūrva-pakṣin for a number of consecutive verses when other commentaries have changed to other pūrva-pakṣins. Maraijñāna Deśikar who is considered to be one of the early commentators

17. 'பாதி விடுத்தத்தாஸிப்பார் விடுத்தமாக உண்மை சாதித்தார்'

—*St. Tāyumanavar*

பார்விரித்த நூலெல்லாம் பார்த்தறியச் சித்தியிலே

ஓர் விடுத்தப் பாதி போதும்

—*Śivabhogasāram*

18. Muthiah Pillai and Tiruviḷaṅgam.

19. *Siddhiyār Aṟuvururai*, Vol. III, p. 7.

refers²⁰ to Nirambavaḷagiar's commentary on the *Tiruvārūṭṭayan*. Nirambavaḷagiar was the pupil of Kamalai Jñānaprakāśar and was himself the teacher of Sambandha Munivar who composed the *Tiruyārur purāṇam* and brought it for recognition before learned men in A.D. 1592.²¹ It is reasonable to assume that Nirambavaḷagiar might therefore have flourished in the first half of the sixteenth century.

Now for a few biographical details. Nirambavaḷagiar was born in *Tirumaṇaikkāḍu* in a Śaiva veḷāḷa family. He studied Tamil and Sanskrit and received instruction in the principles of Śaiva Siddhānta from Kamalai Jñānaprakāśar. Besides his commentaries on the Siddhiyār and *Tiruvārūṭṭayan*, Nirambavaḷagiar has also other works to his credit. Mention may be made of the *Tiruparaṅgiri purāṇam*, *Sethu purāṇam* and *Guru Jñānasambandhar mālai*. Of these the Sethu purāṇam is held in great esteem by Tamil scholars.

Nirambavaḷagiar's commentary is simple and clear in language. Quotations from other Siddhānta works in Tamil, like the *Śaṅkaraṇirākaraṇam* are given to show their agreement with the particular verses commented on. Sometimes, relevant verses from the *Śivajñāna Bodham* are cited as authority. As an old commentary on the Siddhiyār, Nirambavaḷagiar's is not without interest although there is little that is striking in it.

Maraijñāna Deśikar: The editor of Aṟuvarurai says that this commentator was a Brahmin. S. Somasundara Deśikar points out that no authority is cited in support of this statement and he traces Maraijñāna Deśikar's lineage to Ānanda Vaḷḷal who was a disciple of Tirujñāna Sambandhar.²² Maraijñāna Deśikar was born in Sirkāḷi. In his comments on the first verse of the eleventh sūtra of the Siddhiyār, Maraijñāna Deśikar refers to the author of *Paramopadeśa*, as his preceptor. Maraijñānasambandhar is known to be the author of *Paramopadeśa*. He is the author of *Śaivasamayaneṟi* also, from which Maraijñāna Deśikar quotes couplets 328 & 329 while commenting on verse 13 of the Aḷavai in

20. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 20.

21. Dates & other details re: Nirambavaḷagiar, Maraijñāna Deśikar and Śivāgra yogin are taken from S. Somasundara Deśikar's *Sixteenth Century Tamil Poets*.

22. *Sixteenth Century Tamil Poets*, p. 84.

the Siddhiyār. Two other works of the same author are known²³ to have been written in A.D. 1548 & 1555 respectively. Maraijñāna Deśikar, then, could be taken to have flourished about this time.

Maraijñāna Deśikar appears to have written two commentaries on the Siddhiyār, but only one of these is now available.²⁴ He classifies commentaries into three types—urai vakai, vrtti vakai and kāṇḍigai vakai. The extant commentary of this author is of the third type.²⁵ He is also said²⁶ to have commented on works like *Patipāśu pāśappanuval* and to have written *Paramata timira-bhānu*, etc. These works have evidently not survived for, Somasundara Desikar says that nothing is known about his other works.²⁷

This commentator is well versed in Tamil and Sanskrit. His commentary contain references to the *Tolkāppiyam* and the Āgamas. At the end of each verse he mentions the Āgamas which sanction the view expressed. Maraijñāna Deśikar is invariably clear in his comments and keeps mainly to the orthodox Siddhānta standpoint. A significant variation, however, is to be noticed in respect of his espousal of Ānmānanda vāda, a doctrine set forth by his preceptor Maraijñāna Sambandhar in his work *Mutti Nilai*. This doctrine was refuted by Jñānasambandhar, the founder of Dharmai Ādhina Muṭṭi, in his *Mutti Nicchaya*.²⁸ Ānmānanda vāda maintains that the soul is inherently blissful. This bliss is thwarted by mala on the removal of which the soul is restored to its original condition of bliss.

We have an indication of Maraijñāna Deśikar's allegiance to this doctrine in his comments on the first verse of the 11th sūtra. He says, "When the soul attains the feet of Śiva it will be immersed in the bliss of its own Energy (which is svānandānubhūti), inseparably existent in the soul". He protests against rendering svānubhava as Śivānubhava and refers to Śivajñāna Bodham which speaks of 'svānubhūtimān' and also to the Āgamas and Purāṇas. For further elucidation, he refers the reader to his preceptor's

23. Sixteenth Century Tamil Poets, p. 83.

24. Aṟuvururai, Vol. III, p. 5.

25. *Ibid*, Vol. I, p. 85.

26. *Ibid*, Vol. III, p. 5.

27. Sixteenth Century Tamil Poets, p. 73.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

INTRODUCTION

work *Paramopadeśa*. However, we cannot help wishing that we had a more detailed statement from him on this matter.

Śivāgra yogin was born in a Brahmin family in Toṇḍai nāḍu. He was known as Śivakoḷundu deśikar also. He was a scholar in Tamil and Sanskrit. His religious fervour enabled him to transcend caste distinctions and so he came to be called ativarṇāśrami. He belonged to the Śūryanār Koil Ādhinam.

Sevappa Nāyakkar who ruled Tanjore for the Vijayanagar king, heard of Śivāgra yogin's greatness and called him to Tanjore. According to an oral tradition there was a philosophical contest between Śivāgra yogin and Maṇavāla māmuni who was a champion of Vaiṣṇavism. The story is that, being defeated consecutively for seventeen days, the Vaiṣṇavites set fire to Śivāgra yogin's residence on the seventeenth day. The ruler who rushed to the place the next day on hearing this news found Śivāgra yogin sitting unhurt in the midst of fire. From an investigation of Śivāgra yogin's date, S. Anavarata Vinayakam Pillai concludes²⁹ that if we accept the date given for Maṇavāla māmuni as 1370—1444, these two could not have been contemporaries.

Śivāgra yogin has referred to the Tanjore ruler in śloka five and six in his *Saiva sannyāsa paddhati*. These śloka indicate that the work was presented to the scholars of the day for the first time in 1564 A.D.³⁰ Anavarata Vinayakam Pillai quoting Jñānaprakāśar's words, 'Since the commentaries of Maraijñāna Deśikar and Śivakoḷundācāriar are elaborate' argues³¹ from the order of mention of the names that Jñānaprakāśar should have considered Maraijñāna Deśikar as the earlier of the two. This is not a conclusive proof as in Śivajñāna yogin's order of mention Śivāgra yogin comes first. It is clear that all the three commentators, Nirambaṇaḷagiār, Maraijñāna Deśikar and Śivāgra yogin, lived in the sixteenth century. The exact period of their lives not being known, speculation regarding priority will have but doubtful value. The Tanjore ruler, at the request of Śivāgra yogin, built a mutt for him in *Tiruviḷimīlalai*.

29. Śivaneṇṇiprakāśam, Introduction, p. 8.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

A list of Śivāgra yogin's works :

In Sanskrit.

1. Śaiva sannyāsa paddhati. It was written to maintain the thesis, in a dispute regarding eligibility to sannyāsa, that Śaivites, like the Smārtas are eligible for sannyāsa. It sets forth the duties of Śaiva sannyāsins.

2. Śivajñāna Bodha Saṅgraha vyākhyāna.

3. Śivāgra Bhāṣya—an elaborate commentary in 12,000 ślokas on the Śivajñāna Bodha. In this work he has refuted Śivasamvāda advocated by Aghora Śivācārya in his commentary on *Sarvajñānottara*.

4. Kriyā dīpikā.

5. Śaiva paribhāṣā.

In Tamil :

1. Śarvajñānottara—Tamil commentary.

2. Devikālottara „

3. Śrutisūktimālā „ (The original text is by Haradattācārya).

4. Śivajñāna Siddhiyār—parapakkam (not printed).

5. Śivajñāna Siddhiyār—supakkam (in maṇipravāḷa style).

6. Śivaneriprakāśam. This book was written at the request of a lady disciple of Śivāgra yogin. It consists of 215 verses and is a clear exposition of the Siddhānta.

The commentator's vast learning is evident on every page of his commentary. In style and thought, the commentary bears deep impress of his knowledge of Sanskrit. He says³² that it was at the bidding of his preceptor that he wrote the commentary. In the introductory verses he has given an account of the principles of the Siddhānta. He says that Nandi approached Śrīkaṇṭha, seated on Mount Mahāmeru, with a request that his doubts be cleared, as the Vedas and Āgamas give rise to different and con-

32. cf. 'இதற்குரை நீ செய்கவென்றெங்குருசரணரஞர் புரிதன் மறுக்கவஞ்சிக் கூறுமுரை குணமெனவே கொள்வர் நல்லோர்'

and "தருநிகருஞ் சிவஞான சித்தியுண்மைத் தரும்பொருளைக் குருவருளென் றலைமேற்கொண்டே"

flicting systems. He submitted a series of questions and had his doubts cleared.³³ Thus Śaiva Siddhānta is traced to a divine origin.

Jñānaprakāśar: The editor of *Siddhiyār Aṣuvarurai* says³⁴ that 'Jñānaprakāśar lived about three hundred years ago', *Aṣuvarurai* Vol. III, in which this mention occurs was published in 1889 and three hundred years from that date would take us to the closing decades of the sixteenth century. No authority is given for assigning this date. However this much could be said that Jñānaprakāśar must have been, at most, a younger contemporary of Maraijñāna Deśikar and Śivāgra yogin to whose commentaries he makes an explicit reference.

Jñānaprakāśar was born³⁵ in Sālivāḍīśvara nagar, Viṇāgānupuram, in Jaffna, in the family of Pāṇḍi maḷavas. He belonged to the 'Muditotta veḷālas' among Kārkāṭṭa veḷālas. Jñānaprakāśar went to Tirupugalūr where he received dīkṣā from Periya Aṇṇasāmi Gurukkaḷ who was an Ādiśaiva. From Tirupugalūr he went to Cidambaram and thence to Gauḍa Deśa. It was here that according to a story, he learned Śāstras in a rather unusual way. A Brahmin scholar was teaching Tarka (Logic), Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta to his pupils. Jñānaprakāśar attended the lectures every day from a distance. The teacher asked him if he had learnt anything by watching the classes, and tested him. Jñānaprakāśar acquitted himself so very creditably that the large-hearted teacher was pleased to take him as a regular pupil. In a year's time, Jñānaprakāśar became highly proficient and, with his preceptor's permission, came down to Tiruvaṇṇāmalai. The head of the Tiruvaṇṇāmalai ādhinam conferred sannyāsa and taught him the Śivāgamas.

Jñānaprakāśar is credited with the authorship of Pauṣkara vṛtti, Pramāṇa Dīpikā, Prasāda Dīpikā, Ajñāna vivecana, Siddhānta Sikhāmaṇi, Śivayoga sāra, Śivayoga Ratna and Śiva Samādhi Mahātmya Saṅgraha—all in Sanskrit. A tank, dug at his instance at Cidambaram, is named after him. He built a muṭṭ also near the tank.

33. Questions like the following, "Does the Universe have atoms for its cause or māyā alone or māyā controlled by Śiva?"

34. *Aṣuvarurai*, Vol. III, p. 5.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

Jñānaprakāśar says that his commentary is a short one for the benefit of those of dull understanding who cannot profit by the commentaries of Maraijñāna Deśikar and Śivāgra yogin which are elaborate and not easily understood and other commentaries (presumably, there were other commentaries besides Nirambavaḷagiar's available in his day) are far-fetched and inappropriate.³⁶

Jñānaprakāśar is called a Śivasamavādin and his commentary is an attempt to read Śivasamavāda into the Siddhiyār. Jñānaprakāśar, however, repudiates the charge that he is a Śivasamavādin, and calls himself Śuddhādvaita Śaiva Siddhāntin. A study of his commentary makes it clear that his interpretation sometimes makes a wide departure from the orthodox Siddhānta. He holds that souls at release are equal to Śiva in every respect, a view which is interesting and ably argued but totally at variance with the Siddhānta.

Śivasamavāda is of two kinds—rūpa Śivasamavāda and arūpa Śivasamavāda. Aghora Śivācārya was the founder of the latter. Jñānaprakāśar follows this doctrine and claims³⁷ support for his views in the *Kōil purāṇam* and *Tiruvāḍavūrar purāṇam*, both Tamil works.

Jñānaprakāśar's commentary called forth a short and sharp refutation from Śivajñāna yogin in a work called *Śivasamavāda urai maṟuppu*. The book is in the style traditional to controversial works. Śivajñāna yogin treats Jñānaprakāśar and his commentary with undisguised contempt and says in the preface to his refutation that 'looking for mistakes in Jñānaprakāśar's commentary is like trying to pick stones from cooked sand'.

Though Jñānaprakāśar attempts to read Śivasamavāda into the Siddhiyār, he deserves credit for following an unusual line of thought. It is unfortunate that far too many mistakes should have crept into the printed text of this interesting commentary. The commentator's style of writing is also not conducive to easy understanding.

Śivajñāna yogin or Mukkaḷaliṅgar, as he was originally called, was born in Vikramasiṅgapuram near Pāpanāsam. His parents

36. Aṟuvururai, Vol. III, pp. 5-6.

37. Aṟuvururai, pp. 1800-01. According to the first of these works mentioned, the released souls, though not the creators of the Universe, have resolves similar to the Lord's, and enjoy the perfection of lasting bliss.

were Ānandakkūṭṭa Pillai and Mayilammaiyār. There is an oral tradition that the forbears of Śivajñāna yogin had obtained a boon from Saint Agastya to have for seven generations only such sons as would be blessed with divine knowledge and that Śivajñāna yogin belonged to the seventh generation.

Śivajñāna yogin, as a boy, had the good fortune to invite some ascetics to his home and earn their blessings by his hospitality. Taking his father's permission, Śivajñāna yogin went with them to Tiruvāvaṇṭuṭṭurai. Velappa Deśīkar was favourably impressed with him, and he performed Śivadīkṣā and granted sannyāsa to him. He taught Śivajñāna yogin the Meykaṇḍa Śāstras and Paṇḍāra Śāstras. Śivajñāna yogin became very proficient in Tamil and Sanskrit. He had a number of disciples of whom Kachiappamunivar is the best known.

Śivajñāna yogin has enriched Tamil by his contribution in the spheres of philosophy, grammar and literature. He has written two commentaries on the Śivajñāna Bodham—one elaborate called the *Māpāḍiyam* and the other concise, called the *Ciṇṇurai*. He has written a brief commentary on the Siddhiyār. This commentary gives the general sense of the verses commented on together with such remarks as may be necessary for a proper understanding of the verse. Among the philosophical works he has translated from Sanskrit, mention must be made of his translation of *Annam-bhaṭṭa's Tarka Saṅgraha*, *Sarvātmaśambhu Śivācārya's Siddhānta Prakāśikā*, Appayya Dīkṣitar's *Śivatattvaviveka* and *Haradattācārya's Śloka Pañcaka*.³⁸

Besides his *Śivasamavāda urai maṇuppu* to which reference has already been made, Śivajñāna yogin has written a short work, criticising Jñānaprakāśar's interpretation of the word 'eḍuttu' which occurs in one of the invocatory stanzas of the Siddhiyār. In the course of his remarks, he refers to Śivāgra Deśīkar, Marai Jñāna Deśīkar and others as 'old commentators well-versed in Tamil and Sanskrit' and says that Jñānaprakāśar's interpretation fails to square with their interpretation. It is strange that there is no explicit reference to Nirambaḷagiār.

38. For an exhaustive list of the works of Śivajñāna yogin, refer to the *Māpāḍiyam*, pp. 27-8. The account of his life given here is based on the introduction to this work, in *Iṇṇavarurai*, published by the Śaiva Siddhānta works publishing society.

Dedicating his life at a very early age to the pursuit and propagation of spiritual learning, Śivajñāna yogin left a record of invaluable service to Śaiva Siddhānta and Tamil, at the time of his death in 1785 A.D.

Subrahmaṇya Deśikar was² born in Melagaram near Kuṟṟālam in the South in the year 1833 A.D. He came of a very old Śaiva Veļāḷa family. His father, Subrahmaṇya kavirāyar was a descendent of the famous Tirukūḍappa kavirāyar. Subrahmaṇya Deśikar's original name was Kuṟṟāla liṅgar. He began his studies in his fifth year and, according to the custom of his time, learnt Tamil, Sanskrit and Telugu. In his twelfth year, his father took him to Kalliḍaikuṟichi talikai muṭṭ which was the abode of the junior head of the Tiruvāḍuturai muṭṭ, and left him under the care of Iḷakkaṇam Ambalavāṇa Tambirān. Besides teaching him himself, the Tambirān arranged for his pupil's instruction in Sanskrit under Vedānta Śāstri who was the Sanskrit Vidvān of the muṭṭ.

The senior head of the Tiruvāḍuturai muṭṭ, during a visit to Kalliḍaikuṟichi, found Subrahmaṇya Deśikar eligible for initiation, performed jñāna dīkṣā and installed him as junior head of the muṭṭ at the young age of fourteen. Having received sound instruction in the Śāstras,³ he began to teach the pupils of the muṭṭ.

It was during the time of Subrahmaṇya Deśikar that the famous Tamil scholar, Mīnākṣisundaram Pillai was honoured with appointment as Mahāvidvān of the muṭṭ. At the request of his pupils, Subrahmaṇya Deśikar wrote word-meaning for the verses of the Siddhiyār, following closely Śivajñāna yogin's commentary. In course of time, he became senior head of the muṭṭ.

In recognition of Śivajñāna yogin's signal services to Siddhānta and Tamil, Subrahmaṇya Deśikar acquired the house of the former, installed his image and arranged for daily worship. When he was on a visit to Sucindram muṭṭ, Āyilyam Tirunāl Mahārāja of Travancore invited him to Trivandrum. Deśikar stayed as a state guest for some days and when he started back for his place, received several tokens of royal esteem. The Mahārāja accompanied him for some distance before bidding him farewell. The respect shown by this ruler did not cease with him. His successor, Viśāgam Tirunāl Mahārāja visited Subrahmaṇya Deśikar, on his way back from Benares and presented him with the holy water of the Ganges, elephants, etc.

Subrahmanya Deśikar was a patron of learning. He was always surrounded by Tamil and Sanskrit scholars. They received besides his ready appreciation of their scholarship, many gifts from him.

Before we close this account, a reference may be made to two modern commentaries on the Siddhiyār, one by Tiruviḷaṅgam and another by Muthia Pillai. These commentators have had the benefit of studying all the old commentaries and have given us easily readable commentaries of their own.

CHAPTER II

AḷAVAI (Epistemology)

Referring to the age of the systems of Indian Philosophy, Professor Hiriyanna says, "In fact, the several systems which develop now do not set about investigating their proper subject until they have given us what may be described as a critique of knowledge and considered how we come by truth. In other words, Indian Philosophy becomes self-conscious at this stage; and Logic emerges as an explicit branch of it."¹ Śaiva Siddhānta also, like the other systems of Indian Philosophy, gives a critique of knowledge before it proceeds to study the objects of valid knowledge.

The basic text on Śaiva Siddhānta, the *Śivajñāna Bodham* has no chapter on Epistemology. This omission is understandable in a work which is a brief exposition of the Siddhānta in cryptic language and which presupposes a teacher. In the *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār* which was written by Aruṇandi in obedience to the command of his preceptor Meykaṇḍār that the principles set forth in the *Bodham* should be explained in detail, we have an elaborate treatment of all the important subjects connected with the Siddhānta, and the first among them is the Siddhānta's account of the means of valid knowledge.

The epistemological section of the *Siddhiyār* is known as *Aḷavai*,—literally that which is known by measurement.² We measure and know the several material things by counting them or weighing them or by finding their volume or determining their length. So also, we must find out by what means we can get valid knowledge of the three eternal categories, pati, paśu and pāśa. Besides, as Śivāgra yogin says,³ to interpret the verses

1. Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 177.

2. அளவை என்பது அளந்தறியப்படுமது. Aḷavai is the Tamil equivalent for pramāṇa.

3. Śivāgra yogin quotes the following verse to show the need for epistemological enquiry.

இராகமறியார் இசைப்பயன் தாமறியார்
தராதரமறியார் சற்காரியமறியார்
ஓரார் அளவை ஒருபயனுந்தாமறியார்
ஆராய்ந்தளவை அறிந்து கொளீரே.

of the *Siddhiyār* properly, we have to depend on rules and laws acceptable to reason and logic as set forth in the *Aḷavai*.

How can it be said that God may be known by Logic⁴ also when in one of the prefatory verses of the *Siddhiyār*, it was said that He is beyond everything, the Scriptures no less than Logic?⁵ The contradiction here is only apparent. What the *Siddhāntin* means is that while without God's grace neither the Scriptures nor Logic can help us to find God, illumined by His Grace we come to know Him from the Scriptures and also by Logic. The *Siddhāntin* feels the need for Logic in addition to Revelation in the case of dull pupils who are likely to be confused by works of other faiths and who fail to grasp the fundamentals of the *Siddhānta*. Reasoning is necessary not only to support one's own conclusion but also to examine and refute the conclusions of other schools of philosophy. The author of the *Siddhiyār*, before beginning the exposition of the *Siddhānta* in the *Supakkam*, has devoted two hundred and ninety six verses in the *Parapakkam* to the statement and refutation of fourteen systems ranging from the *Cārvāka* to the *Pāñcarātra*. Besides, mere listening to Scriptural truths does not bring about religious experience. One has to *listen* first to the truths set forth in the Scriptures, *reflect* on them, get a *clear grasp* of them, and *practise meditation*. Thus it will be seen that epistemological enquiry plays a prominent part in this discipline.⁶

Maraijñāna Deśikar quotes another verse in the same strain from a work entitled *Aḷavai Viḷakkam*.

பண்ணிலாற்கில்லாத பட்டிற் பயம்போன்றும்
கண்ணிலாற் கில்லாக் கவின்போன்றும்—எண்ணில்லா
அஞ்சொலனவை வறியாதவற்கில்லை
செஞ்சொலனவின் சிறப்பு.

The verses quoted from this work in other contexts are in the same simple and clear language. This work is evidently lost now, for it is not to be found either in print or in manuscript.

4. அருளிஞல் ஆகமத்தே அறியலாம் அளவினாலும் தெருளாம்
prefatory verse 4.
5. மறையினால் அயனால் மாலால் மனத்தினால் வாக்கால் மற்றும்
குறைவிலா அளவினாலும் கூடுறாதாகி நின்ற
இறைவனார் கமலபாதம்..... prefatory verse 5.
6. cf Māpāḍiyam, p. 303 also
“இறைவனையும் இறைவனாயிம்பு நூலும் சுண்டளவும்
.....துகள் தீர சொல்லகிற்பாம்.”

Siddhiyār parapakkam, verse 1.

What are the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇas)? Some recognise six—pratyakṣa, anumāna, śabda, upamāna, arthāpatti and abhāva. Some add four more to these—pariśeṣa, sambhava, aitihya, and sahaṇa or svabhāva liṅga. All these, according to the Siddhāntin may be reduced to the first three viz., pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda. Śivāgra yogin is the only commentator who gives a detailed account of the way in which these ten pramāṇas⁷ can be reduced to three. He argues that upon a final analysis, even these three can be reduced to one viz., cit-śakti (Intelligence Energy).⁸

Quoting the *Paṇḍara Āgama*, Śivāgra yogin says that cit-śakti which is free from doubt, error and remembrance is the sole pramāṇa. Pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda are auxiliaries which help to illumine things and so are *derivately* called pramāṇas. The general nature of cit-śakti consists in attending to such of the things presented as it likes; ignoring those it does not like, and being indifferent to those others which it neither likes nor dislikes.

The Naiyāyikas say that that is a pramāṇa which while, being either an instrument or a locus of valid knowledge is pervaded by valid knowledge. This view is not sound because this will

7. *Pramāṇas* recognised by the followers of the several systems :

i. Lokāyata	...	Pratyakṣa			
ii. Bauddha & Vaiśeṣika	...	„	&	anumāna	
iii. Sāṅkhya	...	„	&	„	& śabda
iv, Naiyāyikas	...	„	&	„	& upamāna
v, Arhata & Prabhākara	...	„	&	„	& arthāpatti
vi. Bhāṭṭa & Vedāntin	...	„	&	„	& abhāva
vii. Paurāṇika	...	„	&	„	& sambhava & aitihya

This is the classification according to Maraijñāna Deśikar. Śivāgra yogin adds pariśeṣa & svabhāvaliṅga to the eight pramāṇas recognised by the Paurāṇikas.

8. There is no mention of cit-śakti as pramāṇa in the other commentaries. We have a reference to cit-śakti in the *Māpāḍiyam* (p. 414) where Śivajñāna yogin says: "The soul is the pramāta (knower), its intelligence which is Intelligence Energy is the pramāṇa and the knowledge gained is pramiti. While it (the soul) is under the influence of 'asat', it has pratyakṣa, anumāna and āgama (which are all pāśa jñāna and which are different from it), as its manifestor. When it comes under the influence of sat, Śivajñāna which exists non-different from it is its manifestor. Hence pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda as well as Śivajñāna are figuratively said to be the pramāṇa.

involve acceptance of the sense of sight and the lamp also as *pramāṇas*. The usage "I see with my eyes" is current because the sense of sight is an auxiliary. Only that in the absence of which there is no valid knowledge can be *pramāṇa*. The sense of sight cannot make such a claim. Each sense performs a distinctive function and it cannot perform the functions of the other senses. The eyes, for example, cannot hear. Since senses do not have the capacity to apprehend anything other than their own respective objects, some thing capable of apprehending everything should be recognised. Such is *cit-śakti* and hence that alone is *pramāṇa*.

It may be said that *buddhi* (intellect) could be taken as *pramāṇa* since it synthesises all cognitions. But this is to forget that *buddhi*, being material, is not different from the several senses. Further, *buddhi* is known as an object because of its forms of happiness and misery. What is an object of knowledge cannot be the means of valid knowledge too.

A claim may be made on behalf of the causal aggregate, beginning with *pramāta* (knower) including internal and external organs and ending with *prameya* (what is known). If this claim is admitted, then the empirical usage of knower, known, etc. treating them as distinct, loses its meaning. So, the causal aggregate cannot be the *pramāṇa*.

But, it may be asked, does not the *Siddhāntin* himself obliterate the distinction between *pramāṇa*, *pramāta* and *prameya*? If, as he says, the self is of the form of intelligence, then *pramāṇa*, *pramāta* and *prameya* are all none other than the self. The *Siddhāntin* replies: *cit-śakti* turned towards objects and defined by *vidyā* and *rāga* (*tattvas*) is only *pramāṇa*; it is not *pramāta*. When, freed from defilement, *cit-śakti* turns on the Lord, it is *pramāta*, not *pramāṇa*.

Śivāgra yogin proceeds to say that in the last resort, even *jīva cit śakti* (the Intelligence Energy of the finite self) cannot be the *pramāṇa*. As *jīva cit-śakti* cannot know *Śiva* and *Śivajñāna* alone illumines both objects and *Śiva*, there is the defect of non-pervasion (*avyāpti*) for *jīva cit-śakti*. Again, *Śivajñāna* alone illumines both objects and *Śiva*; hence *Śiva* is not a *prameya* for *jīva cit-śakti*. On the principle that the *māna* is that which is not *meya*, *Śiva* too would be *māna*; hence there is the defect of over-pervasion (*ativyāpti*). As, *jīva cit-śakti* by itself cannot

know Śiva, there is the defect of inapplicability (*asambhava*). The defect of inapplicability arises in another way also. Though the soul is eternal, pervasive and of the nature of intelligence, even after the removal of its impurity, it cannot know itself, the Lord and the *pāśa* (bonds), unless it is informed by Śivajñāna. As *jīva cit-śakti* is subject to the defects of non-pervasion, over-pervasion and inapplicability, we have to consider Śiva *cit-śakti* alone to be the sole *pramāṇa* for the soul, alike in its bound and free states. Śivāgra yogin quotes the *Paṇḍara* to the effect that informed by Śiva *cit-śakti*, which illuminates like the sun, the soul knows Śiva, His Energy, itself and the bonds.

The Siddhāntin's position may be stated thus: *pramāṇa* may be viewed under two aspects; *pramāṇa* that is helped and *pramāṇa* that helps; *pramāṇa* that is helped has removable defilement. Therefore it is *jīva cit-śakti* which is favoured with the grace of Śiva. The *pramāṇa* that helps is Śiva *cit-śakti*, which is engaged in removing the defilement that veils the soul's *cit-śakti*.

Having established *cit-śakti*⁹ as the sole *pramāṇa*, Śivāgra yogin proceeds to show that as its auxiliaries, three *pramāṇas* are required. He examines the contention of the Bauddhas that *śabda* is not necessary and only two *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* should be accepted. The Bauddhas say that that cognition is valid, the objective content of which gives rise to fruitful and not futile

9. *Cit-śakti* admits of comparison up to a point with the Advaitin's *sākṣin*. Cf. the following: "The *sākṣin* which is the psychical element is always present like an ever-luminous lamp, the enduring and changeless element in experience which does not cease to be even in deep sleep. It is individual and determinate, being determined by reference to the particular internal organ with which for the time being it is associated. It is accordingly termed *jīva sākṣin*". Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 360. A cosmic *sākṣin* or absolute consciousness (*Īśvara-Sākṣin*) which sustains everything that is, is also postulated. But the final position of the Advaitin is that *jīva* and *Īśvara* are non-different from Brahman and, he has no sympathy with a system like the Siddhānta (or the Sāṅkhya) which recognises a plurality of *puruṣas*. His position is summed up thus: The difference of bodies cannot be the ground for assuming a difference in selves. The bodies are products of nescience; and because of being conditioned by them there appear to be many *jīvas*. But in reality, there is only one self which is not different from Brahman. See T. M. P. Mahadevan, *The Philosophy of Advaita*, pp. 184.

Cf. the following: "The word (*Sākṣin*) means "witness" or a disinterested looker-on. The conception is thus relative; and the *sākṣin as such* is no therefore Brahman" *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 342.

activity. Valid knowledge is the cognition that does not fail to accord. Hence they say śabda cannot be considered as pramāṇa. Śivāgra yogin points out that the standard of valid knowledge set up by the Bauddhas is unsound as it is vitiated by the defect of non-pervasion in respect of inferences whose contents are in the past and future. In the case of the past and future, there is at no time the awareness of practical efficiency, e.g. "This river is in floods because of previous rainfall". Here we see the floods but not the previous rainfall. There is the defect of over-pervasion also since in smṛti-jñāna (memory cognition) and savikalpaka jñāna (determinate perception) rejected by them, there is practical efficiency. He gives another reason also. He says that as the Āgamas gives us knowledge of the existence of words below and beyond this one, not available through the other pramāṇas, they must be treated as an independent pramāṇa.

The Lokāyata says that pratyakṣa alone should be accepted as pramāṇa. Śivāgra yogin says that in the *Parapakkam* of the *Siddhiyār*, It was shown that the statements of Lokāyata like 'The soul is compounded of four elements' are all based on inference and not perception. Besides, New Moon Day and Eclipses are known only by means of verbal testimony. So, he concludes that we must accept, besides perception, inference and verbal testimony also.

Having shown the necessity for three pramāṇas, Śivāgra yogin proceeds to show how the other seven may be subsumed under these. The Naiyāyika says that upamāna also must be considered as an independent pramāṇa. A town-dweller, desirous of knowing what gavaya is, is told that that it is like a cow. When he sees later an animal in a forest resembling a cow, he knows it is a gavaya.¹⁰

10. This is the Naiyāyika's view of upamāna. The Advaitin's objection to it is that finding the denotation of the word gavaya in objects resembling a cow may be treated either as a case of inference or as a case of verbal testimony. According to the Advaitin there is in upamāna, the following process. The town dweller who is told that a gavaya resembles a cow goes to a forest, finds a gavaya resembling a cow. And then he compares the cow with the gavaya and knows that the former resembles the latter. This knowledge results from upamāna. The Advaitin's position is stated thus: it is only the knowledge of the similarity to the gavaya that is present in the cow through the instrumentality of the knowledge of the similarity to the cow which is present in the gavaya that constitutes upamiti prama. *The Philosophy of Advaita* p. 40.

This knowledge cannot be had by the other three *pramāṇas*. Hence *upamāna* must be accepted in addition to them. The *Siddhāntin* argues that this could be reduced to *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*. When he says 'This (*gavaya*) is similar to a cow', it is *pratyakṣa* because it is made possible by it. Again, when we say 'That is similar to this', it is *anumāna* and can be represented thus: 'That is similar to this, since it is the counter-correlate of similarity present in this: that which is the counter-correlate of similarity present in something is similar to that, like what is admitted (by both of us)'.¹¹ Or if it be the ascertainment of a thing denoted by words, because of the recognition of that thing after hearing words about it (e.g., from the forest-dweller), it is really subsumable under verbal testimony. Thus, *upamāna* is not an independent *pramāṇa*.

The *Prabhākaras* say *arthāpatti* must be recognised as an independent *pramāṇa*. *Arthāpatti* is the assumption we make to render intelligible that which by perception alone is unintelligible¹² Some one does not take food during day; yet we see him fat. This is not intelligible unless we assume that the man eats in the night. The *Siddhāntin* does not accept this argument.¹³ He says that *arthāpatti* can be included under *vyatireki anumāna* (inference from negative concomitance).

Devadatta eats in the night

because he is fat though he does not eat in the day.

He who does not eat at all either in the day or the night
cannot be fat

like the man who fasts a whole month.

11. Śaiva-Bhāṣa (translation by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. Unpublished MS.).

12. *Arthāpatti* is of two kinds, *drṣṭarthāpatti* (presumption from what is seen) and *śrutarthāpatti* (presumption from what is heard). What is explained above is a case of the former. As for the latter, the *advaitin* gives the following example "The knower of self crosses sorrow". The host of bondage which is indicated by the word 'sorrow' is determined to be illusory, since nothing which is real is removable by knowledge'. The Philosophy of Advaita, p. 41.

13. The *Pauṣkara Bhāṣya* is for recognising *arthāpatti* as an independent *pramāṇa*.

Another example of *arthāpatti* is the following. If we say of some people in a village that they are charitable, it can be presumed that there are others who are not charitably disposed.

This man is fat

Therefore this man is not one who does not eat at all
i.e., he is one who eats in the night.

And again,

He who eats must do so either by day or night

He does not eat by day

Therefore, he eats by night.

The Bhāṭṭas (and also the Vedāntins) say that in addition to five *pramāṇas* recognised by the Prabhākaras, *abhāva* or *anupālabdhi* (negation or non-apprehension) must also be recognised as a separate *pramāṇa*. Negation is knowledge got from the absence of the object. Absence or non-existence is of four kinds.¹⁴

- i. *Prāghabhāva* (antecedent non-existence or prior negation)
Before the pot is made, when clay alone exists.

This negation is beginningless but comes to an end when the pot is made.

- ii. *Dhvamsābhāva* (subsequent non-existence or posterior negation)

This negation has a beginning but is endless as the same jar will never come into existence again.

- iii. *Atyantābhāva* (absolute non-existence or total negation)
When there is the bare ground with no jar on it.

Though temporal, for certain technical reasons, this is considered eternal.

- iv. *Anyonyābhāva* (mutual negation).

The pot is not cloth. A is not B.

This is really a matter of difference (*bheda*) between two objects. It is eternal, as per the Law of Identity.

14. Maraijñāna Deśikar mentions the following five kinds :

- (i) The hare has no horns—*atyantābhāva*.

(ii) No lies are to be found in the utterances of great men—negation of the non-existent (இல்லதன் அபாவம்).

- (iii) The jar is not cloth }
The cloth is not jar } *anyonyābhāva*

(iv) The elephant is not to be seen in the shed—negation of the existent, (உள்ளதன் அபாவம்).

(v) When the jar is broken, it ceases to exist—*dhvamsābhāva*. The first two may be treated as one. If we mean by the second that great people never utter lies, it is the same as the first. We do not find *Prāghabhāva* in this list.

Abhāva is a specific pramāṇa by which negation, not nothing is known, e.g., the absence of a jar or atoms somewhere. Like the Naiyāyikas, the Bhāṭṭas admit negative facts. But unlike the Naiyāyikas, they claim that there is need for an independent pramāṇa to know them. Abhāva means only the negation of something somewhere, not absolute nothing.

Anupalabdhi means 'absence of apprehension'. As knowledge obtained by the other pramāṇas points to the existence (bhāva) of objects, absence of knowledge indicates their non-existence (abhāva), other conditions being the same. Absence to be taken as indicative of non-existence must be aided by the mental presentation of the relevant object and also the knowledge that the object, if present, should be cognised, tho other conditions being favourable.¹⁵

Non-existence cannot be apprehended by pratyakṣa which stands in need of sense-contact with the object. It cannot be apprehended by any other pramāṇa. Hence anupalabdhi or abhāva must be recognised as an independent pramāṇa.

The Siddhāntin does not agree with this view. He says anupalabdhi can be brought under pratyakṣa. By the contact of the eyes with space we say that this place has the absence of a pot, thus predicating a distinguishing attribute. Seeing the place so characterised we say there is no pot here. Absence of pot is the attribute predicated; the place as devoid of the pot is the thing of which the attribute is predicated. Thus, by perceiving the place alone we have a knowledge of the absence of the pot. So, there is no necessity for abhāva as a separate pramāṇa as it could be included under pratyakṣa.

One commentator¹⁶ says that anupalabdhi can be included either under pratyakṣa or anumāna. He classifies negation as (i) of what is perceivable by the senses and (ii) of what is not perceivable by the senses. To the first class belongs the non-existence of objects like the pot. To the second class belongs the negation of things not present to the senses, like the atoms. This can be brought under anumāna. Either way, there is no need for a separate pramāṇa.

15. Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp. 321-2.

16. Maraijñāna Deśīkar.

The Paurāpikas say that pariśeṣa, sambhava and svabhāva liṅga are also independent pramāṇas. The Siddhāntin examines each one of them and shows how they too could be brought under the three recognised by him.

Pariśeṣa (elimination) is but anumāna. When we say that Bhīma killed Kīcaka, it is because we know that Bhīma, Kīcaka, Śalya and Jarāsandha are men of equal might and because we know that neither Śalya nor Jarāsandha was present, Bhīma alone could be responsible for Kīcaka's death. This can be represented inferentially thus:¹⁷

Kīcaka, having the might of a thousand elephants, can be killed only by men of equal might.

Bhīma, Śalya and Jarāsandha are the only three equal in might to him.

Therefore, Kīcaka can be killed only by one of these three.

Again,

Bhīma or Śalya or Jarāsandha could have killed Kīcaka.

Śalya and Jarāsandha were not present.

Therefore, Bhīma alone could have killed Kīcaka.

Sambhava (subsumption) is cognising a part from a whole of which it is a member.¹⁸ It is the certitude of the existence of a hundred in a thousand since a hundred is included in a thou-

17. Maraijāna Deśīkar gives an example bearing on the Siddhānta. The cause of the Universe is neither māyā nor karma nor ātman. If so much is known, then by elimination, we can say that Śiva is the cause of the Universe. But this knowledge can be got by inference also by adducing the reason that māyā and karma, being material (jaḍa) and ātman, being incapable of knowing by itself, Śiva alone is the cause. Cf. the following also:

சீராரொழிபென்று செப்பப்படுவது திண்புவிமேல்
போராடிகின்ற பொருதாரிருவர்தம் போர்க்களத்துப்
பாராரி ராகவன் வென்றனென்றன் பரிசுழிந்து
நேராமிராவணன் தோற்றல் சொல்லா மனிகழ்வதுவே.

18. Sambhava is also taken to be the indication of things or of the way in which things function: It is the nature of wind to blow, of fire to burn, of water to wet or cool and of earth to be firm.

துயக்கற்ற வுண்மையென நாவலர்கள் துணிந்துரைப்ப
தியற்கைப் பொருளின யிற்றெனலாமிது தானுரைக்கின்
இயக்குற்ற கால்சலிக்குந் தீச்சுடு நீரது குளிரும்
வயக்குற்ற மண்வலி தென்றுபட்டாங்கு வழங்குவதுவே.

sand. As this certitude is generated by the inseparable connection between a thousand and a hundred, it is but (deductive) inference. It is strictly numerical inclusion. So, there is no need to make this a separate pramāṇa.

Aitiḥya¹⁹ (tradition) may be said to be a separate pramāṇa. Knowledge got from tradition is said to be unattainable through the other means of knowledge, e.g., 'There is a ghost on this banian tree'. Śivāgra yogin says that though this knowledge can be got neither by pratyakṣa nor by anumāna, yet since it is what is heard, it can be brought under śabda. Dividing tradition into valid and invalid, Maraijñāna Deśikar says that if it comes from reliable elders, it is really śabda. If it is not provable by pratyakṣa or anumāna or śabda, it is invalid. Thus, if invalid, it is no pramāṇa at all; and if valid, it is subsumable under śabda.

Svabhāvaliṅga is the natural meaning of words. What is natural in the context will constitute the meaning of a word rather than those other meanings which the word in question is capable of bearing. If, for example, a horse-rider, sitting on the back of a horse wants a stick (கோல்) he means not an ordinaty stick but a horse-whip.²⁰ Śivāgra yogin says that svabhāvaliṅga is a case of inference of the positively and negatively concomitant type. The word 'tēma' (தேமா) usually means a mango tree. When it is not used of a tree, it cannot be taken to denote a mango-tree—like a stone. Maraijñāna Deśikar says that because knowledge in the case of svabhāvaliṅga is brought about by determining the meaning of words (presumably with reference to objects), it is to be brought under pratyakṣa.

Thus, the Siddhāntin shows how the ten pramāṇas can be reduced to three. While no strong case for independence is made out in the case of pariśeṣa, sambhava, aitiḥya and svabhāvaliṅga, two influential schools, Bhāṭṭas and Vedāntins argue for the acceptance of upamāna, arthāpatti and abhāva. While the author

19. கொன்பயில் வேலைக்கடல் புடைதழுங் குவலயத்தோர்
அன்புடன் ஆலில் அலகையுண்டென்பர்கள் என்பதும்
மின்பயில் புற்றில் விடநாக முண்டென்பரென்பதும்
அன்பொடுசேரு நன்னுவலர் தாமைதிகமென்பரே.

20. மாமேலிருந்தொரு கோல்தாவெனிற் சுள்ளிக்கோல்தரலும்
தாமேலிருந்தொரு கோல்தாவெனிற் றுணியோடுசென்று
பூமேவு கண்ணெழுதுங் கோல் கொடுத்தலும் பூதலத்தில்
தாமேவியல்பென்று கூறுவர் தக்கசொன்னுவலரே.

of the *Siddhiyār* is ready to concede that there are some who recognise even more than ten *pramāṇas*,²¹ his contention is that the ten could be reduced to three, without any violent distortion in the process, as has been shown in the foregoing pages. After all, even these three are only auxiliaries to the single *pramāṇa* that could be accepted upon a final analysis, viz., *cit-śakti*.

The *Siddhāntin* proceeds to indicate briefly the nature of the three *pramāṇas* he accepts, before taking them up for detailed consideration. *Pratyakṣa* is the cognitive faculty of the soul which starting with indeterminate preception arrives at a knowledge of things directly—a knowledge which is free from doubt and error. *Anumāna* is the cognitive faculty of the soul which by observing the invariable concomitance of two things concludes from the knowledge of the presence of (only) one of them that the other also is there, though not present to the senses. All the objects of the material universe can thus be known either by *pratyakṣa* or *anumāna*. But how are we to know what lies beyond the confines of the material universe? The *Siddhāntin* says that we know of such things from the *āptas* (trustworthy persons). The greatest of the *āptas* is Lord Śiva Who has given us *Āgamas* to enlighten us about what lies beyond the ken of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*. Śivajñāna yogin remarks that cognising through the *Āgamas* what can be had by *pratyakṣa* or *anumāna* is pointless.

We shall now take up these *pramāṇas* for a detailed consideration. *Pratyakṣa* is differentiated by its nature into valid perception and invalid perception.²² Valid perception is twofold—(i) indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) and (ii) determinate (*savikalpa*). Indeterminate perception is, perhaps, a little above the state of awareness which a new born child has. It arises, says Śivāgra yogin, when cognition takes place without the aid of *buddhi* but with the aid of *vidyā tattva*. When we know the bare existence of a thing without noticing its features, we have indeterminate perception. But we must be careful to understand by indetermi-

21. அவையிறநின் மேலுமறைவர் *Siddhiyār*, Aḥavai, 1.

22. Invalid perception may be due either to doubt or error in cognition. Due to some common quality in two things, we may be led into taking one of them for the other (see section on error).

Śivāgra yogin says that cognition by remembrance also must be included under invalid perception. He gives as an example the presence (by remembrance) of the beloved to the eyes of the lover when she is really not there. But Śivajñāna yogin says that as memory cognition, does not occur in perceptive cognition it should not be included thereunder.

nate perception not something which is totally devoid of features present in determinate perception. Here, the perception of features noticed explicitly in determinate perception is in a nascent state. If this fact is forgotten, not only is the Siddhāntin guilty of believing in the psychological myth of bare perception but also guilty, as Jñānaprakāśar points out, of giving up his adherence to sātākāryavāda. Determinate perception consists in determining the name of the thing we perceive, the class to which it belongs, its property, its function and its worth.²³ Thus, determinate perception analyses and explicates instead of adding to indeterminate perception.

We have four types²⁴ of valid perception. (i) Indriya pratyakṣa (sense-perception), (ii) mānasa pratyakṣa (mental perception), (iii) self consciousness (svavedana pratyakṣa) and (iv) yoga pratyakṣa (super-normal intuition). Prameya (objects of knowledge) may be viewed under two aspects: asādhāraṇa lakṣaṇa (special nature) and sādharmaṇa lakṣaṇa (general nature).

Proceeding on the principle that the less elaborate of two things may be explained first, the Siddhāntin considers objects of knowledge before taking up the four types of pratyakṣa.

The special nature of a thing consists in a thing persisting in its own unique essence without so much as sharing in the nature of the class of objects to which it belongs.²⁵ It is judged by itself, not with reference to anything else. A cow of a certain colour, say brown, not only differs from animals like buffaloes, horses, etc., but also from cows which are of its class but are of other colours. This difference of an object, both from objects of other classes and from objects of its own class, constitutes its special nature. When we speak of the general nature of a brown

23. Śivāgra yogin gives the following example: mango tree; name-mango tree; it belongs to the class, 'tree'; its properties are its colour, shape etc; its function is the swaying of branches in a gust of wind, giving forth fruits, flowers etc. Its worth is what it will fetch when sold.

24. The Āgamas speak of three types only. Svavedana pratyakṣa can be brought under mānasa pratyakṣa and thus four could be reduced to three.

25. Śivāgra yogin characterises the special nature of a thing as that which is free from non-pervasion (property not pervading a part of the substance), from over-pervasion (property overreaching the substance) and from total inapplicability (property not being applicable to the substance at all).

cow, we refer to certain essential features it shares with other cows, features distinguishing cows as a class from other animals. Śivajñāna yogin insists that this distinction should be borne in mind, for any classification not based on it will be invalid.

Indriya pratyakṣa—Starting from the self which is turned towards itself, cit-śakti which is directed towards objects cognises them without doubt, error and qualifications such as name, class, etc.²⁶ This indeterminate perception is sense-perception.²⁷ In this process, cit-śakti acts as the substrate of the senses like the eye, of the elements like fire which are the support of the sense and of the tanmātras like rūpa which are indispensable to the elements.

Because of differences among the objects of cognition the relation of sense to objects is of six kinds:²⁸

- i. Samyoga (conjunction)—the cognition of an object as pot etc., is from mere contact of the sense of sight with object—it is the conjunction of two separate objects. It is direct.
- ii. Samyukta-samavāya (Inherence in the conjoined). From inherence in the conjoined there is the cognition of its generality or its quality, e.g., 'blue' in the pot. The 'blue' is inherent as the colour of the pot which is conjoined with the eye. The relation here is indirect.
- iii. Samyukta-samaveta-samavāya (Inherence in what is inherent in the conjoined). There is the cognition of quality-ness (blueness of the blue pot). Here there is rela-

26. Reading the relevant line of *Siddhiyār* as செயிரின்றி விகற்பமோடு instead of செயிரெட்டு விகற்பமின்றி, Śivāgra yogin says that sense-perception consists in cit-śakti acting with its auxiliaries, cognising objects as free from doubt, error and remembrance but as qualified by name, class etc.

27. Maraijñāna Deśīkar classifies sense-perception into general (sāmānya) and particular (viśeṣa). In the former, the sense-datum is taken in its continuum and as an aggregate; in the latter it is analysed into discrete particulars. This seems to be merely another way of phrasing differently the distinction into indeterminate and determinate.

28. Tiruviḷāṅgam say that though the Siddhāntins are not in favour of this classification, this finds a place in the commentaries of Maraijñāna Deśīkar and Śivāgra yogin because it is espoused by some other schools. Maraijñāna Deśīkar after quoting verses in Tamil from the *Paṭi Paṣu Pāṣappanuval* refers the reader to the *Paṣṣkara Āgama*.

tion between the eye and the qualityness. The relation here is still more indirect.

- iv. Samavāya (Inherence) The cognition of sound is through inherence in the sense of hearing—here there is relation between the ear and the sound.
- v. Samaveta-Samavāya (Inherence in what is inherent). The 'soundness' of sound is cognised through an indirect relation between the sense of hearing and the quality of 'soundness'.
- vi. Viśeṣaṇa—viśeṣyabhāva or viśeṣanatā (qualification and the qualified) non-existence of a particular object in a particular locus is perceived through the relation of the sense with what is adjectival to the locus, with which the senses have direct conjunction. Non-existence then is known as adjectival to the locus.²⁹

The Siddhāntin does not accept this classification as it is based on the view that perception is generated solely by the contact of the sense with object. He holds that without the presence of cit-śakti, mere contact between sense and object is futile. Being enveloped by mala, cit-śakti abides in itself alone. When kalā, etc., remove the obscuration partially, in conjunction with vidyā, rāga and buddhi, it turns towards objects and through the channel of the senses, enters into commerce with objects. This, according to the Siddhāntin, is the proper explanation.

Mānasa pratyakṣa arises when cit-śakti, with the aid of buddhi, reflects upon objects presented by faultless senses and established beyond the possibility of forgetting. Now the objects are cognised with their properties, etc., *Mānasa pratyakṣa* is determinate.

Svavedana pratyakṣa: When, directed by the five tattvas (viz., rāga, vidyā, niyati, kāla and kalā), experienceable pleasure and pain become objects of knowledge to the intelligence of the self, then, svavedana pratyakṣa (self-consciousness) arises. The determinate knowledge obtained through mānasa pratyakṣa becomes pleasure when it unites with sattva and pain when it unites with tamas. These experiences lead us to say, "I enjoy", "I suffer", etc. We have therein a case of self-consciousness. Neither sense nor internal organs are required for this cognition. Vidyā tattva

29. Datta—Six ways of Knowing, p. 105.

is the instrument which helps cit-śakti in cognising this experience which occurs in buddhi.³⁰

Yoga pratyakṣa: When, subjecting ourselves to the eightfold yogic discipline, we succeed in removing the impurities that cover the intelligence of our souls, though we exist in a particular place and time, we can know things existing everywhere and events of the past and the future no less than those of the present. This experience, unlimited by conditions of space and time, is yogic perception. The cit-śakti of the self is, by its nature and in its essence all knowing; but because of the bonds limiting and obscuring its intelligence, its range of knowledge is very limited. When Śiva's Śakti and tattvas like kalā remove partially the obscurity enveloping the soul, it has indriya, mānasa and svavedana pratyakṣa. The real nature of the self and the range of its intelligence are known only in yoga pratyakṣa whereby it becomes a spectator of all time and a dweller in all space.

Pratyakṣa then stands not merely for the perception of external objects but also for super-normal experiences possible to human beings. The Siddhāntin thus makes pratyakṣa very comprehensive in its scope.³¹

Anumāna:

Anumāna is the cognition of a mediate object through the ascertainment of concomitance. It is the ascertainment of the pervasion (vyāpti) of the pakṣa by the sādhyā (probandum). Hetu is of three types—iyalpu hetu, kārya hetu and anupalabdhi hetu.

30. Māpāḍiyam, p. 189.

31. Śivāgra yogin distinguishes yoga pratyakṣa also as indeterminate and determinate. The former is of the nature of the experience of blissful wisdom. The latter consists in knowing the entire pattern of things spread out in the regions above and below ours, as well as our own; in knowing the events of the past, present and the future. He reminds us once again in this connection that cit-śakti alone can be the pramāṇa.

Jñānaprakāśar mentions the five psychic states (jāgrata etc.) especially with reference to Śivayoga. In the final state of turiyātita, attained after arduous discipline, That which is not open to the ordinary means of cognition is intuited in an intimate way. Maraijñāna Deśikar points out that as intuition of the form of the self (svasamvedana) and of the Lord (svasamvedya which is Śivānubhūti which though intensely felt by the experiencer cannot be explained to others) are matters of immediate perception to the self they are included under pratyakṣa.

The sādhyā (probandum) is proved (in the pakṣa) if it also pervades the hetu (probans).

Anumāna is of two types: svārthānumāna (inference for oneself) and parārthānumāna (inference for another).³² Svārthānumāna is the ascertainment, of concomitance between the hetu and the sādhyā, by the agent himself without being told so by others and the application of this concomitance to the pakṣa when he sees the hetu there, thus inferring that the pakṣa has the sādhyā. Demonstrating to oneself the existence of Śiva, e.g., is svārthānumāna. Parārthānumāna is the explicit statement of the pakṣa, hetu etc., so that others may come to the same conclusion as oneself. The preceptor may impart to his pupils the knowledge that Śiva, souls and pāśa exist, through this type of anumāna, Parārthānumāna is stated as a five-membered syllogism and is of two types—*anvaya-vyāpti anumāna* (positive concomitance inference) and *vyatireka-vyāpti anumāna* (negative concomitance inference).

While the Siddhāntin has the highest respect for reasoning (Logic), it is worthy of note that he realises its limitations as well as its legitimate functions. It is used to examine for oneself the truths set forth in the Āgamas, so that one may be convinced about them and, enable others to reach certainty. The Siddhāntin is confident that reasoning will not conflict with revelation. Where scriptural declarations appear to contradict one another, reasoning must be used to resolve the contradictions, by reference to the context and other considerations relevant to the situation.³³

That in which the presence of the sādhyā is in question but is ascertained finally is the pakṣa. That in which the sādhyā has been ascertained is sapakṣa; and that wherein the non-existence of the sādhyā has been ascertained is vipakṣa. Thus 'mountain' is the pakṣa in the example 'This mountain has fire'. The example that we give to support the concomitance applied in arriving at the conclusion is the sapakṣa—'the kitchen'. That where in the non-

32. Anumāna is the knowledge of the *practicant* who has listened to the Siddhānta śāstras.

Anumāna literally means *after* proof or subsequent knowledge. It is after-proof in the sense that it makes use of prior knowledge derived from perception or verbal testimony and helps the mind to march to further knowledge. Anvikṣa is another name for anumāna.

33. See Māpāḍiyam, pp. 152-3.

existence of the sādhyā has been ascertained is the vipakṣa, e.g., the lake where the sādhyā 'fire' is non-existent. To know the invariable concomitance between two things, so that when we see one of them we may infer the presence of the other which is not present to the senses, we must ascertain co-presence of things as well as their co-absence. Hence the need for sapakṣa and vipakṣa. That which is without the vipakṣa is the barely co-present; that which is without the sapakṣa is the barely co-absent. So to test our conclusion by ascertaining co-presence and co-absence is like using the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference. To sum up, pakṣa and sapakṣa have the sādhyā sought to be established of the pakṣa while vipakṣa does not have it.

The three kinds of hetu³⁴ are (i) iyalpu hetu (or svabhāva hetu—this is only another name for dharma); (ii) kārya hetu and (iii) anupalabdhi hetu. We have therefore dharmādharmi anumāna (as when dharmi is inferred from dharma), kāryāt-kāraṇānumāna (and conversely kāraṇāt-kāryānumāna) and anupalabdhi anumāna.

Iyalpu hetu is the particular connotation a word, which can signify many things, has according to the context in which it occurs. E.g., the word 'mā, (மர) can signify any one of a number of things, tree, horse, etc. But from the context in which it occurs, we can infer what it means. In the sentence 'மா தளிர்ந்தது' 'மா' can only mean a tree, a mango tree. Ś.vāgra yogin says that this is a case of svabhāva lūgānumāna. Of this type is the inference that because the universe has been created and exists, it has the Lord (Pati) soul (paśu) and pāśa (bonds).

Kārya hetu is the probans which, because of a previous knowledge of two things concomitant as cause and effect, helps us to infer the cause when only the effect is present. When we see smoke, we infer fire at once because we know that smoke is the effect of fire and that the effect cannot be unless there is a cause for it. Śivāgra yogin says the following are inferences of this type. The universe is an effect. It cannot be without its causal agent. Therefore the universe points to its cause viz., God.

34. The Pauṣkara says, "The probans is twofold, as what is seen in ordinary experience and what is seen in its generic nature. Of these, the first is what causes inference of a thing capable of being perceived, the other causes inference of a thing which though existent is unseen" (Pramāṇa paṭala, verses 43-44).

Because the body is unconscious, we infer that there must be some intelligent consciousness to pervade and direct it. There can be no effect without a cause. So the universe which is an effect points to its cause—māyā.

By anupalabdhi hetu we are to understand that in the absence of the cause for a certain effect there cannot be that effect. Because there is no dew (cause) we know that it is not cold (effect); or conversely, because it is not cold we know there has been no dew. If there is no Creator, there cannot be the universe either; if there is no soul, there cannot be a body; if there is no māyā (the cause of the universe), there cannot be the tattvas and their derivatives. The quality of the cause is manifest in its effect. By probans such as these Śivāgra yogin says, we can infer the objects of knowledge in the Siddhānta philosophy viz., pāśa, paśu and Pati.³⁵

Concomitance is twofold, anvaya (positive) and vyatireka (negative). According as positive or negative concomitance is applied, the resulting inference is called anvayānumāna or vyatirekānumāna. When we say 'There is fire here because there is smoke, as in the kitchen', our inference is based on the positive concomitance between smoke and fire (between the hetu and the sādhyā). When we argue, 'where there is no fire, there is no smoke, as in the lake' we are using negative concomitance.³⁶

35. He says that this order of mention is adopted because pāśa is to be known and removed first, then paśu (soul) is to be intuited before Pati can become the object of perception.

36. As a matter of fact, the Indian logician classifies inferences according to the kinds of probans, as purely positive (probans merely co-present), purely negative (probans merely co-absent) and positive and negative (i.e., probans being co-present and co-absent). The examples given by the Siddhāntin may be combined to illustrate positive-negative inference (anvaya vyatireka-anumāna).

For the *purely positive* cf. the following :

Whatever is knowable, is namable, as a cloth

Pot is knowable

∴ Pot is namable.

For the *purely negative* : cf. the following :

Whatever is not different from the rest (elements other than earth) has no smell - as for example water.

Earth has smell

∴ Earth is different from the rest.

We cannot say 'whatever has smell has difference from non-earth', for all the varieties of earth are to be considered as the pakṣa in this syllogism.

This anumāna has three members, (pratijñā, hetu and dṛṣṭānta). The author of the Siddhiyār says that there are others³⁷ who use two more members (upanaya and nigamana),

Let us consider the following examples :

This mountain has fire (pratijñā)

Because it has smoke (hetu)

Where there is smoke, there is fire as in the kitchen (udāharaṇa or dṛṣṭānta).

This is so (upanaya).

Therefore it is so (nigamana).

Here the concomitance between the hetu and sādhyā is positive. So, it is anvayānumāna.

This mountain has no smoke (pratijñā),

Because it has no fire (hetu).

Where there is no fire, there is no smoke, as in the lake (udāharaṇa),

This mountain has no fire just as the lake has no fire (upanaya).

Therefore this mountain has no smoke (nigamana).

Here the concomitance between the hetu and the sādhyā is negative. Hence this is vyatirekānumāna.

The Pauṣkara *Bhāṣya* explains the need for five members thus: We cannot begin with the udāharaṇa for where the probandum and the probans have not been designated, there is no expectancy of the concomitance and the statement thereof would be a statement of what is not required. If, however, fire is first premised and then there is a question as to why it is premised and smoke is mentioned as the reason, there is need to know the concomitance between fire and smoke. The statement of the concomitance is therefore justified. Nor is it possible to stop with

37. Śivajñāna yogin says those who use the five membered syllogism are the Naiyāyikas and others. He does not specify who the others are. Niram-baṇaḷagiār and Jñānaprakāśar do not specify any school at all. Maraijñāna Deśikar and Śivāgra yogin say that the Naiyāyikas and Śaivas use the five membered syllogism. Maraijñāna Deśikar points out that the Bhaṭṭas use three members whereas the Bauddhas recognise only two members (udāharaṇa and upanaya). Those who use only three members to construct a syllogism argue that upanaya and nigamana are really contained in the other three members.

the udāharaṇa for we do not know that in the subject there exists the probans as qualified by the pervasion. Since the person who is instructed is ignorant of the existence of the probans as so qualified, it will not be possible for him to make the necessary inference. Even the nigamana, the statement of the conclusion as established, is of service in that it indicates the absence of bādha (sublation) satpratipakṣa (counter-probans).³⁸

Śivāgra yogin says that the kevala vyatireki anumāna clinches the conclusion arrived at by the kevalānvayi. He says that the conclusion 'The universe is false, because it has been made' reached by the anvayānumāna (whatever has been created as the result of somebody's activity is false, like the pot) is strengthened by the vyatireki (whatever has not been created or originated is not false, like Pati, paśu and pāśa).

Both the anvayi and vyatireki have five characteristics. (i) pakṣa-dharmatva, (ii) sapekṣasattva, (iii) vipakṣādvyaṁvṛtti, (iv) abādhitaviṣayatva, and (v) asatpratipakṣatva. The first is the presence of the hetu in the pakṣa, e.g., the mountain having a continuous column of smoke. Sapekṣasattva is the association of the hetu, with an instance where existence of sādhya is ascertained. Vipakṣādvyaṁvṛtti is the non-existence of the hetu in a place where it ought not to exist i.e., where sādhya is known not to exist. Abādhitaviṣayatva is the absence of obstruction to an inference by the origination of another sublating cognition. Asatpratipakṣatva is the absence of obstruction to the sādhya by a counter-probans which establishes a conclusion contrary to the original sādhya. If an inference lacks any one of these characteristics we have fallacies of the probans.

There are three³⁹ varieties of anumāna; (i) pratyakṣānumāna, (ii) anumānānumāna and (iii) āgamānumāna. When we infer from

38. Prof. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri was kind enough to translate this from the original, Pauṣkara Bhāṣya p. 538.

39. Maraijñāna Deśīkar, Jñānaprakāśar and Nirambavaṣaḥgiar treat these as based on pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda. Śivāgra yogin and Śivajñāna yogin say that these are mentioned to show that pramāṇas, in addition to the ten examined accepted by some can be brought under anumāna. The additional pramāṇas suggested are pūrva darśana pramāṇa, vacanaliṅga pramāṇa and anubhava pramāṇa. Pūrvadarśana pramāṇa is the means by which we cognise what has once been already cognised. Vacanaliṅga pramāṇa is that means of valid knowledge which has got for its probans verbal testimony. Anubhava pramāṇa is the means of valid knowledge based on experience.

a certain smell that it is the smell of a certain flower even when we do not see that flower, guided in our inference by our cognition on a previous occasion, we have *pratyakṣānumāna* (This is also called *dharma-dharmi-anumāna*).

The intelligence of a person is not something that can be directly seen. But from his speech we can infer whether or not he is intelligent. If he does not speak sense, we know him for a shallow person. This is *anumānānumāna*.

The Scriptures tell us many things. Sometimes, we make inferences on the analogy of what is said in the Scriptures, e.g. the Scriptures tell us that the pleasure and pain we experience in this life are the effect of the good and evil we did in our previous life. On the basis of this statement and analogously we infer that what we do in this life will bear fruit in a future life.

Āgamas :

Āgamas⁴⁰ satisfy certain essential requisites of significant utterance. The requisites are *ākāṅkṣā* (expectancy), *yogyatā* (compatibility), *āsatti* (juxtaposition) and *tātparya* (knowledge of the intention of the speaker by which alone one could distinguish between different senses of the word). They fall into three divisions: *tantra*, *mantra*⁴¹ and *upadeśa*.

The *tantra* part of the *Āgamas* consists in understanding the primary and secondary signification of words (*śabda sāmānyā* and *ārtha sāmānyā*) and the existence of things (*vastu tattā*) dealt with in the *karma kāṇḍa* by formulating in a single sentence the essence of the text. Care should be taken to see that contradictions of previous by latter statements are avoided; also, what is said in the middle should not be explained in such a way as to run counter to statements in the beginning and the end. Following this law of interpretation (which is known as *upakramopasaṁhāra nyāya*) the tantric utterances are to be understood. These tantric utterances teach Vedic ritual like *agniṣṭoma* sacrifices and *Āgamic* ritual like *Śivapūjā*. This procedure comprises the *caryā* and *kriyā* stages of worship.

40. So called because *a* means *Śivajñāna*, *ga* - *mokṣa-sadhana* and *ma* *mala naśa*.

41. Śivāgrya yogin explains this word thus : மந்—அந்த வஸ்துவை நினைக்கிறவனை : த்ரம்—ரக்ஷிக்கிறது.

Again Veda is thus explained : வேதம் என்பது வஸ்துவை அறிவது.

The mantra part of the Āgamas relates to the yoga-stage of worship. Prior to yogic intuition, the soul is to be tuned to the proper condition by the withdrawal of the activity of the internal organs. The stages of āsana (posture), prāṇāyāma (breath control) etc., must be successively attained before the final stage. Śivāgra yogin says that in the contemplation of the self as the Lord Whom it worships, the devotee can understand from the mantra part of the Āgamas, the meditation (nyāsa), the seer of the hymn (ṛṣi), the metre (chandas), the presiding deity (adhidevata), the seed-letter of the hymn (bīja) and the application of the hymn (śakti) relative to the worship. He says that the mantra part of the Āgamas helps the devotee by instructing him in these ways to practise contemplation of his self as the resplendent God he worships.

The upadeśa part of the Āgamas deals with the existence and nature of the three verities—Pati, paśu and pāśa. In dealing with Pati, the Āgamas say that He is beginningless and endless, that He is non-different from his eight qualities and that He has besides Himself, paśu and pāśa which are different from Him. Śivāgra yogin says that the upadeśa kalā instructs the devotee about Śiva who is of the form of Intelligence and Who is above birth and death; about the soul which has a body subject to birth and death; and about pāśa responsible for the birth and death of the body. He says that upadeśa kalā speaks about the real form of these verities, their pervasiveness and the principle by which they are pervasive.⁴²

Śivajñāna yogin takes up for consideration the contention of the Naiyāyikas that understanding by words like pot, cloth, etc., the respective objects that they denote is also to be brought under

42. Śivāgra yogin points out that in the line of the text அநாதியே அமலஞ் செய்வான் நான் ஆகமந்தான், the word ஆய — ஆகிய signifying activity is used with a specific purpose. There is the possibility of Śiva's nature being defiled by His contact and inseparable connection with the mala-fettered souls. The author's aim in using the word denoting activity, is to show that in spite of such inseparable connection with the mala-fettered souls, Śiva is eternally free from mala. He justifies further the use of the word "intelligence" அறிவு by pointing out that thus alone could the material "śuddha māyā" which is also free from mala, be excluded. Both Śuddha māyā and the Lord are free from mala but it is only the Lord Who is intelligent as well as pure.

verbal testimony. He says that as they are not words which refer to objects not open to sense-perception and inference the contention of the Naiyāyikas is not valid. Even as the word, 'மா' denotes a mango-tree by its *iyalpu hetu*, the understanding of the words is to be classed as a variety of inference. So such words cannot come under *Āgama*. Again, experience is had by hearing about the existence of things. This experience (from hearsay) constitutes, claim some, a separate *pramāṇa* and therefore cannot be brought under inference. But if we accept this argument, we shall be unable to subsume *anupalabdhī* under one of the three *pramāṇas* already recognised. The knowledge that there is no cold because there is no snow fall will have to be treated as knowledge got by a *pramāṇa* independent of the three recognised by the *Siddhāntin*,

What is the *Siddhāntin*'s view regarding the authority of the Vedas and *Āgamas*? This is a controversial matter. In interpreting the line, அநாதியே அமலஞய அறிவன் நூல்ஆகமந்தான் *Śivāgra* yogin and *Śivajñāna* yogin mention the four Vedas along with twenty eight *Āgamas*. *Śivāgra* yogin justifies inclusion of the Vedas on the ground that both are the utterances of the Lord. *Śivajñāna* yogin refers the reader to *Śrīkaṇṭha*'s *Bhāṣya* where it is maintained that Vedas also may be called *Āgamas*. The other commentators do not specifically mention the Vedas at all. The view generally accepted by the *Siddhāntin* is that Vedas, equally with the *Āgamas* are authoritative, the only difference between them being that while the Vedas are general, the *Āgamas* are special.

Śivāgra yogin examines the claim of the *Mīmāṃsakas* that Vedas alone are valid *pramāṇa* and not the *Āgamas*. The *Mīmāṃsakas* give the following reasons: Vedas are not of human origin. In fact, no author is mentioned to have written them. The *smṛtis* which mention the eternality of the Vedas do not speak about any author for these. They are accepted by the majority of worthy people.⁴³

The objections to the validity of the *Āgamas* are: (i) that they have an author and therefore are not eternal and free from faults; (ii) that they are not based on the Vedas and are not accepted by the majority of worthy people in the way in which

43. The *Siddhāntin* says that since the *Āgamas* are based on the Vedas of the aforesaid nature, they are also valid.

the Vedas and smṛtis are accepted. (iii) The summum bonum of life referred to in works like the *Bhārata* depends upon the Vedas for its elucidation and validity. But no such basis is in evidence for the Āgamic sayings. (iv) There are contradictory statements in the Āgamas. (v) The purāṇas frown upon the pursuit of tantric observances. Again, what is the position of the Āgamas in the light of the following story? It is said that a number of Brahmins cursed by Durvāsa, Dadīci, Gautama, Kaṇva, Bhṛgu and Upamanyu approached Śiva and Viṣṇu for redemption from their curse. Śiva and Viṣṇu brought the Āgamas into existence as a means of livelihood for these Brahmins and for deluding the āsuras. It is also said that the Dravidian kings Śaṇḍilya and Citramāna were hurled down into hell because they practised tantric observances. In view of all these objections the Āgamas cannot be said to be valid.⁴⁴

Śivāgra yogin examines first the claim that the Vedas are valid because they are eternal and free from faults and that the Āgamas have no validity because they have an author. He proceeds to show how this statement is unacceptable.

We know that the Vedas are eternal, But by what means do we know it? Is their eternality of their own nature or like that of a stream? Not the first, because sounds are non-eternal and the Vedas have the form of sounds. Sound is known to be non-eternal, even by perception. The 'ga', I pronounced yesterday was destroyed immediately after it was pronounced and was succeeded by another 'ga'. When a noise is heard, though the separate voices constituting that din are not distinguishable, it is perceived as having come to an end when it stops. Thus, even by perception, sounds are known to be non-eternal. The Vedas are not eternal because the sentences of which they are composed are the grouping of words, the words are the combination of letters and the letters are reducible to sounds.

It may be argued that by remembrance cognition the "ga" heard today is recognised as the "ga" heard yesterday and that therefore sounds are eternal. The Siddhāntin does not accept this argument. When we say that the rice we ate in Coḷa deśa was the same as the rice we had eaten in Benares, what is referred

44. Śivāgra yogin says that the pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta of this problem have been dealt with by him in his *Siddhānta Dipikā* also.

to as the same in both cases, is the quality of rice-ness (*vrihitva*), not the several grains of rice. Even so, when we congnise the "ga" heard today as the same as the "ga" heard yesterday, what is recognised as the same is the quality of the letter "ga", not the particular letter itself. Thus the letters are non-eternal. Moreover, the 'ga' that is pronounced aloud is different from the "ga" pronounced softly. This difference is known by perception. Thus, the Vedas as composed of sounds, are not eternal.

If it is said that the Vedas are eternal in the sense in which a continuously flowing stream is said to be eternal, the Siddhāntin's reply is that even this is a poor justification. It may be argued that the Vedas are eternal because they are passed on from teacher to taught successively and without interruption, in the manner of a perpetually flowing stream. The Siddhāntin retorts that the deluge of the past and the deluge of the future are known by *pramāṇas* and so, when the world is subject to destruction, the Vedas which are included in the world are also liable to destruction.

Finally, it may be contended that the Vedas themselves declare their eternality. The Siddhāntin replies that the Vedas are eternal because they are the work of Śiva and because they persist up to the deluge. They have originated from something which is eternal and so are themselves only figuratively called eternal.⁴⁵

Does not the Siddhāntin himself admit the validity of the Vedas? What are his grounds therefor? The Mīmāṃsaka's position is that the Vedas are valid because they are eternal by being continuous in the form of *sāpekṣa uccāraṇa*. The Śaiva Siddhāntin finds the break between one aeon and another a difficulty in the way of accepting the continuity (and therewith the validity) of the Vedas. That which is pronounced differently from the text of the previous aeon is impermanent for the reason that there is a break between one aeon and another. So the Siddhāntin says that the Vedas are eternal in the sense that they have for their author, Śiva the highest reality. His work does not depend upon similarity or continuity for its permanence. Śiva is self-

45. *Tadutpannatvāt tadvyapadeśah*—It is called so because it has come out of that; e.g., *Padmā* is a name for the Goddess *Lakṣmī* because of her birth from a lotus.

knowing and other-knowing. His work does not depend for its permanence upon anything but Himself.

Śivāgra yogin says that even as moon-rise is the reason for the moon-stone secreting water and the water in the Ganjes rising, the eternality of the Lord is the reason for the eternality of the Vedas.

He is a reliable person (āpta) who is not himself deluded or who is not out to deceive others. The words that such a person utters convey sense. The supremely trustworthy person is the Lord Śiva, Who is beginningless and pure, Who is of the form of transcendental happiness, Who is all-knowing and Who creates all. Since the Vedas and Āgamas are His utterances, they are valid.⁴⁶

Are we to accept Āgamas like the Vāma and Kālāmukha and Bauddha literature as valid? The question arises because Śiva Himself brought these into existence to help those who are prohibited from Vedic studies and to delude the asuras. But it must be remembered, says the Siddhāntin, that the same Lord has said in the Āgamas like the Kāmika that these works being external to the letter and spirit of the Vedas are not meant to be studied by those who are eligible to study the Vedas. Being thus set aside by the Lord Himself, they are not valid.

It will be worth while to indicate the view of Śivajñāna yogin in this matter.⁴⁷ Though all the darśanas have been brought into existence by Śiva and are therefore valid, an important consideration is that each one of the darśanas has been designed so as to be understood by people of a certain capacity only. The Cārvāka's dull intelligence cannot grasp subtle truths. Hence he is told that the gross body is the soul and the dissolution of this body is the death of the soul. A low pleasure creed goes hand in hand with

⁴⁶. Śivajñāna yogin raises the question whether there is not reciprocal dependence if we say that Āgamas are pramāṇa because they are the work of the omniscient Lord Whose existence in turn is established by them. He replies: The Lord and His utterance (viz. the Vedas and Āgamas) are kāraṇa hetu and jñāpaka hetu (as obtain between a person and his utterance when he says, 'I, who am so and so have come'). Besides, the validity of Vedas and Āgamas is first taken for granted as they have been accepted by our ancestors, and we learn from the Vedas and Āgamas that the Lord has produced them (cf. Māpāḍiyam, p. 19).

⁴⁷. Māpāḍiyam, p. 21.

this doctrine. When these dull people thus led by the Grace of the Lord Who takes pity on them have their mala partially removed by pursuing this path, they doubt the statements that the body is the soul and that its death is the soul's death. For their edification, the Lord has brought into existence the Bauddha literature. By learning the Bauddha doctrine these people feel that the body is not the soul. The several darśanas have been arranged like a flight of steps as it were, each lower one to be discarded as each higher one is reached.

Thus, there is no contradiction between the several darśanas, if we bear in mind, the people for whom they have been created. Each darśana has a validity limited by the existence of higher darśanas and limiting the validity of lower darśanas. Thus also are the Taittiriya statements to be understood. The statements are: annamaya kośa is Brahman; prāṇamaya kośa is Brahman; manomaya kośa is Brahman; vijñānamaya kośa is Brahman; ānandamaya kośa is Brahman. The agent's capacity is the condition for each of these statements. Subtlety increases as we go from one statement to another. Each earlier statement is meant to be discarded as we understand the succeeding statement. Thus we go up to the final stage.

Āgamas are of two kinds: śrauta and aśrauta. The śrauta Āgamas are dependent upon the Vedas and are full of their essence; not so the aśrauta. The former Āgamas are accepted but not the latter. The aśrauta Āgamas have been declared by the Lord in order to delude some people. These Āgamas are Vāma, Pāsupata, Lakula, Bhairava, etc. Thus when the smṛtis, like the *Manusmṛti* forbid tantric practices, we are to understand the prohibition only with regard to the Āgamas like the Vāma which are in conflict with the Vedas.

The reliability of sentences varies as the sentences range from those of men to those of the Lord. (In the last resort, Śiva alone is the absolutely trustworthy person). The statements of ṛṣis cannot be sublated by the statements of ordinary persons for the ṛṣis are greater āptas than ordinary people. Likewise the statements of the deities are superior to those of ṛṣis. The statements of Brahmā stand higher than those of other deities, and those of Viṣṇu sublate the statements of Brahmā. In this hierarchy, Rudra and Śiva come next. Śiva is the highest and He is the most trustworthy. The trustworthiness and pervasiveness increase as we go higher and diminish as we come down. All those

śāstras which do not conflict with the Śivāgāmas are valid; and all those that conflict with them are invalid. The śāstras are valid to the extent to which they have been pervaded by the Śivāgāmas.

The *Bhārata* is quoted to support the statement that Śiva is the author of the Āgamas. It says, "Even as Maheśvara is the author of the Āgamas like the Kāmika, the son of Satyavati is the author of the eighteen purāṇas".

We are told that the jñāna mārga has been set forth by the Lord, in the form of sound (nādātmaka). We are told also that the Lord is without parts. How does the pronunciation of words and sentences come about, if the Lord is without parts and therefore without the organ of speech? This is not a matter for surprise or doubt because the Lord whose cit-śakti is all pervasive, can produce sounds even without the organ of speech. It is only in the case of mala-fettered souls, the pervasiveness of whose cit-śakti is limited that there is need for organs of speech etc.

When Śiva's cit-śakti, intent on creation, turns towards bindu i.e., śuddha māyā, (sound) is produced. Nāda is the source of origin for the words, paś-anti, madhyamā and vaikharī. The sounds, according to the different faces⁴⁸ of the Lord from which they proceed and according to the succession of teachers to whom they were imparted assume the form of Vedas and Āgamas. The Vedas and Āgamas teach about the way of activity (karma mārga) and the way of knowledge (jñāna mārga). At this stage, certain questions may naturally arise. How did the sounds, thus spoken of originate? How did mantras and tantras arise? What are their differences? What are the means for realising what is taught? Are there differences in the attainment of what is taught?

When the gracious Lord whose activity is unmotivated agitates bindu through His cit-śakti, Brahmā-like *a* (अ) is born. Cit-śakti which exists inseparably with the Lord and which agitates śuddha māyā is known as yoga-māyā, because it is the controller of māyā.

48. The reference here to the 'faces of the Lord' is not to the Supreme Lord. What Śivāgri yogin says elsewhere may help us to understand the position. 'Those who are united to body etc. are only directed creators. Because of the union of the Energy with the partially perfect Anantēśvara and others, these are able to discharge their respective functions. Śiva's form is of the nature of pure intelligence; it is neither gross nor subtle nor is it a void.'

From bindu which is the cause of names, forms and the world when agitated by the cit-śakti of the Lord, the śāstras arise in the form of sounds. Then, like the untainted brightness of the winter moon, the lower bindu arises, assuming a coiled form. From that bindu begins a process of expansion by which sūkṣmā, paśyanti, madhyamā and vaikharī emerge, each previous one causing its successor.

In the lower part of bindu śakti agitated by the Lord's desire, there arises a śakti known as Ambikā. From Ambikā emerge, like the moon's light, three śaktis. They are Vāma, Jyeṣṭhā and Raudrī. Vāma is coiled up like a sleeping serpent, Jyeṣṭhā is straight as a stick, Raudrī is like a bifurcated horn.

Māyā taking on a lower form becomes Jayā, Vijayā, Ajitā and Parājitā. Besides these, there are twelve other Śaktis—from Nivṛtti to Anāśṛiṭa, aggregating to sixteen śaktis.

The entire universe from the Śiva tattva to the prithvī tattva is pervaded by these śaktis. From these śaktis the fifty letters commencing from *a* are produced. Śivāgra yogin reserves the details to recount them later. The way in which the letter *a* took shape is this. Raudrī is the head, Vāma is the face, Ambikā is the arm. Jyeṣṭhā is the straight primal body—*a* has been thus described. Śiva's śakti, of the form of *a*, is differentiated into fifty letters ranging from *a* to kṣa.

Without the Śakti, which is of the form of letters, which is gracious and which is of the form of sounds and meanings, there is neither the world of names nor the world of forms. Thus, these letters are necessary for all attainments. The Lord's cit-śakti is the womb for these; the Lord is the instrument (nimitta) and bindu is the material. Effects must follow from their causes in accordance with the activity of the souls. Hence, the karma of the souls is the accessory cause.

Letters, being many and inert, do not exist apart from bindu. They are created from bindu by the Lord. Whatever has been created is subject to destruction. But, because these letters persist up to the deluge, we say the Vedic utterances are eternal. Letters are of the form of audible sounds, words are the result of letters being grouped together; and the sentences are the results of words being put together.

Vedas are said to be self-originated because they arise as sounds from bindu by the activity of the Lord's Energy rather than by the use of palate, teeth, tongue etc. These sentences give rise to meaning helpful for scriptural and worldly business. These letters are the originators of the world and so are in the place of a mother to the world. The letters themselves arise out of the activity of the Lord's Energy; and thus they have Śiva for their originator.

The presiding deity for the sixteen letters beginning from *a* is Śiva; and His Consort is the presiding deity for the letters ranging from *k* to *kṣa*. If we divide these letters into eight classes the presiding deity for the sixteen letters from *a* is Vināyaka, and the seven mothers, Brāhmī etc.....are the deities for the sentences, having the sounds of the letters from *k* to *kṣa*.

The letters are the instruments of the gracious Lord and therefore are themselves sometimes called the Lord. These letters which are the originators of the world are known as *jñānaśakti*. From the *jñānaśakti* words of the form of sounds and objects (objects that move and objects that are stationary) and words of the form of meaning gradually arise in a regular order. Śiva brings into existence, the Vedas and Āgamas. The material used is the Energy which is of the form of letters.

But, it was previously said that Śiva is without form, that He is without the organ of speech. How, then, can He be said to be the cause of these śāstras? If we say that He had a form to bring about these, shall we not be attributing parts and form to Him? No, He need not have parts and form. Even as by the fiat of His Will He causes the letters to be born from bindu, He causes śāstras to come into existence without having an organ of speech. In the minds of the wise vijñānākalas whose mala is ripe for removal, He causes jñāna to arise. Unembodied, He causes intuitions to arise in their minds. He does not need a form in order to impart wisdom to them.

How, then did the succession of teachers start in the matter of scriptural teaching, if Śiva has no form?

Commencement of all activity for Śiva is for the sake of the souls. So, He Who by His own desire, has the perfect form, comes to have a form constituted by the five mantras. Īśāna mantra constitutes the head of the Lord; Tatpuruṣa is the face:

Aghora is the heart; Vāmadeva is the navel and Sadhyojāta is the form. His six qualities like omniscience, contentment, beginningless conciousness, undiminishing Energy etc., are embodied in the six parts, heart eyes etc.

Does the Lord also have parts even as souls associated with kalās come to have parts? No, because His body is not constituted of skin, bones etc., as the human body is, He is without parts. He takes on a form constituted by the five mantras, so that souls may worship Him by contemplating this form and so that śāstras may be originated. Though He is without parts, parts are figuratively attributed to Him.

He originates the Vedas and Āgamas like the Kāmika in many million chapters and in particular metres. Having thus brought the śāstras into existence, He causes the cognitive and conative faculties of those vijñānākalas whose mala is ripe for removal, to shine, by removing their mala. Among them, to the ten Śivas, like Praṇava Śiva and to eighteen others, like Ekarudra, He gives to each, one Āgama through all His five faces. Thus we come to have the twenty eight Śivāgamas, ranging from the Kāmika to the Vātuḷa. Thus Vedas and Śivāgamas which have been declared by the supremely trustworthy Śiva are valid.

Validity has been conceded to the śāstras declared by Śiva. Does not one gain wisdom and release by studying the śāstras written by great sages like Kapila and Śaṇḍilya? All these sages have written about twenty four tattvas only from prakṛiti downwards. They have not dealt with the twelve tattvas above prakṛiti; and they have not spoken about Śiva who is above the thirty six tattvas. Hence wisdom and release supreme are to be gained only by hearing and contemplating the Āgamas declared by Śiva.

Eligibility : Who are the people entitled to study the Śivāgamas? Is it only the Sūdras and women and those who are called twice-born merely because of their birth, as in the case of the purāṇas and itihāsas? Or is it people of all four castes? The answer is the people of the first three castes and Sūdras and women who satisfy the following conditions. They must be pure—they must not take prohibited food and drinks. Their parentage must be pure both on the paternal side and the maternal side. They must have received Śiva dīkṣā and must show a genuine desire for gaining release. Śivajñāna yogin distinguishes between good Sūdras and bad Sūdras. What was said about

‘those who are twice-born merely by birth’, is enough indication that not only Sūdras and women but the people of the other three castes also are eligible for the study of the Āgamas only in so far as they are pure.

Validity, Error and Truth: Is validity for the pramāṇas intrinsic or extrinsic—given to them by something different from them? What is valid knowledge?

The Bauddhas say that that cognition gives valid knowledge, the objective content of which gives rise to fruitful and not futile activity. Valid knowledge is the cognition that does not fail to accord. But this insistence on awareness of practical efficiency is not sound because it is vitiated by the defect of non-pervasion in respect of inferences whose content are in the past and the future.⁴⁹ Moreover, there is practical efficiency in memory cognition (*smṛti jñāna*) and determinate cognition (*savikaipa jñāna*), neither of which is a pramāṇa for them.

The Prābhākaras say that experience (*anubhūti*) is valid knowledge—experience that is other than remembrance. Remembrance is said to be the cognition generated by the impressions of previous cognition. This contention is not valid. There is contradiction between the earlier and later statements made by the Prābhākaras. They establish first the intrinsic validity of the cognition of the sense of the Vedic texts, which cognition results from the remembrance of the word-senses. Forgetting this later they straight away declare validity for such experience alone as excludes remembrance. Moreover, there would not result what is here considered validity for memory cognitions even in respect of their own existence. In memory cognition, there being no exclusion of the nature of remembrance, there is not the nature of experience. Thus the Prābhākaras contradict their own thesis that there is validity for Vedic texts. Their contention that experience other than remembrance is valid knowledge is untenable.

Śivajñāna yogin rejects the contention of the Naiyāyikas that validity is extrinsic. He says that when a cognition is invalid, this defect itself is known through another cognition. Thus the contention that validity is extrinsic is unsound. Validity is intrinsic and it is invalidity which is not so.

49. See pp. 20–21 of this book.

The Siddhāntin's position is that since cit-śakti abides in the (three) pramāṇas and is necessary for all knowledge, validity is intrinsic.

Doubt and Error: In dealing with invalid perception, 'the Siddhāntin considers the case of doubt and error. Due to the existence of some common quality in two things, we may not feel sure about one of them being the thing it really is and not that to which it bears resemblance. Thus we may doubt whether a thing we see is a post or a man because uprightness is common to both. The usual example for error is a piece of shell being mistaken for silver. Here again, the shiny part which is common to both is perceived, whereas the underlying black triangular part of the shell is not perceived. Likewise rope is mistaken for snake because the one appears coiled like the other.

The siddhāntin's position is similar to the Naiyāyika's (anyātha-khyāti).⁵⁰ The important point is that 'what serves as the subject of an erroneous judgment ('this') is actually given; the predicate also *is*, though elsewhere and not here'.⁵¹ The Siddhāntin, thus differs from the Mādhyamika who says that the non-existent is perceived (asat-khyāti).

It is obvious that the Siddhāntin's theory of error differs from the Advaitin's also. The Advaitin's theory is known as anirvacanīya-khyāti. Briefly, it may be stated thus: The content of error cannot be unreal because it is cognised. It cannot be real because it is sublated. And it cannot be both real and unreal, because there would then be violation of the law of contradiction. Since there is no other alternative left,, it is said to be indeterminate, anirvacanīya. The Siddhāntin's position is that in shell-silver perception or rope—snake perception, the difficulty is removed when the two are independently perceived. He points out that the rope is similar to the snake and shell similar to silver, and that one cannot be said to be wholly real and the other wholly unreal. The substrate (shell or rope) and the super-imposed (silver or snake) can be cognised independently as they are. In fact, it is because they have been so perceived that on occasions, one of them is taken for the other.

50. '.....a term which indicates that the discrepancy found in error is in regard to the predicative element'. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 253.

51. *Ibid.*

Truth: What is the test of truth adopted by the Siddhāntin? It is clear that he has no sympathy with the Naiyāyikas's correspondence theory, as seen in his rejection of the latter's claim that validity is extrinsic. He repudiates the 'fruitful activity' test also, as was seen in his criticism of the Bauddha doctrine. The suggestion has been put forward⁵² that inclusiveness and harmony may be said to be the Siddhāntin's test for truth since he concedes that even the Cārvāka system has a measure of truth in that it recognises at least the four elements. Indeed, the several systems can be arranged in a hierarchy, each system being superseded by one higher than itself and thus at one end, we have the works of human beings and at the other, the Śivāgamas. But the author of this suggestion observes: 'It is not possible to say that the Siddhāntin has neglected the aspect of harmony, since that necessarily forms part of any intelligible conception of inclusiveness; but he does not appear to have placed that in the foreground of his critical consciousness as much as he ought to have'.⁵³

It is necessary, therefore, to invite attention to certain points which indicate the Siddhāntin's attempt to achieve harmony equally with inclusiveness. The account given of the origin of Śaiva Siddhānta as a definite system is interesting. Nandi Devar approached Śrīkaṇṭha Parameśvara with the request that his doubts might be cleared and the truth briefly revealed to him. His plea was that as the Vedas and Āgamas were very elaborate, the authors of the several Śāstras took only so much as they could understand, just as out of the vast waters of the oceans only as much as a vessel can contain can be taken out in each vessel, with the result that there resulted contradictions. Śrīkaṇṭha was thereupon pleased to set forth briefly in Śaiva Siddhānta the truth of the Vedas and Āgamas. Śaiva Siddhānta, then, is an attempt to resolve the contradictions and present truth as a systematic whole. If the parts alone are viewed, error and contradiction are bound to occur.

Śivajñāna yogin refers to the story of the blind men and the elephant in explaining verse 13 of the Eighth Sūtra. He says: "Blind men who feel with their hands the several parts of an elephant maintain in their ignorance of the other parts that the

52. Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri in an article entitled Truth in Śaiva Siddhānta.

53. *Ibid.*

elephant is the part they feel. One who is able to see well knows that the several parts the blind men have felt are but parts of the whole, which is the elephant. Hence the characterisation of the elephant by each blind man is also true to a certain extent. It requires to be supplemented by the vision of one who is able to see the whole elephant. Likewise, the several philosophical systems conflict with one another because out of the wealth of the Vedas and Āgamas, they are able to take only a part, mistaking it for the whole, in their ignorance. Śaiva Siddhānta attempts to bring together in harmony the truth contained in the different systems.

Another point for consideration is the spiritual eligibility of persons.⁵⁴ In so far as the Lord Himself is taken as the author of all systems and works, their differences can be accounted for in terms of the grades of spiritual eligibility of the persons for whom they are intended. Persons are gradually led up from the lower to the higher, the less inclusive to the more inclusive, e.g., the declarations in the *Taittirīya* "Annamaya kośa is Brahman", "Prāṇamaya kośa is Brahman", etc. It is "like holding grass before cows to catch them" as the *Sūta Saṁhita* has it. A person's interest is arrested by something he can understand and then he is led forward. These considerations, involved in claiming the Siddhānta as the highest truth, show that not mere inclusiveness but harmony also is in the foreground of the Siddhāntin's consciousness. Inclusiveness and harmony are the essential features of coherence and so we can sum up the Siddhāntin's theory of truth in one word as Coherence.

Fallacies: (தவற) Fallacies relating to the subject are four (pakṣābhāsa); fallacies of the probans (hetvābhāsa) come under three heads and by further sub-division, we have twentyone fallacies in all; fallacies of example (dṛṣṭāntābhāsa) are eighteen in number; and Occasions for Reproof (nigrahasthāna) are enumerated as twenty-two. Altogether there are sixty-five fallacies.⁵⁵

54. See Māpāḍiyam, p. 21.

55. Maraijñāna Deśikar and Śivāgra yogin alone explain and illustrate the fallacies in some detail. Nīrambavaḷagiār illustrates fallacies of the subject and Occasions for Reproof, leaving the fallacies of the probans and fallacies of example with a bare mention. Śivajñāna yogin and Jñānaprakāśar explain the fallacies and say that to illustrate them would be to swell the commentary. Jñānaprakāśar refers the reader to Maraijñāna Deśikar's commentary for examples. As for the commentaries of Maraijñāna Deśikar and Śivāgra yogin,

It is worth while to refer briefly, to the other schools of Indian Philosophy before we explain and illustrate the fallacies. Dr. Keith says that the treatment of fallacies in both the Nyāya-Sūtra and the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra is brief and simple, standing in curious contrast to the elaboration of this topic by the later text.⁵⁶

The Nyāya-Sūtra runs :

Savyabhicāra-viruddha-prakaraṇasama - sādhyasama - kālātāta
hetvābhāsah.

Savyabhicāra (discrepant) is reason which leads to more than one conclusion (anaikāntika). Viruddha (contrary)—is reason which leads to a conclusion opposed to the established one.

Prakaraṇasama : ('equal to the question') reason which raises the very question to be answered—later considered equivalent to satpratipakṣa—counter-balanced reason for which there is as much or as little justification as there is for considering it equivalent to bādhita—contradicted reason.

Sādhyasama : (equal to the conclusion) reason which itself requires proof like the conclusion—later classed with asiddha—unreal reason. *Kālātāta* is that for which the time has gone by.

The Vaiśeṣika recognises only three types of fallacy : aprasiddha (the unproved), asat (the unreal) and saṁdigdha (the doubtful). Asat and saṁdigdha correspond to the later asiddha and savyabhicāra.⁵⁷

their lists are not wholly in harmony and explanation of identical fallacies is marked by differences.

Eg. Bhāgasiddha, is for Maraijñāna Deśikar, the fallacy of lack of full pervasion in the probans; for Śivāgra yogin, it is lack of pervasion of the subject by the probans.

The explanation of the fallacies here is based on Śivajñāna yogin's commentary and the examples are taken from Muthiah Pillai commentary.

56. Indian Logic and Atomism.

57. This is according to the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra translation. Dr. Keith seems to make out only two....., it states a definition of a fallacious reason or non-reason (anapadesa in his terminology, in which apadesa replaces hetu) as that which is unproved (aprasiddha) that is, which is not shown to be in invariable concomitance with the consequence. Of the fallacious reason two species are mentioned—the unreal (asat) and the doubtful (saṁdigdha) which correspond accurately enough to the later asiddha and savyabhicāra. Cf. Indian Logic and Atomism, p. 137.

Gautama recognises Occasions for Reproof also and enumerates them as twenty-two.

We see then, that pakṣābhāsa and dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa recognised by the Siddhāntin are not recognised by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas.⁵⁸ The Buddhists characterise a train of reasoning as fallacious not only if its middle term is defective but also if the subject matter or thesis cannot be sustained, that is, if it is refuted in advance by the proof of the opposite, or if the examples which serve to show the correctness of the middle term are not valid, being badly chosen. The Jainas also recognise pakṣābhāsa and dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa. The objection of the Naiyāyikas is that if the thesis is in itself true or false there is little use in recourse to the middle term. Dr. Keith says that an examination of the fallacies adduced in the Buddhist school shows useless repetition. Vātsyāyana and the schools after him accept clearly the doctrine that the thesis is neither true nor false in advance; it is a subject of doubt which is resolved by the use of the middle term, or as Annam bhaṭṭa has it, the subject (pakṣa) is that which possesses the conclusion in a doubtful form (saṁdigdha sādhyavān).

Fallacies of the Subject: Śivajñāna yogin says that fallacy of the subject is the partial resemblance to the subject leading it to appear like the subject. But it lacks the characteristics of the subject which possesses the conclusion sought to be established and is one of the requisites for inference. Fallacies of the subject are of four kinds.⁵⁹

(i) *Non-existence of the subject*: (துணியும் பெருட்கு இடஞாதது)

The sky-lotus is fragrant

since it has the quality of flower

like the lotus in the tank.

58. To the contention of the Naiyāyikas that the fallacies of the subject and the fallacies of the example can be subsumed under the fallacies of the probans, Śivajñāna yogin replies that a consideration of the characteristics of the subject and example shows the necessity for recognising fallacies of each as distinct from the fallacies of the probans.

59. Maraijñāna Deśikar and Nīrambavaṭagiar classify them under the following names (i) pakṣābhāsa (pratyakṣābhāsa) (ii) anumānābhāsa (iii) p a-tijñābhāsa (svanumānābhāsa) and (iv) vacanābhāsa. Maraijñāna Deśikar says that these are also characterised as aprasiddha-viśeṣaṇa, aprasiddha viśeṣya, aprasiddhobhaya and aprasiddha-asambandha.

Here there is no subject (sky-lotus being non-existent), to possess the probandum.

- (ii) *Partial non-existence of the subject*: (துணியும் பொருட்கு ஒரு மருங்கு இடனாகாதது).
 Sound is non-eternal
 since it is visible
 like a pot.

Here sound is the subject which possesses the probandum i.e., non-eternality but it does not have the probans 'being visible'

- (iii) *Being the subject of a thing already established as existing*:
 (துணிந்த பொருட்கிடனாவது).
 The kitchen has fire
 because it has smoke
 like the places where smoke is seen.

Here the fire in the kitchen is what is already known to be present. The subject is that where the presence of the probandum is doubted (saṁdigdhasādhyaṁ); it is not that which possesses an already established probandum.

- (iv) *Being partially the subject of a thing that is established*:
 (துணிந்த பொருட்கொரு மருங்கிடனாவது).
 This liquor has been drunk by A
 because it is a liquid
 like milk.

Here the subject (liquor) cannot possess the probandum because what was drunk cannot be shown; we know only that some thing was drunk. It possesses the probans, liquid nature. Hence this is a fallacy of the subject which possesses the probans but not the probandum.

Fallacy of the probans: Śivajñāna yogin says that the fallacious probans lacks the characteristic of being present in the subject while it pervades the probandum; and, agreeing with the probans partially, it appears as the probans. Fallacies of the probans are of three kinds.⁶⁰

60. Maraijñāna Deśīkar attempts a reconciliation of the author's statement with the Pauṣkara which recognises five kinds of fallacies of the probans. Satpratīpakṣa is the counter balanced reason i.e., one for which there exists another reason which proves the contrary of the consequence. As it is

(i) that which has not been established (asiddha), because it is unreal ;

(ii) that which is the contrary (viruddha) because it leads to the opposite conclusion.

(iii) that which is discrepant or not one pointed (savyabhi-cāra) because it leads to more than one conclusion.

This classification is somewhat like the Vaiśeṣika classification into aprasiddha (the unproved), asat (the unreal) and saṁdigdha (the doubtful).

We have to note that hetu or the reason adduced for a conclusion plays an important part in determining the validity thereof. If the reason is incorrect, the conclusion also will be wrong. In such cases, there will naturally be only a semblance of reasoning.

(i) *Probans not having the subject*: (சாற்பில்லது).

The sky-lotus is fragrant

because it has the quality of being a flower
like the lotus in the tank.

Here, the probans, quality of being a flower. does not exist in the subject, because the subject (sky-lotus) is non-existent.

(ii) *Existence in the subject not ascertained*:

(சாற்புண்மை அறியப்படாதது).

Pot etc., are of the form of primal atoms

because they are eternal

like the ātman, in the Pāñcarātra system.

The probans, eternality, is not ascertained in the pot etc.,

(iii) *That which does not exist*: (சொருபமில்லது).

Sound is non-eternal

because of being seen

like visible form.

Probans does not exist in the subject.

equally weighted on both sides, there is no inference at all one way or the other for either is equally possible. Hence it is no fallacy. In bādhita (kālatita) the conclusion flies in the face of truth and this contradiction may be proved not merely by argument but by direct perception or other recognised means of proof. Maraijñāna Deśikar says that it can be subsumed under viruddha (contrary). Śivāgra yogin says that kālatyāpadiṣṭa and prakaraṇasama are only slightly different from the three others.

(iv) *Existence of the probans not being ascertained:*

(சொருபமுண்மை அறியப்படாதது).

When there is doubt as to whether it is smoke or dew,
taking it for smoke and arguing
This mountain has fire
because it has smoke

Here the existence of the probans, 'having smoke' is not ascertained.

(v) *Not having the qualification of the probans:*

(சொருபத்தின் விசேடணமில்லது).

Sound is non-eternal

because it is a visible quality

The qualification of the quality *visible* is not found in sound.

(vi) *The qualification of the probans not being ascertained:*

(சொருபத்தின் விசேடணமுண்மை அறியப்படாதது).

Kapila is subject to likes and dislikes

because he is a person without philosophic wisdom.

The qualification *without philosophic wisdom* is a matter for doubt; hence the qualification is not ascertained.

(vii) *Qualified probans where the qualified is absent:*

(சொருபத்தின் விசேடியமில்லது).

Sound is non-eternal

being a substance cognisable by the intelligence like a pot.

Here the qualified, *substance-ness* is absent from sound.

(viii) *Qualified probans where the qualified is not ascertained:*

(சொருபத்தின் விசேடியமுண்மை அறியப்படாதது).

Kapila is subject to likes and dislikes

because he is without philosophic wisdom associated with the quality of being a person.

Here, the qualified *without philosophic wisdom* is a matter for doubt. Hence it is not ascertained.

(ix) *Partial non-existence of probans:*

(சொருபம் ஒரு பக்கம் இல்லது).

The self and body are non-eternal

being products

like the pot.

Here the probans, products, is non-existent in one part of the subject (i.e., the self).

(x) *Partial non-ascertainment of the existence of the probans :*

(சொருபம் ஒரு பக்கம் உண்மை அறியப்படாதது).

The self and body are eternal
because of not being created

Here the body being not created is a matter for doubt. Hence the existence in one part of the subject is not ascertained.

(xi) *Probans not acceptable to the other :*

(சொருபம் பரனுக்குடன் பாடில்லது).

Sound is non-eternal
because of being created
like the pot.

Sound being created is not acceptable to the Mīmāṃsaka.

(xii) *Pervasion of the probandum not being ascertained :*

(சாத்தியத்தோடு வியாத்தியுண்மை அறியப்படாதது).

Everything is momentary
because non-existent
like water-bubbles.

There is no means of ascertaining the co-occurrence of momentariness and non-existence. Hence the pervasion of the probans by the probandum is not ascertained.

(xiii) *Pervasion brought about by artificial means :*

(செயற்கைபற்றி வியாத்தியுடையது).

Mango-fruit is tasty
because of being soft
like a plantain.

Here the co-occurrence of (sweet) taste and softness is brought about by artificial ripening of the fruit.

(xiv) *Establishing the opposite of what is sought to be established :*

(மறுதலைப் பொருள் சாதிப்பது).

Sound is eternal
being an effect.

The probans *being an effect* establishes non-eternality which is just the opposite of what is to be established.

(xv) *Being the subject of a counter probans which leads to the opposite conclusion :*

(மறுதலைப் பொருள் சாதிப்பதாய்ப் பிறிதோரேதுவை உடன் கொண்டு வருவது).

Sound is eternal
being audible

The previous argument is to be taken along with this. (The result is to establish the non-eternality of sound when its eternality was proposed to be established).

(xvi) *That which is contradicted by sense-perception :*

(காட்சி அளவையால் மறுக்கப்பட்டுக்கொண்டு வருவது).

Fire is not hot
because it is a substance
like water.

We know, as a matter of fact, that there is heat in fire. Hence the probans cannot establish the absence of heat in fire. Direct perception contradicts this fallacious argument.

(xvii) *That which is refuted by inference :⁶¹*

(கருதல் அளவையால் மறுக்கப்பட்டுக்கொண்டு வருவது).

Karma is eternal
because it is beginningless
like the soul.

This inference can be refuted by another e.g.,

Karma is non-eternal
because of being the result of the activities of the
mind, speech, etc.,
like the pot.

The probans 'beginningless' is thus rendered ineffective.

(xviii) *That which is refuted by verbal testimony :*

(உரை அளவையால் மறுக்கப்பட்டுக்கொண்டு வருவது).

All effects are without a first cause
because they arise in the middle

61. In re: to this and the following cf. the following : "Thus the contradicted reason (bādhita) figures in Prasastapāda as part of the contrary (viruddha) in the shape of the reason contradicted by the text of the school (āgamabādhita) and this can be traced further back to the antinomic reason (viruddhavyabhicārin of the Buddhist logic)".

But we have heard it said in the sacred works that effects have a first cause. Hence the probans *they arise in the middle* is rendered ineffective, by verbal testimony, to establish the non-existence of a first cause.

(xix) *Being found not only in the subject and the example but also in the counter-example :*

(பக்கசபக்கமாத்நிரையினன்றி விபக்கத்துஞ் சேறலுடையது).

This mountain has fire

because it is ascertainable by the means of valid knowledge.

Here we can see that *being ascertainable* by means of valid knowledge applies not only to the subject and example where we find fire but also to the lake (the counter-example) where we do not find fire.

(xx) *Being found in the subject alone without being found in the example :*

(சபக்கத்திற் சேறலின்றிப் பக்கமாத்நிரையினுள்ளது).

Sound is eternal

because it has the quality of soundness.

Here the probans quality of *soundness* pervades the subject alone without pervading any eternal thing that can be given as an example.

(xxi) Last comes *that for which there is no example or counter-example :* (சபக்கவிபக்கங்கள் கிடைக்கப்பெடுதது).

Everything is non-eternal

because of being cognisable by the means of knowledge.

Here everything is the subject, so much so, that there is nothing left to be the example or the counter-example.

*Fallacies of the example:*⁶² Example is the place for the ascertainment of the co-occurrence of the probans and the pro-

62. Śivāgṛa yogin classifies fallacies of example under two heads: sādhyavikala and sādhanavikala and says that in all we have eighteen fallacies in relation to positive inferences and negative inferences. Sādhyavikala is the absence of the thing sought to be established and sādhanavikala is the absence of the probans for the thing sought to be established.

Also cf. the following in the Śaiva Bhāṣa. "These fallacies of the example are discussed in the science of logic; why then are they not discussed here? They are not mentioned at first, since they can be included in fallacies of the *probans*, like asiddha. But since they are mentioned in the Śivāgama,

bandum. If, then, an example occurs in which the characteristic of the examples, i.e., the pervasion of the probandum by the probans is lacking, we have a fallacious and not a correct example. Such fallacies are nine in positive inferences and nine in negative inferences, thus aggregating to eighteen in all.

Nine fallacies which arise in positive inferences are :

(i) *That which has not got the probandum :*

(சாத்தியமுடைத்தாகாதது).

Mind is non-eternal
because it has colour
like the primal atom.

In the example, we do not have the probandum i.e., the primal atom is not non-eternal. According to the Naiyāyikas, the primal atom is eternal.

(ii) *That wherein the existence of the probandum is not ascertained :*

(சாத்தியமுடைமை நிச்சயிக்கப்படாதது).

He will become a king
because he belongs to the lunar dynasty
like the prince who is the heir apparent to the throne.

In the example, the probandum becoming a king, is a matter for doubt and hence is not ascertained.

(iii) *That which has not got the probans : (ஏதுவுடைத்தாகாதது).*

Mind is non-eternal
because it has colour
like karma.

In the example (karma), there is no probans (having colour).

(iv) *That wherein the existence of the probans has not been ascertained : (ஏதுவுடைமை நிச்சயிக்கப்படாதது).*

Devadatta is devoid of perfect knowledge.
because he has likes and dislikes
like the man in the street.

they are treated here separately. That is thus said in the sacred Pauṣkara "The fallaciousness of the dīṣṭānta which was indicated is now stated in detail. When it is said that sound is eternal, since it is pervasive, like ether, the example is devoid of the probandum : similarly there would be failure of the probans and so on".

Here the presence or absence of likes and dislikes in the man in the street is doubtful and has not been ascertained.

(v) *That which has neither the probans nor the probandum :*

(சாத்தியமும் ஏதுவும் உடைத்தாகாதது).

Mind is non-eternal
because it has colour
like ākāśa.

In the example ākāśa, the probandum (non-eternality) and the probans (having colour) are non-existent. According to the Naiyāyikas, ākāśa is eternal.

(vi) *That wherein the presence of the probandum and the probans have not been ascertained :*

(சாத்தியமுடைமையும் ஏதுவுடைமையும் நிச்சயிக்கப்படாதது).

This man will go to heaven
because of virtue gained in a previous life
like Devadatta

In the example, the presence of the probandum (going to heaven) and the probans (having virtue gained in a previous life) are to be ascertained, they are not certain.

(vii) *That which has no existence :* (சொருபமில்லது).

Mind is non-eternal
because it has colour
like the sky-flower

The sky flower being non-existent, we really do not have an example here.

(viii) *That the existence of which is not acceptable to another :*

(சொருபமுண்மை பரனுக்குடன் பாடாகாதது).

He is devoid of perfect knowledge
because there is doubt about the possibility of
perfect knowledge
as in the case of Devadatta who is to come.

Here, Devadatta's coming and there being doubt about his perfect knowledge have not been ascertained and so are not acceptable to another.

(ix) *Pervasion being brought about artificially :*

(செயற்கையானாகிய வியாத்தியுடையது).

This fruit is tasty
because it is soft
like the plantain

But the taste and softness of the plantain have been brought about by the artificial ripening of the fruit.

Nine fallacies in relation to negative inference :

- (i) *That which has not got the non-existence of the probandum :*

(சாத்தியமின்மை யுடைத்தாகாதது).

The soul is eternal

because it is pervasive

What is not eternal is also not pervasive, like ākāśa. Since for the Naiyāyikas, ākāśa is eternal, there is not the non-existence of probandum in the negative example.

- (ii) *That wherein the non-existence of the probandum has not been ascertained :*

(சாத்தியமின்மை யுடைத்தென்பது நிச்சயிக்கப்படாதது).

He will be a great king

because he belongs to the lunar dynasty.

Whoever has not been a great king has not been a descendent of the lunar dynasty, like another prince.

It has not been ascertained here that another prince has not been a great king.

- (iii) *That which has not got the non-existence of the probans :*

(ஏதுவின்மை யுடைத்தாகாதது).

Mind is non-eternal

because it has colour

What is not non-eternal has not colour

like the primal atom

The primal atom has colour and so we do not have the non-existence of the probans in the example.

- (iv) *That wherein the non-existence of the probans has not been ascertained :*

(ஏதுவின்மை யுடைத்தென்பது நிச்சயிக்கப்படாதது).

He is without perfect knowledge

because he has likes and dislikes

He who has perfect knowledge has no likes and dislikes

like the scholar well-versed in scriptural learning.

Here, the non-existence of likes and dislikes in the scholar well-versed in scriptural learning, has not been ascertained.

- (v) *That which does not have the non-existence of the probans and the probandum :*

(சாத்தியமின்மை ஏதுவின்மை யென்னும் இரண்டு முடைத் தாகாதது).

Mind is non-eternal
because it has colour
What is not non-eternal has no colour
like the pot.

In the example, pot, we have non-eternality and colour; hence the non-existence of the prodandum and the non-existence of the probans are not found in the example.

- (vi) *That wherein the non-existence of the probans and the probandum have not been ascertained :*

(இரண்டின்மையுமுடைத்தென்பது நிச்சயிக்கப்படாதது).

Mind is eternal
because it has no colour
What is non-eternal, is not without colour like ākāśa.

In the example, the prodandum (non-eternality) and the probans (absence of colour) are not found. (The Naiyāyikas consider ākāśa as eternal.)

- (vii) *that which has no existence: (சொருபமில்லது).*

Mind is non-eternal
because it has colour
What is not non-eternal is without colour
like the sky-flower,

As the sky-flower is non-existent we do not have the example at all.

- (viii) *that whose existence is not acceptable to another :*

(சொருபமுண்மை பரனுக்குடன் பாடாகாதது).

He has perfect knowledge
because he has no likes and dislikes
He who has not perfect knowledge is not without likes
and dislikes
like the Devadatta who is to be born.

Here Devadatta's birth etc., are not acceptable to another because they are doubtful and uncertain.

(ix) *That wherein negative concomitance is brought about artificially*: (வெதிரேக வியாத்தி செயற்கையானுடையது).

Water is that which does not undergo change of taste because it is not cooked

What is subject to change of taste is cooked like a fruit.

Here the concomitance of the change of taste in the fruit and its being artificially ripened is brought about by the effect of heat on the fruit.

Occasions for Reproof: If anywhere in the course of the comments on Fallacies, it is here that we find a substantial measure of agreement among the commentators. The twenty two occasions are named in the same way by Maraijñāna Deśikar, Śivāgra yogin and Nirambavaḷagiar. Śivajñāna yogin leaves out hetvābhāsa given by the others as the twenty second but substitutes the repetition of meaning also where the others recognise only repetition of the words. According to Keith, the fallacies proper (meaning thereby fallacies of the probans) are naturally included as a specially appropriate occasion for reproof.⁶³

In logical disputations, the Occasions for Reproof arising from incompetence to talk are twenty two and fall under two heads:—

(i) Confused reasoning (மயங்கப் பேசுதல்) and (ii) keeping silent (வாளாவிருத்தல்).

(i) A man may be guilty of giving away in the example his own proposition (pratijñāhāni)

(தானெடுத்துக்கொண்ட மேற்கோளைச் சாதிக்கமாட்டாமல் அதற்குக் கேடுவரப் பேசுதல்).

Sound is non-eternal

because it is cognisable by the senses, like the pot.

But, just as the pot is cognisable by the senses, the (class of) potness is also cognisable by the senses. When the opponent points out that (the class of) potness is not non-eternal, the person who stated the proposition comes to agree that pot is also eternal because it is cognisable by the senses, thus affecting his own original argument.

(ii) departing from the proposition stated (pratijñāntaram):

(பிற்தொரு மேற்கோளைக் கூறுதல்).

Sound is non-eternal

because it is cognisable by the ear.

63. Indian Logic and Atomism, p. 156.

The opponent may point out that because the sound in the conch is cognisable by the ear, it is certain that sound is non-eternal and therefore the proposition need not be established. Here the proposer states another proposition “that sound of the form of letters is non-eternal”.

(iii) *opposing one's own proposition (pratijñā-virodham*

மேற்கோளுக்கு மறுதலைப்படப் பேசுதல்).

Substance is different from quality

because it is not cognisable as other than its colour etc.

Here the probans ‘not cognisable as other than colour’ goes directly against the proposition that substance is different from quality.

(iv) *renouncing the proposition (pratijñā-sannyāsam*

மேற்கோளை விட்டுவிடுதல்).

Sound is non-eternal

because it is cognisable by the senses.

When the opponent argues that soundness is also cognisable by the senses and that soundness is not non-eternal, the proposer recants his statement.

(v) *shifting the reason (hetvāntaram*

தான்கூறிய ஏதுவிற்குக்குற்றம் வந்துழி வேறோராற்றானே துக்கூறுதல்).

Sound is non-eternal

because it is cognisable by the senses.

As the eternality of soundness is also cognisable by the senses, the opponent says that the probans is faulty. The proposer changes the reason and gives another in its place—‘cognisable by the senses in relation to the common class inhering in every substance’. This fresh probans is suggested by way of a qualification of the previous one.

(vi) *shifting the topic (arthāntaram*

தனக்கு வருந்தோல்வியைப் பிறிதொன்று பேசி மறைத்தல்).

Sound is non-eternal

because it is cognisable by the senses, like the pot.

When the opponent points out the faultiness of the probans on the ground that the class potness (கடத்தன்மை சாதியும்) is also

cognisable by the senses, the proposer says something else to cover up his defeat. He may say

Sound is the quality of akāśa

because it exists in the relation of inherence in akāśa.

And because that relation is non-eternal, sound is non-eternal.

(vii) *making remarks which are meaningless (nirarthakam*

பயனொடுபடாதன பேசுதல்).

Sound is non-eternal

because it is of the form of letters.

As the form of the letter is itself sound, adducing it as the reason is meaningless.

(viii) *being unintelligible (avijñātārtham*

பொருள் இனிது விளங்காத சொற்களை எடுத்துக்கொண்டு பேசுதல்).

Speaking in such a way that only with difficulty can the subject and predicate be found out; talking quickly; and using words which are largely out of use—these are all fallacies of avijñātārtha.

(ix) *being incoherent (apārthakam*

அவாய் நிலைதகுதி அண்மை இல்லனவாய்ப் பேசுதல்).

Cow—horse—man—elephant.

Here the words do not enter into meaningful relation with one another. In ‘quench with fire’ we see that fire has not got the capacity to put itself out. ‘Bring the cow’ when uttered letter by letter does not yield meaning.

(x) *improper sequence (apṛāptakālam*

மேற்கோள் முதலிய ஐந்தினையும் முறைபிறழ்ப் பேசுதல்).

Because it is an effect

Sound is non-eternal

So is this

like a pot

Therefore it is non-eternal.

(xi) *Saying too little (nyūnam*

மேற்கோள் முதலியவற்றில் சில குறையப் பேசுதல்).

This mountain has fire

because it has smoke

like the kitchen.

Here only three members of the syllogism are used whereas all the five are necessary for correct inference

(xii) *Saying too much (adhikam ஒன்றுக்குப் பலகூறுதல்).*

This mountain has fire

because it has smoke and brightness

like the kitchen and the blacksmith's forge.

Here we have more probans and examples than are absolutely necessary.

(xiii) *repeating oneself (punaruktam*

சொல்லை இரட்டித்துச் சொல்லல்).

Sound is non-eternal, sound is non-eternal.

(xiv) *repeating the meaning (பொருளை இரட்டித்துச் சொல்லல்).*

This is Śivajñāna yogin's substitute. Neither the other commentators nor the Naiyāyikas speak of it.

Sound is non-eternal, is liable to destruction

Here non-eternality and liability to destruction mean the same thing. It is unnecessary to use both.

(xv) *being reduced to silence (anubhāṣaṇam*

பிறன் கூறிய பொருளை அநுவதிக்கமாட்டாமை).

The inability of the person to refute what the opponent said and was understood by the assembly is an occasion for reproof. Normally it would be expected of him to state his opponent's position and point out its untenability.

(xvi) *displaying ignorance when an argument has thrice been repeated before him under the eyes of the assembly (ajñānam*

பிறன் கூறிய பொருளை அறிந்தும் அறியான்போன்று வினாத்தல்).

When the opponent has explained a thing thrice and when it has been understood by the assembly, the person declares that the meaning is not clear to him and asks for an explanation.

(xvii) *showing lack of ingenuity (apratibhā*

விடை சொல்லத் தெரியாது வேறொரு கருத்துடையான்போன்றிருத்தல்).

The person may pretend to be praying even when the argument has been thrice explained by his opponent and understood by the assembly.

(xviii) *evading discussion on the plea of business etc. (vikṣepa*

வாதத்தை விட்டுப் பிறிதொன்றைச் சொல்லிப்பொழுது போக்கல்).

When the discussion has already begun, the person may, wishing to while away the time, put off discussion by saying that the judges have not come, that the president of the assembly viz., the king has not come, and so on.

- (xix) *admitting a defect on his own side while criticising another* (*matānujña* சுபக்கத்துக்குச் சொல்லிய குற்றத்தைப் பரிகரியாது உடம்பட்டுப் பரபக்கத்துக்குக் குற்றம் பேசுதல்).

When a defect has been pointed out in one's argument the procedure is to prove that it is not a defect and then prove the opponent's argument to be defective. But the person may give room for reproof by admitting his defect and then criticising his opponent's argument.

- (xx) *When the opponent merits reproof failing to avail oneself of the opportunity to point this out.* (*paryanuyojoyopekṣaṇam*.
தோல்வித்தானம் எய்தினோனைத் தோல்வித்தானம் எய்தினோ
யென்று அறிந்து கூறுதிருத்தல்).

- (xxi) *Censuring what is correct* (*niranuyojyānyogam*
தோல்வித்தானம் எய்தாதானை எய்தினோயென்று கூறுதல்).

- (xxii) *Departing from a tenet which forms the basis of reasoning* (*apasiddhānta*
தன் சித்தாந்தத்திற் கிணங்காதவற்றைச் சொல்லிச் சித்தாந்தஞ்
சாதித்தல்).

The Sāṅkhya argues :

Modifications like mahat etc. arise from one cause, viz. prakṛti because they are seen to be of the same nature as prakṛti just as pot which is made of clay is a modification of clay (i.e. having the same nature).

The Sāṅkhya is asked, "What is prakṛti? What is its modification?" If he replies, 'That from which modifications which are asat appear is prakṛti. Whatever is subject to origination and destruction is a modification' he is guilty of espousing asatkārya-vāda which is opposed to his own view.⁶⁴

64. This is the example given by Śivāgra yogin for apasiddhānta.

CHAPTER III

PATI—THE LORD

Of the three means of valid knowledge accepted by the Siddhāntin, perception (in the sense of sensory perception) cannot establish the existence of Pati, paśu and pāśa.¹ Though there is scriptural warrant for the existence of these, verbal testimony itself is not accepted by all. So, it is sought to establish the existence of these declared in the scriptures by means of inference. Doubts may arise, Jñānaprakāsar reminds us, in our study of the scriptures. If we test by reason our beliefs gained through the scriptures, they will become firm convictions.

The first sūtra of the *Siddhiyār* sets forth the reasoning thus: "Since the Universe constituted of parts like 'he' 'she' and 'it' is subject to the states of emergence, stay and absorption in a regular order, there must be someone who thus causes it to come into existence. So, the Universe must have the Destroyer, into whom it was taken up when it went out of existence, for its efficient cause when it comes back into existence. The Destroyer who is eternally free and intelligent, causes the world to come into existence".

The Universe constituted of things classed as 'he', 'she' and 'it' (i.e., things denoted in the masculine, feminine and neuter genders) and, as being thus diverse and finite, requires a Creator.

1. Śivāgra yogin gives the meaning of these terms. Pati stands for Paśupati, the whole name being apprehended through a part thereof, even as Indra means Devendra. Paśupati means Lord of the souls (Paśūnām Patih Paśupatih).

Paśu - The soul is so-called because it is beginninglessly associated with āṇava (Paśuḥ paśutva samyogāt).

Pāśa is so-called because it beginninglessly binds and limits the pervasive intelligence of souls. Pāśa is the common name for āṇava, karma and māyā (bhandanāt pāśam ucyate).

Referring to three, instead of one bondage is not a figurative assumption. Because āṇava obstructs the omniscience of the soul, it is *Pratibandha*. Karma ceaselessly follows the soul, directing it towards enjoyment rather than attainment of release. Hence it is *anubandha*. Māyā limits the pervasiveness of the soul making it partial, it is therefore *sambandha*.

Further, because the Universe is constituted of parts, we can infer its being subject to the three states of emergence, stay and absorption. To manifest it, maintain it and withdraw it, an intelligent being is required. This being is none other than the Destroyer, for a thing can come only out of that into which it had previously gone. If the Destroyer had withdrawn the Universe into Himself, it is from Him that it can re-emerge.

Maraijāṇa Deśīkar, Śivāgra yogin and Jñānaprakāśar state the argument in syllogistic form. We shall give the syllogism as stated by Śivāgra yogin who examines its validity also.² He takes phrases from other verses also so as to state the reasoning in the author's own words :

“The must be someone to cause the Universe to come into being—*pratijñā* (தருபவன் ஒருவன் வேண்டும்).

Because the Universe comes into existence, stays any goes out of existence—*hetu* (வருமுறை வந்து நின்றபோவதும் ஆதலாலே).

(whatever comes into existence etc., must have a cause as for instance the following)

It is due to the potter that there is the production of pot, etc., from clay—*drṣṭānta*

(மண்ணினிற் கடாதியெல்லாம் வருவது குலாலனாலே).

He creates all the forms He wants to create—*upanaya*

(எண்ணிய உருவமெல்லாம் இயற்றுவன்).

He brings about all the effects He contemplates from their respective causes—*nigamana*

(கண்ணு காரியங்களெல்லாம் காரணமதனிற் காண்பான்).

Śivāgra yogin proceeds to examine the validity of the syllogism. *Hetu* (probans) must have five merits and must be free from five defects.

1. *Pakṣadharmatva* (existence of the probans in the subject).

Because the Universe is an effect, the probans is in the subject. The fallacy of *asiddha* (the absence of the probans from the subject) is avoided.

2. Maraijāṇa Deśīkar and Jñānaprakāśar state the probans differently. The former states it as 'because it is constituted of parts like 'he', 'she' and 'it'. The latter says the probans is implied and states it thus—'because of being an effect.'

The Universes is established to be an effect because it is diverse and finite as constituted of parts like 'he', 'she' and 'it'.

2. *Sapakṣesattva* (existence of the probans in the positive example).

Because it is seen in effects like the pot.

The fallacy of *viruddha* (reason leading to an opposite conclusion) is avoided.

3. *Vipakṣādvyaṅṛtti* (absence of the probans from negative example).

There is no 'effectness' in the soul.

The fallacy of *anaikāntika* (reason leading to more than one conclusion) is avoided.

4. *Abādhita viṣayatva* (the absence of obstruction to an inference by the origination of another sublating cognition).

Because of being subject to origination and destruction, the Universe cannot but have a Creator.

The fallacy of *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* (that for which the time has gone by) is avoided.

5. *Asatpratipakṣatva* (absence of obstruction to the probandum by a counter-probans which establishes a conclusion contrary to the original probandum).

Because the material cause, *māyā* and, auxiliary cause, karma are inert, because the intelligence and activity of the souls are clouded and limited by *āṇava* and because *Hiraṇyagarbha*, *Nārāyaṇa* and others come to possess bodies, etc., created by the Lord after creation of the Universe, there is no obstruction to the establishment of the Creatorship of Śiva.

There is the avoidance of *prakaraṇasama* (i.e., the fallacy of *satpratipakṣa*).

Of the four types of *anumāna* (inference), we can use the *dharmādharmy-anumāna* (inference of the substrate from the attribute) to show that Śiva is the Creator of the world.

Because the Universe is a product, there is (a cognitive and conative) Energy to envisage and bring into existence this product.

There must be someone to possess this Energy.

Though there may be clay, wheel, stick, the person who wants a pot and the potter, a pot comes into existence, only if there is activity on the part of the potter. If he does not work, there is no pot although all the other conditions for the making of a pot are there. Even so, by positive and negative inference, we can argue thus: though *māyā*, karma, souls and *Īśvara* are eternally present, if there is activity on the part of the Energy inherent in *Śiva*, the Universe comes into existence; if not, the Universe does not come into existence.

Does not the example of the potter go against the proposition that *Śiva* is the Creator of everything? No. Creatorship can be distinguished into two types as (i) directing creatorship (*prayojaka kartṛtva*) and (ii) directed creatorship (*prayojya kartṛtva*). *Śiva* is everywhere the directing Creator whereas potters and others are everywhere directed creators. Therefore, the original proposition is not affected; neither does the example contradict the proposition to be established.

Śivāgṛha yogin says that the mode of causation is also suggested by the word 'he' 'she', and 'it' used in the singular number. The incomparable Lord is the efficient cause (*nimitta*); the Energy inherent in *Śiva* is the womb; and the karma of the souls is the auxiliary cause. *Bindu* is the material cause. He goes on to point out the significance of the words of the Text. The words 'because the Universe comes into existence, stays and goes out of existence in an order' refute the views of the *Cārvākas* and the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsakas* that the Universe is eternal and needs no Creator. 'There must be some one to produce the Universe', refutes the view of the atheists while 'some one' refutes the view of the polytheists. 'He is the beginning and end' (of all things) indicates that He is eternal. The word *maruṇidum* ('மருணிடும்') means that He is all pervasive. By 'the eternally free One' *Śiva* is distinguished from *Ananteśvara* and others whose release can be dated back to a beginning. *Śiva's* autonomy is also thereby indicated.

Having set forth his position, the *Siddhāntin* proceeds to examine criticism thereof by the followers of other schools. In the *Parapakkam*, *Aruṇandi* stated the views of other schools and refuted them from his standpoint. Here, the procedure is different. He states his position and meets objections brought against it.

Thus, the charge that the *Supakkam* repeats what was said in the *Parapakkam* is untenable.³

We may start with the objection that the Siddhāntin uses reality of the world as the basis of his proof for God's existence and that this basis is an unproved assumption.

If the Siddhāntin bases his proof for the existence of God on the reality of the world, what is his warrant therefor? Śivāgra yogin says that the reality of the world is given in direct perception. The objector questions the validity of perception on the ground that sometimes we see things wrongly. Error in perception is a fact of experience and such being the case, how can validity be claimed for perception? When thus perception is at fault and has no validity, inference which is based on perception cannot be valid either. Nor can verbal testimony, opposed to perception and inference, be valid.

The Siddhānta questions the correctness of this argument He argues for the validity of perception (see *Māpāḍiyam*, pp. 161-2). In a perception giving rise to two alternatives as for example, whether a thing perceived is a post or a man or when one is wrongly perceived for the other, the difficulty is removed when the post and man are both independently perceived, or when there is clear perception of it as the one and not the other. Erroneous perception occurs in regard to some objects and some times, as when a rope is mistaken for a snake. But in clear perception, a pot for example, is seen to be a pot by all persons and at all times. Similarly the reality of the world is given in direct perception of it. Inference, based on valid perception and, verbal testimony consistent with both these, are valid.

The Siddhāntin does not accept the view that the world is super-imposed on Brahman and that the latter is mistaken for the former. His objection is that there is no similarity between the world and Brahman as there is between the rope and snake (both appearing coiled up, etc.). The world is acit and Brahman is cit. How, then, can there be super-imposition of the world on Brahman?

3. Śivajñāna yogin says that what is said in the 2nd and 1st pādas of the *Vedānta sūtras* is also thus understood.

Again, what is the *pramāṇa* for taking the world to be non-real? Is it valid or invalid? If it is valid, since it is part of the world (which it tries to establish as non-existent) by accepting it we are forced to accept the world: i.e., It cannot be argued that the world, containing something real, is wholly non-real. If it is invalid, we cannot establish the non-reality of the world through an invalid *pramāṇa*.

The Lokāyata recognises nothing as valid which is not sanctioned by sense perception. So he naturally objects to the statement that the world has a beginning and end when all that we see is its continuous existence⁴. According to him the world is beginningless. But the Siddhāntin meets the Lokāyata on the latter's own ground. He says he will not make use of inference, etc., to enforce his argument, as origination and destruction of things (constituted by the elements) are as much facts of perceptual experience (as seen in the origin and destruction of bodies, etc., constituted by the elements) as their present existence.

The Lokāyata says that it is natural for the elements themselves to come into existence and go out of it. The Siddhāntin replies that it is not natural for a thing by itself to undergo the many changes it does. If it undergoes changes perpetually, then there is nothing that can be called its nature, if the changes are excluded. It may be said that the elements themselves cause these changes. But, as Maraijñāna Deśīkar points out, if the elements themselves, by their functioning cause these changes, how does it happen that earthquakes occur, that water is warm in some places, that fire does not burn in some places and wind does not blow? There is a breach in all these instances of the law of uniformity of Nature. As these exceptional conditions are seen and as the elements are inert, an intelligent director of the Universe must be assumed to cause the elements to function.

Jñānaprakāśar examines the Lokāyata's position in more detail. The essence of a thing does not consist in its undergoing perpetual changes, for nothing would be left thereby. But the Lokāyata may say that if change does not constitute the nature of a thing, even the omnipotent God cannot bring about the production and

4. Jñānaprakāśar says that the Lokāyata objects to treating the world as an effect on the ground that it consists of parts and that it is subject to the three states and thence proceeding to look for its cause.

destruction of things whose nature is so 'static as not to admit of these changes. Therefore, he argues, that a thing has two phases, i.e., of being subject to creation] and destruction. The Siddhāntin asks why destruction is not seen during creation and creation during destruction, if a thing is subject to both. The Lokāyata says that he admits changes in the thing but that he denies their simultaneity. It is the Bauddha who says that changes are simultaneous. To the Bauddha, a thing is simultaneously in and out of existence. The Lokāyata says that changes like creation and destruction are seen in things; and things acted upon require an agent to act upon them. Although mutability resides in things constituting their essence, changes are latent when they are in a certain condition. The changes are dependent upon the causal aggregate, like the agent, and they do not arise from their first cause. Therefore, it is natural for things to be dependent upon an agent for the changes they undergo.

Having agreed to the need for an agent to cause the change, if the Lokāyata maintains that the elements themselves are the agent, the Siddhāntin points out that the elements being inert and passive, require some agent other than themselves to cause the changes that they undergo. The elements being themselves what undergo the changes, they require some one to cause the changes. They cannot cause their own origination and destruction. The causal agent and the thing acted upon are not to be identified. Śivajñāna yogin points out when we say some one stabbed himself, that which stabbed is his hand and that which was stabbed is some other part of his body.

Jñānaprakāśar says existence refers beyond itself to creation and destruction. Existence of the world refers back to creation and forward to destruction. In the light of the connection that obtains in the mind between creation, maintenance and destruction, viewing the Universe as caused, the Universe is seen to require an agent who is above these changes and who is perfect.

One sect of the Lokāyatas will accept the three states of emergence, etc., for the world. But they argue thus: Of the four elements, air maintains the other elements and exists in their company; fire destroys the other three elements and is destroyed with them; water causes the other three elements to appear and appears with them; and earth cause the fructification of the results to be experienced from the other elements and in their

presence it itself fructifies. So of what avail is it to invoke some one else when the elements themselves are thus seen to cause all the changes? The Siddhāntin's reply is substantially the same to this question also. The elements being inert cannot come into existence by themselves or bring one another into existence.

The Sautrāntikas now enter the field. They say that everything arises in a chain of succession, caused by the existent of the previous moment and causing the existent of the following moment. If everything is caused by its predecessor and causes its successor there is no need for a being other than the events to cause them. Why should a God, who is great by virtue of being above origin and destruction, be invoked to explain what can quite naturally be explained without Him? There is the seed; out of the seed arises the sprout. The seed as such has disappeared giving place to the sprout. Surely, the sprout depends for its existence on the seed of the previous moment? The Siddhāntin asks a counter-question: What is it that appears? What is not, cannot appear, while what is, need not appear. Hare's horns being non-existent cannot appear; while a pot being existent, need not appear. So are we to take it, like the Mādhyamika, that what is neither existent nor non-existent but indeterminable appears?⁵

When we ask, if what is said to be neither existent nor non-existent but indeterminable does not exist, those who hold this view will have to say either that it exists or that it does not. If the former, why not say so? If the latter, how can it appear? In any case, it cannot be called the indeterminable because it will have to come under existence or non-existence. An indeterminable thing is really a void and as such it cannot appear. Thus, neither the non-existent things of the Sautrāntika nor the indeterminable things of the Mādhyamika can be said to appear. So we have to conclude that both cause and effect exist and that the latter is manifested from the former through the instrumentality of God. This is positively and negatively known thus. When the

5. Jñānaprakāśar reminds us that to the Buddhas, the Buddha is only a preceptor, not the Lord of the Universe. Jñānaprakāśar says that waiving the question of the existence or otherwise of God, the Buddha has to make clear what it is that appears. Nīrambavajagiar states the Sautrāntika position thus: 'In the inference of the five skandhas, everything classifiable under what has form or is without it arises in a chain of dependence upon its immediate predecessor. So, there is no need for God'.

potter works on clay which is the first cause with the wheel, stick, etc., which are the auxiliary causes, we know the result will be a pot or a jar and not a cloth.⁶

When the objection of the *Mādhayamikas* is shown to be groundless, the Jainas may take up the question trying to answer it in their own way. They may contend thus: Why not say that a thing in the form of an effect or as produced, has the double nature of existing and not existing and thus stands in no need of God to cause it? If it is its nature to come into existence and go out of it, it is superfluous to invoke God to explain activities carried on automatically. The *Siddhāntin* objects to this view on the ground that a thing cannot have the double and opposed nature of existing and not existing. If it exists, it cannot be non-existent at the same time; if it is non-existent, it can never come into existence or be said to exist. These are contradictions; they oppose each other and between themselves, they cannot constitute the nature of a thing. On the other hand, if it is said that by existence and non-existence, existence in the form of cause and non-existence in the form of effect are meant, the *Siddhāntin* replies that cause and effect are non-different and that because the cause exists, its effect is latent in it and will be manifested through the intervention of some agent.

So far, the objections of the heterodox schools were considered. Now the objections of some of the orthodox schools are taken up. The *Mīmāṃsakas* say that we see the origin and decay only of bodies classifiable as 'he', 'she' and 'it'. We do not see the origin and decay of the material universe as a whole. In other words, it would result in the fallacy of composition^{6a} if we predicate of the whole material universe changes affecting only parts of it. The *Siddhāntin* says that the material universe which thus deludes the objector is not a simple unit but is constituted of

6. Maraijñāna Deśīkar treats the matter here as an exposition of *Satkāryavāda*. He quotes a verse which means. 'Those who know the *Āgamās* are free from the delusion that the non-existent comes into existence and that the existent is annihilated'.

6a. In a brief review in the *New Indian Antiquary*, (Vol. II, No. 2, May 1939) of 'The Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Religion,' in 2 volumes by Sadhu Santinatha and of *Māyāvāda* or the non-dualistic Philosophy (*Vedānta*), by the same author, Prof. S. S. S. says: "Nor is it very sound to convict the theist of the fallacy of composition, in the face of the determined attempts of systems like the *Śaiva Siddhānta* to avoid just this fallacy".

earth, water, fire, air and ākāṣa.⁷ Therefore (as constituted of parts) it comes into existence and goes out of it, just as the bodies constituted of the various elements do.

Śivāgṛa yogin quote a maxim of the Bhāṭṭas: 'Na kadācidanīdṛśam jagat' which means—'The world was never unlike this'. He says that the Bhāṭṭas contend that only bodies, pots, etc., which are effects are created and destroyed and not the material universe which is of the form of the five elements which are not effects but causes. The Siddhāntin replies thus, 'Because the Vedas say that earth, water, etc., are evolved one from another commencing with ākāṣa, the Mīmāṃsakas who abide by the statements of the Vedas cannot but accept the origin and destruction of the Universe'.⁸

The objector contends that we never witness the destruction of the entire world. When one part of the Universe is destroyed, another persists. To say that the entire Universe is destroyed is to contradict verbal testimony to the effect that the world is eternal. Moreover, if everything is summarily destroyed, there will be nothing from which re-origination of the world can take place. Why not say that one part of the Universe is destroyed when another persists? The Siddhāntin says that this is not so. We find that various things belonging to the same genus exist at a particular time and are destroyed wholesale at another time. Seeds, e.g., manifest their sprout during the spring; the sprouts which develop into plants are destroyed about the beginning of autumn. So, also the world, being material, is subject to similar origination and destruction. When the time comes for it, the world is manifested; again, when the time is ripe for it, the world is destroyed. May be, the intervals are prodigiously long. But the process is analogous.

We noticed earlier the objection that to say of the whole what can be said of the parts only is to commit the fallacy of compo-

7. Śivajñāna yogin says that in the foregoing the objections of the Sautrāntikas and others have been met, Satkāryavāda has been maintained and the necessity for a Creator established.

8. Śivajñāna yogin, however, says that it is wrong to argue that because the Mīmāṃsakas accept the validity of the Vedas they have to accept also the evolution and involution of the elements declared by the Vedas: The Mīmāṃsakas say that all passages which do not set forth prescription etc., are only figurative.

sition. But the Siddhāntin has been, from the outset, treating the world as an effect on the ground that it is diverse and finite. He is basing his argument on an analysis of the instances studied. Their nature reveals that they are effects. Hence, the argument need not be considered fallacious in so far as it is based on the *essential* nature of things. We can justify his procedure on another ground also. The Siddhāntin is arguing from analogy that the world also is subject to creation and destruction by giving an instance where *objects of a whole class* are seen to undergo these changes.

If origin and destruction of the world are said to come about with the passage of time, why not take time to be God? The Siddhāntin replies that time is unintelligent and inert. No doubt, time does play a part in these changes. But it is only as an auxiliary cause.

The Naiyāyikas¹⁰ say that after the destruction of the Universe, the primal atoms come together to constitute the Universe,

9. Maraijñāna Deśiker quotes Tolkāppiyam.

இறப்பே நிகழ்வே எதிரதென்னும்
திறத்தியல் மருங்கில் தெரிந்தனர் உணரப்
பொருள் நிகழ்புரைப்பது காலமாகும்.

(Roughly, it means that Time is what records the history of things as belonging to its three phases, past, present and future). He adds that no eternity is predicated of this time as is done by the Jaina, Kaṇāda and Akṣapāda. Maraijñāna Deśiker and Śivāgra yogin take the objector here to be the Kāleśvaravādin, while others take him to be the Mīmāṃsaka. Maraijñāna Deśiker explains the objector's view thus: Though time may be inert, it causes the changes from childhood to youth and youth to old age in the lives of human beings and blossoming, yielding fruits etc., in their due seasons, in plant life. Śivāgra yogin mentions two more considerations urged by the objector. They are (i) Time exists eternally; and (ii) no one can rise about it.

Jñānaprakāśar explains the view that time is inert by saying that it does not know what is the cause or effect or instrument or purpose of any given thing.

10. Śivajñāna yogin says that though the atomic theory is espoused by the Sautrāntikas, Vaibhāṣikas and the Jainas also, its refutation is directed against its prominent exponent viz., the Naiyāyikas. Taking the objector to be the Ārḥata, Śivāgra yogin states his point of view thus: primal atoms (and not māyā) constitute the universe even as grass, plants and trees constitute a forest; Creation and destruction can be accounted for by the atoms and the karma of souls. No God is necessary. Jñānaprakāśar says that for the Ārḥatas, Arheśvara is the Lord only in matters of instruction. He is not considered the Lord of the Universe.

stay for a time and then get resolved again. Like karma and kāla, the desire of the Lord is also one of the causes and nothing more. Why should primacy be given to the Lord? The Siddhāntin replies that atoms, like karma and kāla, are inert. They cannot, by their joint activity, bring about creation, etc., without an intelligent agent. Besides, when the Universe is destroyed, the atoms are not spared their fate. Whence then can their re-grouping arise?

The Naiyāyikas may retort: Atoms are the cause of the universe. If they are destroyed, the Universe which is the result of their aggregation is also destroyed. How can the Universe re-emerge from the pralaya state? The Siddhāntin says that māyā which is eternal and is filled with the presence of the Divine Energy is the first cause of the Universe. Hence though the primal atoms may be destroyed, there is no difficulty for the re-emergence of the Universe. The Naiyāyikas may ask why we should take māyā to be the cause when we can stop with atoms. The Siddhāntin's reply is that since the atoms are known to be effects, māyā which is without parts, must be their cause.

But why should atoms be taken as effects? The Siddhāntin says that we judge a thing to be effect if it is multiple and has parts, like a pot. Atoms must have parts. Otherwise, there can be no relation between two or more atoms enabling them to come together and constitute objects as they do. As all effects are thus destructible as having parts, māyā which has no parts and therefore is indestructible is the cause of the Universe.¹¹

11. Śivāgra yogin states the doctrine of the Naiyāyikas thus; As a result of the Lord's desire and the potency arising for the experience of the souls, there begins activity in primal atoms in combination of twos. When primal atoms of the same class come together dyads result. When the dyads in groups of three form the triads we see them in the sunbeam. Mahāprthivi and other things arise in combinations of triads through parts. Thus, water, fire, air etc. arise through their respective paramāṇus. Dissolution begins when there is the Lord's desire to destroy and there is no potency for the experience of souls. There is activity in the primal atoms constituting the four primal elements; and this activity leads to separation and destruction. Ākāśa, kāla, dik and ātman are pervasive and eternal, whereas mind is non-eternal. In refuting this position, Śivāgra yogin says that since ākāśa, kāla, dik, etc., have been declared by the Vedas and Āgamas to have an origin, they cannot be eternal.

Both in the Vedas and in empirical usage, there is sanction for the view that *māyā* is responsible for the creation, sustenance and destruction of the Universe. The Vedas declare *māyā* to be the primal cause.¹² In empirical usage, we find it said that if the leaves, etc., exist in a latent condition in the seed, they will be manifested later and that if they are not so present in a subtle form in their cause, they can never be manifested. Thus, both positively and negatively, the pre-existence of the effect in the cause is ascertained. It will be seen, therefore, that *māyā* is taken to be the cause not only because it is said to be without parts but also because of Vedic declarations and ideas current in empirical usage, calling attention to the general principle of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause.¹³

The Universe which resides in *māyā* is subject to creation and destruction. If it is not admitted that the effect is pre-existent in its cause, then we should grant the possibility of a hare growing horns. An objection may be raised. Do the leaves that a tree sheds go back to that tree to re-appear as leaves once again? If not, why should we say that the effect pre-exists in its cause and is manifested later? The Siddhāntin finds no difficulty here. Because the leaves that have dropped off from the tree have a potential causal existence, other factors such as time, karma, etc., being present, they can manifest themselves later on.¹⁴

12. Know *māyā* is *prakṛti*, says the Śvetāśvatara, 4, 10.

13. Śivāgra again gives the following illustration. Even as from the minute seed of the banian tree, leaves, flowers and fruits spring forth, the seen Universe emerges from the unseen *māyā*. *Māyā* reconciles what is not otherwise reconcilable. If the aggregation of the primal atoms were the Universe, then we should say that what stands as branch, twig etc., is only an aggregation of the primal atoms. This is not so. Neither can the Universe be an aggregation of the primal atoms. To be reduced to this position is to have invited the reproof called *apratibhā*. The only course left, says this commentator, is to accept *māyā* as the cause.

Jñānaprakāśar says that enquiring along the lines of Satkāryavāda, we are led to accept *māyā* as the primal cause.

14. cf. Carlyle's remark: There is power in the rotting leaf; how else could it rot? - quoted in the Philosophy of Advaita, p. 219. N.

Jñānaprakāśar says that leaves which fall from the tree (which is the cause) are absorbed into the earth which with other conditions brings forth the tree. Though the identical leaves do not go back, when the tree which contains the energy to cause an infinite number of leaves, is there, many different leaves appear in it.

It may be said that those who hold the doctrine of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, cannot consistently speak of the destruction of the world.^{14a} The Siddhāntin replies that because what is considered to be the cause is an existent, what comes from it, viz., the effect is also an existent. Therefore the world is beginningless and eternal. But we speak of the world as having a beginning and as non-eternal because God manifests this world from māyā and because it is subject to changes. Without regard to the changes it undergoes, the world may be called eternal.¹⁵

But even māyā by itself cannot account for the world and its changes. God is necessary. Just as pot is an effect produced from clay by the potter, the Universe constituted by the elements is an effect produced from māyā by God. For the production of an effect, e.g., pot, three causes are required—the first cause (clay), the auxiliary cause (wheel, stick, etc.) and the efficient cause (the potter). Likewise, to account for the world we require māyā, Śakti and God. Cannot the finite soul which is intelligent produce the world? No; the finite soul can know only when the physical (and ps,ychical) apparatus is supplied to it by māyā. Māyā cannot be the ultimate (and efficient) cause,¹⁶ because as the cause of the inert Universe, it is not itself conscious. So, by elimination of the finite soul (pāśu) and māyā (pāśu), we find that what remains, viz., Pati (God) is the Creator of the Universe.¹⁷

14a. Śivāgra yogin takes the objector here as the Nihilist who presses his view that the void is the cause, when the Siddhāntins and the atomists are criticising each other. The Siddhānta is that just as in the ocean (cause), waves, foam, bubbles etc., arise by the play of wind on the waters and are absorbed again, the Energy of the Lord agitates māyā and from the agitated sphere, four kinds of bodies, world, etc., come forth - they are (i) udbhijja. (soil-born), (ii) svedaja (sweat-born), (iii) aṇḍaja (egg-born) and (i) jarāyuja (placenta-born).

15. Jñānaprakāśar says that the Siddhānta is that the world is eternal even as a ceaselessly flowing river is. Māyā, the cause, is ever-existent. So, the world its effect, is also ever-existent—whether in a latent or a patent form. Because the worlds come into existence one after another, they are compared to a stream.

16. Marañjāna Deśikar's definition of cause is interesting. He says that cause is that which precedes the effect, is indispensable for the production of the effect and produces none other than that effect.

17. Śivāgra yogin says that the creator spoken of here is Anantēśvara who carries out the mandate of Sadāśiva. Creation here refers to āsuddha māyā.

A difficulty is noticed. The Lord is said to create the Universe, as the potter makes the pot. The potter occupies some place on the earth while he makes pots. But, where can the Lord be, if He is to create the Universe? The Universe has not yet come into existence: that it may, the Lord has to create it. Where can the Lord stand to create the world if space itself has not been brought into existence?

This appears to be a crude objection to the first view. But on examination it is found to be based on genuinely felt difficulties. Though the concepts of space and time are indispensable to our thinking, they are, by no means, easily intelligible. As a matter of fact, dialectics makes short work of them, pointing out contradictions and condemning them as non-real. But with all that, by their persistence in our thinking, they show themselves necessary and useful. Normally it is difficult to think of an object except as existing somewhere and somewhen. If, therefore, we are asked to think of Reality without these first and then bring them in as later creations, we are sorely perplexed.

The Lord must station Himself somewhere if He is to set about His work—in which case space exists prior to creation. If it is said that the Lord exists everywhere, we find that what is characterised as everywhere has itself been brought into existence by Him. We begin to argue in a circle. The Lord cannot create if there is no place for Him to take His stand first; but there can be no place unless He creates it!

The *Siddhāntin* recognises the difficulties and attempts an answer. The Lord, unlike the world, is beyond the ken of speech and thought. It is hard to understand what form He assumes. Yet, with the help of an example, we may try to understand the position. The Universe is brought into existence, maintained and destroyed by the lapse of time. While thus causing all occurrences, time supports them all without itself being supported by anything. In the same way, we may understand God's activity.

We should remember in this connection that though the *Siddhāntin* recognises the importance of time, time is for him only an auxiliary cause. Besides, he frankly admits the difficulty and, without attempting an implausible explanation, suggests an analogy.

Is the Lord affected by His activity? Because the *Siddhāntin* recognises the existence of division of time into past, present and

future according to the activities of creation, maintenance and destruction, the objector asks if God will not become subject to changes of state by reason of His activity.

The Siddhāntin's reply shows that he recognises the transcendent as well as the immanent aspect of the Lord.

The states of wakefulness, sleep, etc., arise and subside in the soul; thereby the soul becomes subject to them and is bound by them. Likewise, the Lord in Whom all the worlds merge and from Whom they re-appear becomes subject to the states of involution, enjoyment and authority (*laya*, *bhoga* and *adhikāra*). But even as the words studied from books and their meanings remain in the buddhi tattva, merge and re-appear in the intelligence of the self without affecting it thereby, the Lord is not bound by being subject to different states.¹⁸ Jñānaprakāśar says that the Lord is related to the world only by His presence and His resolve which brings about creation, etc.,—not otherwise.

Why should the Universe and all souls which were absorbed in Hara be made manifest again? It is because maturation of the impurity of souls is to be brought about, prior to the removal of the impurity. The objector may say: If this is His object, the Universe could very well have continued to exist. Why should it be destroyed and then re-created?¹⁹ The Siddhāntin replies that the Lord destroys the Universe to give rest to the souls overcome by weariness. The products of *māyā* are destroyed in

18. Marijñāna Deśīkar is for taking both instances as showing that the soul is not affected by the change of states and the remembering or forgetting of things read. Śivāgra yogin says that what we read in the Śāstras remains latent in the mind until recall and likewise, if the Lord does not will, there is no creation and when He wills, we have the manifestation of the Universe. Even as the five states arise and subside in the soul, the energies of the Lord, are manifested and withdrawn on the occasions when He is Śakta, Udyuka and Pravṛtta.

19. Śivāgra yogin raises the question whether the destruction of *anna*, *prāṇa* and *mano-māya-kośas* at the time of *pralaya* does not mean the release of souls. He replies that so long as *āṇava* remains, the souls have no experience of Śiva, though the products of *māyā* with which they were associated are destroyed. As *māyā* persists even after destruction of its products, there is the possibility of recreation to enable souls to get rid of their *āṇava*.

Jñānaprakāśar says that for the Siddhāntin, absorption and manifestation of souls do not mean as they do for the Vedāntins and Pāñcarātras, absorption in and manifestation from Brahman and Nārāyaṇa Prakṛti respectively. The illumination and help caused by *māyā*'s products and the obscuration

their state as effects but are latent in their cause. The products of *māyā* are manifested by the Lord Who sees to it that the karma of souls is also made manifest without break in continuity with the past.

The Siddhāntin gives an illustration to show that the Lord is not affected by His activities. When the sun shines, the lotus blossoms forth, the burning-glass emits fire and the water in the earth dries up. While the sun is responsible for these changes, it itself does not undergo any change. So, it is with the Lord also.

Śivāgra yogin says that the creation of the Universe is comparable to the blossoming of the lotus, the fructification of karma during the state of maintenance to the burning-glass emitting fire and the destruction of the Universe to water drying up.²⁰

Schomerus is inclined to think that the Siddhāntin's explanation, of how God Who is immutable can be the author of changes, by means of analogies is unsatisfactory.²¹ In addition to the sun-lotus analogy, Schomerus mentions the crystal analogy. It is not proper to compare Śiva Who is intimately connected with things with the crystal which is only loosely connected with the things whose colours it reflects. He finds the sun-lotus analogy also unsatisfactory likewise. He says that the problem is not whether things outside Śiva affect Him as whether things in Him affect Him.

It is good to remember in the first place that all comparisons, as Śivajñāna yogin points out,²² are partial only—they can never

and thwarting caused by *āpava* to the soul's intelligence and activity are spoken of by the Siddhāntin as the birth and death of the soul. Since the cause of these is Śiva (for ultimately nothing can take place without Him), these are figuratively ascribed to Him.

20. Jñānaprakāśar explains Śiva's five activities thus: *Sṛṣṭi* is the manifestation, by the will of the Creator of the effect from its first cause through the preponderance of the *sattva* element.

Sthiti is the stay of the effect in dependence on its first cause through the preponderance of the *rajas* element.

Samhāra is the cessation of their duties by things and their disappearance into their first cause.

Tirobhāva is the power of obscuration which causes attachment in the soul for enjoying that which is condemned most, all the while believing it to be good.

Anugraha is the removal of *pāśa* and manifestation of Śivatva.

21. Der Caiva Siddhānta, p. 97.

22. Māpāḍiyam, p. 158.

be complete. Again the propriety of talking about things *outside* Śiva and things *inside* Śiva is highly questionable. Jñānaprakāśar's comments help us to understand the whole position. He meets the objection that the effects attributed to the sun in the example may not be due to the sun by affirming that they take place only in the presence of the sun. As for the objection that since the potter and God are both intelligent entities, there is no point in exempting God from being affected His activity when the potter is not exempt, the following reply is given. In the case of the potter, the modification of his gross body is brought about by the modification of his subtle body which again is brought about by the resolve of the unmodified, unmoved Cit-Śakti. To seek a further cause is to be launched on an infinite regress. We say that the potter is affected only in so far as his psychological organism is concerned; as for the Śakti part of the potter, there is no modification. When we go thus far in our analysis we find that there is some part of the potter, initiating but unaffected by his activity. This being so, there is no impropriety in saying that the Lord is not affected by His activity.

It may be asked why Śiva should be said to be responsible for all the activities, when it is usual to speak of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva as responsible for them. The Siddhāntin replies that Brahmā and Viṣṇu, on account of their merit, have been given the high authority of Śiva to carry out His mandate.²³

23. Śivajñāna yogin quotes the following line from Poṭṭippahroḍai

நல்வினைக்கண்வாணுளின் மாலாய் அயனாகி

and claims that the Caturvedatātparya Saṅgraha shows this to be the view of the Vedas, Purāṇas and Itihāsas.

Śivāgra yogin expresses a different view. He quotes the Siddhiyār line

“நவந்தரும் பேதம் ஏகநாதனே நடிப்பன்”

in his support. He says that the Conative ‘Energy of the Lord settles in Brahmā, causing the predominance of activity. Conative and Cognitive activity settle equally in Viṣṇu causing a condition where intelligence and activity are equal to one another. In Kāla Rudra, the Cognitive Energy alone settles and thus intelligence predominates. Śiva (the Lord) transcends māyā. As for the Trinity, Viṣṇu governs the Universe created by Brahmā and Kāla Rudra destroys it. As the Trinity have these three qualities, they control the three guṇas of prakṛti and remain in the Universe. These deities come under the category of Pati. They are responsible for the creation, maintenance and destruction of the gross products. Just as when the red-hot iron-ball is seen, what emits the glow is fire and not the ball, the Trinity appear to function by themselves, while in reality, they are controlled by Śiva.

If, even after destruction, Brahmā and Viṣṇu continue to exist with all their powers, complete destruction cannot be said to have taken place. Besides, the Destroyer does not spare anything.²⁴ while there is none to destroy Him. Because He alone remains after destruction, it is from Him, all things absorbed previously, must re-emerge. He is their support during the state of pralaya. Hence, He alone can cause them to come out.

What is the Lord's purpose in performing His several activities? Some say, following the Tiruvācagam lines, "In sport Thou guardest, formest, dost enshroud", that the Lord wishes to play at being the Creator, Protector and Destroyer. Others, following the lines, "O Guru, make us Thine in grace. In this Your sport, what those who would be saved perform, we have done, as they", say that sport indicates the *ease*,²⁵ with which the Lord performs these activities and that the purpose of these activities is to grant to the souls the pleasures of svarga and graded release during the state of bondage and when the time for release comes, to grant them complete release. These two views do not really conflict and so we can say that the reason for creation is Śiva's love for the souls. Love of souls actuates all His activities.

How can His activities be said to be actuated by love, when except the manifestation of grace, the rest merely plunge souls into births and deaths? The Siddhāntin indicates the purpose of each one of the Lord's activities. *Destruction* is carried out by Him with a view to give rest to souls; *creation* is to enable the souls (by giving them body, etc.) to work out their karma; *maintenance* is to

Śivajñāna yogin says that the supremacy of Śiva is established by reason as well as verbal testimony. He quotes from Haradattācārya who gives twenty two reasons for the supremacy of Śiva. See Māpāḍiyam, p. 85.

24. Maraijñāna Deśikar says that Śiva causes three kinds of destruction in the first of which, the products of prakṛti alone, in the second of which, the products of māyā alone, and in the third of which the products of nāda alone are destroyed. It is Śiva Who carries out these kinds of destruction.

Śivāgra yogin answers the question whether the Universe will not become a void if the Creator and Protector also are destroyed. He replies that the eternal Śiva destroys everything and because we hear of re-creation, we can understand, by elimination, that Hara causes subtle creation and for furtherance of His work in its grosser aspects, He creates the Trinity.

25. cf. the usage "It is mere play to so and so to lift a huge weight". See Māpāḍiyam, p. 120.

make the souls experience the fruits of their action; *obscuration* is to veil the nature of souls as cit and bring about indifference to fruits of actions, good and bad by *first* making them engage in action (or as Śivāgra yogin puts it, to avoid the avoidance of karma); *Grace* is the grant of release. All these activities are thus indicative of His Grace and there is no ground for attributing cruelty to Him.²⁶

Having given what is analogous to the cosmological proof for the existence of God and defended it against objections, the Siddhāntin proceeds to give what may be called the moral argument for the existence of God. He states first that the moral law requires a judge who will administer it, and defends his view against objections.²⁶

The fruits of karma are brought about by the Will of the Lord Who is, in this respect like the king and the physician. The body and the fruits of karma are both inert and so they cannot attach themselves to the soul in its next birth.

In reply to the objection that karma or māyā will do and no agent need be accepted, Śivāgra yogin says that karma is destroyed as soon as it is done (i.e., the act is here and now and its consequences hereafter). So, an unseen potency has to be generated

26. Śivajñāna yogin says that thus the Siddhāntin meets the objection of the Nāstikas that if God engaged in these activities, it would only show that He lacks virtue, of the Mayāvādin that it is for no purpose, and of the Pariṇāmavādin that it is for His own purpose.

Jñānaprakāśar includes, along with the grant of rest to the weary souls, the imparting of efficacy to Śiva's māyā śakti. Anugraha is causing purification (dikṣā). It consists in the removal of mala and in the illumination of Śivatva.

Śivāgra yogin does not accept the view of the Pāncarātra that destruction is due to tamas and obscuration is due to deceitfulness on the part of the Lord.

The view regarding obscuration (tirobhāva) is that as the soul is intelligence, it will not engage in action, to work out its karma and attain release, if its nature is not veiled so as to make it engage in action. Thus, tirobhāva defeats its own purpose. Obscuration is for removing obscuration once for all. So it is for the ultimate good of souls.

According to Marajñāna Deśtkar, tirobhāva does not hinder the soul, it hinders the hindrance to the soul. This way he tries to show that God is not to be thought of as first bringing about obscuration and then removing it.

27. The matter is taken from the *Siddhiyār*, Sutra II, 2nd adhikaraṇa.

for each act and new element interposed in the chain of acts and consequences. So karma itself cannot yield fruits. If an unseen potency is accepted, why not God? Therefore, Īśvara is said to bring about the fruits of karma. He grants to souls pleasures and pains according to their deeds.

Illustrating the position, Jñānaprakāśar says that as the owner of the land gives to each tiller, a share of the produce that is proportionate to the labour put forth, Śiva, united with māyā grants to each soul pleasure²⁸ etc. appropriate to its activities. Without the earth which is the first cause, the owner cannot bring about the produce. But because the earth is non-intelligent, it cannot yield its produce, without the owner (i.e., without the intelligent agency of the owner).

The Lord's love is the reason for His taking the deeds done by the soul and granting it the fruits of the deeds. Even punishing the souls is due to the Lord's love for them. The question may arise: Out of His love, He may grant grace to them; but can He be said to punish them because He loves them? The Siddhāntin replies that when the souls commit sins, the Lord punishes them and causes them to realise the sinfulness of their ways. He makes them feel the necessity for doing good deeds and conducting themselves in the proper way. His punishment is reformatory and is due to His love for them. All His acts, including the act of obscuring the intelligence of souls so as to make them engage in activity and get rid of their karma and the act of destruction whereby their physical body is removed, are acts of Grace. Whatever He does and whenever He does anything, it is all because of His love.²⁹

Parents thrash their children for disobedience and handcuff them—punishing them, not because they hate their children but because they love them though it may not appear to be so. So also, the Lord punishes the souls because He loves them.³⁰ Śivāgra yogin says that parents punish their children because they desire

28. Nīrambavajagiar takes the statement here to be a reply to the Bhāṭṭa who says that the Siddhāntin's God likes virtuous people and dislikes sinners and so cannot be Anugrahāmūrti.

29. cf. the striking similarity to the Epistle to the Hebrews, Ch. XII.

"My son, despise not thou the chastening of the Lord, nor faint when thou art rebuked of him.

For whom the Lord loveth, He chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom He receiveth.

their children's pleasure here as also hereafter. This can be achieved only through righteousness.

The objector (the Mīmāṃsaka) says that deeds themselves can yield their fruits, that no God is required to discharge this function and to assume one is superfluous. The Siddhāntin replies that deeds (karma, being what is done with thought, word and deed) perish as soon as they are done and so cannot yield their own fruits, to do which they must continue to exist. The objector gives an example to support his contention. The herbs used for fertilising fields and medicines taken by people are first destroyed and then their effects are felt. The Siddhāntin retorts; Very well; if the food, medicines etc., first decay in the stomach, the result is certainly excreta!⁸⁰

If ye endure chastening, God dealeth with you as with sons; for what son is he whom the father chasteneth not"

"Furthermore we have had fathers of our flesh which corrected us, and we gave them reverence. Shall we not much rather be in subjection unto the Father of spirits and live?"

Pointing out that fatherhood of God means not only love but stern discipline as God is also described as a 'consuming fire', C. S. Lewis puts the popular view thus: "We want, in fact, not so much a father in heaven as a grandfather in heaven—a senile benevolence who, as they say, 'liked to see young people enjoying themselves', and whose plan for the Universe was simply that it might be truly said at the end of each day, 'a good time was had by all.'" - The Problem of Pain.

The following verse in Appar's Tevāram also shows how love and discipline go together.

ஓதுவித்தாய் முன் அறவுரை காட்டிய மணரொடே
காதுவித்தாய் கட்டனோய் பிணிதீர்த்தாய் கலந்தருளிப்
போதுவித்தாய் நின்பணி பிழைக்கிற் புனியம் வளாரால்
மோதுவிப்பாய் உசப்பாய் முனிவாய் கச்சயே கம்பனே.

30. The example is not very happy. Śivāgra yogin says that the gross form of manure and medicine decays while the subtle form continues to exist and make its results felt.

Jñānaprakāśar says: If you take feeding another person as your religious duty and feed him sumptuously, the food is digested by him and the essence reaches his system. But excreta is the result. Do you get the pleasures of heaven or the pain of hell from what is left of the food digested by the other man? Nīrambavaḷagiār says that the visible effect of the food given to another man is excreta and nothing else. Since this is dṛṣṭānta virodha, saying that karma perishes first and then yields its fruits is unintelligible. Jñānaprakāśar explains how it is dṛṣṭānta virodha. Good and evil are qualities. Herbs and medicines are things possessing qualities. So, the example is not sound.

It may be said that because somethings atleast manifest their fruits where they decay, these things can serve as an example for deeds fructifying after they perish. The objector, therefore, argues that deeds reside in the finite consciousness of the agent and bear fruit subsequently—in the manner of manure yielding its result where it decays. The Siddhāntin meets this objection. The results of one's deeds are experiences in the various places classified as heaven, earth and hell. These results must then have resided in the finite consciousness as the produce of field remains there. To be reduced to this position is to make experience in heaven, earth and hell similar to the conjuror's tricks. Experience in these places will mean nothing; they will be mere words.

“Can you say that heaven, hell and earth you visited existed merely in your finite consciousness” is the question put by Śivāgra yogin. He continues: “Since you do not know, your statement that you experienced the results of your deeds which existed in your finite consciousness lacks reality as much as the conjuror's performance.”

It was argued that deeds cannot reside in the consciousness of the agent in order to fructify. Can deeds be said to be resident in the objects with which they are done and fructify subsequently? The thing given in charity, those who receive charity, the deed of giving itself are all impermanent and they are destroyed. So it is only the eternal Lord that can know all these and cause the deeds to bear fruits. Why should the Lord cause the fructification of fruits? What relation has He to the whole process? All efforts to experience the fruits of one's past deeds are really due to the Lord's will. But we put forth efforts with the consciousness that we are responsible for them. So to remove this egoistic consciousness, the Lord takes the responsibility of knowing the merit and de-merit of our deeds. He causes them to bear fruit, by experiencing which souls get rid of their karma.³¹

It is acceptable to all that the soul which puts forth efforts, performs deeds and experiences the consequences thereof with the

31. Śivāgra yogin says that charity has three aspects. (i) mantra, (ii) kriya and (iii) dravya. Charity will be defective if these three are less or more than they ought to be. So the Lord looks into superfluities or deficiencies and causes souls to get rid of their karma by experiencing the fruits thereof.

help of the *body* wherein it resides, *organs* in the body which serve as instruments, *time* suitable for the performance of deeds, *deed*, *order* (niyati) which regulates the fruits to their appropriate deeds, *purpose*, and the *result*. These auxiliaries are inert and incapable of autonomous action. So they cannot themselves bring about their association with the soul. The soul is incapable of mental activities without these auxiliaries; and so it cannot think with the aim of bringing these auxiliaries to itself. Soul and the auxiliaries thus excluded, by elimination, we have the Lord Who has immeasurable and autonomous intelligence and Who causes souls to be associated with these auxiliaries. He does so because He loves the souls. So all the deeds done by the souls, in conjunction with these auxiliaries are to be regarded as the carrying out of His mandate.³²

The Lord who performs the five functions must have a form. Can we say that He is with form or without form or with and without form? He Who is eternally free and Who is of the form of intelligence has a form which can at once be said to be all the three. This is the definition *per accidens* of the Lord's form.

Certain objections are considered. If we say the Lord is corporeal, then all corporeality being alike, there must have been somebody to give Him His body, just as there has been someone to give us ours. If it is said that He can assume any form He likes, the same must be the case with us also. In other words, either the Lord must be controlled by some external agency as

32. Śivācārya yogin gives different details: If souls are to carry out the many sacred observances in holy places like Benares, at sacred hours like the time of the solar eclipse with activity of the motor organs like speech, and of the sensory and internal organs, the place, time etc., referred to here, being inert, they cannot attach themselves to the souls which have limited intelligence, and which cannot find out for themselves the deeds of their past lives and the fruits appropriate to them. They cannot create for themselves body etc., from māyā, suitable for experiencing their karma. The Conative Energy of the omniscient Lord grants pleasures and pains to the souls in the manner of a mother who gives her child bitter draughts when it is ill and sweet things like milk when it is healthy.

Maraijñāna Deśikar quotes the following sūtra from the *Tolkāppiyam*:

வினையே செய்வது செயப்படு பொருளே
 நிலனே காலம் கருவி என்று
 இன்னதற்கு இது பயன் ஆக என்னும்
 அன்னமரபின் இரண்டொடும் தொகைஇ
 ஆயெட்டு என்ப தொழில் முதல் நிலையே.

we are if He is given a body³³ or we must have the same independence that He has to assume any form He likes. As for the second alternative, we know that we cannot take any form we like.

But if we say that the Lord can take any form He likes, just as the yogins and the siddhas do, does He not become one like them, ceasing to be the Supreme? The Siddhāntin replies that the yogins and the siddhas take different form only by His Grace. Besides, the bodies that they take are the products of *māyā*. Again even as there is great difference between ourselves and the yogins, the difference between ourselves (yogin's included) and the Lord is also great.

It may be objected that all forms are products of *māyā* and that therefore where forms are concerned there is no point in distinguishing between the Lord's forms and the forms of others.

The Siddhāntin replies that because of the differences between the wholes, there are differences between the parts also. The parts are not equal to one another. The differences may be viewed thus: we, the yogins included are souls (*paśu*) fettered by mala. Besides, our knowledge and activity are limited to minor things. The Lord is the Lord of all souls (*Paśupati*) Who informs the mala-freed intelligence of the souls. He knows all, does all, is the Master of all. Thus there are differences between the parts (souls) and the whole (the Lord). The mala-fettered souls have forms which are the products of *māyā* which *māyā* is akin to mala and which causes partial illumination. But *Paśupati* Who is eternally free and intelligent has for His form the Energy which grants pervasive intelligence to mala-freed souls. It is thus seen to be untenable to hold that the soul's desire also can generate the desired forms and that if the material of one form is *māyā*, all forms are evolved from *māyā*.

The soul which has partial knowledge has a form given by *māyā* whose products are subject to limitation. The Lord Whose intelligence is pervasive has for His form, His Energy which can never be subject to limitations.³⁴

33. Maraijñana Deśikar says that the Lord creates our bodies and if we say that likewise His body also must be created by some one else, we shall be launched on an infinite regress. Therefore, we must realise that He Himself assumes any form He pleases, out of His Grace, in order to save the souls.

34. Jñānaprakāśar raises the question how Śrīkṛṣṇa Parameśvara and others can have bodies caused by *māyā* when there is no mala for them. He

Even if Energy is His form, says the objector, it will evolve and be destroyed, all forms being conditioned things. But change and destruction are not consistent with Śiva's Energy. Therefore, it is proper to speak of Śiva only as incorporeal. The Siddhāntin does not accept this view. The Lord is beyond the six *adhvās*. To say that He is incorporeal is to subject Him to the limitations of objects within the six *adhvās*. The Siddhāntin proceeds to explain this.

All things found in the Universe are either with form or without form or with and without form. One thing cannot assume the nature of another. Formless things like *ākāśa* cannot have form. Things having a form like the earth cannot be formless. Those things which are with and without a form like the moon cannot be exclusively characterised as having or not having a form. Thus no one thing within the six *adhvās* can have the form of another. So, if we say that Śiva is formless, He also becomes limited like them and therefore one of them. The point is, to predicate any one quality or even a host of qualities of a thing is to exclude the possibility of a different quality being predicated of that thing and thus limit it. When we are attempting to understand the nature of God, we must take care to see that our attempt at characterisation does not in any way limit the highest reality.

The Lord who is eternally free and intelligent is not of the nature of *pāśa*. Nor is He of the nature of *paśu* which seeks release from bondage. He has neither beginning nor end. Hence we cannot say that He is of this, that or the other nature.³⁵ Being such,

says that because of the residual impressions of *mala*, *Ananta* and others get a very pure body caused by *māyā* (like the body caused by *mahāmāyā*) in order that they might exercise their authority. Śiva, being eternally free, has no *mala* of authority born of the residual impressions of effects. His form is not of *māyā*. He has form which is the product of His inherent Energy.

35. Maraijñāna Deśikar and Niramavaḷagiār quote the words :

(இப்படியன் இந்நிறத்தன் இவ்வண்ணத்தன் இவனிறைவன்
என்றெழுதிக் காட்டுமாணதே).

which are relevant in this context, from Appar's *Tevāram* beginning with the words மைப்படிந்த கண்ணோளும்

Niramavaḷagiār sums up the position thus : The Lord pervades both matter and intelligence causing them to appear as themselves and, exists untainted by them. Therefore, He can be known only if He instructs the souls to know and not independently by the soul's intelligence.

His nature cannot be ascertained by the means of valid knowledge. Being neither incorporeal, nor corporeal nor incorporeal and corporeal, He is not subject to the modifications as *vṛtti* (one type of evolution), or *pariṇāma* or *vivarta*.

The Lord is not deficient in respect of the capacity to become what He pleases. He is autonomous. Therefore, He is free from changes. He is omniscient and omnipotent unlike the souls whose range of activity and knowledge is limited. He has no likes and dislikes such as bind the soul. He who is eternally pure can assume any form³⁶ He pleases out of His Grace.

The soul does not require any form other than itself to direct its body: So also, the eternally free, intelligent Lord need not become corporeal to control the body which is His body. Still, if He does not, out of His Grace assume a form to bring the Vedas and Āgamas into existence, it will become impossible for the *Praḷayākalas* and *Sakalas* to understand the nature of things and attain salvation. Moreover, the inauguration of the line of preceptors also cannot take place unless He takes a form and initiates the process.

Some may say that when the eternally-free intelligent One comes to have a form, He must have the functions attendant on having a body, organs etc., and thus become determinable like any one of us. But this is against the Vedic declaration that He transcends thought, words and mind. What is the way out of this difficulty?

Because Śiva's form is a form of Grace, His hands, feet, eyes, nose and the other parts of His body (which are all known as *pratyāṅga*) are also forms of Grace. The activities and the qualities like truth (these are *Sāṅga*) arising from that form in order

36, Śivāgṛa yogin raises the question : How is it that the Āgamas declare Śiva to be corporeal? He proceeds to say that though Śiva destroys in anger or saves in grace, He does not come to have sin or merit thereby. He carries out His activities, out of Grace, through the body of the *jīvanmuktas* who contemplate themselves as the pure Lord. Through *Ananteśvara* and others, whom He supports, He attends to creation etc., He grants grace to the soul, through the preceptors whom He supports.

Jñānaprakāśar says that the Lord is the directing agent supporting others like *Aṅśadaśiva*, *Ananteśvara* and *Śrīkaṇṭha*, the Trinity and *Ārṇata*, *Kapila*, *Kaṇāda* who are preceptors. He makes their body His, but He is none of these.

to grant knowledge to the souls are also of the form of Grace. These qualities are represented by His weapons. The worlds and enjoyment are also of the form of Grace. (These are represented by *upāṅga* like the cloth, garland, ornament, seat etc.). All these forms are assumed by Him not for His own sake but for the sake of the souls. Hence though He can be thought of in these ways, He is really not within the ken of human apprehension.³⁷

Ignorant people do not consider the statement that the form of the Lord transcends the Universe (that He is Viśvādhika): they do not consider the fact that the Universe evolves from and involves into the form of the Lord (that therefore He is Viśvakāraṇa). They do not understand that He is the Inner Ruler of the Universe (Antaryāmin). They do not understand that He manifests Himself as the world (Viśvarūpa). Those who do not know the nature of His form say that He is one of the gods accepted by the people of this world.³⁸

Those who say that He is one of the gods do not understand the purāṇic statement that He is of a form which is not knowable even to Hari and Brahmā (He is Viśvādhika). They do not understand the statement that the Trinity arises out of Him (He is Viśvakāraṇa). They do not understand the statement that the Universe originates from Him and that its existence can be understood only as origination from Him (He is Antaryāmin). They do not understand the statement that He manifests Himself as, and is of the form of, the Universe which is what is meant when He is said to be half-feminine. They say that He is one of the

37. Maraijñāna Deśikar says that the Lord assumes sixteen forms, five as Creator, five as Protector and six as Destroyer.

Śivāgra yogin emphasises that Śiva's form is the manifestation of His Intelligence Energy and that it is not evolved from māyā. Out of His Grace, He assumes a form so that souls may contemplate Him and gain their objects of desire.

38. Śivajñāna yogin says that just as we say that the lotus is mud-born whereas it is born of its own seed, we say that the Universe which evolves from and involves into māyā is born out of and taken back into the Lord, Who is the support of māyā.

Śivāgra yogin says that when māyā is impressed by the Lord's Energy, it evolves; when the Energy turns away, involution takes place. Because He pervades the Universe, He is immanent in it and is its Life. Because of non-attachment, He transcends the Universe.

gods because they are not able to know the truth even with the help of the Purāṇas.³⁹

Of the many forms that the Lord assumes (for the benefit of the souls), some are symbolic of enjoyment and have been assumed so as to enable the souls to have enjoyment (this is the Umāmaheśvara form); some others symbolising anger (Kāmāri form) have been assumed so that the activities of the souls may be destroyed; and some others symbolising yogic meditation (Dakṣiṇāmūrti form) have been assumed so that souls may gain release through yoga. Those who miss the significance of these forms—such ignorant persons are only too many—say that Śiva is one among the other gods.

‘If you must make me weep, you must weep yourself’ is a maxim in art. Example here, as elsewhere, is better than precept. So also, the Lord appears to carry on certain vital functions in order that mortals may follow His lead. Besides, to trace the origin of these vital urges to Godhead is to sanctify them. If mortals are to enjoy the pleasures of life or engage in meditation in the right way, the Lord Himself must set them an example.⁴⁰

It is because of His Grace that He assumes such different forms symbolising enjoyment, cruelty and yogic meditation. Destruction is caused so that good may result from it, in the form of the destruction of the consequences of activity. We may under-

39. Nīrambavaṇgiar puts the matter briefly thus: Those who do not know the truth say that Śiva is like Brahmā and Viṣṇu, not knowing that Śiva’s form is of intelligence whereas the form of the others is of māyā. He says Śiva is not one among the other gods because (i) His form is of Intelligence, (ii) He grants enjoyment and release to souls existing as Śakti and Śiva for that purpose and (iii) He is not knowable to Brahmā and Viṣṇu.

40. Regarding the purpose of the Kāmāri form, we have the following explanations:

Maraijñāna Deśikar: The Lord Who is free from desires and aversions, like an angry person causes the evil-doers to be placed in a sorry plight so that they may, by their experience realise the need to be delivered from their bad karma.

Śivāgra yogin: The Lord, like an angry person punishes the souls and destroys their evil actions so that their sins may not accumulate.

Nīrambavaṇgiar says nīgraha is also anugraha. He says the Lord destroys the world so as to give rest to the souls.

stand from His assuming such different forms that He transcends the Universe.⁴¹

When Umā, playfully closed the eyes of the Lord with her hands, the whole world was plunged in darkness. The Lord, in His concern for the residents of the world, caused light to shine forth by opening the eye on His forehead. From this we can understand that all the light in the world is but the effulgence of His form.⁴² But people do not understand this.

When the Lord was in yogic meditation, the celestials began to pine for sexual pleasures, although Manmatha was present. Viṣṇu, desiring to alleviate their distress, sent his son, Manmatha, to influence Śiva. Enraged by his interference with His meditation, Śiva burnt Manmatha to ashes. However, taking pity on the souls, Śiva wedded the daughter of the King of the Himālayas and thereby caused great happiness to souls.

These stories are narrated to the refrain that those who say Śiva is formless do not know that He is the Life of the Universe. Unless activities are inspired by Him they are of no avail. Though Manmatha was present, he was unable to stimulate the sexual urge. It has to be sanctified by the Lord's personal example, so to speak. We find here a healthy attitude to the problem of sex. The play and gratification of the sexual instinct are not frowned upon. Nor is there any over-emphasis on sex, because release through meditation becomes equally obligatory for mankind when the Lord assumes the Dakṣiṇāmūrti form.⁴³

The Lord assumes a form to bring the Vedas and Āgamas into existence. Besides, as said in the *Vātula*, the stationary and mov-

41. Maraijñāna Deśīkar says that there are twenty-five different forms assumed by the Lord. Each form has its own weapons, and each form differs from the others.

42. "Not there the sun shines, nor the moon or the stars, not these lightnings either. Where then could this fire be? Everything shines only after the shining spirit: through its light all this shines," Kaṭha Upaniṣad II, ii, 15.

cf. also Slokas 21 to 24 in the 3rd chapter of the *Gītā*, beginning "yadyadā carati."

43. The *Vāyu Samhitā* says that the forms, names and activities of Śri-kaṇṭha apply to the Lord also.

Śivāgrya yogin says that the Lord's forms of enjoyment and yogic meditation are for the sake of the souls, not for Himself. He reminds us of the story that when Umā performed penance, Śiva was pleased to wed her.

ing worlds have to be produced from particular parts of the Lord's body. In order to grant Grace, on the achievement of an attitude of indifference to the fruits of karma, He has first to cause obscuration (causing obscuration is alien to His nature which is Grace; so He is assumed to cause obscuration). For this, He performs the dance known as *Ūna naṭana*. He unites on His left side with *Umā* so as to sustain the souls and give them happiness. He has to show the souls by personal example that Grace can be obtained through meditation. In order to remove *pāśa*, He has to destroy the various products by withdrawing them into those parts of His body whence they came. Thus He requires a corporeal form.⁴⁴

All forms that have a gross manifestation must, on grounds of the doctrine of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, have a subtle state when they are formless. Therefore when we say that the Lord assumed a form we can see that there is a formless state in which His form is latent. In passing from the formless to form we can infer a middle stage when it had something in common with both, characterised by the presence and absence of form. All His manifestations, as characterised by corporeality, incorporeality and both together, are for the sake of freeing the souls from the grip of the *māyā*-produced body.

Śivajñāna yogin explains the position further. The Lord is corporeal—incorporeal, when from being incorporeal, He comes to assume a form. A corporeal—incorporeal form is like the image in a mirror—not tangible but visible.

So for it was said that the Lord's form is of Grace, not of *māyā*. How are we to reconcile this statement with the Scriptural

44. *Jñānaprakāśar* does not accept the view of some that without interposing *Śrīkaṇṭha*, *Śiva* Himself directly causes the origination, maintenance and destruction of the products of *Śuddha māyā* and the subsequent creation etc., of the other products. The King Emperor has intimate and mediate activities; so is it with *Śiva*. He carries on His intimate activities directly by Himself, while His mediate activities are done by others. He gives the following details:

In the primal creation, *Śiva* brought about the five *Śivatattvas* into existence; then, as the dweller in the body of *Ananteśvara*, He evolved from *aśuddha māyā* the tattvas from *kālā* to *prithivī*. He created *Rudra* from His heart, *Viṣṇu* and *Brahmā* from the sides, sun and moon from the right and left eyes, *Vigneśvara* and *Subrahmaṇya* from throat and heart. He created the *devas*, *ṛṣis*, *vedas* etc., from other organs. In the subsequent creations, He dwells in the body of *Śrīkaṇṭha*.

declaration that the six adhvās, mantra, pada, varṇa, bhuvana, tattva and kalā constitute His form?⁴⁵ The Lord pervades all these adhvās and becomes all these adhvās. He is eternal and therefore exists as different from them. He directs intelligent beings and inert things and thus exists in them all. Because of similarity of His Tirodhāna śakti to these adhvās, the adhvās are figuratively said to constitute His form.

Even of the adhvās, mantra adhvā alone is specially mentioned as constituting the form of the Lord. The Universe has three material causes. Bindu, mohini and mahat (Śuddha, aśuddha and prakṛti māyā). Śiva Śakti is associated with śuddha māyā, the highest of the three material causes.⁴⁶ Mantras arise from śuddha

45. Maraijñāna Deśikar gives the following details: kalā adhvā.- Śāntatita kalā is His Head; śāntikalā, Face, vidyā, Chest, pratiṣṭha - Navel and nivṛtti - Knees and Feet, *bhuvana* adhvā constitutes His Hair, *varṇa* - skin, *mantra* - blood, *pada*, nerve, and *tattva*, bones and flesh. *Prāṇa* element is Paramaśiva.

Jñānaprakāśar says that the Lord comes to be invested with two forms for the sake of the souls - acala and cala. Acala form is a Cit-śakti form, constituted by intelligence and activity. The Lord in this form brings about production of effects like pot, by the sheer fiat of His Will. This form is His real and true form. Calā form is of the five prāṇava kalās. It has the five śiva tattvas and their derivatives for its superior body; the seven vidya tattvas with their derivatives and the twenty-four ātma tattvas with their derivatives for its subtle body; and the universe for its gross body. In other words, His superior, subtle and gross bodies are constituted respectively by Śuddha, Śuddhaśuddha and aśuddha adhvās respectively. Because of His activity and because He is worshipped as manifested in a liṅga, form is figuratively ascribed to Him. Really He is not bound by form.

46. Śivāgra yogin says that though material causes are said to be three, they are the result of śiva śakti agitating mahāmāyā, which alone is the first cause. The agitated portion becomes threefold. These three are also called prakāśa, moha and ajñāka. Śuddhādhva prapañca arising from bindu is known as Śāntātmaka, miśrādhva prapañca arising from mohini as ghorātmaka and the aśuddha prapañca arising from mahat as muḥātmaka. From Kuṇḍalini (also called mahāmāyā, the supreme material cause) apara bindu, mohini and mahat are derived.

Saying that Śiva is of the form of intelligence and has no body either of mantras or of māyā, Śivāgra yogin argues that the ascription of a form constituted by mantras is for purposes of worshipful contemplation. The five mantras are Iśāna, Tatpuruṣa, Aghora, Vāmadeva and Sadyojāta - for purposes of anugraha, tirodhāna, saṁhāra, sthiti and sṛṣṭi. As transcending the Universe, He is called Iśāna. As the substrate of souls and gods who are conditioned by the possession of bodies, He is called Tatpuruṣa. He is Vāma as luring souls by dharma, artha and kāma and plunging them in the lower māyā.

māyā. Śiva Śakti leads aspirants for release to contemplate these mantras. When they have contemplated these mantras, Śiva Śakti grants them enjoyment and release, using the mantras as a channel therefor. Thus mantras have a double significance, as arising form the highest of the three material causes and as conferring enjoyment and release on souls. Judged by their fruits, no less than by their roots, mantras are charged with high importance. Hence the Scriptures declare the Lord's form to be constituted by mantras.

Even of the mantras, the five (nivṛtti etc.) are specially mentioned as constituting the Lord's form because they arise prior to all other mantras. They are figuratively said to be of the form of the eternal Tirodhāna Śakti which leads them into activity. Thus we have Adhvāmūrṭi, Mantramūrṭi and Pañcamantramūrṭi.

Though the Vedas and Āgamas speak of the contemplation of the beautiful forms of Brahmā and others in connection with the examination of adhvās etc., they are not to be taken as absolute like Śiva. Because energies of Śiva like Jananī impress agents like Brahmā, Vedas and Āgamas figuratively ascribe equality with Śiva to Brahmā and Viṣṇu.

To the objection that Śiva will become a supernumerary if Brahmā and others can carry on their work independently, the Siddhāntin replies with an illustration. Even as ministers and other state officials cannot function without the authority of the king, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and others cannot do anything without the grace of Śiva. He assigns functions, one to each of these deities.

Why should there be two agents, Śiva and the direct agents for each action? This question is raised to show that without Śiva, the deities cannot function. Besides, not one of the five functions can stand by itself. Hence an absolute agent in respect

Because of His luminous nature, He is called Deva (Hence Vamadeva). These five mantras along with Hariṇi, Jananī and Rodhayitri are called the eight saktis. The last three are called Parigraha Śakti. Hariṇi destroys bodies etc., of the soul thus making them lapse into māyā. It helps souls ready for salvation to attain the Feet of the Lord. Destruction and grace are its activities. Jananī has the nature of creating the Universe. Rodhayitri helps to bring enjoyment for the souls in the state of maintenance. In the praḷaya state, it enables Sakalas, Prajāyākalas and Vijñānākalas to reside in the lower, middle and upper māyā respectively. Maintenance and obscurity are its functions.

of all the five is necessary. Each one of the ministers has his own port folio but he acts in the name of and on the authority of the king. In the last resort, it is the king who is responsible for the entire government.⁴⁷

Is the Energy of the Lord manifold then?⁴⁸ Just as the power of the king is availed by the several members of the government for the discharge of their respective duties, that power being differentiated according to the different activities for which it is requisitioned, the One Energy of the Lord is differentiated into Jananī etc. according to the differences in the activities for carrying out which it is required. This can be understood if we realise that without His will there cannot be enjoyment or release.

The sacrifice of Dakṣa, the span of Mārkaṇḍa's life, the emergence of poison when nectar was expected—all these illustrate the truth that without Śiva's Will, nothing desired by others will come to pass.

The svarūpa of Śiva's Energy is intelligence. With a view to grant grace to souls, this intelligence knows in a general way and informs the souls in a general way, (without knowing or informing in a special way). It is one only. It is called Parāśakti. With a view to bring about the maturation of souls, it functions as Tirodhāna Śakti. Tirodhāna Śakti is differentiated as affective, conative and cognitive. One may question the propriety of deriving conation and affection from intelligence.⁴⁹ Because affection and conation function as intelligence does, they are particular modes of

47. Śivāgra yogin says that Śiva performs the subtle activities and brings about the gross activities through Sadāśiva, Maheśvara, Rudra, Viṣṇu and Brahmā. These five deities are responsible for grace, obscuration, destruction, maintenance and creation respectively. Each one is responsible for his own activity primarily and the other four only incidentally and in a subsidiary way.

48. Maraijñāna Deśīkar says that the Energy which exists in the Lord in a samavāya relation like heat in fire is one only. Śivāgra yogin formulates the objections thus: If the Energy is many, the owners of the Energy must also be many. This is Anekeśvaravāda. Or, if the Owner is one, while Energy is many, changes occur, affecting the One in which the mutually opposed many inhere.

49. Maraijñāna Deśīkar reminds us that wherever there is intelligence, there affection and conation also appear and function.

Affection (icchā) is the quality and conation (kriyā) is the activity (vyāpāra) of cognition. The śāstras have established that there are as much

the activity of intelligence and not different from it. Energies like Janani which become many on account of differences in functions come from that one Parāśakti which does not cloud the souls. Obscuring Energy is Tirodhāna Śakti and illuminating Energy is Parāśakti.

The general way in which Parāśakti is informing and informed is in regard to the grant of Grace alone. The special way is with regard to the carrying out of creation etc. These are comparable to the general desire to help and the particular way in which that help is rendered.

Parāśakti is one,⁵⁰ viewed in a general way as the unclouded intelligence. According to differences in activity it becomes differentiated into three, affective energy, cognitive energy and conative energy. These, again, are differentiated into many according to the differences among their respective activities. Affective energy is the Lord's grace involved in removing the mala of the souls and granting them the attainment of Salvation. Cognitive energy is His knowledge of the ways by which He can do what He desires to do; and conative energy is what He wills to do and does accordingly.

Thus it is shown that although the form of Brahmā and others are also used for contemplation and though Śakti gets differentiated, Śiva alone is the Absolute First.

The Śivasamavādin might say that the soul is equal to God in as much as both have cognition and conation and affection. But this is not acceptable to the Siddhāntin. In the kevala state, souls are enveloped in mala. In the sakala state, souls experience what ever is meted out to them according to their karma by God. Their experience is limited to one thing at a time. The release they experience in the Śuddha state is granted to them by the Lord

affection and conation (which are the quality and activity of intelligence) as there is cognition. What is known is desired and what is desired is done. Knowledge, desire and activity reside in the same substrate and are directed to the same object. The statement that what is known is desired and what is desired is done applies only to the souls - not to Śiva.

50. Śivāgra yogin says: The Lord finds out by His cognitive energy, the sins and merits of souls and gives the souls bodies, organs etc., accordingly. Conative energy is said to be such because the Lord causes activity in bindu by His mere touch and not because the Energy itself is able to act. Thus the Energy is one only.

even as their experience in the sakala state was regulated by Him according to their karma. Thus the cognition, conation and affection of the souls are different in their nature and characteristics from those of the lord.⁵¹

Of the Energy described as threefold, affective energy functions ever the same without undergoing any change of its nature. Cognitive and conative energy function in five different ways. When the Lord functions through the cognitive energy, He is called Śiva; when He functions through the conative energy, He is called Śakti; when He functions equally through the cognitive and conative energy, He is called sadāśiva. When cognitive aspect decreases while the conative aspect increases, He is called Maheśvara. When cognition is more prominent than conation, He is called Śuddha vidyā. Besides, He is the substrate for the three states of absorption, enjoyment and authority, Śiva and others being substrate for these states. Thus Śiva is the Absolute though Āgamas speak of a plurality—Laya Śiva, Bhoga Śiva and Adhikāra Śiva.⁵²

51. Śivāgra yogin takes the idea here to be an indication of the relation between the Lord and soul as being like the relation which obtains between master and servant. The functioning of the servant has its origin in the will of the Lord. By servant is meant one who receives wages for work turned out. Here, karma is the work done by the souls and the effects of karma are the wages given by the Lord. Śiva who is the Protector (சாவலன், Sid-dhiyār) causes intelligence to shine forth according to the karma of the soul: by this intelligence the soul cognises objects. Jñānaprakāśar says in his introductory remarks that the objection of the Mimāṃsaka is stated here. The position of the Mimāṃsaka is that since the finite soul has cognition, conation and affection, it is unnecessary to go in for a god who is not seen. He takes the verse to refer not to the three states but the three kinds of souls. Vijñānakālas and prajāyākalas are under the dominance of āṇava. Sakalas have their faculties of cognition, conation and affection partly manifested through kalā. So none of these can be the Lord.

Jñānaprakāśar refers at the end to Śivasamavādins and Anekeśvaravadins who say that the soul can perform the five activities because it has cognition, conation and affection like the Lord. Jñānaprakāśar says this is due to ignorance. The released soul can carry on the five activities only through the Grace of Śiva. It is not the Lord of the Universe. Śiva is.

52. When Śiva is called the Absorber (layi) Śivatattva and Śakti tattva are included therein. When He is called the Enjoyer (bhogi), Sadaśiva tattva is included therein. When He is called the person in authority (adhikāri) śuddha vidyā and Īśvara tattvas are included therein. The Āgamas refer to Śiva in these states as Sattar, Udyuktar and Pravṛttar; Īśar, Sadaśivar and Śāntar.

The products of Śuddha māyā, viz., Śuddha vidyā, Īśvara, Sādākhyā, Śakti and Śiva are the centres of the Lord's activities. They constitute the natural form of the Lord. The order of mention of these tattvas follows the earlier and later activities of the cognitive and conative energy. It is not based on time which arises after these tattvas have come existence and so cannot be their cause. Besides, these tattvas are beyond time limits. Therefore they are called the eternal abodes of Śiva. These tattvas are called the natural forms because they are directly controlled through Ananta and others. The abode is figuratively referred to as form.

The changeful tattvas are said to constitute the natural form of the Lord because they are eternal. They are eternal, because they are above time. Though they are a-temporal, they are classed as earlier and later in respect of their functional difference. Śiva-jñāna yogin says that since Śiva Śakti under the name of Kalā-yitri is the abode of time, there is no contradiction when we take it to be the cause of these activities.⁵³

Just as the person who acts many parts remains essentially himself in spite of assuming all these parts, the Lord does not change though He assumes all the different forms in order to fulfil His five functions. All the forms that He assumes are the forms of His Energy. The Lord and His Energy are like the tree and its hard core. The relation between the Lord and His Energy is like that which obtains between the quality and the substrate.

How can what appears in his Energy be said to appear in Him? Because the Lord does not appear except through His all-pervasive Energy, He appears as the different forms figured in His Energy without seeming different from them, even as the crystal reflecting various hues, golden, blue, etc., does not appear as other than the hues reflected.

Śivāgra yogin says that the Lord performs His activities controlling parānāda, sādākhyā and mahēśvara which are the seats of absorption, enjoyment and authority.

53. Jñānaprakāśar speaks of sṛṣṭa śivatattvas as the special form of Śiva's inherent Energy and sṛjya śivatattvas as the form of His assumptive Energy (general form). No temporal distinctions apply to the sṛṣṭa śivatattva because they are beyond time limits and are eternal. When, however, temporal distinctions are applied to them it is on the analogy of these distinctions applying to the sṛjya śivatattvas.

Because the Lord has in Him the dual nature of Śakti and Śiva, the bodies of souls which otherwise are the same, come to have the distinctive organs and qualities of the male and female sex. Thus enjoyment becomes possible. Life itself becomes possible only because of Śakti. The ignorant do not know that Śiva and Śakti take two forms so that souls may have bodies characterised by differences in regard to sex. They do not know the nature of liṅga and piṭha.⁵⁴

The Siddhāntin gives other details of the variations in the forms assumed by the Lord. Nine are mentioned. Jñānaprakāśar says that Śiva Who is a single substance manifests nine variations because of the differences in the substrates which He occupies. The nine variations are Śiva, Śakti, Nāda, Bindu, Sadāśiva, Maheśvara, Rudra, Viṣṇu and Brahmā. Śakti comes from Śiva, Nāda from Śakti and so on. The Lord exists in these and inspires the respective functions. The first four are incorporeal forms, the fifth is corporeal-incorporeal and the last four corporeal.⁵⁵

54. Maraijñāna Deśikar says that liṅga is of the form of cognitive energy and piṭha is of the form of conative energy.

Śivāgra yogin says that Śiva is the substrate and His Śakti is the attribute. Likewise, He has ordained all things as substrate and attribute. The pratykṣavādin might say that there is no warrant for assuming an unseen Śiva and Śakti as agents for procreation and that procreation is explicable by the presence of male and female mortals, not realising that the attraction between these is made possible only because the Lord and His Śakti, unite. Śiva and Śakti assume the form of nāda and bindu which are symbolised by liṅga and piṭha.

Jñānaprakāśar: The bases for Śakti and Śiva as attribute and substrate, like female and male, rotundity and elongation are assumed in the inert substances like piṭha and liṅga, while bases for them as intelligent attribute and substrate are: found in the other-knowing intelligence and self-knowing intelligence.

55. Maraijñāna Deśikar: The forms are for meditation. Can one object be said to have two natures? No; sakala is like the tree; niṣkala is like shade; the flower (like sakala) and its smell (like niṣkala) also help us to understand the position. Will not sakala-niṣkala suffice? Should there be sakala also? There must be sakala to enable souls to make images in metals and wood, worship the Lord through them, and obtain His Grace. Since sakala-niṣkala is unique in having the advantages of both sakala and niṣkala, the celestials set up the liṅga form and worship it. Śivāgra yogin: The sole Lord of the Universe Who is without forms manifests Himself differently in accordance with the three kinds of souls (vijñānākalas, praṇayākalas and sakalas), the three kinds of adhvas (śuddha-śuddha) and the three kinds of material (bindu, mohini and mahat). To the question how there can be four varieties when the incorporeal is one, Śivāgra yogin replies that kala, dik and ākāśa also

Corresponding to the variations in the form of the Lord, Śakti which is one like Śiva also has various forms because of difference in the functions. Śiva, has Śakti ; Nāda-Bindu ; Sadāśiva—Manonmaṇi, Maheśa—Maheśvari ; Rudra—Umā ; Viṣṇu-Mahālakṣmī and Brahmā—Sarasvatī. In whatever way the Lord residing in these variations of His form acts, in the same way, Parā Śakti, residing in the variations of Śakti also acts. Thus Śakti helps Śiva.

It was said earlier that the forms of Śiva are the forms of Śakti. Here variations of Śiva and variations of Śakti are kept apart. How are the two statements to be reconciled? Parāśakti unites itself with the variations of Śiva like Nāda. Likewise Śuddha Śiva manifests Himself through the variations of Śakti. Because Śiva and Śakti exist together, like a tree and its hard core, all the forms assumed by Śakti are common alike to Śiva and Śakti. Though Śakti remains so inseparably united to Śiva, it is the incomparable consort of the Lord, becoming all that He wants it to become. Hence the differences of the form and quality of Śakti and Śiva.

Though fire is one as substance, it is treated separately, as red in its colour and hot in its quality. So also, though the Lord is one, as the expanse transcending everything, He is Śiva ; as uniting with everything and as having the quality to attract everything, He is Śakti. The idea of man and wife is applied to Śiva and Śakti. To emphasise this the author says : “Śakti becomes all that Śakta wants it to become.”

Śivāgra yogin says that Śakti controls all the tattvas from Nāda to pṛthivī ; and Śiva controls everything including Śakti. All things created by them are of the form of Śiva and Śakti. Śakti is the strength of Śiva Who possessess it ; it is also His cognition, conation and affection.

Where Śiva and Śakti unite we have Sadāśiva tattva. They both unite joyfully and cause the origination of the intelligent and inert Universe.^{55a} Nevertheless Śiva is a celibate and Śakti a

which are incorporeal are different because of their effects. The incorporeal one is said to be different in view of differences in function.

55a. How can souls and māyā characterised as beginningless, be said to arise from Sadāśiva tattva? Since re-manifestation of souls and māyā from the praḷaya state is meant, there is no contradiction.

virgin. Those who have knowledge now as the result of the merits of their former lives know that all the deeds done by Śakti and Śiva are like unto a drama.

Tattvas are the cause of bodies, organs, worlds, enjoyment, bondage, release, the differences in bondage and release. These tattvas go together with the souls and not with the Lord. He who knows these things from the Scriptures and by reasoning deduces tattvas in the proper order of deduction and who realises without doubt or error, That which transcends these tattvas, knows the truth of the saying that Śiva is a celibate and Śakti a virgin.

Śiva neither has a form nor is without form. He is neither intelligent nor non-intelligent. He does not engage in the five activities. He does not assume forms symbolising meditation or enjoyment. Though He is defined *per accidens* as having these attributes, etc., His essential nature cannot be defined by them.

When the Lord recreates the Universe, He exists as one with the souls by reason of His contact with them in the manner of the soul and the body. Because of difference in substance, He is different from the souls even as the sun and the eye are different. Because He is the Life of their lives, He is one with them like eye sight and finite consciousness. As the Āgamas declare, He is Śakti, i.e., He is of the form of Śakti which transcends the souls. He is the Lord in as much as He directs the souls to pass through the five states of creation, etc., in accordance with karma which Śiva Śakti enables to fructify.⁵⁶

We have elaborate comments on this matter from Śivāgra yogin. He says that the relation of non-difference between Śiva and souls is set forth.

Śiva and souls are different because, while Śiva is pure, souls are mala-ridden. But they are non-different in respect of perva-

56. This is the position as set forth in the Siddhiyar, II. 1. Maraijñāna Deśikar says that this sets forth the characteristics of advaita. The Lord though different from intelligences and inert matter, is non-different from them because He pervades them. As two different attributes, like difference and non-difference cannot be predicated of the same substance, as the Jainas do, we say that He is the effulgence of wisdom. He is the cause of all activities because it is His conative Energy which guides the activities of numerous souls in accordance with karma. But the Lord is not affected by the pleasures and pains that the souls experience.

sion and intelligence. In accordance with the karma of countless souls, the Lord agitates *māyā* through His inherent Energy and creates bodies, organs, etc., wherein the inherent Energy is continuously present. He causes these things to remain in the Universe during the state of sustentation, and to be absorbed at involution. For all these, He is the remote agent. He exists inseparable from the Universe; but He does not have the activities and enjoyments of souls, the contractions and expansions of *māyā* and the states of origination, sustentation and destruction of the products. Thus He is the naturally beautiful, pure, self-luminous One Who is not de-limited by space, time and things.

He becomes the whole world through His Energy. The souls have de-limiting adjuncts but Śiva has none. He is eternally pure whereas *Anantēśvara* and others were made pure by Śiva. He is self-luminous and enables others to be luminous. Thus they are different from Śiva.

The Lord is identified with the creation, maintenance and destruction of the Universe because He is the remote agent for these together with His Energy which is turned towards activity. His Energy is continuously and non-differently present in the Universe. Thus though Śiva is the efficient cause, He is said to be the material cause of the Universe because He is non-different from His Energy. Are we not going against our earlier statement that *Śuddha* and *aśuddha māyā* are the material cause? No; the material for the child's flesh comes from the mother and that for the bones from the father. It is even so in regard to the Universe.

Because conscious Energy and inert *māyā* combine, the Universe is constituted of conscious and non-conscious things.

If Śiva and souls are different in substance and yet non-different because of pervasion, what is the relation between them? Is it one of inherence or inherence in what is conjoined? The relation is neither of these but the Intelligence-Energy, i.e., consciousness. If the relation is one of conjunction, is it generated or non-generated? If generated, is it generated by the activity of either or both or by another conjunction? Because both the things related are conscious and pervasive, the generation of relation by the activity of either or both cannot be the cause. Conjunction generated by another conjunction cannot have an origin and will

only lead to an infinite regress. Thus the relation can only be non-generated. Change does not result if it is non-generated conjunction.

Pervasion is of two kinds, external (*vaiṣayika*) and intimate (*aupaśleṣika*). External pervasion is like ether pervading all things having form, like pot. Intimate pervasion is like that of ghee in milk, sweetness in fruit, oil in the sesame seeds and fire in wood. Because Śiva and souls are intelligent and pervasive, the relation of pervader and pervaded obtaining between them is intimate. This relation is one of identity-in-difference because there is difference between Śiva and souls and yet they are inseparable.⁵⁷

Jñānaprakāśar has his own way of stating the Siddhāntin's position. The Siddhāntin says that the Lord becomes the intelligent and inert Universe. But he differs from the Vivartavāda-

57. (உலகெலாமாகி) (Śiva becomes all the world). This refutes the Vivartavādins who say that the world is an illusory transfiguration and not something which has an origin.

வேறுய்	... (is different) refutes the Śivādvaitin.
உடனுமாய்	... (is ond with) refutes the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas who say that the Lord and souls are absolutely different.
ஒளியாயோங்கி	... (is self-luminous) refutes the Pāñcarātras and the Bhāgavatas who say that God has qualities and parts.
அலகிலர உயிர்கள்	... (countless souls) refutes Ekātmavāda.
கன்மத்து	... (in accordance with karma) refutes the Lokāyatas and meets the alleged defects of cruelty and partiality.
ஆணையின்	... (through His Energy) refutes the Bhāṭṭas and Bhāskaras who affirm a māyā—Energy but deny Śiva's inherent Energy.
அமர்ந்து	... (stays) refutes the Bauddha who says that the world has origin but no sustentation because it is momentary.
செல்லத் தலைவனாய்	... (being the Destroyer in Whom it is absorbed) refutes the Mimāmsakas who say that the universe is not destroyed. The Mimāmsakas deny the need for God, arguing that bodies and sense organs arise because of the karma of souls.

Vedāntin who says that Brahman appears as the Universe because of intelligence being sullied by ignorance. On the Vivartavādin's view, Brahman remains in its own nature on discrimination. The Siddhāntin differs also from the Pariṇāmavāda Vedāntin who says that Brahman is modified as the Universe and remains as itself too. Jñānaprakāśar introduces a discussion bearing on the nature of consciousness and incidentally brings in the Advaita view for criticism. The nature of the released soul or Śiva is not that which has consciousness for its cause nor is it what is characterised as indeterminable, for either way it will become inert as it does for the Naiyāyikas and others. If we say that which is caused by consciousness or that which is indeterminable is consciousness, we shall be landed in an infinite regress. No doubt it is of the form of consciousness but it is not pure consciousness (consciousness alone) as it is for the Vedāntins. If it is not the indeterminable something-we-know-not-what, but consciousness, the words of the Śivāgama, "There is something established as the denotation of the word 'that'" will apply. The *Parākhya* and the *Mṛgendra* convey gradually the idea that *ḍrk* (knower) is different from objects that are known (*drśya*) and unknown (*adrśya*). The Advaitin speaks of bare consciousness as devoid of the distinctions of knower and known and as dependent on (i) itself, (ii) other consciousnesses and (iii) objects of knowledge. For the Advaitin, consciousness is pure, independent, non-relative and supra-relational; for the Siddhāntin it is never pure alone, it is dependent, relative and relational. The Advaitin stresses pure identity alone; the other, identity in difference.

Though consciousness is alike in respect of the omniscient, omnipotent Śiva and the souls, freed from delimiting adjuncts, the characteristics of consciousness are natural and not adventitious, just as the natural characteristic of the lamp is to burn and illuminate. These characteristics are not found in the unintelligent inert material *pāsa* or in the souls which, limited by *pāsa*, know, do and enjoy little. Capacity to know and do little is due to an adventitious cause. Partial knowledge, partial activity and partial enjoyment and non-knowledge, and non-activity are due to limitations. It is wrong to hold as some do that omnipotence and omniscience are also due to an adventitious cause. These are natural characteristics.

According to the Advaitin, pure consciousness alone is the natural characteristic. As we have seen, the Siddhāntin says that the natural characteristic is pure consciousness but as qualified by its relation to (i) itself, (ii) other consciousnesses and (iii) objects of cognition. Omniscience and omnipotence constitute for the Advaitin, the definition *per accidens* of Brahman's nature.

Jñānaprakāśar rejects the view of those who hold the relation between the Lord and the souls—the pervader and the pervaded—to be one of beginningless conjunction brought about by intimate relationship as obtains in the case of sesame and oil, fruit and its juice. Such a relation constitutes release also for them. This is untenable. As non-corporeal objects like ether and absolutely non-corporeal objects like the soul do not conflict with one another, as rays from the two eyes reach the moon simultaneously without conflict, the consciousness of the Lord and the consciousness of the released souls are found together in all objects without clashing with one another. There is no relation between them as external and internal nor is there conflict between them. So no relation can be predicated of the released souls and the Lord either as one of conjunction or as inherence; nor does the same relation as obtains between the pervader and the pervaded apply. All that can be said of the released souls and the Lord is that they are similar. This view, he claims, has the support of the commentator on the *Raurava*.

The difference between Śivāgrayogin and Jñānaprakāśar is significant. While to the former, the relation is one of intimate relationship as between the pervader and the pervaded (both of which are according to him intelligent and pervasive) as obtains in the case of ghee and milk, fruit and its sweetness, oil and sesame seeds, the latter, who must have read the commentary of the former rejects this view also. Both are agreed on rejecting a relationship based on conjunction. Jñānaprakāśar speaks of released souls only whereas Śivāgra yogin speaks of souls in general. But the difference is significant.

The Vedas declare the existence of one soul only. How could the Siddhāntin speak of a plurality of souls? The Siddhāntin replies that the Vedas declare the Lord of souls to be one—not that there is only one soul. Just as the sound *a* is found in all other letters, the one Supreme Soul pervades the plurality of finite souls. This way the oneness of souls with the Lord is kept

up while the difference between Him and the souls is not lost sight of.⁵⁸

Śivāgra yogin takes the above as a reply to the objection of the Advaitin who takes the Vedic declaration to mean the existence of only one soul. There is the further objection of the Advaitin that Vedic declaration regarding non-difference (Advaita) is also overlooked if the Siddhāntin says that the Lord of the souls is one, thereby affirming difference between God and soul.

As for non-difference, Śivāgra yogin says that there can be no negation except of that of which there is 'the possibility. Therefore non-difference is declared in the sense that the finite souls and the Infinite are non-different in respect of pervasion though they are different in respect of substance. The finite souls are pervaded by the Infinite. Just as the letter *a* animates the other letters and remains as their life, Śiva animates the souls existing inseparable from them. The vowel *a* animates the consonants. But how can *a* be the life of the vowels themselves? While *a* is the archetype, the fifteen letters similar to *a* are its modifications (Refer to Aṭavai for further details). Because souls are different from Śiva they are known by Him as objects of knowledge. Hence we are faced with a dilemma. If souls are objects of knowledge, they become conditioned and destructible. If we say that Śiva does not know these souls, in order that we may escape this untenable position, His omniscience is jeopardised. How can we meet this dilemma? Śivāgra yogin replies that the truth of the position which does not belittle the souls any more than it detracts from the Lord's omniscience can be known through the preceptor,

Jñānaprakāśar says that like that which is related to another as similar, Śiva is related to the released souls in as much as the

58. Maraijñāna Deśikar quotes the following rules in support of the illustration that vowels give life to the consonants 'உடல்மேல் உயிர் வந்து ஒன்றுதல் இயல்பே' and 'மெய் தனித்தியலா' and says further that vowels cannot be consonants any more than consonants can be vowels but both must combine to produce any result. Souls have no activity of their own.

Nirambavaḷgiar quotes the following verse from the Śivajñāna Bodham.

ஒன்றென்ற தொன்றேகாண் ஒன்றே பதிபசுவா
மொன்றென்ற நீ பாசத்தோடுகா—னொன்றென்ற
லக்கரங்களின்ற மகரவுயிரின்றே
லிக்கிரமத்தென்னு மிருக்கு.

Intelligence-energy of the latter is manifested in its entirety in accordance with Śivaśakti. But the manifestation of the bound souls is partly without accordance with Śivaśakti. So the relation between Śiva and bound souls is like the relation between him who shows and him who receives Grace. The objector asks why the Siddhāntin should maintain the relater and the related as pervader and pervaded to be in the relation of that which manifests and that which is manifested. The Vedas declare the existence of a Lord who is beginninglessly so (i.e., has been the Lord beginninglessly), an infinite number of lords whose attainment of their position has a beginning and an infinite number of souls also. If so, is the Lord in a place other than the one where the lords and souls are? The relationship is illustrated by an analogy which applies in part only. The several letters are related to *a* which is inherent in them. There is identity in difference. But the Lord and the lords are related as similars. The Lord and souls are related as pervader and pervaded.

The Siddhāntin gives the body-soul analogy to illustrate the relation between the Lord and the souls. The soul resides in the body made up of nerves, etc., and has sense organs, etc., for its instruments. Yet the soul and body remain distinct without either of them becoming the other. Likewise, the Lord exists non-different from the souls. But at the same time, He does not become the soul anymore than the soul can become the Lord. Thus, like the soul and the body, the Lord exists as different and non-different from the soul.

The soul-body analogy may be criticised on the ground that while no satisfactory explanation of the relation between the soul and body is available or even possible, it is used to illustrate the relation between God and soul. The critic may proceed to deny the ultimate reality of God as such and soul as such. If dialectics sets up intelligibility in terms of ratiocination as the test of reality, we find not merely that the relation of God and soul, of soul and body cannot be accounted for but also that God, soul, and body—all these have to be treated as appearances! Strangely enough these appearances are admitted to be facts of experience. But, if they are admitted as facts of experience, then is it not proper to try to understand them as best as we can—by means of analogies which in the very nature of the case cannot be complete but still can be helpful for our purpose, and thus enable us to verify the truth in religious experience? The experience of the

Śaivite saints is ample proof, if we do not mean by proof what is given by ratiocinative processes, that God is the informing spirit of the soul just as the soul is the informing spirit of the body.

Differences not withstanding, it is worthwhile considering what the Viśiṣṭādvaitin has to say on the matter. 'In the highest sense of the term, the Śrī Bhāṣya conculdes with the very significant note of the Śarīraka Mīmāṃsā "sarvamsamañjasam" (everything is satisfactorily explained). This includes philosophical satisfactoriness as well as spiritual satisfyingness which is traceable to the infinite suggestiveness of the synthetic insight afforded by the Śarīra-Śarīri bhāva'.....Again, 'The truth of Brahman as the Śarīrin of all beings is clearly intuited by the Ālvars and summed up in the Tamil Veda "uḍalmisai uyir." Rāmānuja thus shows that the foundational truth of Brahman as the Śarīrin furnishes the key to the understanding of all philosophical problems'.⁵⁹

To show that even the soul-body relation is a fact of experience, Nīrambavaḷagiār quotes a verse from the Śivajñāna Bodham which says that though different from the body, organs etc., the soul answers when the name of its body is called—because it identifies itself with the body.

The sense organs and internal organs cognise their objects, as informed by the soul; but they do not know themselves or the soul which informs them. Even so, souls cognise, as informed by the Lord's Intelligence-energy which resides in all souls and which is all-pervasive; but they do not know themselves (as the agents who know and experience the fruits of their deeds) or the Lord's grace actuating them. Śiva Who, in the end imparts real knowledge to the souls, knows them, informs them and exists together with them.⁶⁰

59. The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita, p. 246ff.

There is an explicit reference to Śarīra-śarīri bhāva in Mapāḍiyam.

Cf.

“முதல்வனே பசுபாசமென்று அபேதங்கூறுதலும் முதல்வன் வேறு பசுபாசம் வேறெனப் பேதங் கூறுதலும் ஏலாமையின் முதல்வனுக்கும் பசுபாசங்கட்கும் சரீர சரீரீ பாவத்தான் அபேதங் கூறுதல்வேண்டும்”.

60. The nature of Tirodhāna is figuratively ascribed here to the Lord.

Śivāgra yogin answers a few questions: To the questions how sense organs etc., which are declared to be inert can be said to cognise, he replies that the statement should not be taken in its primary sense but in its implied sence, as a figurative usage based on the relation of cause and effect. The sense organs etc., are auxiliary to the soul's intelligence in cognising objects when it is turned towards them; but they do not know the soul or that they are auxiliary causes only by reason of their contact with the soul. Is it not inappropriate to mention the sense organs etc., which are inert in order to illustrate a point involving the soul which is intelligent? No; since the subject is all souls, there is nothing to compare with them (i.e., no *sapakṣa*). So it is not improper to illustrate the point with a negative example. It may be conceded that the inert has no activity except as controlled by the intelligent. But would it not lead to an infinite regress if the intelligent itself be said to require another intelligence (viz., Śiva) to inform and impel it? No; Śiva Who informs souls does not require another intelligence. He is self-luminous, knows everything-informs souls and exists non-different from them. Souls, which are also intelligences, cannot know for themselves (but have to be informed by Śiva) and cannot teach others. How can there be this difference between intelligences while the nature of intelligence is the same? The eye is luminous; so is the sun. But the eye cannot see without sun-light nor cause other eyes to see. The sun can, by its light, see all things by itself and show them to the eyes also. It is even so in the case of souls and Śiva.

If God is required to inform souls, how is it that all the souls are not alike as intelligences? If karma is responsible for the grades in human intelligence, God is rendered superfluous. To such questions, the Siddhāntin replies thus: for the blossoming of the lotus, the sun is necessary as also for cultivating land. So, God is indispensable for the ripening and fructification of karma.

The soul that cognises things knows a particular thing through particular sense-organs, forgets things it has known once, remembers them when reminded by others, and does not know itself as knowing things. Hence it does not know independently but only as taught by the Lord.

The soul cannot be said to cognise without the help of other things. It requires the *ātmātattva* (which it impels), the derivatives (the internal organs), *kalās* etc. (which manifest the cogni-

tion, conation and affection of the soul), *kāla* (which assigns karma to a definite period), *niyati* which maintains karma without increase or decrease), body, the means of knowledge, the modes of speech (which are the cause of the writings), and an intelligence to inform it. Otherwise it would remain incorporeal and be ignorant of its own existence. That it may have all these, there must be an intelligence (*viz.*, God) which out of Grace, gives it these things. Such an intelligence is indispensable.

The Lord is without the accessories aforesaid for His cognition. It cannot, therefore, be said that He requires some one else to give Him these, for that would lead to an infinite regress. He cognises everything by Himself. He performs the five subtle functions in the *kevala*, the five gross and the very subtle functions in the *sakala* state.

There is verbal testimony, in addition to reasoning, using the principle of elimination, to show that the souls do not function except in the presence of the Lord. In the presence of the all-pervasive Lord, the souls come to have the fruits of knowledge according to their karma. He is not affected, as the inert world cannot stand over against Him. So, though the Lord informs the souls, He is not thereby affected.⁶¹

Jñānaprakāśar, explains the position thus: Change (and inertness) would result for Śiva if He were to exist in a *samyoga* relation with inert things like *māyā*. Neither do *māyā* etc. exist in a *samavāya* relation to Him, for that way He would become inert. He does not exist in either of these relations to the souls. For, if He did, He would become subject to changes. By His presence which consists in having contact with objects through the resolve of His Energy, He produces changes in the intelligent and the non-intelligent.

Just as the soul cognises with the help of the body etc., the Lord is a play-actor, doing the five-fold functions. For this, He has the two hundred and twenty-four worlds as His body, the eighty four hundred thousand species of living beings as the members of His body, the luminous cognition, conation and affection as internal organs and the function of informing the souls, existing

61. Muthiah Pillai says that presence does not mean being directly opposite to something. It means the inseparable Grace of the Lord.

as the intelligence of their intelligences, as His duty. Unlike the souls which function through organs and instruments, the Lord functions by His resolve. That is why He is said to be a play-actor.

Grace which thus helps the soul is the Energy of the Lord—His natural quality. As quality and substance cannot exist apart, Śiva and Grace do not exist apart from each other. As the sun dispels physical darkness and causes light to shine forth, so does Śiva remove the spiritual darkness of the souls by means of His Grace and grant them release. Śakti is Śiva's efficiency. As the light is not other than the power of the light, so is Śiva not other than Śakti (the relation here is one of identity-in-difference).

The analogy of the sun-light dispelling darkness has only a partial application to the point that the Lord removes āvara; for in the former there is manifesting operation. So, a more appropriate analogy would be the following: Cataract prevents the perception of object. On the application of collyrium, the cataract is removed and the eye is enabled to see. In addition to the removal of mala, the residual impressions of mala have to be removed and Śivatva made manifest. The removal of the residual impressions of mala and the manifestation of Śivatva are not separated much in respect of time. The transition is as immediate as the sequence in the snake throwing off its skin and appearing in a new one.

Having set forth the nature *per accidens* of Śiva, the Siddhāntin proceeds to state His essential nature.

If Śiva can be known by being pointed out in the manner in which material objects can be pointed out, He would become inert and liable to destruction. If He cannot be known in any way at all (since what cannot *at all* be known is non-existent), He would be a void. Pāśajñāna cannot exist in the presence of Śiva Who can be known (only) by Śivajñāna. Śiva Who is all pervasive is neither inert nor void but the intelligent real (citsat).

Śivāgra yogin interprets *asat* as 'anitya,' an interpretation Jñānaprakāsar discountenances. While Śiva Who is all-pervasive is not knowable by the instruments of māyā, He is not unknowable by the souls. He is of the nature of sat and cit. In Jñānaprakāsar's commentary, the word 'asat' is taken as meaning *aśuddha*. *Aśuddha māyā* may be balled *śuddha* as it is a product of māyā; but *śuddha māyā* is also *aśuddha* as compared with intelligence.

If, instead of interpreting *asat* as *āśuddha*, we interpret it as *asatya*, we would be lapsing into Vedānta. If we mean by it 'non-eternal,' this would also be unsatisfactory as *māyā*, *mala* etc., would then be non-eternal. As for Śiva, if He were not an object of cognition, then He would be non-real like the horns of a hare which are eternally non-existent.

In the presence of the Lord Who shows the way to release, the *śuddha* and *āśuddha* *prapañcas* remain as bare existents; to the souls, they are the means and objects of enjoyment. They are not the objects in respect of which Śiva performs the five functions. Even if they are, it is not for the released souls. They are so for the unreleased souls.

If, instead of such a view, it be held that the universe does not exist in the presence of Śiva and that it is not known to Śiva by any means whatever, Śiva must be said to have agency in respect of the five functions without having the conditions for them. If Śiva has nothing to know or act upon, He cannot be said to be omniscient or omnipotent; His condition would be like that of an inert object. Śiva would be a void and all the sayings of the Scriptures would be pointless.

Demonstrative knowledge is limited in time because it is subject to origin and decay; it is limited in space also. It is manifold as relating to world, enjoyment, body and instruments. It is associated with *mala*. It is superseded by real knowledge. For these reasons, it is *asat*; objects known through such a knowledge are all *asat*—they cannot be *sat*.

This is a reply to the Naiyāyika who says that not all things known are *asat*. He is told that they are *asat* by thus explaining the nature of the knowledge relating to them.

Śivāgra yogin says that this is in reply to the Mimāṃsaka's contention that the universe is *sat*. The Siddhāntin (he says) proves that the universe is *asat*. The universe is subject to origin and decay. The soul's intelligence knows the universe by pervading it. Body, organs, world and enjoyment change for the same soul and are the cause of the soul's delusive knowledge. When by the grace of Śiva, real knowledge dawns upon the soul, all these turn out to be *asat* and different from the soul. Things discriminated by the soul as different from itself are all *asat*.

Life, whether it is as king of the earth or as king of the celestial regions or as anyone of the 8,400,000 species of living beings,

and everything that is seen, is like a conjuror's trick (a conjuror so blinds the eye of the person as to make what is really not there appear to be there), like a dream (which comes to an end without a proper consummation) and the mirage (which is occasioned by the sun's rays and disappears with their disappearance). Life comes to an end like these. Hence the world is *asat*.

Though it is called *asat*, the world is really *sat*. The Sāṅkhya says that as for Satkāryavāda, there cannot come to be what is non-existent, it cannot be said that what is known is non-existent. The Siddhāntin shows with the aid of examples how what is known can be *asat*.

Giving his view of the matter Śivāgra yogin says that things which exist for a time and cease to be thereafter are *asat* and points out that the words of the text 'also *asat*', indicate partial acceptance as '*sat*.' So, it must be said to be *sadasat*. Is this not a defect of *anaikāntika*? No, it is not a mere appearance as obtains in the silver-nacre illusion: nor is it eternal like the souls or Śiva. It is existent upto *pralaya*. In the sight of the world it is existent, in the sight of the Scriptures it is non-existent. So, there is no defect in calling it *sadasat*. How is it known that there is dissolution of the world? In *suṣupti*, the souls do not have the functions of the senses and the internal organs. At death, body, organs, etc., are destroyed. As at death the body is destroyed for the soul occupying and identifying itself with that body, at the death of Brahmā, the world he identifies himself with viz., *Brahmāṇḍaloka* is destroyed. The worlds constituted of the *tattvas* above these are also destroyed at the death of the deities presiding therein. Thus there is all round dissolution.

Jñānaprakāśar says that the Vedāntins do not realise that what appears as false is not really false. They therefore call the world *asat*. But the Śaiva Siddhāntins say that what is *sat* in its own nature is real and that the world which is not real in its own nature is *asatya*.

What is known is subject to change and destruction. What is not known is not subject to these; so, why not recognise what is not known? Such a thing is really of no use. Neither can we reach that, nor can that come to us. It can give rise to no function. It would be like a garland of sky-flowers or a rope of tortoise-hair.

Why not say then that Brahman is neither existent nor non-existent nor both nor different from these but indeterminable? The Siddhāntin presents two alternatives to the person who proposes this view. Is Brahman non-existent? If so, the defects applying to what cannot be known would apply equally well to this. If to escape this, it be said that It is existent, this very admission would go to prove that Brahman is existent and not indeterminable. It may perhaps be said that if Brahman exists, It ought to be known. Whatever is an object of demonstrative knowledge is liable to destruction. Brahman (Śiva) is an intelligence transcending demonstrative knowledge.

Jñānaprakāśar says that a section of the Vedāntins says that Brahman is indeterminable (anirvacanīya). The Siddhāntin says that there cannot be such an entity—an entity that lacks usefulness. Śiva is intuited by the soul's Intelligence-energy as informed by Śiva-Śakti. Śiva is of the nature of intelligence. The world with its cause including the most fundamental is inert.

An object that is known becomes inert and liable to destruction. So, sat is what cannot be known (for what cannot be known is free from appearance, destruction etc.) This view is unacceptable to the Siddhāntin. Sat must be known by the soul who is the knower. Or else, of what avail can it be to assume a sat that cannot be known? Śiva exists with the soul who is the knower. He is known by means of Grace. Śiva who is thus known exists as that intelligence itself, as different from it and as one with it.⁶²

Offering his comments, Śivāgra yogin says that the soul which is the knower intuits Śiva by uniting with Parāśakti, as non-different from itself. Intuition (or cognition) implies the existence of the known and knowledge (காட்சி). Are these not different? No; the soul that attains to a state of trance (nirmalānanda Parāśiva samādhi) knows, on returning to the normal state, how the bliss of Śiva is experienced. Knowledge arises later and not when the experience is had. This is like a man waking up from deep sleep saying that he slept well. This is the case in jīvan-mukti. In the state of supreme release, there is Śiva only (i.e., as paramount reality). Hence there is no room for the kind of doubts

62. Maraijñāna Deśikar: Souls are supported by Śiva-śakti and they attain the highest happiness i.e., self-consciousness. This commentator is said to be a disciple of Maraijñāna Sambandar who preached ānānandavāda.

suggested earlier at all. It is for this reason that it is negatively stated in the twelfth sūtra that souls exist as Śiva Himself. Śiva Who is the object of knowledge is of the nature of intelligence. He is, in fact, different from the soul. Because of His Grace, He has the soul (which is an intelligence) for His form ; He exists non-different from it and is knowable by experience.

Jñānaprakāśar says that if Śiva be like the sky-flower (if He cannot be known), the enjoyment or release that the souls get through such a being would be like the produce of a field that has been ploughed with hare's horns. The object of intuition is patent in revelation (the Āgamas) interpreted through lakṣaṇa ; it is non-manifest through the path of mantras used by modes of manas, buddhi and ahaṅkāra ; it is without a substrate like the flame seen in the grass that is on fire. The soul which uses instruments appropriate to enjoyment and release, intuits Śiva by means of its Intelligence-energy which is informed by Śiva-Śakti. The soul belongs to the same class as Śiva. There is similarity between the two because the soul shares in the generic nature of Śiva. In intuiting Śiva, the soul is protected by Śiva-Śakti from the residual impressions of pāśa affecting it. Śiva-Śakti is that which indicates Śiva to the soul.

If, for contemplation the aid of instruments is sought for, it would be the sakala state ; if it is without instruments, kevala would set in ; if it be without either, it would result in the indeterminate and be a waste ; if it be on the view 'I contemplate an object that is beyond contemplation on the presumption that I have attained it,' no useful purpose would be served by such a contemplation. All these four kinds of contemplation are like play-acting. The proper contemplation would be intuiting Śiva with the help of Grace existing non-different from it.

The view of the Pātāñjalas is refuted here.

The Lord is not different from the soul ; He lives in its intelligence ; He informs the soul. He removes conceit which makes one feel egoistic and possessive. The distinctions of cogniser, cognised and cognition cannot be made in knowing Śiva. The Lord cannot be cognised by the soul's intelligence (as an object of demonstrative knowledge).

Śivāgra yogin raises the question why it should be said that Śiva can be cognised by śivajñāna only, when the soul is itself an

intelligence. He answers the question saying that the soul is pervaded by Sivajñāna which is pervasive. Whatever the soul thinks is really due to Śiva existing within it and causing it to think so. Because there is no object other than Śiva, the soul cannot think "I", "mine" etc. Because Śiva is inseparably united to the soul, the soul's intelligence cannot intuit Him without Sivajñāna.

Jñānaprakāśar says that when the soul and Śiva are distinguished, (without separating them), it is found that the soul is characterised by similarity to Śiva, belongs to His class and is really infinite in its thought and action. Finitude and limited scope of activity which constitute paśutva are really illusory (mithyā). The Lord does not appear limited to the cogniser but is impartite. He is not encompassed by the demonstrative knowledge of the soul. He pervades it and extends beyond it. If He informed the soul directly by His Energy, the stage of bondage would be superseded, the soul's finite intelligence would be made infinite, release and intuition of Śiva granted forthwith. But the soul is not ready for these yet. So, without hiding Himself wholly in the soul which is united to instruments like kalā, He manifests partially the mental mode of cit-śakti and informs it. He removes the limitations attaching to demonstrative knowledge (which results from buddhi and ahaṅkāra) making it dependent on Śiva-śakti. He makes cit-śakti susceptible to His (own) onset. The Lord cannot be intuited by paśu Jñāna illuminated by pāśajñāna (pāśa, paśu and Patijñāna are each twofold as manifesting and manifested respectively). The Lord can be seen only thus: Patijñāna characterised by Śivaśakti subdues pāśajñāna arising from kalā, buddhi, etc. This Patijñāna (manifesting type) manifests Patijñāna (manifested type) which illumines the Patijñāna characterised by the soul's Cit-śakti. The soul's manifesting Patijñāna illumines the manifested Patijñāna by which Śiva is intuited. This is the supreme Siddhānta. That Cit-śakti might cognise objects of sense-pleasure like garland, sandal paste and women, one type of instruments is required, (tattvas like kalā and their derivatives). For the cognition of Śiva Who does not belong to this category, another type of instruments is necessary, i.e. Śivaśakti and mental mode illumined by Śiva-śakti. Though these instruments are said to be adventitious, they are natural to the soul.

Śiva cannot be cognised by Śivaśakti. If He can be so cognised (as an external object to Śakti), He would become external to Śakti. The fruit of knowledge goes to Śiva instead of to the cogniser.

The soul's Cit-Śakti which is illumined by Śiva śakti, is like the eye lit by sun-light. Śiva-śakti and other objects are cognised by the soul whose intelligence is thus informed by Śakti. This is the supreme Siddhānta.

Some say that Śiva and the soul are (entitatively) one. But as there is some one cognising [in this fashion, we find the soul and Śiva are different. There are some others who say that the soul and Śiva are different. To cognise them as different, we must be able to see another intelligence within the soul's intelligence. As this is not the case, this view is also untenable. Even when Śiva is cognised, it is found that the soul exists as one with Śiva, just as shadow exists always as one with water. To intuit this state of union, the soul must have the help of Grace. The soul would then see itself as non-different from the Lord.⁶³

Śaiva Siddhanta speaks of Pati, paśu and pāśa as eternal. In the foregoing discussions, we noticed the terms sat and asat used of Pati and pāśa respectively. How can pāśa be said to be asat? What is the meaning of this term? The commentators differ in their interpretation of this term. They are confronted with the problem of interpreting asat in such a way as not to compromise or deny the eternality of pāśa. Śivāgra yogin interprets it as 'anitya,' a procedure which is discountenanced by Jñānaprakāśar. Jñānaprakāśar suggests that 'asat' means aśuddha. Śivajñāna yogin says that interpretation of asat as sadasat, aśuddha etc. are all the result of confusion.⁶⁴ He says that there can be no asat different from sat (in regard to the entities accepted by it) in Śaiva Siddhānta which accepts Satkāryavāda. The Universe is said to be asat because it does not persist in its manifested state as an effect but lapses into the causal state when it becomes latent. Hence by asat only the Universe in its *manifested* state is meant.

63. Marajñāna Deśikar: The statement, "there is only one" (to wit Brahman) implies the existence of more than one...Because the soul is pervaded by the Lord and exists in union with Him, it can be figuratively called the Lord.

64. cf. the following: "In the Śaiva Siddhānta which espouses, Satkāryavāda, asat is not the opposite of sat. Though paśu and pāśa are called asat with reference to their general nature, they are not asat judged by their special nature. They are sat."—Śivajñāna Bodha Vacanālaṅkāra Dīpam. See Māpāḍiyam also on asat.

Similarly in regard to karma also, the justification is that it exists in a subtle form in the causal state and in a gross form when it is manifested. Likewise ānava whose efficiency is in evidence in the state of the soul's bondage, subsides and exists like a void, in the state of release even as darkness is subdued by light. The soul also (as will be seen in the Chapter on Souls) which is really sat, is obscured by mala and its capacities rendered ineffective. Thus it appears to be non-existent. Though it subsequently gets free from mala and continues to exist, it does exist for a time like asat. It is only Śiva who exists ever the same and therefore can be called 'sat' and 'cit' in the full sense of these terms. Thus the Siddhāntin uses the term 'asat' to characterise whatever undergoes change and does not persist ever the same, with its capacities unsubdued. Compared with Śiva not merely pāśa, but even the soul (paśu) has to be called asat, taking care to remember the connotation given to this term by the Siddhāntin.

Developing this position the Siddhāntin says whatever becomes an object of demonstrative knowledge is asat. In their manifested state, the objects of the universe appear for a while and disappear into their cause, viz., māyā. So, as compared with māyā which does not become an object of perception, the manifested universe is asat. The Siddhāntin illustrates this by reference to the writing on water, dreams and mirage. While we write, the letters do appear in water, though they disappear even as we write; dream experiences are known to cause actual physiological effects.⁶⁵ In the case of the mirage, the mirage is there though water is not. Error consists in mistaking it for water—in not recognising it as an effect of the sun's rays on sand.

So, whatever becomes an object of demonstrative knowledge is asat. Sat is beyond such knowledge.

But are there not declarations which refer to Śiva as an object as "He" ('அவனேதானேயாய்' 'அவனிவனாய் நின்றமுறை')? Though Śiva is so indicated in a general way, He cannot be demonstratively known in one's experience. He can be known

65. The treatment here follows the Māpāḍiyam closely. Cf.

"உரையுணர் விறந்து நின்றுணர்வதோர் உணர்வே" Tiruvācagam.

"ஆட்பாலவர்க்கருளும் வண்ணமும் ஆதிமாண்பும்
கேட்பான் புகிலளவில்லை கிளக்கவேண்டா"

"ஏதுக்களாலும் எடுத்த மொழியாலும் மிக்குச்
சோதிக்கவேண்டா".

only as informed by Patijñāna which is not demonstrative in character at all.

We shall attempt an estimate of the proofs given by the Siddhāntin to establish the existence of God. In the main, they are the cosmological proof and argument from morality. Before we assess their worth, it is important to find out first the Siddhāntin's view about reasoning. Śivjñāna yogin says that reasoning is necessary, in addition to verbal testimony, to re-inforce the truths to pupils of dull understanding who are likely to be confused by the doctrines of other schools. Besides one does not realise the truth in one's own experience automatically as soon as it is taught; one has to go through the four stages of hearing, reflecting, attaining clarity and entering the state of trance. Again, there are apparent contradictions in Āgamic declarations. One should know the relative strength of these declarations and to determine this, reasoning is necessary. Thus reasoning plays an important *part* in acquiring a knowledge of the verities. There can be no dogmatism on the part of the teacher and blind acceptance on the part of the pupil.⁶⁶

What is heard and thought over is tested in one's own experience. Till it is done, one's knowledge is merely theoretical. Śivajñāna yogin gives a significant example. The knowledge of a young girl regarding love, gathered from a study of books on love is merely theoretical. She will understand it adequately only when she has actual experience.⁶⁷ Even so is one's knowledge of God gained from a study of sacred books. Here we have insistence on

66. Māpāḍiyam, p. 303. In this connection we may refer to the account which tells us how Meykaṇḍār was initiated. He heard the Siddhānta from Parañjoti Munivar. He sat in the presence of Pollāppillaiyār in the local temple, reflected on what he heard and attained clarity. The author of the Parithāṣā says that though pupils who are fit for initiation do not doubt the truth of the teaching imparted to them, they are directed by their preceptor to reflect on it and they do so in order to realise it in personal experience. As the Kaṭha upaniṣad has it, *dṛśyate tu agryayā buddhyā* III, 12...

67. Māpāḍiyam, p. 356. Cf. the following: 'What is revealed by scripture has to be mediated in thought before it could get transformed into one's own experience. Śruti is what is helped; yukti or tarka is what helps. As an aid to revelation, reason is of inestimable value; and it should be regarded as subsidiary to śruti and anubhūti'.

the need for personal experience. 'Faith' as Dean Inge says 'begins as an experiment and ends as an experience.'

Reasoning (*anumāna*) is defined by the author of the Śaiva Siddhānta Paribhāṣā as the reflection which follows the hearing of the Siddhānta Śāstras. This may appear to limit the scope of reasoning needlessly. But viewed in its context, it means just this that reasoning is useful in helping us to understand the truths set forth in the Śāstras. To borrow words used in a similar context elsewhere "Reason may establish our certainties, it does not initiate them."⁶⁸ The author of the Paribhāṣā goes on to define *pratyakṣa* as one's own experience (*svānubhava*).

As a matter of fact, all the three *pramāṇas* are only auxiliaries. The real *pramāṇa* is *Cit-śakti*. The Siddhāntin characterises the knowledge given by three *pramāṇas* also as *pāśājñāna* in so far as they are limited by the psychic apparatus. Intuition of God is *Patijñāna*.⁶⁹ It would be incorrect to argue that because the Siddhāntin uses reasoning to establish the existence of *Pati*, *pāśu* and *pāśa*, these are no more than inferences for him. God is something more than an 'Inevitable Inference.'⁷⁰ "The religious man would scoff, and rightly so, at the philosopher who believed that because he could demonstrate that Reality as a whole is a supra-rational harmony or what not, he thereby 'knew God.' The form has a filling. But the filling is not for Philosophy. If at all, it must be only for direct experience".^{70a} The deservedly popular story of Kaṇṇappar is ample proof to show that the Siddhāntin's God is not the end of a syllogism. That unlettered saint was wholly ignorant of Logic and yet his experience of God has evoked the admiration of all savants down the ages, not excepting the redoubtable champion of Absolutism—Śaṅkara. 'It is not that ignorance is, for religion, a mark of superiority but that the knowledge of God is granted as freely to the unlettered as to the learned, to the Apostles or to a St. Francis as to a Butler or an Aquinas.' "Do you require," asked Kant at the close of the

68. C. B. Bennett quoted by Elton Trueblood in his *Trustworthiness of Religious experience*, pp. 28-9.

69. *Māpāḍiyam*, p. 414.

70. In a paper read before the Indian Philosophical Congress in 1945, it was argued that the Śaiva Siddhāntin's faith in God is no more than faith in an inference. No theist's faith in God can be adequately described as faith in an inference.

70a. *Scepticism and Construction*, p. 310.

Kritik, "that a knowledge which concerns all men should transcend the common understanding and should be revealed to you only by philosophers?"⁷¹

A word about the Śāstras. Verbal testimony is given importance because the Śāstras embody for us the truths discovered by the sages and saints in their personal experience, truths which can be tested by us if we undergo the discipline necessary therefor. Discovery and experience of truths always precede the systematic formulation thereof. The experience embodied in the Śāstras should not be lost sight of. Experience comes first, exposition only afterwards. Samayakuravar (Sambandar, Appar, Sundarar and Māṇikkavācagar) precede the Santāna kuravar (Meykaṇḍār, Aruṇandi, Maraijñānasambandar and Umāpati Śivam). If we seek a parallel in Viśiṣṭādvaita, we find that the Āṭvārs precede the Ācāryas.^{71a} "No man can be argued into the presence of the living God. Nor could any proof, however convincing, avail to satisfy the demand of the believer ...Men do not bring with them to the religious experience a ready made concept of God as the proper object of worship and then go on to an emotional attitude towards Him. They find themselves in presence of a reality and know it to be God in the response it evokes. Conceptual expression follows after; it is the product of reflection not on speculative premises but on the experience of contact".^{71b}

The validity of religious experience will be taken up in the last Chapter. We shall proceed to examine the value of the cosmological proof, with special reference to Western Theism. The traditional proofs (Ontological, Cosmological and Teleological proofs) have been compared to 'the strands of a rope which is more than three times as strong as each one of its strands would be by itself... arguments for theism tend to be cumulative'.⁷² Hence, even if the cosmological argument is weak or unsatisfactory, it cannot be a serious obstacle to the acceptance of a theistic conclusion. The cosmological argument has been explained thus: Starting from an undeniable deliverance of experience, namely, that there are such entities as existings things and events,...it is noted that these existing things and events reveal themselves, even

71. De Burgh - Towards a Religious Philosophy, p. 35.

71a. The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita, p. 502.

71b. Towards a Religious Philosophy, pp. 15-6.

72. R. B. Henderson, Belief in God, p. 25.

on the most cursory inspection, to be contingent in character,—that is to say as not being there in virtue of any intrinsic necessity of their own.....If this be true of all that nature contains, it must likewise be true of nature in its entirety. In the long run, therefore, the existence of nature must depend upon a Being Whose existence is intrinsically or unconditionally necessary,—a Being, that is to say, that is not dependent for its existence upon the prior existence of something else.⁷³ While it is usual to sum up the cosmological proof as 'Because the contingent is, therefore the necessary being is,' it has been suggested that it is rather 'Because the contingent *is not*, the necessary Being is'.⁷⁴

Two difficulties are noticed in the cosmological argument. One is the legitimacy of the passage from causation in parts of the Universe to causation in the universe as a whole. Another is the very notion of cause, with the added difficulty, of a First Cause. The first is a real logical difficulty, there being no passage from the particular to the universal. But all Induction suffers from this disability. In so far as the matter is treated as one of analogy, no certainty can be claimed for the conclusion. As for the second difficulty, a First Cause is without doubt an awkward expression. But is not 'cause' used in two different senses from one of which something essential to the meaning of this term as commonly used has been eliminated? In mathematical physics, causation is reduced to an equation. Cause has a richer meaning in regard to the historical evolution of man or nature where for one thing, the time factor is not considered unessential as in mathematical physics. If the time-factor is taken into consideration and we resist the habit of looking in one direction only namely backward for a first cause, and look forward for the final cause also, then God may be the Cause we seek for—not merely the First Cause but also the Final Cause⁷⁵

73. Dawes Hicks. The philosophical Bases of Theism, pp. 163-4. This way of phrasing it reveals the close approximation to the Siddhantin's version of it.

74. Caird quoted by Pringle Pattison in his Idea of God, p. 250.

75. This is how Professor Sorley treats the cosmological argument. See his Moral Values and the Idea of God, pp. 320-2. Cf. "The cosmological argument underlies the plain man's thinking about the world, and despite the destructive logic which lays its axe at the roots of many of the forms of this argument, it may yet reassert itself in healthy growth and vigour, with sap and life in its veins"—T. M. Watt, The Intuition of God, pp. 3-4.

So for as the moral argument as usually presented is concerned, we owe it to Kant who regarded it as giving us a practical certainty of the existence of God. "Admitting," he said "that the pure moral law inexorably binds every man as a command (not as a rule of providence), the righteous man may say, I will that there be a God. I firmly abide by this, and will not let this faith be taken from me".⁷⁶ Sorley considers the moral argument as a special and striking expansion of the cosmological argument. The cosmological argument first looks for a cause for the bare existence of the world and man. From God as the First Cause and the Great Law Giver in relation to the laws of nature and order therein, we proceed to something beyond the material world to a sphere of relations and principles of a still more general kind, of ideals like Truth and Goodness. Where could these ideals be, if they cannot be embodied in matter or realised by finite minds. but in God?

The moral argument too is not free from difficulties. If at the very outset, the objective validity of moral law is questioned or denied, the argument cannot proceed at all since it is based on it. But as has been suggested already the value of these arguments consists in their cumulative strength. The Siddhāntin also gives a moral argument, but the difference between the Hindu approach with its belief in karma and the Christian view without such a belief has to be borne in mind. That apart, there is an essential similarity in this, that both regard God as the Moral Governor of the Universe.

The Siddhāntin's claim would be somewhat like A. E. Taylor's. Says the Professor, "I am not seeking to create faith where it is simply non-existent—only God Himself can do that but to defend it, where it—or at least the will to it—is present, against, the specious bad reasoning of its assailants".^{76a} In regard to the traditional proofs, R. B. Henderson says humorously,⁷⁷ 'the worst that can be said about them is that they are not proofs in the mathematical sense.....all the three of them are extremely valuable if properly used and if not too much is expected of them. There was once an examination candidate who was asked by his tutor, after a geometry paper, if he had proved a certain proposition which had

76. Quoted by Sorley, *ibid*, p. 329.

76a. Does God Exist? preface, pp. v-vi.

77. Belief in God, p. 24.

been set in the paper. He replied, "I can't quite claim to have *proved* it, but I made it seem highly probable".....They (these arguments) cannot *prove* the existence of God, but they can make His existence seem extremely probable!

The words demonstration and proof are often loosely used. When Huxley says "In matters of intellect do not pretend that conclusions are certain which are not demonstrated nor demonstrable,"⁷⁸ he evidently means by demonstration a process possible only in pure logic and mathematics. Taylor says, 'He must have known that no one can demonstrate that the battle of Waterloo was ever fought, but he can hardly have meant to say that the fact that it was fought is not certain.....The point I would insist on as all important is that much which is certain truth, and truth, of the highest practical moment for the conduct of life, is wholly indemonstrable, even when we improperly widen the scope of the word *demonstration* to include the sort of proof of fact which satisfies a jury or an historian.'⁷⁹

We shall notice some points of criticism of the Siddhāntin's conception of God and briefly attempt a reply. It has been said that the creatorship of God does not amount to anything considerable in the Siddhānta system as along with Him there are two other eternal entities.⁸⁰ It is not as if the Siddhāntin does not realise the difficulty here. If Śiva is pervasive, there is no ground for affirming the existence of souls and pāśa as other than Śiva. If they are other than Śiva, He cannot be pervasive.⁸¹ Stating the problem thus, the Siddhāntin goes on to meet it by giving an analogy. He says God is like the ākāśa which gives the space for the waters of the sea. Though the sea (i.e., ākāśa giving the space for the waters) and water are pure, salt clings to the water and not to the sea (ākāśa). Similarly, though Śiva is pervasive, He is not affected by the qualities of paśu and pāśa. But it may be asked whether there can be three eternal entities. This is really the age-old problem of the One and the Many and the difficulties in the conception of God as the Infinite. We shall state the Siddhānta in regard to this matter, before we consider the general position with reference to Western philosophy. So far as pāśa is concern-

78. Quoted in Does God Exist? p. 131 N.

79. Quoted in Does God Exist? p. 131.

80. Śaiva Siddhānta, p. 74.

81. Sūtra VII. See also Māpāḍiyam. pp. 447-8.

ed, we have seen already how *pāśa* does not manifest itself before *Pati*. Thus though present it cannot prevail before *Śiva*. We shall briefly consider the position of *paśu* (the soul). Though *Jñāna-prakāśar's* commentary is not viewed with favour by the orthodox *Siddhāntins*, he has rendered a distinct service by his frequent insistence on the nature of spiritual entities. Time and again, he points out that there can be clash only between corporeal substances, and souls and *Śiva* not being such, there is no possibility of clash between them at all. Hence, there is no point in the contention that the existence of one spiritual entity will limit the existence of another as would be the case in regard to corporeal substances. It may be said that God's supremacy is compromised if *paśu* is also eternally existent. So far as souls are concerned, the systems of Indian Philosophy which recognise the existence of soul, whether one or many, always speak of it as *anādi* (beginningless).⁸² The basic assumption is that there can be no birth for the soul as, to admit it would be to accept its death also—a notion which seems fantastic to the Indian thinkers. Hence the criticism that *Śiva* is "not responsible for the genesis of souls"⁸³ ignores the basic assumption of orthodox systems of Indian philosophy. The souls, though essentially intelligent, have been beginninglessly bound by *mala*. Restoration to their essential nature is possible only by the grace of *Śiva*. Thus though souls are similar to *Śiva* in being intelligent and eternal, they are not free, and cannot be compared to the ever-free Lord. Souls constitute no limitation to the Infinity of the Lord on whom they are dependent.

In regard to *pāśa*, the important point to remember is that though the *Siddhāntin* recognises it as independent, its capacity to function depends on *Śiva's* Will. It is His *Śakti* in its obscuring

82. cf. the *Gita* which says :

na jāyate mṛyate vā kadācin
 ayam bhūtvā bhvita vā na bhūyah
 ajo nityaḥ sāvato'yam purāṇo
 na hanyate hanyamāne śarīre II 20

and also the following

veda'vināsinam nityam ya yenamajamavyayam II, 21.

83. *Śaiva Siddhānta* p. 87. In regard to Christian Theology cf. the following "The doctrine known as Creationism attributes the independent existence of each human soul to a definite creative act; while the opposite doctrine called Traducianism, holds that all souls are generated from other souls in the same way and at the same time as bodies from other bodies". J. Ward. *The Realm of Ends*, p. 205.

aspect (as Tirodhāna) that impels āṇava to function. When He wills it, Tirodhāna changes into Aruḷ śakti and āṇava ceases to function. But for Him, they would not function at all. When He originally started the process, and how souls, whose essential nature is intelligence came to be affected—are question which are difficult to answer.⁸⁴ The process has been going on. Because we do not know its origin—we call it beginningless.⁸⁵ As an empiricist, the Siddhāntin recognises the existence of facts. His empiricism is not confined to the material world alone. The religious experience of saints who are, to borrow the words of Royce, 'radical empiricists' is enough to assure him that the material Universe and souls though different from God are nothing without Him.⁸⁶ The alternative would be—if protesting all the time that Logic has its limitations, we still persist in giving priority to the exigencies of thought over facts of ordinary and mystical experience,—to deny the reality of the material world and the finite souls because it is difficult to evolve a scheme guaranteeing the infinity of God and the independent existence of souls and matter entitatively.

Because māyā is said to exist independently and is the material cause of the world, it may be thought that God's infinitude is compromised, that He becomes only an artificer, not a creator in the full sense of the term. But the Siddhāntin holds that māyā is the Lord's Parigraha Śakti, that without His command, there can be no evolution at all. Examining the Christian doctrine of Creation out of nothing, Pringle Pattison⁸⁷ says that it is from what it denies, rather than what it affirms, that its true meaning is to be gathered. It was a counter-statement against a dualistic conception, that the world was merely shaped by God out of a pre-existing material. If, however, creation is taken as an act of the Lord's will, as the Siddhāntin does,⁸⁸ there could be no objection

84. 'There are some questions which we cannot answer and must leave alone. We do not know why there is a world'-Dean Inge in an article entitled Theism in Philosophy Vol. XXIII, No. 84.

85. 'The relation between the soul and mala is anādi, because we do not know the reason therefor.' Śaiva Siddhānta Paribhāṣa. p. 30. cf. also Māpāḍiyam, pp. 112-3. where the commentator says that re-creation or re-emergence (புனருற்பவம்) of the universe is spoken of instead of the first emergence, because that cannot be known by us.

86. ஒன்று நி அல்லலை, அன்றி ஒன்றில்லை Tiruvācagam.

87. idea of God, p. 306.

88. Māpāḍiyam, p. 137.

to the acceptance of *māyā* which does not evolve without His will. Thus, we could avoid dualism of a type which takes away from the supremacy of the Lord.

What about karma? If God requires karma as an auxilliary cause, if He cannot but allow karma to function, is not His independence limited? The Siddhāntin replies that there can be no pleasure or pain unless it is through karma, as the Lord is merciful and compassionate to all souls. He is not partial. He does not confer favours on some and heap misfortunes on others. Just as the king's independence is not limited on the ground that he rewards or punishes people according to their deeds, the Lord's autonomy is not in the least compromised because He governs in accordance with karma.⁸⁹ Souls, by their deeds, make or mar their future. In fact, if God did not Himself recognise the ethical law, He may be still thought to be omnipotent but hardly a just and merciful being. The position of the Siddhāntin is typical of Hindu thought which has been finely summed up thus: 'According to Hindu conception God is not a judge sitting in a remote heaven meting out punishments according to a penal code or waiting to mete out the last day of judgment, but an indwelling spirit whose law is wrought into our natures. At the same time, He never abdicates in favour of law. Our Scriptures call Him Karmādhyaaksha—the supervisor of the law of Karma'.⁹⁰

Above all, we have to remember that the Siddhāntin calls souls as the servants of the Lord (அடிமை) and the effects of *māyā* and karma as His possession (உடைமை). Thus He is absolutely supreme.

In what sense, then, shall we understand the Infinity of God? Sorley examines the term infinite as it is used in Mathematics and refuses to apply it to God in the same sense for two reasons. One is that in Mathematics, there are conceptions of a least infinite and great infinities. These cannot express the divine essence. Secondly, the infinite in Mathematics has reference to a class consisting of parts. This is inapplicable to God. Though we speak of God as omnipresent and everlasting, what we mean is that there is no part of space beyond His power and that His power reaches throughout all time. 'It is illegitimate to extend to Him as

89. *Mapāḍiyam*, p. 40

90. *What is Hinduism?* D. S. Sarma, p. 69.

spirit the characteristics which belong to space and time, any more than those which belong to matter'.⁹¹

Dawes Hicks says⁹² that Infinity is a slippery notion and is susceptible of various meanings and states his view of God's Infinity thus: "God may be 'infinite' not because, He is the world, nor because the world is part of Him; but because in and through Him, the world has meaning and significance; because His knowledge of it is complete, and His solicitude for it perfect. To me, at all events, it seems simply a misuse of language to call an individual finite or limited *merely* because there are other individuals distinct from himself. If there were no other individuals, then his being would, indeed, be impoverished and his sphere of influence confined."

Thus we find that it is possible to understand infinity of God in such a way as to recognise the existence of souls and matter as entitatively different from Him but as subject to His control.

Another criticism is that God cannot be absolute because His nature is such as to make Him dependent on the world and souls. He requires these to give expression to His creatorship etc., and so the world is as necessary to God as He is necessary to the world.⁹³ This is to overlook two important considerations. In the first place, creatorship, etc., constitute the definition *per accidens* of the Lord. His nature defined *per essence* is sat and cit. So, to argue that because He creates the world and engages in

91. Sorley - Moral Values and the Idea of God, pp. 480-1.

92. The Philosophical Bases of Theism, p. 263. Henry Jones says: "...here as elsewhere the opposites which seemed to contradict and therefore supplant each other, really supplement and fulfil each other. Surely the infinite that stands merely opposed to the finite must be another finite. The true infinite must be that which reveals and realizes itself in the finite. On the other hand, the finite in which, and by which, the infinite is thus revealed and realized has its own reality in the infinite, and exists in virtue of it' A Faith that enquires, p. 179.

93. cf. this in the light of the following: "Both philosophy and religion bear ample testimony to the almost insuperable difficulty of finding room in the Universe for God and man. When speculation busies itself with the relation of these two, each in turn tends to swallow up the other. The pendulum of human thought swings continually between two extremes of Individualism (or pluralism) leading to Atheism and Universalism (or Absolutism), leading to Pantheism or Acosmism." Pringle Pattison in Hegelianism and Personality quoted by J. Ward, 'The Realm of Ends p. 46.

activities like preservation, that without these activities He is no God is to ignore the frequent insistence of the Siddhāntin that God is essentially *sat* and *cit*. To give a parallel, Dean Inge says 'Christianity teaches quite definitely that though the creation may be the necessary result of the character of God, it is not an essential part of His nature'.⁹⁴ Secondly though He is *sat* and *cit*, He nevertheless engages in the five functions, because of His Grace, not because of any danger that in the absence of these functions He would cease to be God. Nor is it a case of inevitability which He Himself cannot control.

Mystics have spoken in a strain which suggests that God is dependent on the souls as much as these are dependent on Him. But such utterances are to be understood in the context of love, the highest category (though even this is inadequate) available to us to describe the relation between God and souls. A love that is unilateral is a love without fruition. Pringle Pattison says that Bosanquet is fond of appealing to the great experiences of life—to love, to the religious consciousness, to social union, as carrying us out of selfish claims into a world of deeper spiritual membership where such claims disappear in the intimate consciousness of union with our fellows, with the beloved object, or with God. But he says he would appeal confidently to the same great experiences to prove the absolute necessity of 'otherness', if they are to exist at all. There are two in all these experiences. Sweet love, he quotes the poet with approval, were slain, could difference be abolished. Even in the most self-effacing love there is a double fruition. The most perfect *alter ego* must remain an *alter* if the experience is to exist, if the joy of an intensified life is to be tasted at all.⁹⁵ But this must not blind us to the fact that God minus the world would be still God. Eckhart's utterance "I am as necessary to God as God is necessary to me" has to be taken along with his other utterance, "Couldst thou annihilate thyself for a moment, thou wouldst possess all that God is in Himself."⁹⁶ Surely it is implied here that God will not disappear as soon as the soul annihilates itself but remain as the Real to give it existence.

The conception of Śakti may be criticised on the ground that it does not serve the purpose for which it has been introduced viz.,

94. Theism in Philosophy. Vol. XXIII, No. 84.

95. Idea of God, p. 289.

96. Quoted by Ward in his Realm of Ends, p. 43

to make possible the immanence of God while preserving His transcendence. In the first place, Śakti is not different from Śiva. It is God in relation to the world. It is like Eckhart's distinction between Godhead and God, not two separate beings. It may be said that transcendence and immanence are contrary concepts that cannot be both true at once. But this contradiction exists only for discursive reason. The other aspect also has been pointed out. Immanence as opposed to identification implies transcendence.⁹⁷ The experience of the saints indicates that God is both transcendent and immanent. The Russian philosopher S. L. Frank says that it is an 'immanent experience of a transcendental reality'.⁹⁸ Theism differs from pantheism and deism by insisting that God is the immanent and transcendent ground of the world, while they stress respectively the immanent and transcendent aspects exclusively. To say that when Śakti is withdrawn from the world and souls, Śiva becomes purely transcendent is to forget that withdrawing etc., mean nothing spatial. The Lord's *resolve* is responsible for various functions.

From the statement that except as grace, Śiva does not exist—it may be argued that the world and souls that call forth the grace of God are indispensable to Him and that therefore He is not the Absolute. The Siddhāntin defines God as *sat* and *cit*. No doubt, he insists that God and Grace are non-different. But this does not warrant the conclusion that God is nothing more than Grace. Nor is there any inevitability that He should grant His Grace to souls or cease to exist. If He does show His Grace to all—it is not because of any external compulsion but because of His boundless benevolence!

97. Dean Inge-Theism, in *Philosophy* Vol. XXIII, No. 84. Cf. the following: "Immanence and Transcendence are not sharply contrasted. It is the Transcendent who is immanent and it is the Immanent who transcends"—W. Temple, *Nature, Man and God*, p. 298. Again, "The more we study the activity of God immanent, the more we become aware of God transcendent"—*Ibid.* p. 270.

98. *God with us*, p. 61.

CHAPTER IV

PĀŚA — BONDS

Of the three verities, recognised by the Siddhāntin, pāśa is the common name for māyā, karma and āṇava. All these bind the soul and hence they are called pāśa. Here, māyā, which is the primordial cause of the Universe is first taken up for detailed consideration.

*Māyā :*¹

The Universe that is produced as an effect is threefold, as śuddha prapañca, śuddhāśuddha prapañca and aśuddha prapañca. Hence, there are differences among their respective causes. Of them, that which, without association with mala (i.e. āṇava) and karma, pervades and stands above them as the first cause of Śuddha prapañca is śuddha māyā (bindu). That which stands below bindu and is associated with mala and karma is aśuddha māyā (śuddhāśuddha māyā). It is the cause of śuddhāśuddha prapañca. That which appears as the gross evolute of this aśuddha māyā is prakṛti māyā. From śuddha māyā the four forms of speech (vaikharī, etc., in the order of destruction), are manifested; from aśuddha māyā, the five causal tattvas (rāga, etc., again in the order of destruction) are manifested. From prakṛti māyā, the twenty-four tattvas for enjoyment (from guṇa tattva, in the order of creation) are manifested. Thus, bindu, mohinī and mahat which are material (jaḍa rūpa), perform their respective activities in the presence of the Lord's Conative Energy.

Śivajñāna yogin says that to indicate that Śiva's presence is necessary for the activity of Ananta and Śrīkaṇṭha, the author says that the three Universes evolve only in His presence.

Śivāgra yogin explains this with an example. Even as out of cotton threads, silk sarees and gunny bags cannot be produced, out of māyā (mohinī) miśrādhva (śuddhāśuddha) alone can be produced. He says that bindu, mohinī and mahat produce the material for the body, instruments and world of vijñānākālas, pra-

1. 'Mā' stands for involution and 'yā' for evolution. Māyā is so called because things come forth from it and go back into it - Māpāṇiyam, pp. 149-50.

layākalas and sakalas respectively. Because they are enlightened by Śiva's Grace, not āsuddha māyā but bindu (śuddha māyā) alone can be the cause of the body, etc., of the vijñānākalas. Though bindu is śuddha (māyā), because it is inert and material, like clay to potter, it is only parigraha śakti (Assumptive Energy) and not the Inherent Energy of the Lord.

As against the Siddhāntin
the Śivādvaitin says that Īśvara is the material cause

„ Vāmādvaitin	...	Cit-Śakti
„ Pāśupata	...	māyā (alone)
„ Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas	}	... primal atom
„ Sāṅkhya and Pāñcarātra	}	... prakṛti
„ Jaina	...	atom
„ Bauddha	...	five skandhas
„ Lokāyata	...	four elements

Evolutes of śuddha māyā :

The Siddhāntin states the characteristics of the evolutes of śuddha māyā, in the reverse order, from their external manifestation back to their genesis. First, in this order, comes vaikharī. It is of such a nature that it can be heard by him who utters it and by him who hears it and it has the capacity to express what is thought. It has two characteristics ; (i) It helps to create determinate knowledge in the speaker and hearer (ii) It functions in the following way : the letters that, as impelled by udāna get differentiated at the madhyamā sthāna are at this stage, forced out by prāṇa which is directed by ahaṅkāra.

Madhyamā is different from paśyanti and vaikharī and is in between the two. It helps to form determinate knowledge in the mind of him who utters it and is not heard except internally (sub-vocally) because it is a soft sound, residing in the throat. Prāṇa vāyu does not act on it. It is acted upon only by udāna. It is not scattered by striking against teeth, lips, tongue and palate. It exists in a subtle form internally where the letters are differentiated into subtle forms.

Paśyanti, like the contents of the peahen's egg which do not show the five colours that are to be manifested later, possesses in a very subtle form, the several letters manifested and distinguished

in the madhyamā sthāna, and resides in thought. Secondly, it makes indeterminate knowledge possible.

Sūkṣmā has two characteristics; (i) it exists as sound in the kāraṇa śarīra and (ii) it makes knowledge possible. While paśyanti, madhyamā and vaikhari which evolve from it are destroyed, it persists as śuddha māyā. He who is able to see it as it is, as a result of merit gained from his penances will derive the great enjoyment of the śuddha māyā world (this is partial release) and come to have unceasing wisdom, independence and eternity. He is freed from the weariness and changes brought about by the cycle of births and deaths.

Śivāgra yogin says that it is difficult for souls to see themselves as different from this sūkṣmā. When, by the grace of the preceptor, the soul sees itself as different from sūkṣmā, it live-through enjoyment etc., and the destruction of mala takes place. As soon as the mala which covers the soul like a sheath and occasions partial development, is removed, the soul is freed from births and deaths and the delusion and changes caused by these. This marks the disappearance of the undesirable. The Siddhāntins do not say that the complete removal of sorrow alone is salvation, as the Naiyāyikas say. On the other hand, they say that because they recognise independence and the desire to have experience of wisdom and bliss, there are for them absolute omniscience, experience (by the self) of supreme bliss, independence and eternity.

The four forms of speech, so far dealt with, reside in the five Śivatattvas (Śiva, Śakti, Sādākhya, Maheśvara and Śuddha vidyā in dependence on the five kalās, (nivr̥tti, pratiṣṭha, vidyā, śānti and śāntyatīta). They evolve without undergoing substantial changes of their nature, unlike the products of aśuddha māyā. The Śabdabrahmavādins call these four modes of speech Brahman. The Śaiva Siddhāntins say that they are not Brahman but the Assumptive Energy of Brahman (parigraha śakti) which energy is of the form of śuddha māyā.

In regard to effectuation, the Bauddhas and Jainas hold the doctrine of aggregation (Samudāyavāda) e.g., they account for the production of oil by referring to the aggregation of certain seeds. The Naiyāyikas hold the doctrine of creation (Ārambhavāda)—e.g., the cloth is created out of threads. The Māyavādins espouse the doctrine of illusory transfiguration (vivartavāda e.g., the mirage causes the appearance of water. None of these theories

is acceptable to the Siddhāntin. He recognises only two types of evolution—one where there is a substantial change of cause (pariṇāma) and the other where there is no such substantial change (vṛtti). The evolution of the four modes of speech is of the latter type. The modes of speech are not Brahman, but only mahāmāyā. The example given to illustrate vṛtti (subtle transformation) is the cloth spreading itself into a tent. As Jñānaprakāśar says there is no inherent difference here. General transformation (pariṇāma) is of two kinds—partial and full. Partial transformation takes place as when worms are produced from ghee. When milk is transformed into curds, we have an instance of full transformation.

Śivāgra yogin explains pariṇāma as the assumption by a thing of a form different from its previous one. In general transformation, the cause is substantially changed; in transfiguration, the effect does not exist at all. So, both theories are inapplicable here. Even as when the wind blows, some one part of the sea is subjected to change, so also Śiva causes the evolution of a part of His Parigraha Śakti and thus brings about the tattvas etc.

Śuddha māyā is the first cause of not only these four modes of speech but also of the words, letters, worlds, mantras, tattvas, bodies, object of enjoyment, organs and everything required for the partially released souls like the Mantreśvaras, Mantramaheśvaras and Aṇusadāśivas.²

The four modes of speech are also necessary for determinate knowledge and hence they are required not only for partially released souls like Sadāśiva, but also for the vijñānākālas, praḷayākālas and sakālas. Without these modes of speech, there can be no knowledge. They differ in their manifestation according to the condition of the people for whom they are manifested i.e., they are gross, grosser, and grossest, according as they are for the vijñānākālas, praḷayākālas and sakālas respectively. The knowledge thus obtained is knowledge of the objects of the world. The modes of speech thus necessary for determinate knowledge constitute the supreme bondage. When the self discriminates itself as

2. Śivāgra yogin says that though partially released souls are associated with kalās etc., they are not controlled by them like the sakālas.

Jñānaprakāśar gives the following details: words 81 - letters 51 - words 224 - and mantras 12.

different from these and attains to a knowledge that is greater than that which these modes of speech give, it there and then attains complete release.³

From sūkṣma māyā arise the gross kalās, the grosser mūla prakṛti and the yet grosser guṇa tattvas. The products resulting from these grosser things are grosser still. The universe that is produced consists of parts like the earth, water fire, air, ākāśa, male, female, hermaphrodite etc. It increases, decreases and is transformed. The Naiyāyikas recognise difference between cause and effect which have the characteristics aforesaid. Their position is untenable. Because of being distinguished into two as cause and effect, there is difference. Because cause and effect are inseparable, there is difference cum identity. Because of being identical in substance, there is non-difference. In manifesting the effects which are different, different and non-different, and non-different from their first cause, (māyā), through Ananta and Śri kaṇṭha, Śiva Who is the efficient cause, exists as non-different from the first cause by reason of pervading it, exists as different from it because of difference in substance and exists immanently by directing it.

To refute the Māyāvādins who derive the world from the indefinable, the author says 'from the incorporeal the corporeal arises.' In referring to parts and whole, the Siddhāntin has in view the doctrine of aggregation according to which the parts constitute the whole (which is nothing without them). To refute Ārambha vāda which argues that from the corporeal earth etc., the incorporeal smell etc., arises, he says from the corporeal (gross evolutes), the corporeal arises. By saying that the universe expands (in the form of air, water etc.) and contracts (these products lapse into their causal state), the Siddhāntin refutes the theory which explains a thing as fundamentally different, every-time it expands or contracts.

From māyā which is incorporeal (and therefore not subject to changes) how can we derive the universe which is corporeal and changing? This question is put by the Māyāvādin. But

3. Nirambavaṇagiar says that souls do not have knowledge except through bindu. But when they gain Śivajñāna, even the knowledge gained through bindu and Scriptures is superseded and they get full release forthwith.

the Siddhāntin answers this question by referring to an identical procedure of the Māyāvādin. The Māyāvādin says that the incorporeal and unchanging ākāśa gives rise to the changing and corporeal elements like air, earth etc. Besides, many clouds, many changes in these clouds, many sounds, lightnings, thunder etc., arise in the ākāśa. By forgetting these and raising the objection against the Siddhāntin, the Māyāvādin cuts the ground from under his own feet; whereas to the Siddhāntin, who is committed to Satkāryavāda, there is no difficulty.

Having stated the Siddhāntin's position, we have to observe that he seems to overlook the Māyāvādin's view that Śruti is not purportful in respect of the teaching of creation. Whether such a view is tenable and whether it does not deny the problem altogether is another matter. Failure to note the Māyāvādin's view as it is stated by him is regrettable.

What are the characteristics of *aśuddha māya* which is the first cause of the universe? It is eternal as it has no beginning; incorporeal, as it is invisible; one, as it is indestructible; it is the seed of the universe, as cause thereof; inert, as it is non-intelligent; pervasive as it endows souls everywhere with bodies, organs and worlds; the Assumptive Energy of the Lord, since it is pervaded by the Lord; and an impurity as it spreads itself into the universe, enjoyment, body and organs for the sake of the souls. It is delusive as causing delusive cognition.

The Mādhyamikas speak of the void. To refute them, the Siddhāntin says that *māyā* is the seed of the universe. The Kṣaṇikavādins say that everything arises in a succession, each thing depending on its predecessor and giving place to its successor. To refute them, *māyā* is said to be eternal. The Lokāyatās say that elements (they recognise only four) cause the universe. To refute them, *māyā* is said to be incorporeal. The Vaiśeṣikas and others say that primal atoms are the cause of the universe. Atoms are not pervasive. To refute them the Siddhāntin says that *māyā* is all-pervasive. The Sāṅkhyas say that *prakṛti* which is of the form of the three *guṇas* is the cause of the universe. To refute this, *māyā* is said to be one. The followers of Bhāskara say that Brahman is the cause of the universe. In reply to them, *māyā* is said to be an Assumptive Energy of the Lord. The Śivādvaitins say that *Cit-Śakti* is the cause of the universe. The Siddhāntin says that *māyā* is inert. The Māyāvādin says that *māyā* which is the cause of the universe is *anirvacanīya*. They

are told that māyā is a mala. One sect of the Śaivas holds that māyā deludes wholly, like āṇava. In reply, it is said that causing delusion is also (thereby implying some other function to be primary) the characteristic of māyā.

From māyā of the aforesaid nature, arise kāla, niyati, kalā, etc., in the order of mention. Kāla is distinguished, by command of the Lord, into past, present and future. Kāla sets the time-limits for the effected universe, excluding itself. The universe is subject to the states of origination, sustentation and destruction. Kāla causes the universe to function in accordance with karma. Śivāgra yogin says that impelled by the threefold Energy of the Lord, janāṇī, āraṇī and rodhayitrī, kāla causes the creation, sustentation and destruction of the world.

The Kālavādin says that time is one, pervasive and the cause of effects which are eternal like a perpetually flowing stream. How could beginning and end be affirmed of time if it is eternal? Since there is cognition of beginning and end, time is many and non-eternal. The Kālavādin may reply that cognition of beginning and end are occasioned by delimiting adjuncts, like the movement of the sun and, otherwise, difference is not true of time.

The Siddhāntin replies that if the activities of time can take place only with such adjuncts, time itself cannot be existent. If time is one, positive and negative affirmations like, "At such and such a time, such and such a thing is possible" or..... "is not possible," cannot be made. Besides, the movement of the sun is a delimiting adjunct only for days and hours—not for lava (eight seconds, and tṛti (second). Hence differences of time are not its de-limiting adjuncts. It is patent that they are its nature.

It may be said that there is no present at all in time as, in regard to substances like pots we have activities of past and future but none of the present. The Siddhāntin replies that in the making of the pot, the state when it is clay is the past, the state when it is made to contain water is the future, and when it exists on the wheel of the potter as he shapes it out, we have the present. Time is thus threefold. What is inert and many cannot be eternal. No substance that is non-eternal can have pervasiveness. Time is many and non-eternal.

If time is the cause of beginning, etc. has this beginning of time a time? If it has, then there is an infinite regress. If it has

no time, time itself cannot arise, To this objection, the Siddhāntin replies thus: Time is the cause of the tattvas and their derivatives, other than itself. It is not cause of its own origin. The Lord Who is above time, originates it without having any desire of His own for so doing. If time is born of *aśuddha māyā*, what is the time for the origination of the products of *śuddha māyā*? In *Śuddha māyā* there is *śuddha kāla*. What is the time for the intermediary dissolution? Time is required only for the activities of *Sadāśiva* and others. The Lord, Who transcends time and does not require it (for His activities), performs the five functions.

Time is past for one thing, present for another and future for a third. It cannot be uniform as past, present and future. It may therefore be argued that time cannot be said to be threefold objectively. But time and space are conceived differently with reference to each object. It was already stated that time is dependent for its distinction on each thing. Hence there is not the defect alleged.

The objector may say that the soul is eternal as existing in eternal time. How could the soul be eternal if time be non-eternal? The soul is not eternal by being in time which is eternal but being unlimited by time. Not being measured by time is eternality. There is no contradiction in the Siddhāntin's view.

Śivajñāna yogin explains the position thus: If time is said to be eternal, it will be the fallacy of self-dependence; if it is said to be eternal by depending on another time (which is eternal) that will require another time for its eternality and thus there will be an infinite regress. Some other important points given by him are the following:

Kāla is *śuddha kāla* and *aśuddha kāla*, the former for '*śuddha prapañca* and the latter for *aśuddha prapañca*. It cannot be said that because the Lord does not require time for the manifestation of the *śuddha tattvas* themselves, time is unnecessary for others also. For the work of deities like *Ananta* and others, time is necessary. Only the Lord is above time and brings time itself into existence.⁴ Pringle Pattison refers to an old gibe of the Epicureans familiar in Cicero's day; to ask what God did before He created the heavens and the earth, and how He came to choose just that

4. *Māpāḍiyam*, pp. 177-8.

time to create them, after forbearing to do so for many ages, 'a flippancy provoked in some measure by the shallow anthropomorphism of the doctrine assailed. St. Augustine's answer was that time itself was created along with the world of moving things by which its duration is measured, so that there could be no lapse of unoccupied time before the creation, there being in eternity neither before nor after.'⁵

This view is like the Siddhānta. But Pringle Pattison thinks that St. Augustine does not meet the real difficulty in so far as he still regards Creation as a unique event. He thinks that to think of Creation as an event that took place once, an act of His will, not grounded in His nature—is to think of God as an Absolute in the old bad sense of a being existing by itself with no essential relations to anything else. He refers, with approval to 'thinkers both Christian and non-Christian' who have insisted that 'Creation must be regarded as an eternal act, an act grounded in the divine nature and therefore, if we are to use the language of time, coeval with divine existence.' He quotes with approval Ulrici who says "Hence just as God does not become Creator of the world but is from eternity Creator of the world, so the world too, though not eternal of itself, exists from eternity as the creation of God."⁶

Niyati arises next from māyā. It allocates, by command of the Lord, the experience of the fruits of their deeds to the respective agents. Then kalā comes from māyā. Kalā partially removes the evil of āṇava, illumines the Conative Energy of the soul and impels it to the experience of the fruits of its deeds. From kalā arises vidyā which partially illumines the Cognitive Energy of the soul and impels it to the experience of the fruits of its deeds.

Śivāgra yogin says that niyati determines karma, prevents increase of activities liable to arise from the attractiveness of objects; prevents the evasion of experience of the fruits of demerits on the score that they are not to one's liking and prevents experience in the wrong order of the karma that matures. It does all these by command of the Lord, as things are done by command of the king.

5. Cum tempore non in tempore is Augustine's distinction. The world was not created in time but together with time. Plato says in the *Timaeus*, 38. 'Time then was created with the heavens'—Idea of God, p. 303.

6. Idea of God, pp. 303–305.

Cannot the Lord's Energy itself bring about the proper allocation of karma? Is *niyati* a figurative assumption? The *Siddhāntin* says that since the Energy of the Lord is free from mala, it will lead to release if it were to do the function of *niyati*. Cannot karma give the fruits to the respective agents? Since karma is like the agricultural activities, it cannot make the allocation. But do we not see that though the king is present, the results of agricultural activities done by one are enjoyed by another? Just as the master ordering the sacrifice experiences the results of it though it is actually done by somebody else (the priest), he, who orders somebody to do a thing, himself experiences the results of that deed. Even without one who commands and one who carries out that command, how is it that we see some one experience the results of tilling activities done by someone else? Even this does not happen without relation to some other (previous) birth. So, apart from the Lord's Energy, *kālā* and karma, there must be *niyati tattva* to regulate the soul's enjoyment.

Should *kālā tattva* illuminate the soul which is of the form of intelligence? Because the cognitive activities of the soul are obscured beginninglessly by *āṇava*, that *āṇava* must be partially removed by *kālā*. If it is not so removed, there will be no apprehension of objects; it will be like the *kevala* state. It will be as though there were no souls.

But then, cannot *āṇava* be completely removed? It cannot be completely removed by *kālā*. Just as, when a stone is flung at the mossy surface of a tank, that part of it which has been touched by the stone is cleared of moss, through *kālā*, the Lord causes the *āṇava* of souls in the *kevala* state to be removed partially (to the extent of their karma), and illuminates the cognitive activities of the souls.

Should *āṇava* be partially removed only through controlling *kālā*? Cannot the Lord remove it through His Energy? By the contact of the Lord's Energy, ignorance will be completely removed. The soul's mala has not matured enough for its removal and the soul remains in pure ignorance so that it is not fit to have contact with the Lord's Energy. Just as the master wakes up his sleeping disciple, not by himself touching him but by prodding him with a stick, the Lord, through *kālā* which is his Assumotive Energy, partially dispels ignorance. Since these *tattvas* (like *kālā*) cover the soul with a subtle body, they are the first bondage. *Vidyā-tattva* arises from the *kālā tattva* (which is above it) for

the sake of enjoyment and causes the cognition of objects by the soul's intelligence.

Will not the intelligence of the soul do for the cognition of objects? Soul's intelligence is pure intelligence.⁷ Hence, it is turned towards Śiva rather than towards the objects. Unless it is associated with vidyā, soul's intelligence will not be turned towards objects. The souls come to have the capacity to cognise and function through kalā. Whatever is the instrument for the soul (which is of the nature of intelligence) to cognise objects, that is vidyā. Cannot buddhi be the means for the cognition of objects? Since buddhi is also apprehended by the souls, it is inert like the pot or the wall. Buddhi is an object for the soul even as forms are apprehended through the eyes. This buddhi itself is grasped by vidyā,

There is the maxim that one who has to make a journey requires a horse, a chariot and a charioteer. In this order, the self sees an object with the eyes, determines with buddhi and apprehends with vidyā. "If buddhi is required to determine objects, then, we can stop with buddhi itself as the means; why assume something else, besides buddhi"? says the objector. The Siddhāntin replies that unlike the sense organs such as the eye, manas doubts, ahaṅkāra produces egoism and buddhi determines. Like the sun's rays for the perception of substances, these (manas, etc.) are auxiliary to vidyā. Kalā partially removes āṇava and informs cognitive activities. Vidyā associates itself with intelligence and causes perception of objects. Thus vidyā causes the second bondage for the souls.

Raga arises from vidyā, informs the Affective Energy of the soul and impels it to enjoyment in accordance with karma. Thus the soul comes to have a coat consisting of the tattvas,⁸ kalā,

7. It will be noticed, here, that the soul is said to be pure intelligence which normally turns towards Śiva rather than towards objects of the world. It has to turn towards the latter in order to have experience of the world, necessary for working out karma and removing āṇava. The emphasis on the intelligence of the soul is important in helping us to avoid the popular misconception that the soul has no status of its own or that it is all the time a creature of its environment. In being sat and cit like Śiva in His presence, it is only true to its own nature.

8. Jñān prabāṣar says that the soul which has a five-fold coat, has five afflictions arising from the five human defects of negligence, self-conceit, desire, aversion and ignorance.

vidyā and rāga (which inform conation, cognition, and desire respectively) and kāla and niyati (which are responsible for determining the time limits and the proper allocation of the experience of the fruits of karma to the respective agents). The soul wearing such a coat is present partially in desire, cognition and conation.

What is specially referred to as *puruṣa tattva* is the soul when it wears a coat of ignorance, egoism, greed, affection and anger arising from *mūla prakṛti*. The soul is an intelligent entity. *Tattvas* are inert. *Puruṣa tattva* is the soul. The soul turned towards experience is called the *puruṣa tattva*.

Śivāgra yogin considers the need for these two *tattvas*. Should there be a *rāga tattva* to cause desire for things? Is not affection, one of the soul's three characteristics? Though in the waking state the soul has these three, there is no enjoyment for a person devoid of desires; and a person who does have desires is not attracted to enjoyment of unclean things. Hence *rāga tattva* arises and helps the enjoyer. It quickens the activity of the soul which is turned towards enjoyment by *kalā* and *vidyā*.

An objection may be raised: "The soul has *avairāgya* in its *buddhi*. This *avairāgya* will do for prompting the experience of souls. *Kalā*-born *rāga* can be accepted only as a figurative assumption." The *Siddhāntin* replies: "The soul's *Cit-Śakti*, which is agitated by *vidyā* and *kalā*, unites with *rāga* that is a disposition of *buddhi* and that is different for different objects. This *rāga* is special. The *rāga* we are talking about is general, different from the *rāga* which is a disposition of *buddhi* and a bondage for the soul."

The objector says that all things are of the nature of the three *guṇas*. The soul is the seat of the three *guṇas*: Therefore it is impelled to act by the objects having particular *guṇas*. There need be no primal *rāga*. The *Siddhāntin* replies that if the attraction of things is the cause of *rāga*, there will be none without desires. The objector retorts that if desire is ever-present in souls there will be desire even in respect of things already enjoyed and thus also there will be none without desire. The reply is that *rāga* is of two kinds—as of the form of residual impression and as causative. The former exists as that which is related to the intelligence of the soul. That which is causative is resident in *buddhi*. When delusion, etc., which are the dispositions of *āṇava* and which are attached to objects, ripen, non-attachment to objects comes

about and interest in them is given up. How is this? Even when there is the eye (sense-organ), it is of no use in the absence of coloured objects. When the desire resident in buddhi is removed, apprehension of objects of enjoyment does not take place though there may be the attraction of objects (even as when there is a coloured object, it cannot be perceived in the absence of the eye). Just as eye and object are necessary for perception, desire and object are also necessary. It is, as it were, a complementary process.

Cannot a person be said to be without desires when desires of the form of residual impressions are removed? In that case, a person cannot be in the state of being a seeker after release when he is not desiring enjoyment or when he has not already attained release (i.e., the stage between release and aspiring for worldly enjoyment; he has transcended the one but has not reached the other). Then is he also to be treated as a person with desire because he has this desire? Because the desire in the form of residual impression leads to desire for release, there is śaktinipāta. Rāga is removed without any residue being left over by the contemplation of Śiva in the case of Sāmsiddhas and by purification and contemplation of Śiva in the case of the Vainayakas. At that moment, there is a desire for Śiva in the person without desires. This desire removes āṇava mala which is the cause of delusion, etc., and brings about the direct intuition of Śiva Who is Existence, Intelligence and Bliss.

Kalā, vidyā and rāga are inert. How can kalā remove āṇava partially and cause cognitive and conative activities? How can vidyā bring about the perception of objects and rāga cause desire for objects? The Siddhānta replies that the procedure is not improper. The exclusive non-exclusive secondary significance is had in view and therefore it is not improper. The Energy of the Lord assumes the form of the tattvas (resides in all tattvas in male and female forms) and controls them; hence these tattvas were said to perform the functions that are performed by the Energy, even as the palanquin is said to produce the sounds that are as a matter of fact produced by the palanquin-bearers.

The tattvas like kalā have different functions. How can they, as an aggregate, simultaneously perform their functions? There is the lamp in the aggregation of oil, wick and fire. So also, it was determined that puruṣa tattva arises from the aggregation of kalā, etc., and avidyā. The soul takes on this aggregate as its cloak and

gets the name of puruṣa tattva by reason of its conjunction with it. This name is not given to the Vijñānākālas and Praḷayākālas. This puruṣa tattva enables the soul to experience the enjoyments upto kālāgni rudra world, without having 'desire for each particular object.

An objection may be raised : Kāla and the other tattvas will do for the production of the puruṣa tattva. There need be no relation with avidyā in prakṛti. But this is to overlook a difficulty. If there is no relation with avidyā in prakṛti, the soul becomes a praḷayākāla and a resident of miśrādhvā. It cannot experience enjoyments of prakṛti. So relation with avidyā is also necessary.

The objector may say that the soul itself is called 'puruṣa-tattva' and that there is no independent puruṣa-tattva. But we cannot reckon the tattvas as 36, if puruṣa-tattva is not recognised as an entity by itself. There will be no transmigration for the pervasive soul if there is no puruṣa-tattva existing as a cloak for the soul, covering and de-limiting it. Thus puruṣa-tattva is seen to be necessary.

After tattvas like kāla have arisen from aśuddha māyā, mula-prakṛti, in which the guṇas are in a latent form, arises from kalā. From mūlaprakṛti, the three guṇa tattvas, sattva, rajas and tamas come into existence. Each of these three guṇas becomes threefold and thus we have nine in all.⁹ Tattvas conducive to enjoyment, like buddhi, arise from the guṇa tattva. All these tattvas existing in the form of guṇas bind the souls. Wherever the soul experiences enjoyment, it exists in the form of guṇa.

Śivāgra yogin states and meets the views of other schools in regard to prakṛti. The Pāñcarātra and the theistic Sāṅkhya argue thus : The equal state of the guṇas is called prakṛti. How can prakṛti be said to be the cause of the guṇas? The Śaiva Siddhāntin does not accept the view that the equal state of the guṇas is prakṛti. For, the guṇas, being inert and many, are effects and there must be a cause for them. That cause is prakṛti.

9. Jñānaprakāsar :

sattve-sattva	rajas-sattva	tamas-sattva
sattva-rajas	rajas-rajas	tamas-rajas
sattva-tamas	rajas-tamas	tamas-tamas.

The objectors urge again: The effulgence of knowledge and of activity are of the nature of *sattva* and *rajas*. *Prakṛti* is of the nature of the effulgence of knowledge and activity. Therefore *prakṛti* is of the nature of *guṇas*—not different. Since *māyā*, *kalā* and *vidyā* are also of the nature of the effulgence of knowledge and activity, they are not different from the *guṇas*. They are of the very nature of *guṇas*. The Siddhāntin replies: The effulgence of knowledge and activity as the nature of things beginning with *māyā* and ending with *prakṛti* is also an established fact. By the maxim—‘The attributes of the cause produce the attributes of the effect,’ the effulgence of knowledge and activity produces a similar characteristic in *kalā*, the effect of *māyā*, *prakṛti*, the effect of *kalā* and in the *guṇas* like *sattva*, the effects of *prakṛti*.

The atheistic Sāṅkhya argues: The origin, sustentation and the intermediary destruction of the Universe can be said to be caused by *rajas*, *sattva* and *tamas* respectively. Why should it be said instead that Śrīkaṇṭha Parameśvara performs creation, etc., in *prakṛti*? Where to, the Siddhāntin replies: Since the *guṇas* are inert and many, they are effects. To produce the effect from the cause intelligent agency is required. It may be said that the *guṇas* have their cause in other *guṇas*. But since these other *guṇas* are also effects, a cause for them must be sought and thus we are launched on an infinite regress. Whatever is inert cannot function without the control of an intelligence. So Śrīkaṇṭha Parameśvara is the agent for creating *prakṛti* from *kalā* and the subtle things like the *guṇas* from *prakṛti*. Even as the products of *māyā* cannot exist without *māyā*, *prakṛti* is indispensable for its products. The word *māyā* includes all the *tattvas* in the lower part of *māyā* from *kalā* upto *prthivī*. Likewise, with the indispensable *guṇa* which is the lower part of *prakṛti*, we have the *tattvas* from *buddhi* to *prthivī*.

With the contact of the Energy of the all-knowing and extraordinarily mighty Śrīkaṇṭha, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* arise from *prakṛti*: these *guṇas* are controlled by *Brahmā*, *Viṣṇu* and *Kālarudra* who perform creation, sustentation and destruction respectively.

Of these *guṇas*, *sattva* is luminous like the crystal, *rajas* luminous like the ruby and *tamas* like the indranila. The activities, suitable to the karma of each soul, which these three *guṇas* cause are as under:

Sattva: Intellectual firmness, mental resoluteness, efficiency, softness, taking light meal etc., happiness in the face of great loss, the joint (harmonious) functioning of the three organs (manas, buddhi and ahaṅkāra), without cunning, with cleanliness, good efforts, patience, capacity to understand and retain, contentment with what one gets, desire for release, control over external and internal organs and mercy towards all beings.

Rajas: Cruelty, worldly desires, egotism in doing things with the feeling of “I” and “mine”, “I did this” etc. deceiving, thieving, lack of mercy, desire for enjoyment and pompous ways.

Tamas: Total lack of contentment, lack of enthusiasm, mean-living, tale-bearing, excessive eating of prohibited food, sleeping too much, arrogance, laziness, hindering other people’s prosperity, lack of intelligence.

When one guṇa preponderates over the other two, two other guṇas rise from the guṇa that preponderates: So with each primary guṇa we have two derivatives and thus nine in all. When sattva predominates, keeping rajas and tamas down, lightness (not being heavy) and luminosity arise. When rajas predominates, keeping sattva and tamas down, inertia and movement arise. When tamas predominates, keeping tattva and rajas down, heaviness and lack of order arise. Thus six derivative guṇas arise and together with the primary three make up nine in all.¹⁰

These nine guṇas unite with the intellect and help the souls in the perception of sense-objects just as the lamp helps the eye to see objects. By relation with the guṇas mentioned just now the soul experiences everything by assuming bodies suitable to its merits and demerits. The means of enjoyment to the soul, in the form of buddhi, subtle body and gross body which unite with the guṇas, constitutes the gross body for the soul.

Mūlaprakṛti which has been determined to be the cause of the guṇa tattva is the cause of ignorance also. Ignorance leads to contrary cognition. Buddhi has its origin in the guṇa tattva (when sattva predominates and rajas and tamas subside). When the merits and de-merits of the soul attach themselves to buddhi in accordance with karma, buddhi determines them. After that, it transforms itself into the forms of pleasure, pain and delusion and remains the object of the soul’s cognitive activities.

10. Cf. with the Gītā, Ch. XIV & XVII.

Śivāgra yogin explains this in detail. The activity of buddhi is of two kinds—one consisting in the non-discrimination of objects, and the other in the determination of these. The deeds like erecting a water shed, digging a tank, done by one desiring their fruits do not fructify immediately but only in a hereafter. The act is destroyed the moment it is finished. An unseen potency arises from the act and persists till the act bears fruit. It does not reside in the soul. If it did, the soul would be inert. The fruits of agricultural activities done by people are seen neither in the place where the activities took place nor in the many enjoyers. Even as the impressions of man's deeds manifest their fruits in the world at the time suitable for their fructification, the impression of that activity resides in buddhi characterised by non-discrimination and leads to activities which are advantageous at the respective times. Merit (puṇya) is dharma. It is the secondary significance of intelligence etc; de-merit (pāpa) is adharma. It is the secondary significance of ignorance etc. The eight special dispositions are merit, intelligence, non-attachment and lordliness; and de-merit, ignorance, attachment and lack of lordliness.

By the pre-ponderance of sattva, merit, intelligence, and non-attachment come about; by rajas, the activity of raga viz., lordliness; by tamas, de-merit, ignorance, attachment and lack of lordliness. Heaven is awarded for merit, graded release for intelligence, absorption into prakṛti for non-attachment and attainment of one's desires for lordliness. The fruit for demerit is birth in the wombs of cows, birds etc., for ignorance, hell; for attachment, bondage and for lack of lordliness, frustration of desires. Dharma is of two kinds—yama and niyama. Jñāna is of five kinds as laukika, vaidika, adhyātmika, adimārgika, and mantra (these five become ten owing to differentiation effected by buddhi. Vairāgya is distinguished into ten kinds (like vairāgya resulting from disease), lordliness is distinguished into eight kinds as aṇima, mahimā, garimā, laghimā, prāpti, prākāmya, īśitva and vaśitva. Adharma is distinguished into two kinds, ayama and aniyama. Ajñāna is of five kinds. They are tamas, moha, mahāmoha, tāmiśra and andhatāmiśra. The commentator says that there are sixty four varieties of ajñāna in all. Avairāgya is of ten kinds. It is the counter-correlate of vairāgya-guṇa. It consists of a hundred guṇas like pain etc., and creates desire for condemned objects without inviting reproof. Anaśvarya is the counter-correlate of aśvarya. It consists of eight guṇas and one hundred and seventy six varieties.

Ahaṅkāra is the cause of egoism like "Whoever is comparable to me? None!" It helps buddhi to determine whatever is presented through sense perception by associating itself with sense-objects and identifying itself with them as "I" and "mine." It exists as non-different from the soul. Because of the differences obtaining in the guṇa tattva which is its cause, it is also differentiated into bhūtādi-ahaṅkāra, vaikharī-ahaṅkāra, and taijasa-ahaṅkāra.¹¹

Śivāgra yogin asks why ahaṅkāra tattva should be recognised when buddhi tattva has already been accepted. Buddhi is the intelligent soul de-limiting objects as being of a particular nature. Ahaṅkāra marks off one ego from another. Ahaṅkāra's activity consists in seizing external objects. Buddhi determines. So ahaṅkāra and buddhi cannot be said to be the same. Cannot one ahaṅkāra do for all the souls? Why should it be different for each? The word 'ahaṅkāra' is one. The objects however are not one but perceptible different. Again, there is the cognition of many pots as 'This is a pot', 'This is a pot', but all pots are not one. Similarly, ahaṅkāra being fixed for each, must be different. Or else two persons must have one cognition. This is not so. Besides, if ahaṅkāra were only one, when one says "I am Devadatta", another who does not have that name must also say 'I am Devadatta.' This is not the case. Thus ahaṅkāra is different for each.

In the form of citta, manas considers the objects presented to it. Then it lets doubt play upon the presentations. The sense-organs which are related to manas appear from taijasāhaṅkāra for purposes of cognition. From vaikarī-ahaṅkāra, the five motor-organs appear.

Śivāgra yogin asks why there should be a manas tattva when we have buddhi and ahaṅkāra tattvas already. Resolving and doubting cannot be done by buddhi and ahaṅkāra. Buddhi decides; ahaṅkāra (as resolve to make sure) apperhends. Cognition of the nature of resolving must be done by the manas. Whatever makes the object seen with the eye an object for buddhi that is manas. Buddhi determines only that which has been grasped by the manas.

11. Jñānaprakāśar: Ahaṅkāra arises by the preponderance of rajas in buddhi. It is three-fold as the cluster that is the cause of the sense-organs associated with manas; the cluster that is the cause of the motor-organs, and the cluster that is the cause of the tanmātras. In this order it is known as tāmasa, rājasa and sāttvika.

Should it determine anything else, a pot seized by manas may be determined as a cloth. Manas is that which is instrumental in thinking e.g., an entity to be the denotation of the word 'cow' on seeing it to possess dewlap etc., because the combination of dewlap etc., with a body has many times led to the recognition that it is the denotation of the word, 'cow.'

Some say that because manas seizes and apprehends objects, one by one in sequence, it is atomic and that if it is great or extensive it must cognise all things at the same time. It is not so. Manas, in dependence on the functioning of subsidiary causes, apprehends in sequence. How is it that the soul which is of the nature of intelligence is said to have cognition in sequence? It is so, since it is veiled by ignorance and needs accessories. Some say, manas is atomic; it apprehends small objects because it can grasp only so much as it pervades. When the lamp throws an object into relief only so much is seen as the light of the lamp pervades. But this is not right. As sun-light throws everything into relief, manas which is extensive can grasp big objects also. It is wrong to say that because it grasps minute objects it is therefore atomic. Even what is small is apprehended by sun-light which is pervasive; whereas by lamp light big things cannot be grasped. Manas is extensive and different for each soul. Our conclusion is that what is pervasive grasps small as well as big things; whereas what is small or atomic can grasp only small things and not the big things also.¹²

Some say that manas, ahaṅkāra and buddhi together determine the significance of objects; some others say that manas seizes (objects) in sequence; ahaṅkāra apprehends and buddhi determines. Of these two views, which is acceptable? Manas first seizes and then doubts. Ahaṅkāra (with self-assertion and egotism) determines to obtain knowledge and buddhi decides. So, the view that the object is determined in sequence is acceptable. It may be said that since intelligence is continuous everywhere, buddhi must also be in relation to all objects and not cognise in sequence. It is not so. Organs like buddhi are inert. Cit-Śakti is continuous everywhere. Manas, like the crow's eye is internally and externally resident. It seizes external objects through the

12. *The Pauṣkara* says that if karma has not matured, manas does not attend to objects even when there is sense-contact. Karma does not ripen all at the same time. So cognition is in sequence, not simultaneous.

channel of sense-organs like the eye and causes (inward) consideration. Ahaṅkāra apprehends only that which has been seized by manas; and buddhi determines only that which has been apprehended by ahaṅkāra-

The five sense-organs like the organ of hearing arise from taijasāhaṅkāra. The ear which causes awareness of the sound produced from ākāśa is of the nature of ākāśa. The objector may say that the ear is the same as the skin etc., and that the five sense-organs arise from the five elements and cause awareness of the five sense-objects. No; if they so arise from the elements they become corporeal like pot etc. If a sense-organ is corporeal either it must be able to see by itself or be seen by another sense-organ. If it sees by itself there is the defect of self-dependence; if it is seen by another, there must be some other organ to see this one and so on endlessly. If it is corporeal, it will require a separate place for location. When there is obscuration by another corporeal substance, there will be no apprehension of the obscured substance. Then the eye must be unable to perceive an object beyond a crystal. When the eye apprehends a substance under water, it must become quiescent (i.e. cease to function), as soon as it reaches the water and thus be incapable of apprehension. Water is opposed to fire and the eye is said to be born of the fire element.

The objector says that if the sense-organ is said to originate from ahaṅkāra and thus be incorporeal, it must be able to see objects beyond the wall also. No; it is not so. The wall is not a pure substance. It is a tāmasic substance and obstructs the rays of light, unlike crystal which is a pure substance. The objector is not slow to make use of this distinction for his purpose. He says that either fire may be subtle enough to allow rays of light to pass through water or water may be pure enough to allow a ray of light to pass through. Thus a stage is reached when the Siddhāntin and the objector alike have some unanswerable arguments for their respective positions. The Siddhāntin goes back to a statement of the objector and argues that the object perceived and that which perceives the object need not be of the same class. The activity in the pot and the class to which it belongs are objects of visual perception along with the seen pot. Since neither of these is of the element of fire, the manifest and the manifested do not belong to the same class. Fire which has got tejas is a product of the rūpa tanmātra which arises from tāmasāhaṅkāra. It may be said that if the eye perceives activity and class also,

then there is difficulty with regard to the position that it perceives form alone exclusively. But the difficulty applies to the objector's position also. The eye does not perceive objects other than those which come into contact with it. It goes without saying that it cannot perceive objects obscured by a wall. All sense-organs perceive only those objects which come into contact with them.

The wise ones have said that the ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose are sense-organs because they cognise things.¹³ Ear is that which perceives sound existing with *ākāśa* limited to the extent of the physical organ of hearing. Skin is the skin of the body. It exists with the subtle element of air and feels the hot, cold or lukewarm, hard or soft conditions of the objects which impinge on it. Eye exists in the physical eye-balls along with the subtle element of fire and goes out to perceive coloured objects. Tongue exists along with the subtle element of water and perceives the six kinds of tastes like sweetness which come into contact with it. Nose has for its substrate the subtle element of earth and perceives the good and foul smells wafted to it by air.

The objection may be brought forward that it is not necessary to have beside the physical organs of hearing etc., five *tattvas* different from these but resident in them. The *Siddhāntin* answers thus: there are blind, dumb and deaf people who have the respective physical organs but are deficient in respect of the function relating to this. It may be said that the capacity to hear etc. is bound by the absence of the unseen potency to experience hearing etc. Then on the analogy of *tarpaṇa* being the same even though the Tamil and the *Āndhra* use different languages, what the objector calls the capacity to hear and what we call the *tattva* of hearing are different only in name and not in significance. So, it is well to accept the *tattvas* in accordance with the *Śaivāgamas* originated by the supremely reliable One.

Does the sense of hearing go out to perceive or does it perceive the sound which reaches it?

The *Naiyāyika* says: The sound generated from the

13. When it is said that the cot calls, we understand (*jahat lakṣaṇa*) that it is the person on the cot who calls. Likewise, we must understand the senses in the ear etc., to have been referred to when the ear etc., are mentioned.

neighbourhood of the drum travels in ripples and waves. Each wave gives rise to another and then ceases to be. The last sound wave comes into contact with the ear; and the ear perceives it. On the analogy of the petals of the kadamba propagating themselves from the top downwards, the sound from a high place also propagates itself and the last sound comes into contact with the ear. This view is not acceptable. If the earlier sound generates the later ones, there will be no limit to the sounds generated by the drum. So, as the arrow released from the bow starts with an original velocity, but as time and space intervene, travels with a diminishing velocity, the ear perceives the sound which reaches it. Or else the same sound must be heard everywhere and as having the same intensity. If the ear does not go out to perceive the sound, how can it know the place from which the sound comes and the origin of the sound? The answer is that sound waves travel from the place where the sound originated and reach the ear. Just as we are able to infer from an arrow's flight whence it came (by noticing the direction of its flight), its speed etc., we can judge from the intensity etc., of the sound, the place from where it came etc. Thus from our room we hear sounds that reach us and infer that it comes from the temple, school etc., There is a line of communication, as it were, between the place where the sound originates and the place where we are. The objector asks how we can hear the sound if the ear does not go out. The Siddhāntin replies that sound waves travel and reach us through the window or some other opening. We can hear no sound coming from the outside world if we are in an air-tight room. The objector retorts that if sound can reach us travelling along a certain route from the temple to our room, why not the ear go out along the same route to perceive the sound? The Siddhāntin answers that from our room we hear only the high notes and not the low notes also. If the ear were to go out to the source of the sound, nothing would prevent its hearing the low as well as the high notes. Now, since only the high notes are heard in the room this phenomenon cannot be explained otherwise than by assuming that sound reaches us in waves. It cannot be explained by assuming that our ear goes out to grasp the sound.

It cannot be said that the eye perceives the object that comes into contact with it. Pot and other things do not come into contact with the eye. If fire and a missile should reach the eye, there would be pain. The light of the eye perceives coloured objects which come near it. The other three senses perceive only those objects which are suitable for being grasped by them. Is not the

pervasiveness of sight confined to the eye balls alone? No; it cannot be; since it perceives big objects like mountains, it cannot be confined to the eye balls alone. Is it then all pervasive, since the top of the tree and the moon are perceived simultaneously? No; this is also untenable because the top of the tree and the moon are not simultaneously perceived. What appears simultaneous is not really so. Even as we say that we pierced a hundred lotus leaves with a needle simultaneously, not noticing the subtle and minute time interval, we say that we saw the top of the tree and the moon simultaneously. The sense of sight is neither limited to the two eye-balls nor does it pervade all objects simultaneously.

Motor organs: Motor organs are: (i) the organ of speech, (ii) feet, (iii) hands, (iv) anus and (v) the generative organs. As these organs do not apprehend objects but perform certain functions, these are called conative organs. If the sense of hearing perceives sound, vāk abides in ākāśa and speaks. If the skin perceives touch, feet abiding in vāyu, walk. If the eye perceives coloured objects, hands abiding in tejas, do the work of giving and taking. If tongue perceives taste, anus abiding in water, defecates. If the nose perceives smell, the generative organ abiding in the earth, causes enjoyment. Sense-organs are helpful to motor-organs whereas the reverse is not the case. Sense and motor organs are the indicators of the activities of the soul's cognitive and conative Energies.

A question arises: vaikhari vāk was said to arise from śuddha māyā. We have referred to a vāk here also. Is the present a figurative assumption? No; this is the place or mode for the manifestation of vaikhari vāk. How is that? When words expressing meaning are written by hand, the meaning is not created by the hand. It is eternally there. The activity of writing manifests the conventional forms of expressing the meaning. The activity does not express the meaning because of the many differences in regard to the script, country, language etc. By vāk is meant here the manifestation of meaning. Then is not sound which is one of the tanmātras enough? No; for, that is non-differentiated sound. It is a mere noise and does not express meaning. Hence vāk (one of the motor organs) is established as the mode of manifestation of vaikhari. The manifestation of śabda-tanmātra is not the cause of modes of speech (vāk) like sūkṣmā. The cause is bindu.

Relation between internal and external organs: The sensory and motor organs are the external instruments existing on the

surface of the body for purposes of cognising things and for acting. Manas, buddhi etc., are the internal organs. These exist inside the body and consider the objects presented by the external senses. How about evolutes like rāga? These are the internal organs which cause the results of the activities of manas etc. (like desire, aversion) to cling to the soul's cognition, conation and affection. These instruments are different from one another and hence these three kinds are all required. They bind the soul. Śivāgra yogin says that to those who enquire into the nature of the self, by a process of elimination like, 'This is not myself', 'This is not myself', rāga, vidyā and kāla are instruments more internal than even manas etc. The soul remains in the māyā region, bound by these tattvas and experiences impermanent enjoyment mistaking it as permanent.

Tanmātras: After sensory and motor organs, the tanmātras of sound, touch, form, taste and smell arise from bhūtādi ahaṅkāra. The tanmātras cause the senses to function in regard to their respective objects. Besides these, we have the puryaṣṭaka deha which is constituted by the five tanmātras, manas, budhi and ahaṅkāra.

In dealing with the origin and function of the elements, we have to notice a variation between Śivajñāna yogin and Śivāgra yogin. According to the former, the five tanmātras originate the five elements. These elements exist inseparably from the tanmātras. They stand as a whole in order to cause the activity of the sense-organs. These elements have sixty derivatives for their effects. The derivatives are the parts and the elements the whole. (like the pot and a paint of wet clay over it, say Maraijñāna Deśīkar and Jñānaprakāśar). Śivāgra yogin interprets the idea in such a way as to maintain conformity with a previous statement (வான்வளியாதி பூதந்தருவது). From the manifested śabda tanmātra, ākāśa arises; it has the quality of echo, is of an unmanifested form and is the locus of the four elements like air. Sound which is its quality is perceivable by the ear. Air arises by adding to ākāśa the sparśa tanmātra which is of the nature of unmanifested sound and manifested touch. It has the saka-saka sound and the special quality of luke-warm touch sensation. It exists as long as ākāśa exists. Touch is perceivable by skin. Fire arises by adding to air the rūpa-tanmātra which is of the nature of unmanifested sound and touch and manifested form. It has the taka-taka sound: it is hot to touch; it has the quality

of colour and the capacity to burn and illuminate. Its quality is perceivable by the senses.¹⁴ Water arises by adding to fire the *rasa-tanmātra* which is of the nature of unmanifested sound, touch and form and manifested taste. It has the *śāla-śāla* sound, sensation of cold and the special quality of sweet taste. Taste is perceivable by the sense of taste. Earth arises by adding to water the *gandha-tanmātra* which is of the nature of unmanifested sound, touch, form, taste and manifested smell. It has the *rada-rada* sound. It has luke-warm sensation, the six tastes like sweet, etc., and the special quality of smell. It has the capacity to support things. Smell which is its quality is perceivable by the nose. Thus arise the five elements. *Ākāśa* has got the quality of sound alone. The *Vaiśeṣikas* say that air, water, etc., also have only one quality each. But we actually perceive sound in the earth. It is said so in the *Āgamas* also. The *Vaiśeṣika* view contradicts perception and verbal testimony. The probans is open to the defect of *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* (sublation).

Instead of deriving the five elements from the five *tanmātras*, why not derive air from *ākāśa*, fire from air, water from fire and earth from water? By the maxim that the quality of the cause must be in the effect also, this must be the case, for air, water, etc., have the quality of sound, etc. The *Veda* (also) says that *ākāśa* arises from the soul and the other elements arise one from another, starting with *ākāśa*.¹⁵ Is not the *Siddhāntin* contradicting the *Veda* then? We must infer the quality (replies the *Siddhāntin*) present in the effect to be existent in the cause also. So the five qualities, smell, etc., should be found in *ākāśa*. If they were so found then there should be no difference between each and *ākāśa*. If *ākāśa* should arise from the soul, then the soul would also be inert and changeable like the *ākāśa*. The secondary significance of the word *ātman* used previously is *ātman* as defined by *ahaṅkāra*. *Ākāśa*, air, etc., arise one after another in sequence. The *Pañcīkaraṇa*-sequence also is responsible for this statement. This sequence may be stated thus: each element is halved. One half remaining itself, the other half becomes divided into four

14. *Jñānaprakāśar*. Elements are threefold as *sūkṣma*, *antara* and *bāhya*. *Sūkṣma* resides in the subtle body and is the support of the sense-organs. *Antara* resides in the gross body and performs the function of rearing the body etc. *Bāhya* is the support of the words and objects of enjoyment and performs the activity of giving place etc.

15. Cf. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* II, 1.

parts and added to the other four elements. These parts become pervasive in respect of the other four elements. Thus we have the mahābhūtas.

The Lokāyatas and Bauddhas say that there are only four elements and the fifth, viz., ākāśa is non-existent. They may say that neither perception nor inference can be used to affirm the existence of ākāśa. The Siddhāntin says that he can support his contention with the aid of perception, inference and verbal testimony. As a means for the movement of living things, ākāśa is necessary. Besides, sound is a quality, and there must be a substance of which it is a quality. The other four elements cannot be the substance possessing the quality of sound—loudness, etc. By elimination, we find ākāśa to be such a substance. It may be urged that the non-existence of the other four elements constitutes ākāśa. If so, then the non-existence of the pot must be the existence of the cloth. Ākāśa has a quality, viz., sound. It cannot be non-existent. The Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas say that ākāśa is eternal. They object to affirming origin and destruction of ākāśa which is incorporeal. It is only the corporeal that perishes. Ākāśa exists while air, fire, earth and water are subject to the states of origination, sustentation and destruction; it pervades them. So, origin, etc., cannot be predicated of ākāśa. This is the conclusion of all the tantras, Śaiva, Vaidika, Vaiṣṇava, Sāṅkhya, etc.

The Siddhāntin proceeds to state his conception of substance. If smell, taste, etc., are said to be the qualities and earth, etc., substances, then is the quality the cause of the substance? There is no substance as a substrate for the quality of the inert. The inert world is constituted of qualities alone. Intelligence alone is the substance. The Universe is said to be śāntātmaka, ghorātmaka and muḍhātmaka, in describing the grandeur of the relation of the inert which consists of qualities to intelligence which is the only substance. Likewise, rājasa, tāmasa, and sattva relate to the souls for the sake of dharma, adharma (which is the equivalent of absence of fixed order) and the dawning of wisdom respectively. The soul is that which experiences delusion by reason of activity, pain by absence of fixed order and pleasure by wisdom. Hence souls alone are substances and the inert comprises only qualities. If so, how is it that we find the Āgamas mention the relation between substance and quality in respect of the inert? In the diverse modification of māyā, the tattva which has arisen earlier is the substance and what arises therefrom is a quality.

The products of the five elements which are distinctive are the members and the soul is the whole. From the distinctive earth, hard things like bone, flesh, hair, skin, nail, teeth, etc., originate. From water, watery things like urine, blood, phlegm semen, sweat, etc., originate. From fire, things that are hot, like the heat in the heart, heat for cooking rice, heat in the eyes, brilliance in the body, excess of bile, burning sensation, etc., arise. From air originate *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *udāna*, *vyāna*, *samāna*, *nāga*, *kūrma*, *krikara*, *devadatta* and *dhananjaya*. These protect the body according to the development of *ahaṅkāra*. *Ākāśa* is the region for the airs like *prāṇa* which are found in the *iḍa*, *piṅgala*, *suṣumnā* veins, in the heart, in the pores of the face, etc., which are related to *ahaṅkāra*.

Earlier, *Sadāśiva* and *Anantēśvara* were spoken of as the agents for the production of the effects from the two material causes, viz., *bindu* and *mohinī*. Here the first cause is given as many. The five elements are said to arise from the five *tanmātras*, these from *bhūtādi-ahaṅkāra*, the five motor organs from *vaikarī ahaṅkāra*, the five sense organs and *manas* from *taijasāhaṅkāra*, *ahaṅkāra*, from *buddhi*; *buddhi* and *citta* from *avyakta*, *avyakta* from *kalā*; *kalā*, etc. from *āsuddha māyā*, *puruṣa tattva* in the aggregation of these five, *nāda* from *śuddha māyā*. Why should origin of things be thus dealt with? The tree grows from the seed and puts out many branches, leaves, flowers, etc. But because of differences in states we say that the sprout arises from the seed, tree from the sprout, branches, from the tree, many leaves and flowers from the branches, fruits from the flowers. So for everything the first cause is the twofold material—(*māyā* which is *śuddha* and *āsuddha*).

Cause exists inseparable from its effects. How do the effects arise and how do they persist? *Ākāśa* remains immutable and as the air from it agitates the ocean we find bubbles, ripples and foam. Even so, as the Lord's Energy is agitated the twofold material, bodies, organs, worlds, etc., are brought into existence. When the air subsides without movement into *ākāśa*, bubbles, ripples, etc., also subside. Likewise, when the Lord's Energy is not directed towards them, the world consisting of body, organs, etc., subsides into its cause. Through bubbles, etc., are known by different names and, differ in form, they are yet water. It is even so with *māyā* and its products.

Ākāśa has the quality of spread-outness and the function of being the locus for things to reside. Air has the quality of movement and the function of collecting together the things that are scattered and scattering the things that are collected. Fire has the quality of being hot and the function of burning all things. Water is unceasingly cold and it wets things. Earth is hard (quality that gives strength) and it supports all things. The activities of these distinctive elements can be witnessed likewise in the body.

The tanmātras of the form of the subtle body are the internal elements. Ākāśa, air, etc., which are of the form of the gross body are the internal-external elements; and elements of the form of the world are external elements. The elements of the form of the gross body are external in relation to the tanmātras and internal in relation to the external elements. Hence, they are called internal-external elements. It is the nature of the tanmātras which are the internal elements to induce the sense-organs to perceive objects. It is the nature of the internal-external elements to cause the sense-organs to turn towards objects.

The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas say that air cannot be corporeal because it is unseen. For them, it is incorporeal like ākāśa. They object to the predication of any colour for the incorporeal air. The Siddhāntin does not accept this argument.

Air is perceptible

since it has manifest touch, while possessing great size like a pot.

By this inference we find air to be perceptibly big. It causes touch sensation and is corporeal like the pot. Objection may be raised that if it is corporeal it must be visible to our eyes. No, says the Siddhāntin; because evil spirits are not visible to us, they are not therefore non-existent. Likewise, air is not incorporeal because it is invisible. It has manifested touch sensation and unmanifested form. That form is perceptible to yogiśvaras.

The objection may be extended to ākāśa that since it is incorporeal it cannot be said to have colour. Besides, the *Māgendra*, *Saravajñānottara* etc., say that ākāśa is like crystal, whereas it is said here that it is of the colour of smoke. The reply is: Because of its conjunction with air, ākāśa is of smoky colour even as the crystal is blood-red when in the presence of japākusuma. So there is no contradiction.

There are thirty six tattvas in all. Though śuddha tattvas are also inert, they are said to be intelligent, because they constitute the form of Cit-Śakti. Of the remaining thirty one tattvas, puruṣa tattva is called Cid-acit because it assumes the colour of its environment. The other thirty tattvas are inert.

States of soul as cida-cit explained:

The soul is made out to be cidacit. Has it no status and nature of its own? Puruṣa-tattva which is inert exists inseparably with the soul as its coat. Since it associates with the soul which is intelligence, it comes to have something of the nature of intelligence. So, the soul that wears a coat which is of this double nature is itself said to be of that nature. The real nature of the soul is intelligence. It is an independent intelligent entity. Because of impurity, puruṣa tattva clings to it, and the soul is taken to have the characteristics found in puruṣa tattva.

Classification of tattvas:

Five are called śuddha tattvas. These tattvas originate from śuddha māyā. We have the seven śuddhāśuddha tattvas like kāla etc. These come from aśuddha māyā. Aśuddha māyā is called śuddhāśuddha māyā because it stands between śuddha māyā and prakṛti māyā. Twenty four tattvas from puruṣa tattva downwards, are called prakṛti māyā because of their origin from it. The Śuddha tattvas are the means for impelling the tattvas like kāla to enjoyment. And so, they are called preraka kāṇḍa. The Śuddhāśuddha tattvas cause enjoyment to souls and hence they are called bhojayitṛ-kāṇḍa. The twenty four aśuddha tattvas are the means for the countless souls experiencing enjoyment. These are called bhogya-kāṇḍa.¹⁶

The entire effected Universe, which is threefold as incorporeal, corporeal and corporeal-incorporeal and which evolves from māyā is of the form of tattvas. Thirty six tattvas are each threefold as gross, subtle and very subtle. The presiding and controlling deities of these tattvas (deities of the class of the souls and

16. The Pāñcaratra asks: Will not prakṛti suffice? Are thirty six tattvas required? Without kāla and niyati, enjoyments cannot be experienced. If there is nothing to experience, the fruits of karma will be left uneaten. If karma is not worked out by its fruits being eaten, release cannot be attained. So, the Śivāgamas recognise thirty six tattvas.

of the Lord) get the names of these tattvas. Hence we must understand everything in relation to the tattvas. It is clear that he who knows the thirty six tattvas can understand everything. Śivāgamas make this matter clear.

Śivāgra yogin examines an objection stated as follows : Tattvas applicable to the soul are only upto sādākhyā. But Śakti and Śiva tattvas are what are to be attained rather than what are to be examined. So, why should these two also be examined? He replies : The thirty six tattvas beginning with nāda and ending with prithvī are meant for the enjoyment of souls. Since the Lord creates these tattvas as favourable to the maturation of mala everything is a tattva to be examined. Another objection is that if by tattva, the eternal is meant, these having a beginning and end, cannot be said to be tattvas. With the dissolution of the five elements, the celestials have destruction. But with reference to mortals, they are called immortals. Even so, tattvas do not perish immediately like their derivatives but persist upto the state of dissolution. Hence they are called tattvas. Jñānaprakāśar says that the word 'tattva' applies to causal as well as effected entities. The corporeal produced by the incorporeal is the effected : the incorporeal is the causal entity.

The thirty six tattvas are withdrawn into their causes at the time of involution. Twenty four tattvas beginning with prithvī and ending with mūlaprakṛti are withdrawn by Śrīkaṇṭha who is the presiding deity for all kinds of souls. The six tattvas above mūlaprakṛti are withdrawn by Ananta, the deity for vidyā ; śuddha vidyā, īśvara and sādākhyā are withdrawn by Laya Śiva. Śakti and Śiva tattvas are withdrawn by Śuddha Śiva. At the time of re-creation these tattvas are manifested by their respective agents. Śuddha Śiva alone is the eternal without origin and disappearance. Laya Śiva, Ananta (Bhoga Śiva) and Śrīkaṇṭha Rudra (Adhikāra Śiva) are also taken by some to be eternal. This is only figurative.

The Vaiṣṇavas say that the non-material world (aprākṛta loka) is eternal ; the Lord's form there is eternal, Sāyujya is being united to infinite auspicious qualities (as the Lord has these) and having all His enjoyments with the exception of Mahālakṣmī. The Śaiva-ekadeśins say that the three tattvas, śuddha vidyā, īśvara and sādākhyā and their deities Rudra, Maheśvara and Sadāśiva are eternal. Sāyujya is being perfect with the eight

qualities. This is not the Siddhānta. Śakti and Śiva tattvas are taken into Parabindu which is called Śuddha māyā. Parabindu is also called Śiva because it is controlled by Him.¹⁷

Karma :

It is so-called because its is produced by the activity of manas, vāk and kāya (thought, word and deed). Souls experience pleasures and pains which are the fruits of their past deeds. In experiencing them, they accumulate further karma whose fruits have to be experienced in succeeding births. Souls go to and return from heaven and hell again and again. By souls, sakalas are referred to here.

The Lokāyata objects to the statement that good and evil deeds are the cause of pleasure and pain. He says that pleasure and pain are natural to human beings. The Siddhāntin refuses to admit that such opposites as pleasure and pain can be natural to one and the same thing. The nature of anything does not consist in having two opposite characteristics. So, pleasure and pain have their cause in good and evil deeds. Water comes to have fragrance if flowers are put in it. If water is heated, it becomes hot. Neither fragrance nor heat is natural to water. The objector may say that fragrance and heat are natural to water ; but they are not. The nature of water is to be at a certain degree of coolness. That water becomes fragrant or hot is due to the presence of flower or heat. So also the natural characteristic of the soul is intelligence. It is the soul which experiences pleasures and pain. The experience of these comes about for each soul by virtue of its deeds. The cause of pleasures and pains is sñcīta karma. The body cannot be said to experience pleasure and pain, because it is inert.¹⁸

17. Jñānaprakāśar rules out certain views as not consistent with the Siddhānta. The Sāṅkhyas and others say that prakṛti, āśuddha māyā and śuddha māyā, respectively are eternal. According to the Siddhāntin, prakṛti and āśuddha māyā are withdrawn into śuddha māyā. Some of the Śaivas say that the three tattvas, Śuddha vidyā, īśvara and sādākhya are eternal. This is also unacceptable.

18. Jñānaprakāśar says that if merit and de-merit are objects of perception then we need not concern ourselves with their purpose or purposelessness to verify their being the cause of pleasure and pain. If purpose were to be the test, then it can only be in the case of what is inferred. Either way, the Lokāyata's position is unintelligible. From the Lokāyata's point of

The Lokāyata attempts to explain pleasure and pain as the results of endeavour or lack of endeavour on the part of people. He appeals to certain facts of our everyday experience in support of his contention. Those who strive hard to earn riches succeed in their attempts and enjoy the advantages of being richer in this life. Those who do not strive, earn no riches and consequently they are subject to misery. Why not stop with endeavour or the lack of it as responsible for our pleasure and pain? On the other hand, if we assume the cause for pleasure and pain in the merit or otherwise of previous deeds, that cause must be able to produce certain wealth for a person who puts forth no effort to earn it. We hardly ever find this in life. So it is superfluous to invoke the merit or otherwise of previous deeds as the cause of pleasure and pain when these can be accounted for by present endeavour or the lack of it.

The Siddhāntin meets the objector on the latter's own ground. He appeals to certain facts of experience whereby the objector's contention can be met. Those who work hard to accumulate riches are overcome by depression when their attempts do not materialise. Even when people work without feeling any depression, they fail sometimes. Thus, striving leads to misery. Besides we do find that some who do not exert themselves in the least are rich. This fact goes against the endeavour theory. We can find the cause for the paradox of great riches going together with an absence of endeavour only in karma. That cause is the externally unobservable sañcita karma. Śivajñāna yogin gives as example people unearthing treasure. Thus he claims the doubts of the Lokāyatas are answered and sañcita karma established through its kārya hetu viz., pleasure and pain.¹⁹

Even before one is born, riches and poverty, oneself being considered as high or low by other people consequent on having or not having riches and, pleasure and pain—all these are contained in a subtle form in the embryo. These do not come into existence just when they are seen. They are in a subtle form in the embryo

view, it is evident that pleasure and pain are not natural to the soul but only adventitious. Body, sense-organs etc., being inert they cannot experience pleasures and pains which are born in the buddhi tattva and attach themselves to the soul.

19. Jñānaprakāśar says that exertion in this life is fruitful in some cases, not fruitful in others and is thus inconstant in its results. Where exertion is fruitful we must assume it to be the channel of the cause.

and through effort which is helpful in experiencing them, they are manifested. The effort that helps to experience the gross manifestation of these does not cease there; it is the cause of further activities which have their results again. Just as the effort in a previous life was the cause of these six (birth etc.) experienced now, the effort of this life has its results in the future; it does not yield its fruits now. Satkāryavāda is adopted here.

Karma is brought about by the activity of one's body. But how is the body itself brought into existence? What is the cause of the body? This body is the result of deeds done in a previous life. Just as the seed and the sprout follow each other, these (bodies and acts) come in a series and as cause and effect of one another from time immemorial like a perpetually flowing stream. Hence there is no saying which is earlier and which is later of these two.

One may grant that the efforts of one's previous life produce wealth etc., and that these are experienced by the efforts put forth in this life. But still one may ask how the efforts put forth to experience the fruits of *prārabdha* cause the body etc. of the next birth. If the merit and de-merit of the previous life which yield their fruit in this life were not other than the efforts of that individual in that life, it stands to reason that the efforts of this life must have their fruits in the succeeding birth. The doubt may arise that where there is no effort now, there is no possibility of karma to be experienced in a future life. No; all experience is dependent upon efforts. As long as *prārabdha* has to be experienced, there must be the effort to experience it. So when *prārabdha* is experienced, there is effort which serves as a cause of the body etc., of the next birth.

Fruits etc. grown for human consumption are used not only for that purpose but also for further production. Likewise, our efforts put forth with egoistic consciousness have external and objective consequences by way of yielding for our experience the fruits of our previous deeds; they have internal and subjective consequences by ever leading to the performance of good and evil deeds which constitute *āgami* karma—'ever leading' because the efforts continue ceaselessly till the attainment of release. The objector says that if we experience now the fruits of our past deeds—our time being taken up in this—there is no possibility of further karma. This difficulty is met by saying that in experiencing the fruits of past deeds, the souls forget that their

experience is made possible by the Will of the Lord and wrongly think that their experience is due to themselves; wherefore āgāmi begins.

Śivāgra yogin illustrates thus: Jack-fruits, mangoes, dates and tamarind are used for present consumption and their seeds are used for future production. The gross impressions of karma done with our thought, word and deed perish here; from them an unseen potency arises in a subtle form and brings about at their respective times, bodies etc., as results for experience. From this subtle karma arise residual subjective impressions, which remain in the buddhi tattva under the name of 'the seed of karma.' The seed of meritorious deeds causes merit and the seed of sinful deeds causes demerit. Karma is of three kinds (i) gross (ii) subtle and (iii) subtler than the subtle.

What are good and evil deeds? Good deeds are doing with one's thought, word and deed those things that are enjoined by the scriptures as beneficial to the welfare of souls. Deeds opposed to the welfare of souls are evil.

Muthiah Pillai says that one may set out with the object of doing good and thus while one's motive may be laudable, the actual consequences may not be conducive to the welfare of the souls or in quite the reverse way, one's motive may be anything but good but the consequences of one's action, may turn out to be good. Or again, the evil doer may not know that his deeds are evil.

Thus the Lord Who alone can understand good and evil deeds takes them and grants their fruits to the souls.

Śivāgra yogin says that a good deed consists in caring for the welfare of the people, in talking well to them, in physical exertions for their good, in giving food etc. to them. An evil deed consists in thinking ill of people, talking ill of them, doing them harm physically and filching other people's property. Any one who, though capable of alleviating the suffering of someone, fails to do so and is indifferent is to be charged with having done an evil deed. The Lord considers all this and grants to souls pleasure and pain according to their deeds.

Why should the Lord Himself take the deeds done by the souls? It is because of His love that all should gain salvation that He does so. Though His love is thus the reason, since the cause is twofold, the effect must also be twofold. So He grants grace to those who do good deeds: He punishes them that do evil deeds.

Śivāgra yogin says that because the Lord Who dwells in the hearts of all souls is inseparably existent in them, He takes their deeds Himself.

Virtues :

Conducting oneself in conformity with the ways of the world, love towards all, being gracious to all, following the injunctions of the Vedas and the Āgams, hospitality to deserving persons, mixing freely with all, having good qualities, accumulating merits (gained by austerities) like controlling the five sense-organs, being charitable to the proper persons, being obedient to elders, being reverential to elders, being truthful, faultless renunciation like not desiring other people's property or women, refraining from straying into evil ways, capacity to discriminate proper from improper things, worshipping one's elders—if one has these sixteen virtues and other similar ones besides, one's efforts will produce merits. These sixteen come under yama and niyama. These practices are common to everyone whose conduct is righteous. Hence it has been mentioned apart from the worship of God. It is specially noteworthy here that love towards all figures in this list, thus revealing that Siddhānta ethics is mindful of this important virtue.

If one has the virtues mentioned above, is free from defects like anger, worships the deity one likes to worship by letting one's mind contemplate, the mouth utter praises and mantras, the hands sprinkle flowers on the image and thus lives a virtuous life, Śiva Who is the most ancient of the ancient deities, receives the worship offered to the other deities by residing in them and grants the fruits of the worship.

Whatever has been in one of four kinds of wombs, is born and dies, and belongs to the class of finite souls. What has no birth or death in the way in which finite souls have these, that is the Infinite. Thus alone can we distinguish between otherwise indistinguishable beings. All other deities are subject to birth, suffering and death; they have to perform deeds. (Nirambavalāgiar says: Hence they cannot know the conditions of the souls and deliver them from births and deaths.) But no where do we hear such

20. எல்லார் பிறப்பு மிறப்பு மியற்பாவல்தஞ்
சொல்லார் றெளிந்தே நஞ்சோனேச—ரில்லித்
பிறந்த கதையுங் கேளோம் பேருலகில் வாழ்ந்துண்
டிறந்த கதையுங் கேட்டிலேம் —அருணகிரியந்தாதி

Jñānaprakāśar says that the other deities function as directed by Śiva.

things said of Śiva.²⁰ Hence Śiva without becoming subject to activity appears through the particular deities worshipped and grants them what they want. Other deities cannot do so.

It may be said that we do not see some one other than the one we worshipped answer our prayer. Can we say then that when we worship our parents, Brahmins and others, these appear to us in heaven and grant the fruits of our deeds? No. We are agreed in saying that the Lord Who knows our devotion to these, grants us the fruits of our worship. It is equally reasonable to hold that whomsoever we worship, it is Śiva Who gives the fruits of our worship. But we have heard it said that the deity worshipped by each person appears unto him and grants him boons. Are we to say then that the other deities also have the capacity to bring about the fruits of action? No; just as we see the king's authority, vested with the ministers, to be productive of results, the Lord gives His authority to the other deities and grants the fruits of the devotion of the votaries of these deities. The other deities cannot, by themselves, bring about the fruits of people's action.

If the worship directed to the other deities is also accepted by Śiva Who grants the fruits of one's action, then does paśu puṇya become Śiva puṇya? The distinction of merits into paśu puṇya and Śiva puṇya is from the point of the agent and not from the point of view of Him Who accepts the worship.

The idea of the foregoing arguments is that when we carry out the command of the Lord with an egoistic consciousness (assuming responsibility for our actions or thinking that we are the real agents because we *will* our actions) our deeds become sinful.

What is true merit?:

We realise that the Lord Himself accepts the worship offered to all the deities and grants rewards to the devotees. It is evident then, that the best merit is to worship Him. All the good deeds we do forgetful of Him are vain deeds. Virtue is what is enjoined by the Lord in the Vedas and the Āgamas. The Lord Who has no likes and dislikes, desires to reward those who practise virtue. We must therefore worship the Lord. The Siddhāntin is alive to the limitations of mere morality. In so far as the soul takes itself to be the agent and performs good or evil deeds, it is caught up in the nexus of consequences. When it realises that true virtue is becoming an instrument in God's hands for the fulfilment of His purposes, it ceases to be bound by the consequences of its deeds.

Besides, there is an immeasurable enrichment as a result of placing oneself under God's guidance. To accept God's agency for one's own acts is not to escape moral responsibility but to bear it in the best way possible. *The Siddhantin's ethics is God-centred and not man-centred.*

We notice a gradation here—from adherence to ethical tenets—to worship of deities of one's choice and finally to Śiva—the Highest Who is the author of all the virtues (i.e., the source of the Good). Worship of the Highest is bound to be an unfailing source of inspiration for the best conduct.

The Lord resides in the Sadāśiva tattva, manifests Himself externally in a particular physical form and with a particular garb. In this form, He accepts our worship and shows grace to the souls. If we contemplate Him inwardly, He accepts our worship by dwelling in us. Because we know this, we should worship the Supreme Being in these places.²¹

Good and bad deeds bear fruits according as the deity accepting them is exalted or not. They do not bear fruit either according to the status of the agent or the value of the deeds. Even the bad deeds done by people devoted to Śiva become good deeds. Even the good deeds done by people who do not worship Śiva turn out to be evil. The yāga performed by Dakṣa who had received boons from the devas was a good deed; but because he was not devoted to Śiva, the consequences turned out to be evil.

The young Caṇḍīśa, who killed his father, might be taken to have done a bad deed; but because he was devoted to Śiva, his act had good consequences. We must worship Śiva alone.

Thus, while the deeds themselves perish, Śiva accepts them and grants pleasures and pains to souls. What are the Vedas and

21. Maraijñāna Deśikar: Śiva resides in Śiva-līnga and in those devotees who have received Śiva dikṣā and grants grace to those devoted to these. The Āgamas declare that if the worshippers of līnga disregard the devotees of Śiva then līnga-worship will be unavailing.

Sivāgra yogin: Śiva exists non-different from the fixed līnga and moving forms like Śiva-worshippers. Contemplation of Śiva as existing in the heart is worship free from the defects of deficiency, cruelty, repulsion, pollution and suffering of the body to which external worship can be subject. If contemplation is not possible, the agent should undertake spiritual enquiry, meanwhile worshipping Śiva-līnga and Mahāśvara (movable form). Jñānaprakāśar says daily we must worship by kriyā, yoga and jñāna.

Āgamas but the utterances of the Lord? Hell is a prison where souls who did not give heed to His words are punished. Heaven is a big city where the souls who act according to His words are made to live, enjoying great wealth. Thus souls have pleasure and pain through the Lord.²²

The king punishes and imprisons by his mighty authority those who do not obey his commands. On the other hand, he grants riches and invests with authority to work under him those who obey his mandate. The authority of the ministers, and others is the authority of the king. The matter stands thus in the case of the Lord also.

The king punishes wrong doers severely and warns them that if they persist in their ways, they would be punished still more severely. Those who are wise act according to the Vedic injunctions and escape hell. The punishment in hell is also like the punishment inflicted by the king. Because the king punishes with a view to deliver souls from suffering in hell, the king's authority is derived from Śiva. It is not his own free authority.

Not acting according to the precepts of the scriptures is sin; acting in accordance with the precepts of the scriptures but without being actuated by love for all beings is virtue. Hence both are to be treated as diseases. The Lord causes those who disobey the scriptures to be hurled into hell and removes their sins after they have been properly punished. By causing them to experience the joys of heaven, He removes their virtues. Pleasures and pains are the medicine administered by Śiva, the physician to cure the diseases and delusion caused by mala.

Here again we notice that the Siddhāntin insists on love for all and calls virtue (in the sense of merit that qualifies one for enjoying the pleasures of svarga) a disease in so far as it is

22. Śivāgra yogin: Hell is for those whose sin alone matures. Experience there is of pain, in the yātana śarīra. Those who have merits and de-merits are womb-born to experience pleasures and pains here. The celestials have a body which is the quintessence of elements, to enable them to experience pleasures. Souls have a subtle body as their invariable concomitant up to release. But to experience the results of their deeds in the particular worlds, they require more concrete embodiment than their subtle body. This concrete embodiment differs according to the conditions of the particular worlds in which they are to experience the results of their deeds.

Maraijñāna Deśikar says that by Lord reference is made to Sadaśiva who knows all and is without desires or aversions.

self-centred and does not radiate love to all beings. It is karma, based even on such virtue that the Siddhāntin calls mala. The Lord's will is that we must educate ourselves morally to get beyond this narrow virtue and practise the virtue of loving all beings. Morality is His law in the latter sense. Thus there is no contradiction in saying that morality is His law and yet in the limited sense, it is a mala.

If one lives in accordance with the health regulations given by the science of medicine, one will not be liable to diseases. But if one flouts these regulations, the diseases resulting thereby on account of oneself and the five elements, are cured by proper medicines given by the physician. The diseases that a person gets, not because he flouted health rules but because the gods have so willed it are cured by appropriate devices like dāna, pūjā, and homa. The Lord Who is the author of the Vedas and the Āgamas thus causes the souls to experience the fruits of their deeds and delivers them from the bondage of karma. The physician doctors the body, and Śivā doctors the soul.

The physician cures certain diseases by kindly but firmly making incisions with his knife. He cures certain other diseases by giving sugar and milk mixed together. Likewise, the Lord causes the souls to experience pleasures and pains and cures them of karma.

When the gross body is destroyed, many other bodies arise from the subtle body which is not destroyed along with the gross body, to experience the fruits of deeds, good and bad. Souls go to heaven and hell with these bodies by order of the Lord's Energy and experience pleasures and pains there. With the faultless subtle body, they return to the earth and enter some womb to experience the remains of the fruits of their deeds.²³

23. Śivāgra yogin says that the body for experience in hell is constituted by the five tanmātras and manas, buddhi and ahaṅkāra (puryaṣṭaka). For experience in heaven there is the effulgent body constituted by the essence of the elements. After experiencing pleasures and pains in heaven and hell respectively (which experiences are made possible by the Lord's Energy) the soul enters the womb in the form of the subtle body that is free from the defects of the primal atom and the madhyaparamāṇu. The earthly body is said to be the evolve of the elements because it is subject to change of states like youth.

Jñānaprakāśar says that according to the pure Śaiva Siddhāntin the gross body assumed for experience in hell is coarse, that for the earth is middling and the body for heaven is subtle.

Perhaps there is no interval between the discarding of the earthly body and the assumption of the yātana body or vice versa? The soul takes another earthly body immediately after discarding one, instead of taking yātana śarīra. Or it may take one yātana śarīra after another without interposing an earthly one in between. It all depends upon the efficacy of the deeds. Discarding this earthly body, it may enter the womb so as to take another earthly body and go on thus continuously. Or, without entering any womb, it may, because of its sins, remain like a stone and after some time go to hell to experience great pain there and return to earth again. Thus there is interval also. We can understand the stay of the soul in heaven also similarly. Śiva's Energy finds the relative strength of deeds. 'The fructification of the weaker deed is not yet' says the Pauṣkara (Paśu paṭala 35)

Like the snake which discards one skin and assumes another, like the birds which come out of the eggs and go to some other place, like those who discarding their own bodies enter the bodies of others, like entering dream-consciousness and forgetting waking consciousness, the souls without themselves changing leave their gross body, enter heaven and with the assumption of another body come to have a different consciousness.

This is the Siddhāntin's reply to the Kriṣṇa Brahma Vādin's objection that if the soul is re-born, body, etc., which perish must be able to come into existence once again; since the latter is not so, the former is also not so.

Deeds were done by the soul (which is sadasat) in its previous birth. These deeds give rise to merit or de-merit according as they were good or bad. Merit and de-merit bring about their appropriate fruits. Deeds refer to the first cause which is kāmmya mala. Since this binds the souls even as āṇava and māyā do, this is also reckoned as a mala, We can infer the existence of kāmmya mala from good and evil which are its cause and from pleasure and pain which are its effect.²⁴

24. Jñānaprakāśar: Karma is twofold as merit and demerit; threefold as causing the birth of the body etc. (janaka); as supporting the soul in the form of the body (tāraka) and as causing enjoyment by being in the form of an object of enjoyment (bhogya); again as i) visible ii) invisible and iii) indeterminate object of enjoyment.

We infer the cause from its effect - from pleasure and pain, we infer karma.

Śivāgra yogin says that karma is produced by the union of the real finite intelligence and the non-real products of māyā. It becomes merit and de-merit; during the pre-laya state it resides as impressions in māyā and at the time of creation is useful for the production of body, etc. Some say that there need be no such thing as karma. The enjoyment of pleasure and pain comes about by the grace of God and by the acquired disposition of the prakṛti-born intellect. While all are equal in respect of being the enjoyer, some experience the pleasures of heaven and some others the pains of hell. Karma must be the cause of this disparity. Besides, while the act of tilling is the same for farmers it is previous karma that is responsible for the disparity in the fruits of the acts of tilling. Some reap very much; some others very little. The Lord's Grace itself is the cause for making karma bear fruit. He has no partiality or cruelty and He brings about the souls' experience of heaven and hell only in accordance with their karma. If the dispositions of the prakṛti-born intellect are said to be the cause, we must remember that the derivatives of prakṛti are the experienced rather than what causes the experience. It may be said that karma of the form of the acquired disposition of the prakṛti-born intellect is enjoyed as a disposition and is also what causes enjoyment as an act. It cannot cause the enjoyment and be the instrument of the enjoyment. There cannot be in the same object the act of enjoyment and the act of causing the enjoyment. That is the contradiction in the sāt being active in respect of itself. It is as impossible as it is for an actor, though ever so clever, to stand on his own shoulders. Karma is co-present with the performance of good and bad deeds and experience of pleasure and pain. Since it is the primal cause of the activities done by the operation of thought, word and deed, it is known as kāraṇa mala. Though the deed perishes, it continues to exist in a subtle form and hence is known as the unseen. As it is the cause of the enjoyment of aśuddha māyā, it is known as mala. It is also the cause of the distinction into ādhyātmika, ādhībhautika and ādhidaivika. Ādhyātmika is twofold—as pertaining to the body and the mind. Of these, karma pertaining to the body consists of diseases like fever, etc., and pain inflicted by human beings, animals, devils, cows, birds, thieves and giants. Karma pertaining to the mind consists of the pain resulting from grief, envy, shame, jealousy, hatred. Ādhībhautika is the pain resulting from cold, heat, air, rain, lightning, thunder, etc. Ādhidaivika is the pain accruing from pregnancy, birth, old age, ignorance, death, hell, etc.

Deeds, good and bad, are done; they perish and thus they have a beginning and an end. Yet, because they follow each other continuously from the beginning, like a ceaselessly flowing stream, they are said to be beginningless. Karma, along with āpavic qualities like delusion, etc., and māyā qualities like body, organs, etc., binds the souls to births and deaths and causes the souls to have suitable bodies for experiencing pleasure and pain which are its results. Karma brings about all these while remaining subtle and invisible to the souls.

Śivāgra yogin says that an end is indicated for karma which is beginningless. Since karma has been continuous from time immemorial, it is beginningless like a ceaselessly flowing stream. Since it is generated by the activity of the mind, word and body, it has a beginning. It may be said that it is a contradiction to predicate beginning and beginninglessness of the same object. But karma is beginningless as an aggregate; since it comes to a close as individually begun and done, it has a beginning. It grows by the dispositions of āpava like moha. Souls occupying the bodies evolved from māyā act with the feeling of "I", and "mine". There are differences between the acts and differences between the results also. In the pralaya state karma remains invisible in māyā. During creation, controlled by the Lord's Energy, it functions with a view to producing results for each and every soul.

Metempsychosis :

The moving and stationary souls are re-born in accordance with their karma without being subject to metempsychosis (i.e., with a new body of the same and not different kind).²⁵ But do the souls which earned merits here enjoy the fruits thereof in heaven with a celestial form or with the terrestrial form itself?

If it is said that celestial pleasure is enjoyed in heaven by souls in their human forms, then, heaven ceases to be heaven and becomes earth. If it is admitted that souls assume a celestial form, then, metempsychosis is recognised. So when, souls return to the

25. Maraliñāna Deśīkar and Nambavayāgiar say that the Bhāṭṭas hold this view. The former states the Bhāṭṭa view thus: Souls born as men will be re-born only as men and those born as bulls will be re-born only as bulls. What is born as man will not be re-born as bull. Śivāgra yogin says that this is the Tattvavādin's view, that human beings, animals etc., are re-born in their own class and that these never change their class even in the state of release

earth after enjoying celestial pleasures, they are re-born in their human form and not as celestial beings.

Caterpillars change into bees; a kind of worm changes into the hornet. These can be seen by direct perception. Scriptures of every religion recognise the changes in birth according to karma. How could the objector affirm change of birth but not metempsychosis? Thus perception and verbal testimony alike refute the objector's view.

The analogy may be objected to on the ground that in the case of the bee, etc., there is not the assumption of a body of a different kind but only the transformation of the original body. Compare the following examples: Ahalya was transformed into a stone by the curse of Gautama and she lost her human form. Viṣṇu, cursed by Bṛghu, underwent the ten transformations into fish, etc. A spider that worshipped Śiva in Tiruvānaikkā was born in its next birth in the solar dynasty and ruled the world. A rat, by coming into contact with a lamp (and thus making it burn brighter) in a Śiva temple was born subsequently as the famous emperor, Mahābali. In all these instances, we see the loss of the original body and the assumption of a new body.

If you say that the change into a different kind of body is due to boons or curses and deny the change as being due to karma we have only to remind you that we have already stated that the Lord is the witness of the deeds done by the souls. The effects of the deeds are the boons and curses of the Lord.

How can the soul which takes on the colour of its environment take another form? Since karma is inert, it cannot directly know the suitable worlds and bodies and attach itself to them. Souls are conscious entities, no doubt; but since they cannot know by themselves, they are unable to know the fruits of their deeds and experience them. So, by elimination, the Lord is seen to cause māyā and karma to function and to direct them to the several souls. The body that the Lord created is changed by Him in accordance with karma. There should be no difficulty in conceiving this.

Whence do the changes of body arise? The different gross bodies arise from their cause—the subtle body. It may be said that if the cause is one its effects cannot be many.²⁶ If a person

26. Jñānaprakāśar says that the objector's difficulty is how there could be changes in the gross bodies when there is none in the subtle body.

is efficient, he can make different kinds of ornament from the same gold. Even so, one subtle body is transformed by Śiva into many different forms. This is not at variance with satkāryavada.

Quoting the law that the qualities of the cause produce the qualities of the effect, Śivāgra yogin says that the changes of māyā (which is the cause) are seen in all the bodies (which are its effects).

Gross body evolves from the subtle body. But it is not like the transformation of gold into several ornaments. The subtle body is not destroyed and the gross manifested as when the seed is destroyed, the tree take its place. Nor does the gross body arise from the subtle as the digits of the moon arise from one another. How else does it arise? Just as when one tree is cut down another grows from its roots, there is a potency in the subtle, i.e., the gross exists in a potential form in the subtle.

The example of gold was to indicate that by the efficiency of the maker many effects are produced. Here, a different analogy is given to show that many things arise from one. So, there is no contradiction. In the example of the gold, the efficiency of the agent and different effects produced by him are referred to. In the example of the tree, neither of these but the production of the different effects from one and the same thing are referred to. Thus, two examples are required.

Trees grow from seeds; likewise, by command of the Lord and in accordance with karma, gross bodies arise from the subtle which is their cause. When the tree is destroyed, the seed is destroyed therewith. Is it even so in the case of the body that when the gross body is destroyed, the subtle is also destroyed? No; it is not so. The analogy for the manifestation of the gross from the subtle is partial only. Of the sixteen digits of the moon, one persists while the fifteen others arise from it and disappear continuously. The tree cannot come into existence without the seed. On the presumption that the gross cannot come into existence without the subtle, the existence of the subtle is established.

Unless there is a subtle body, the different gross bodies cannot come into existence and go out of it. The latter is seen to be the case. So the former must be true. Thus presumption is the only means whereby the existence of the subtle body is established.

The five elements may very well be the cause of the gross body: what necessity is there for a subtle body? It must be remembered that according to *sāṅkhya*vāda, only the subtle can be the cause of the gross. Subtle body is constituted by the subtle elements, i.e., the *tanmātras*. The five great elements (i.e., gross) are the effects of the *tanmātras*. The elements constitute the gross body. When the gross body is referred to as the product of the five elements what is meant is that it is the effect of the subtle body constituted by the five *tanmātras*.²⁷

As medicine for the doctor, the gross body, subtle body, *prākṛti māyā*, *asuddha māyā* and *śuddha māyā* are the assumptive substances for the Lord.

To the question how karma, caused by the body and organs which are the products of *māyā* can be destroyed, Śivāgra yogin replies that it is like the forest fire destroying the forest.

Bodies, organs, etc., that come into existence are all mala. What is the reason for saying that mala is removed by mala? (or as Śivāgra yogin puts it, how can bodies, etc., the products of ignorance remove ignorance?). Like the washerman who washes the dirty cloth with dirt, like cow-dung and fuller's earth, the Lord uses *māyā* as a medicine wherewith to remove the other impurities.

The doctrine of karma is the Indian answer to the problem of suffering. No doubt, its scope is wider than this. It states, in the opinion of Indian thinkers, a moral law corresponding to the law of causation. Not only Hinduism but also Buddhism and Jainism accept the doctrine of karma. It is no exaggeration to say that this doctrine has profoundly influenced Indian thought. But this doctrine is usually wrongly identified with fatalism and on the basis of such wrong identification, it is argued that this doctrine denies freedom to man and deprives him of all initiative. This argument overlooks some important features of the doctrine of karma. The law says that as a man sows, so shall he reap. One's past determines one's present. One cannot hope to escape the consequences of one's past. This leads critics to think that however

27. Jñānaprakāśar says that when souls attain release, the Universe ceases to bind them. In the *Mutanga Paramesvara* he says, it is sad in respect of the released soul which has attained Śivatva that Śiva is not its controller, nor is it the controlled in relation to Śiva.

much one may strive in the present, there can be no success if the past is against it and that therefore there is no point in moral endeavour at all. The inexorability of karma reduces all moral endeavour to a mockery. Does the doctrine of karma warrant such a conclusion?

Karma has three aspects—*prārabdha*, *sañcita* and *āgāmi*. *Prārabdha* is that part of a man's store of past karma which has started manifesting its consequences. It is inescapable, however much one tries to escape it. Therefore, it has to be experienced and thus only destroyed. *Sañcita* is also a part of past karma but something that can be overcome by spiritual practices and destroyed entirely by *jñāna*.²⁸ *Āgāmi* is karma which is created now by our present acts. It is open to us, so to act as to make our future or mar it. Surely, we have no one but ourselves to blame if we misuse our opportunities and fail to create a glorious future for ourselves!

It is clear that only *prārabdha* has an inexorability about it which 'neither all our piety nor tears' can undo. But even here, an understanding of the operation of the moral law may help by reconciling us to what cannot be cured and so must be endured. Do we not accept as scientific truth what psychologists call certain inescapable factors of heredity? Besides, what is now past was once present and was largely created by one's free acts. *Sañcita* may be overcome, if properly treated. So far as *Āgāmi* is concerned, there is all the freedom we could wish for. Thus, the doctrine of karma recognises the element of freedom and the element of necessity in our moral life. Morality presupposes freedom, otherwise there will be no point in judgments of moral conduct as worthy of praise or blame. But it is equally necessary to recognise the element of necessity. A man is free to act as he pleases. But having acted in a particular way, he has thereby made a good or bad man of himself. Good deeds tend to perpetuate themselves by creating favourable predisposition for future acts and likewise bad deeds. We cannot persist in a certain line of conduct and

28. Cf. the following :

தன்னை யந்நிதிந் தத்துவ ஞானிகள்
முன்ன வினையின் முடிச்சை யறிழ்ப்பார்கள்
பின்னை வினையைப் பிடித்துப் பிசைவார்கள்
சென்னியில் வைத்த சீவனஞாலே—

piously wish to escape its consequences.²⁹ The whole position is summed up very neatly in the oft-quoted words of Professor Ś. Radhakrishnan: "The cards in the game of life are given to us. We do not select them. They are traced to our past karma, but we can call as we please, lead what suit we will, and as we play, we gain or lose. And there is freedom."^{30a}

The charge that social ethics finds no place in the Siddhānta³⁰ as each individual is concerned only about his own salvation not caring for what happens to his fellow-men and that there is no mention of one's duties to one's fellow-men, has been met³¹ by pointing out that philosophical works were intended as replies to rival systems and covered points of difference. One's duty to one's fellow-men, not being a point at issue, there was no need for specific treatment thereof. We may add that service for the social and spiritual welfare of other men is quite within the sphere of one's obligation to one's fellow-men. Hita was defined earlier, as doing what is prescribed by the Vedas and Āgamas as good for the soul's welfare and ahita as not doing this.³⁴ Surely, the soul's welfare, spiritual as well as social is comprised in hita? As for not caring for what happens to others spiritually, we need remind ourselves of only one of several utterances in a similar strain. 'Oh men do come here. You eat fruits if they are given. An exceedingly sweet fruit is the Lord's feet!'³³ Is this not an appealing way of inviting humanity to share one's religious experience?

A more sweeping charge is the following: "The Śaiva Siddhāntin has no true ethics. One finds certain ethical prescriptions here and there; however the aim of these is not ethical but the

29. The treatment here follows closely the simple and lucid exposition of the doctrine of karma given by Professor D. S. Sarma, in his *What is Hinduism?* pp. 65-68. Cf. the following 'Every soul is like a farmer to whom a plot of land is given. The extent of the land, the nature of its soil, the changes of weather to which it is exposed are all pre-determined. But the farmer is quite at liberty to till the ground, to manure it and raise suitable crops or neglect it and allow it to run to waste.' *Ibid*, p. 67.

29a. The Hindu View of Life, p. 75.

30. Schomerus, p. 420.

31. Śaiva Siddhānta, pp. 216-7.

32. Siddhiyar, II 13. In the text line 'இதம் உயிர்க்குறுதி செய்தல்' the words 'உயிர்க்கு உறுதி' are significant. Also see p. 171 of this work for Śivāgra yogin's remarks about good and evil deeds.

33. மனிதர்கள் இங்கேவம்மொன்று சொல்லுகேன்
கனிதந்தாற் கனிஉண்ணவும் வல்லிகே

promotion of natural processes.”³⁴ It is not clear as to what precisely is meant by ‘natural processes’. As for the charge that the Siddhānta has no true ethics, we have to invite attention to the section on karma, where is a fairly long exposition of one’s duties, of virtue, vice, etc. If these are not connected with true ethics, it is difficult to understand what else is. The Siddhāntin is alive not only to the demands of morality but also to the need for relating them the Supreme Reality—God, Who is the moral governor of the Universe. Eligibility for spiritual endeavour is acquired by a preliminary process of arduous discipline, calling for the strictest adherence to the codes of morality.

Does the doctrine of karma ‘stultify all altruism by making it impossible for men really to help one another?’^{34a} This view is based on the assumption that every one *has* to experience the fruits of his karma, nothing that another person does will affect one, nor anything one does affect another, for good or ill. This contention derives its plausibility by taking karma in its aspect as prārabdha alone, ignoring the other two. If the doctrine of karma entails, so to speak, a window-less monadic career of the souls, how do they come to accumulate karma at all? Is it not because one’s acts affect others that they come to affect oneself and thereby constitute one’s karma?

Swami Vivekananda was once provoked to righteous indignation by a misinterpretation of the doctrine of karma to the effect that if a person suffered, he deserved it and that it would be wrong to attempt to relieve the suffering. We saw earlier (p. 171 of this work) that Śivāgra yogin includes among evil deeds, failure to alleviate the suffering of fellow-men while one is capable of doing

புனிதன் பொற்கழல் ஈசனெனுங்கனி

இனிது சாலவு மேசற்றவர்கட்கே

—Appar

Cf. the concern for others’ spiritual welfare expressed in the lines

ஆக்கைக்கே இரைதேடி அலமந்து

காக்கைக்கே இரையாகிக் கழிவரே

—Appar

and the way of salvation suggested

கற்றுக்கொள்வன வாயுள நாவுள

இட்டுக்கொள்வன பூவுள நீருள

கற்றைச் செஞ்சடையானுளன் நாமுனோம்

எற்றுக்கோ நமனூல் முனிவுண்டதே

—Appar

34. Schomerus, p. 430.

34a. The Christian Message to the Hindu, p. 80: See footnote 35 on the following page.

it. It is clear that the Siddhāntin considers omission to do a good deed here as serious as commission of a bad deed. Not merely should one refrain from doing evil to others; one must also do good to them and help them by alleviating their suffering. We know the operation of the moral law only in a general way. We do not know enough to determine whether one's suffering is the result of one's past or not. So, it is the obvious duty of one to go to the succour of one's fellowmen in distress. If one's best efforts fail, and nothing more could be done—then and only then, perhaps one could reconcile oneself to the situation in terms of the *prārabdha* of the sufferer. Besides, there is no warrant for taking all suffering to be evil. The lives of saints and sages afford ample testimony to their ministry to human welfare and their being moved to merciful interference on behalf of suffering humanity.

Again, if the doctrine of karma means that it is impossible for men really to help one another, why do the Scriptures, no less than the popular ethical works enjoin service to fellow-men as our highest duty?³⁵

Āṇava :

Āṇava is eternal and beginningless. It is as connate to the souls as verdigris is to copper. It is the primal bondage for the souls. If *āṇava* is removed, the souls will be restored to their essential nature as intelligences. *Āṇava* is one; but by virtue of its infinite capacities, it thwarts the cognitive, conative and affective functions of the souls. Śivāgra yogin gives the following syllogism :

This mala is a substance,
because it has many energies,
like fire.

35. Dr. A. G. Hogg in his *The Christian Message to the Hindu*, gives the Christian solution of the problem contrasting it with the Hindu solution in the following words. 'The Hindu declaration is: There is no problem, for there is no undeserved suffering'. The truly Christian declaration is: 'There is no problem, for it is right that there should be undeserved suffering'. Again 'Fundamental to the *karma*-transmigration idea is the moral pre-supposition that individually unmerited suffering would be an iniquitous phenomenon, and is, therefore, inconceivable in any Universe that deserves to be called a moral order. Now my submission is that the fundamental Christian presupposition is the precise opposite; that individually unmerited suffering, so far from being a mysterious ethical anomaly, is precisely what cosmic justice requires in any Universe into which sin has entered'. p. 76.

What is the means of affirming the existence of āṇava? Is it perception or inference or verbal testimony?³⁶ Since āṇava is beyond the ken of the sense organs, it cannot be perception. We see fire and smoke in the kitchen. When we see a mountain pervaded by smoke, we infer the presence of fire. We do not have similar probans to establish āṇava. So āṇava cannot be established by inference. Verbal testimony, when it is opposed to perception and inference, cannot be accepted. Thus one might seek to maintain that there is no means of recognising āṇava. But the Siddhāntin says that āṇava can be established by inference and verbal testimony supported by inference.

The soul is a being with its omniscience obscured by something,

because it is a being with limited knowledge.

The soul whose omniscience is unobscured by something cannot be a being with limited knowledge, like Śiva.

We may note here that the inference proceeds upon a negative example since a positive one would beg the question.

Śivajñāna yogin argues that since the soul is eternal and pervasive, its attribute also must be eternal and pervasive.³⁷ If we find the soul's intelligence manifest sometimes and not at other times, if we find it parviscient, these conditions must be due to an external factor; and that factor is āṇava.³⁸

36. The discussion is found in Śivāgra yogin's commentary.

37. If the soul be subject to change and destruction, deeds done would perish and deeds not done would accrue. Such a view will conflict with the characteristics of karma already dealt with. Besides, the new-born babe is seen to reach for its mother's milk knowing that it will satisfy its hunger. This would not be the case were it not for the impressions of the karma of a previous life. So the soul is eternal. Now, an eternal thing cannot have parts and be limited and subject to destruction. So it must be pervasive. Since the attributes are not different from substance, the soul's intelligence also must be eternal and pervasive, if the soul is eternal and pervasive.

38. கோதற்ற முத்தியென்பதேது விடிலென்றே
குறித்திடி லவ்வாணவமாங் கூறுங்காலே—

...Śivaneṭiprakāsam, Verse 4

This stanza summarises the Siddhānta view. 'If there is nothing to obstruct their intelligence, souls will not be subject to sorrows and brāhs; they will not be finite intelligences: they will be omniscient and omnipotent; they will be of the nature of intelligences and be like Śiva Himself.'

It may be said that without recognising āpava, we may take limited knowledge to be natural to the soul, just as omniscience is natural to Śiva. In that case, how can there be omniscience for the soul at and after release? If it is said that there is no omniscience for the soul at release, what is the difference between bondage and release? The view that there is no omniscience for the soul at all is opposed to verbal testimony. So parvi-science cannot be natural to the soul.

A more radical view can be taken that ignorance found in the souls is their special quality. But if ignorance be an attribute of the souls, inertness would result for the soul's intelligence. Inertness cannot be accepted for the soul's intelligence, for if it is accepted, there will be no point in speaking of enjoyment and release for the souls. It may be argued again that defect exists in a thing just as its quality exists, as in the blind eye. But mere existence of a defect in a thing cannot warrant it to be a quality of that thing. If one person is blind, it does not mean that blindness is a quality of every one's eyes. Ignorance is a quality, not of the soul but of āpava.

Is ignorance caused by āpava, the opposite of knowledge or the non-existence of knowledge or a different kind of knowledge or what obscures knowledge? If ignorance is the opposite of knowledge, then, if there is ignorance there cannot be knowledge at all and vice versa. If, like light and darkness, ignorance is the non-existence of knowledge, what is non-existent cannot do anything. It will be like the non-existence of a pot. Is this non-existence (i) prior non-existence or (ii) posterior non-existence or (iii) eternal non-existence or (iv) mutual non-existence? If the first, there should be no knowledge at the beginning but only later. If the second, there should be knowledge at the beginning but not later; if the third, the soul can never have knowledge and will be like the pot or the wall. If the fourth, because there is no apprehension of the counter-correlate, it is defective reasoning (thus): For reciprocal non-existence, there must be apprehension of both terms viz., knowledge and ignorance. If there is knowledge, there can be no ignorance. Thus there can be no apprehension of the counter-correlate. Śivajñāna yogin urges further that if non-existence be taken to be posterior or eternal or mutual, all these varieties of ignorance being ever indestructible, there would be no release at all. To avoid conflict with scriptural declarations which warrant release, non-existence must be taken

to be prior non-existence. If so, what is the cause of the prior non-existence of eternal knowledge? That is the connate impurity (*āṇava*). If ignorance is a different kind of knowledge (i.e., erroneous knowledge), without defect there cannot be erroneous knowledge. If it is maintained that there can be erroneous knowledge without defect, then, is this fortuitous or natural? If it is fortuitous, it cannot affect the eternal intelligence; if natural, never can souls have true knowledge. The error consisting in cognising nacre as silver does not affect the cognition of silver. If ignorance is what obscures knowledge, *āṇava* affirmed by the *Siddhāntin* is established. Karma cannot be said to obscure all the souls; for, as resident in *buddhi* in *aśuddhādhvā* and remaining in *adhomāyā* during *pralaya*, it cannot be in any relation to the residents of *śuddhādhvā*. Karma cannot be the cause of obscuration and the means of enjoyment at once.

Instead of accepting *āṇava*, it may be said the products of *māyā* can be taken as obscuring the souls. The *Siddhāntin* says that *māyā* stands apart from the souls, informing their cognitive, conative and affective activities. *Āṇava*, on the other hand, exists together with the souls and obscures their threefold activities. The difference between *māyā* and *āṇava* is really great and it is wrong to ascribe the functions of the one to the other. The objector may argue thus: clouds obscure the radiance of the sun and the moment they lift, sunlight becomes manifest. Even so, when *māyā* (its products) leaves the souls, the real nature of the soul becomes manifest. The *Siddhāntin* cannot accept this view. For, according to him, it is the products of *māyā* which help the partial manifestation of the cognitive, conative and affective activities of the soul. Without body, organs etc., the souls do not have cognition, conation and affection. So, while *āṇava* obscures, *māyā* illumines; while *āṇava* thwarts, *māyā* helps. *Āṇava* and *māyā* differ from each other in respect of their function as much as light differs from darkness.

We may notice here the Advaitin's view that *avidyā* removes *avidyā*. The examples usually given are the forest fire burning up the forest and burning itself out in the process, and the powder of the clearing nut settling down along with the dust which it causes to come down, in making dirty water clear. In Saint Rāmānjan's language: "When we run a thorn in our hand, we take it out by means of another thorn and throw out both". So relative knowledge alone can remove that relative ignorance which blinds the

eye of the self. But such knowledge and such ignorance are both included in avidyā ; hence the man who attains to the highest knowledge (jñāna), the knowledge of the Absolute, does away in the end with both knowledge and ignorance, being free himself from all duality.³⁹

It may be thought that the Advaitin achieves duality of function with unity of entity ; while the Siddhāntin recognises two entities—āṇava and māyā. The Siddhāntin feels that there is something other than āṇava (which obscures), to bring about partial manifestation of the soul's intelligence. Māyā is a sort of lamp which dispels, however partially, the darkness caused by āṇava. The Siddhāntin has this in common with the Advaitin that he treats māyā also (along with āṇava and karma) as pāśa and, in the last resort all the three are treated as one in so far as they bind the soul.

We may notice another similarity. Both the Advaitin and the Siddhāntin view ignorance as positive (bhāva rūpa). The Advaitin considers avidyā to be positive because it is not mere absence of knowledge but the positive assertion of something else as knowledge. Though he thus recognises avidyā to be positive, he never accepts it as more than phenomenal.

To the objection that avidyā is not positive but negative, the Advaitin replies with the question : If ignorance is wholly negative, how could it be known to exist ? Perception cannot be the means of knowing it, because the alleged object being wholly negative, cannot be in contact with the senses or anything for that matter. If absence of knowledge is taken to be an attribute of the self, there is the difficulty that an attribute can be perceived only in a substrate that is in the field of perception ; and the self which is self-luminous is not an object of perception. Even were inference possible, the knowledge that it could give would only be mediate, while our experience of ignorance is immediate in the form, "I did not know nacre ; but now I know". Moreover, as inference is based on perceived concomitance, it is not possible where perception is excluded. Neither could non-cognition apply since the knowledge that it can give is again mediate. Besides, non-cognition avails only where perception or some other means of cognition is possible. There can be no cognition of non-existence,

39. The *Brahma Sūtras* (415-20, published by the Advaita Āsrama.

except where the substrate of non-existence is capable of being perceived. As a matter of fact, we have experience both of ignorance and of its removal by knowledge. Hence ignorance is both positive and indeterminable like nacre silver.⁴⁰

How does āṇava function? In the kevala state, the soul's cognitive, conative and affective functions are entirely thwarted by āṇava. The soul is, in the kevala state, like the eye opened in intense darkness. How could āṇava obscure the pervasive soul? Because āṇava also is pervasive, obscuration is possible. How could āṇava which is inert obscure the soul which is intelligent? There is beginningless conjunction between the soul and āṇava. The capacities of āṇava are the obscuring impurities for souls. Non-inert things can be affected only by inert things. Īśvara is no limitation for the soul. If we say that one finite soul affects another finite soul, we must accept that in release the soul that affects will be destroyed. For, whatever affects the soul, the destruction of that is the release of the soul. Is the soul's Intelligence.—Energy, covered by āṇava or is it made non-luminous? If we say that āṇava causes non-luminosity, there should be destruction of the luminous when made non-luminous. Since the Intelligence Energy is pervasive, there can be no obscuration; because it is eternally luminous, there can be no non-luminosity. As fire in the presence of a certain gem or because of mantras and herbs, fails to burn in the usual way, though it blazes forth, the soul's Intelligence Energy thwarted by the very proximity of āṇava will exist, but fail to call forth cognitive, conative and affective activities. Thus the obscuration caused by mala is its *presence* (or proximity) (*sanni dhāna viśeṣa*) to the soul.⁴¹

A difficulty arises. The soul's Intelligence Energy was said to be of the form of the seer. It is not so when there is no cognitive or other activity. Apart from being cogniser and agent, there is no activity at all. How can āṇava be said to thwart the tendency to act or cognise if there is no Intelligence Energy apart from the state of being cogniser or agent?

These cognitive and conative energies are not the soul's Intelligence Energy. What is of the nature of the supreme entity, — that is

40. This account of the Advaita follows closely the language of the introduction to the Bhāmātī (pp. XXIX, XXX, Bhāmātī Catuṣṣūtrī T. P. H.)

41. Śaiva Siddhanta Paribhāṣa, p. 59,

the soul's Intelligence Energy. Cognition and conation are generated as inseparable from that Intelligence Energy. These which are the effects are thwarted by āṇava.

Another doubt is raised. If self-intuition is self-abiding, there should be for unhindered self-abiding intelligence the recollection of itself as cogniser and cognised in respect of itself. Since this is not perceived, perhaps āṇava obscures the intuition of the self itself? No, says the Siddhāntin. Though the eye is of the nature of luminosity, it is able to perceive objects only with the help of the light of the sun etc. Even so, though the soul is of the nature of the eternal and pervasive Intelligence Energy, it cannot, in the perception of sense objects, function without the help of kalās etc. which are the products of māyā and it cannot without the help given by Śiva's Parāśakti attain self-intuition. Intelligence Energy in the absence of kalās and Śiva's Parāśakti is like the eye in the dark which neither loses its luminosity nor has perception of objects.

In the sakala state āṇava and its seven products play their part. The seven are: (1) moha (delusion that prevents avoidance of things known to be bad through the preceptor and scriptures), (2) mada (conceit-thinking of oneself as superior to all others), (3) rāga (having desire for unattainable objects), (4) viṣāda (despondency as the result of separation from things once possessed), (5) soṣā (grieving at separation from members of one's family or pining caused by the fear that there may be none to take care of one's family after one's death) (6) vaicitriya (wrongly assuming acts to be done by oneself or others without realising that they occur in accordance with karma) and (7) harṣa (joy induced by one's children and friends and the feeling that one is not wanting in anything). When souls turn away from experiencing the fruits of their deeds, it is āṇava which turns them that way again so that they may experience and work out their karma.

Relation between the three malas: Karma, māyā and āṇava, like sprout, bran and husk, hide the real nature of the soul and delude it. They cause enjoyment (of pleasure and pain), embodiment (with which to experience pleasure and pain) and the state of being the enjoyer. Together with these three malas, there are two others which bind the soul. Karma causes enjoyment. Even as the capacity of the grain to sprout causes the sprout, karma exists as the first cause and causes pleasure and pain to the

souls. Māyā causes embodiment. As the bran helps the sprout to grow, māyā manifests its products like body and organs so that souls may be enabled to experience pleasure and pain. Āṇava causes the state of being the enjoyer. Just as the husk is the instrumental cause of the sprout, āṇava maintains the souls so that they may experience pleasure and pain.

Two other malas are: (i) the products of māyā which are the locus for all the pleasures and pains and which make the cognitive, conative and affective activities of the soul partial and (ii) Śiva's obscuring Energy, called Tirodhāna Śakti, which impels each of the malas to its respective function and brings about the ripening of all the three. Though the products of māyā can be subsumed under māyā, they are reckoned as a separate mala because of differences in their binding the soul. Śivaśakti which helps these malas can be subsumed under Parāśakti. But because of difference in function it is figuratively reckoned as a different mala.

Tirodhāna is so-called by great ones because it prevents intuiting of the self and the Lord. Why should Śiva's Energy (which is said to be Pati substance) be referred to here as pāśa? If we enquire into the nature of this Energy, we shall find that though as what is inherent in Pati, it is Pati substance, it is figuratively called pāśa because it impels mala to function.

The objection may be brought forward that Tirodhāna Śakti is enough to obscure the soul's intelligence and that āṇava is superfluous. The answer is that only the inert can affect the intelligent. This inert mala requires to be impelled by Tirodhāna Śakti.

CHAPTER V

PAŚU—SOUL

Existence :

The Siddhāntin takes up the views of the other schools of Indian Philosophy in regard to the soul and by criticising them leads the way to his own view.

Some maintain that the soul is a void. If the soul be a void, what is it that says so? The physical body is taken to be the soul by some others. This cannot be, for there is something which, existing in the body, claims things as “I” and “mine.” Neither can the sense organs be the soul for, there is not only cognition but conation and affection also. If the subtle body be taken to be the soul, we must remember that dream experiences are sought to be re-interpreted and related to waking life. The vital air cannot be the soul for there is no experience of pleasure and pain in sleep though vital air functions in that state. Some say that Brahman is the soul.¹ This cannot be true because the souls have knowledge only as subject to the five states. The aggregate of everything may be claimed to be the soul. But this claim also cannot be established. The soul continues to exist in the turiyā. Ita state when it is devoid of everything (the sense organs, etc.). So the soul residing in the body is different from all these.

The Siddhāntin proceeds to examine these views in detail. The pūrva pakṣin asks how the Siddhāntin can say that souls exist as different from the body they occupy, when their very existence is denied by some? The Siddhāntin replies that if there is no counter-correlate like ‘that’ there cannot be ‘that is not.’

1. The words of the text are ‘அஞ்சுவதெதப்படும்’. With the exception of Śivajñāna yogin, the others say that the reference is to the five states of the soul.

Maṇijñāna Deśīkar and Nīrambavaḷagiār say that the five states are : (i) waking state, (ii) dream state, (iii) sleep, (iv) turiya and (v) turiyātita and add that the state natural to the soul is turiyātita when it is free from all delimiting adjuncts.

Jñānaprakāśar's comments are interesting. The Lokāyata denies the existence of souls. The Siddhāntin's reply is that the subject of a judgment cannot be absolutely non-existent. No predication can be made of what is totally non-existent. The very act of denial implies the existence of the subject of the judgment. The Lokāyata may retort: Does not the Siddhāntin deny horns of a hare on the ground of their total non-existence? Yes, replies the Siddhāntin. Denial here is not of the absolutely non-existent but of horns as found in cows etc., in relation to hare. Here, the subject of the judgment is not absolutely non-existent. It is because we know what horns are that we proceed to deny them of a hare.

Śivajñāna yogin states an objection: if souls are said to exist, because denial of their existence really implies their existence, can we not similarly infer the existence of hare's horns on the ground of their denial? He proceeds to state the reply. Even those who deny the existence of a soul do not *merely* deny. They indicate the body, sense-organs etc., deny that any of these is the soul and conclude that there is nothing like a soul. But that which exists as different from all these and denies their title to be considered soul, is the soul.

This reminds us of the celebrated argument of Descartes. The very act of doubting implies the doubter—not merely, as Descartes said, *Cogito ergo Sum*—I think, therefore, I am; but as one gathers from the nature of his argument, *dubito ergo sum*—I doubt, therefore, I exist. One cannot doubt one's existence and not exist at all. One exists atleast in the act of doubting.

Can we not say that the physical body itself cognises thus? Granting that there is something which cognises, it is not found elsewhere than in the physical body which is a combination of elements. Though the elements are inert, we have the emergence of intelligence from their combination, even as we have red colour from the combination of areca nuts, betel leaves and lime. It is the physical body that is referred to as oneself in judgments like 'I am lean', 'I am fat', 'I am a man' etc. So the soul is really the physical body.

The Siddhāntin does not accept this argument. He points to the use of language as in 'my body' where the body is claimed as its own by something other than the body. Though in state-

ments like 'I am a man' 'I am fat' etc., the qualities of the body are figuratively ascribed to the soul, we never come across statements like 'I am my body', 'I am my hand' etc. The soul is what claims things as 'my leg', 'my hand' etc., existing different from them, even as it claims objects other than the physical body as 'my house', 'my wife' etc. The Siddhāntin urges the Lokāyata to press forward with his enquiry. Before the Lokāyata read works bearing on his system, he took objects external to himself as his self. After reading his system, he realises that external objects are not the soul and that his body is the soul. Without stopping here, let him proceed with his enquiry and he will realise that even his body is not his soul.

Besides, if the physical body itself can cognise, a corpse which is not deficient in any member of the body must also be able to cognise. This is not the case. It may be suggested that with the stopping of vital air, cognition ceases. This fails to prove the point because there is no cognition in sleep even though vital air functions.

It may be suggested that the five sense-organs constitute the soul. They 'cognise' in the waking state, cease to cognise in the sleep state and decay when death overtakes the physical body. This view is rejected by the Siddhāntin. Even in the waking state, the sense-organs function in respect of one thing at a time and not of all things at once. If it is said that it is their nature to perceive things one by one, we must remember that in addition to this, each sense-organ perceives only what it is capable of perceiving—not the objects of other sense-organs also. There is something which cognises objects through the respective sense-organs. That something is the soul.

A particular sect of the Lokāyatas, committed to the view that the sense-organs are the soul say that the soul also does not cognise in sleep. To the Siddhāntin's reply that 'mala prevents the soul's cognition', they are ready with the rejoinder that the sense-organs are subject to the defect of *tamas*. They say that each sense-organ perceives its respective object and that all the sense-organs taken together are the soul. The Siddhāntin replies that just as five people coming to one place from different places are sure to differ sometime, all the sense-organs together cannot perceive the same object. If they perceive each separately, they cease to be the soul in respect of anyone thing at a given time.

Śivāgra yogin states the difficulties of the view that the sense-organs are the soul thus: The aggregate of the five sense-organs cannot be the soul because each organ can perceive only its respective object. Besides, there is the contingency of each organ trying to perceive every object and the fight that would follow might affect the integrity of the soul. Nor can each sense-organ be said to perceive with the help of the rest, for that way each would cease to be primary and nothing would be achieved. The Indriyātmaikadeśavādin holds that all the five sense-organs are five different souls! As the several birds dwelling in a tree eat the fruits thereof, these sense-organs exist in one body and perceive objects. But this is unsound. 'Ātman' means 'knower'. It must know all. Since the object of one sense-organ cannot be perceived by another nor one sense-organ itself perceive another, nor one sense-organ itself be perceived by another, none of these can be the soul. It may be asked why, if the soul can cognise everything, it does not cognise everything at the same time. The reason is that the soul which is bound by āṇava is subject to the five states. Its capacity thus limited, the soul becomes incapable of cognising every thing at the same time.

The view that vital air can be taken as the soul is examined next. Vital air is said to be the soul cognising through the sense-organs. Without inhaling and exhaling, there cannot be cognition. There is no cognition in sleep because the instruments required for it are not there. The Siddhāntin finds this a poor argument. If vital air is the agent in cognition, its instruments will not be absent while it continues to persist. So it is the soul which cognises and which controls the inhaling and exhaling of breath.

If the internal organs like manas and citta be said to be the soul because they cognise, we must remember that like the sense-organs, they too cannot cognise each other. The soul is different from these. It is bound by āṇava which is the cause of egoism. It is unable to cognise things by itself and, so it associates itself with the internal organs. It controls them and impels them to function within, cognising what happens there in the dream state. In the waking state, it unites them with the external organs to cognise what happens without. Being limited by āṇava and being united to these organs constitute the definition *per accidens* of the soul.

Śivāgra yogin splits up the argument that the internal organs are the soul into two—one is that each of the internal organs is

the soul; the other is, that the aggregate is the soul. He proceeds to examine the contention that each organ is the soul. If each internal organ be the soul, then, there may or may not be co-operation between all the organs in the cognition of an object. Co-operation will not be obligatory but accidental. If each perceived a different object, then there would be no clear cognition of a single object. Since there is clear cognition of objects these organs must be subordinate to something else whose instruments they are. That something is the soul.

The aggregate of the internal organs cannot be the soul on the analogy of the several constituents of a lamp producing light, for each has a definite function. But this criticism is unsatisfactory. In the case of a lamp, the oil, wick etc., have—each its separate function but all produce light. The ahaṅkāra etc., have different functions and that therefore their aggregate cannot constitute the soul is not illustrated by the example. For the example, if anything, only serves to confirm the pūrva-pakṣin's view. The other commentators instead of splitting up the argument into two parts like this, present the intelligible view that since these internal organs do not cognise each other (and do not know that they do their respective functions) there is a soul different from these.²

Before examining the next view, the Siddhāntin proceeds to show how intimately the internal organs are related to the soul. Manas, buddhi, ahaṅkāra and citta are the instruments for cognising an object. They associate themselves so intimately with the soul that they themselves appear to be the soul. They are to the soul what the lamp is to the eye. When they are realised to be instruments and further enquiry is made regarding the nature of the agent using these instruments, we are on the way to an understanding of the self. The intelligence which makes this enquiry is the soul's intelligence. Those who seek to know the source of the soul's intelligence find Śiva's intelligence as existing over and above the soul's intelligence. By knowing the soul and the Lord, internal organs are seen to be mere instruments—not agents.

2. Jñānaprakāśar states the Siddhānta thus; That which is different from the internal organs and says "I" by means of its self-knowing intelligence and "my citta", "my manas" etc., by means of its other-knowing intelligence is the soul,

The knowledge we have with the aid of *manas* etc., which are products of *māyā*, is *pāśa jñāna*. *Paśu jñāna* is knowing the self to be other than the internal organs. This is preliminary to *pati-jñāna* where the soul's intelligence is informed by Śiva's intelligence. *Paśu jñāna* is not release because the discrimination of the soul from the internal organs is obtained through *kalā*, *vidyā* etc. There is a stage beyond this, viz., *pati-jñāna*, as we saw just now. In this stage, the soul has got rid of *kalās* etc., and *āṇava*. There is the onset of the Lord's *Paraśakti*. The soul's intelligence, now made efficient by the removal of *mala* and by the presence of the Lord's intelligence, is able to find itself and everything.³

The *Siddhāntin* proceeds to give further details about the internal organs. *Ahaṅkāra*, *buddhi*, *manas*, *citta* and particular cognitive states become instruments of cognition only as impelled by "a", "u", "m", *bindu* and *nāda* respectively. The aggregate of these letters is "Om". The changes in consciousness induced by these letters are comparable to the constant ebb and flow of waves in the sea. Those who know the origin of the four kinds of speech like *sūkṣmā*, supported by the five *kalās*, like *nivṛti*, understand the instruments of cognition to be of the nature aforesaid.

"A", "u", "m", *bindu* and *nāda* are controlled by *Brahmā*, *Viṣṇu*, *Hara*, *Maheśvāra* and *Sadāśiva*. The soul can cognise only if it unites with the five internal organs, the five letters and the five deities. Otherwise it would remain non-intelligent like inert things. This is known to those who practise yoga by controlling the two powerful vital airs.

Śivāgra yogin explains the matter thus: Just as a doll is put through several movements by being manipulated with a string, these deities control the internal organs through the letters. Cannot the internal organs function by themselves? No; they are inert: they cannot function without an intelligence informing them. Thus they require an agent. Yogic perception reveals

3. Śivāgra yogin: To the objection that *paśu jñāna* cannot be a half-way house, as it were, between *pati jñāna* and *pāśa jñāna*, the *Siddhāntin* replies that although *mala* is removed in the *tattvas* below *śuddhā-vidyā* and above *māyā*, its residual impressions affect both the soul that is known and *Cit-Śakti* that knows it. Through the realisation of the self, the way is paved for *pati jñāna*. According to *Jñānaprakāśar*, *pati jñāna* consists in relating the self which is illumined by Śivaśakti and which is of the nature of Śivaśakti, as one with Śiva, by making it Śiva.

the activity of the internal organs. Yogic perception reveals the soul which is of the nature of intelligence. It can be achieved by controlling the breath⁴ (inhaling and exhaling) and holding external objects under control.

Having given a detailed account of the internal organs, the Siddhāntin takes up for examination the view that the soul is the aggregate of many things. If this view is accepted, there will arise the difficulty that an aggregate is no one thing in particular but a number of things. If the soul is such an aggregate, it will cease to be an entity and become a number of things. The soul knows these things. The knower and known are not one. Hence the soul is different from the several things that it knows.

Śivāgra yogin and Jñānaprakāśar examine this view in greater detail. The view refuted is as follows: Vijñāna skandha (consciousness-aggregate), saṃskāra skandha (the aggregate of innate impressions), vedanā skandha (the affection aggregate) samjñā skandha (symbol aggregate) and rūpa skandha (perception aggregate) are non-different from buddhi which is cognition-series. Hence the aggregate of the five skandhas can be taken to be the soul just as collection of trees, shrubs etc., is taken to be forest. The Siddhāntin does not accept this argument. In enquiring about rūpa etc., we find the eye, buddhi which existing apart from the eye determines objects and the cognition "I know the object"—are all different from one another. The soul is different from the skandhas and is an eternal intelligence. Moreover, there is no such thing as an aggregate without something to reside in it.

Before we proceed to examine whether the existence of the soul has been established, we shall state the syllogism given by Śivajñāna yogin and state the position of the Sāṅkhya.

This body has a soul which is different from a void etc., because it has knowledge.

Whatever does not have a soul, has no knowledge like a pot. This is a negative inference. The Siddhāntin's attempt is to

4. Jñānaprakāśar explains the process thus: When exhaling (a) and inhaling (u) are stopped and breath is restrained within, *m* appears. Then all bonds are strapped; and uniting with Śiva, the soul remains as intelligence and has self-conscious perception.

infer the unseen soul from the seen body even as he infers the unseen God from the seen world."

The Śāṅkhya proves the existence of soul thus: "Spirit exists (as distinct from matter), since collocations serve a purpose of some (being) other than themselves, since this other must be the reverse of (what is composed of) the three constituents and so on, since there must be control (of the collocations), since there must be an enjoyer, and since there is activity for the purpose of release (from threefold misery)".⁶

Bradley states the view that the self is not apparent but quite real and undertakes an enquiry to find whether it is not 'a mere appearance—something which is given and in a sense most certainly exists but which is too full of contradiction to be the genuine fact'.⁷ He says he is forced to embrace the conclusion that it is an appearance. Bradley merely mentions the view that the self is the body before he takes up other views. What is the self? Is it the total content of experience? But we have far too much of content and there seems to be no principle of unity. Is it the constant *average* content of experience? It cannot be, for it is not possible to strike an average where each mental content is unique, and is unlike mathematical units or quantities. Shall we say that what is essential among the contents is the self? But this does not help, as it is difficult to distinguish what is essential from what is not essential. Neither can we take the essential to be what does not change, for that would leave us with a mere point. Even the suggestion that what one is interested in constitutes the self is untenable because one's interests change from time to time. Our sense of personal identity may help us to get us out of our difficulty. But in what does one's personal identity consist? If it is physical, have we any right to say that our body persists just the same, all the time? As for psychical continuity, clearly there are breaks—as in sleep, lapses of memory

5. The view that Brahman is the soul was mentioned earlier. It is not discussed in detail in this context. Śivajñāna yogin has examined it in his *Māpāḍiyam*, (pp. 298–300). Without instruments, organs etc., the soul is totally without knowledge in the kevalāvastha; in the sakalāvastha it knows only through the instruments. Hence the soul is different from Brahman Who, without changes in state like these, ever knows all things as they are.

6. The Śāṅkhya Kārikā, p. 47.

7. Appearance and Reality, p. 64.

etc. In the opposition between self and not-self, one may see a ray of hope. But there is no clear line of demarcation between the self and the not-self. *Feeling* may be said to reveal to us what the self is. We find however, that feeling as such is neither self, nor not-self. The reality of feeling itself is far from certain. If self-consciousness is suggested, we find that consciousness of the self gives us a diversity without a unity. Besides, self-consciousness is in the relational form as involving subject and object, and therefore cannot be real. The will is not the self, because it does not explain the problems of change, causation etc. The conception of the self as monad does not help, because the monad, being a simple substance, cannot by its very nature admit of changes. But it is said to change. How this happens in the simple substance is far from clear. Having thus argued that the self is not real, but an appearance, when Bradley proceeds to say emphatically that sentient experience is reality and what is not this is not real,⁸ one wonders where one is to get at sentient experience if the finite self is 'condemned as an appearance'. Bradley's phrases, describing the finite self as a "wretched fraction" and "poor atom" haunt our memory and now we find that this "wretched fraction" and "poor atom" is to be the whole of reality. The stone that the builders rejected has become the corner-stone! It is rather difficult to understand how the self which was considered too flimsy even to bear its own weight, so to speak, can now be made co-extensive with the whole of reality, though it may not be called the self in this context. Bradley himself testifies: "My way of contact with Reality is through the felt this.....Everything beyond, though not less real, is an expansion of the common essence which we feel burningly in this one focus".⁹ Yet this focus is an appearance!

One feels similarly that when the Advaitin interprets the mahāvākya, Tat tvam asi in such a way as to deny ultimate reality to the human soul, the whole point of the declaration seems to be obliterated. While one is hesitant to criticise master-minds which favour a monistic (or if the term is preferred, non-dualistic) interpretation, it is only fair to remember other interpretations favouring a pluralist standpoint. The Siddhāntin certainly treats the mahāvākya with great respect. But he will

8. Appearance and Reality, p. 126.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 260.

understand by it essential similarity (even this within limits and for a certain purpose) and not substantial identity. Tirumūlar has a number of verses to indicate the meaning of the mahāvākya and as his work is considered as one of the major Siddhānta classics, these verses may be taken to represent the Siddhāntin's view.

Plurality of souls :

When the Vedas declare the existence of one soul only, how can the Siddhāntin speak of a plurality of souls? The Siddhāntin replies that the Vedas declare the Lord of souls to be one, not that there is only one soul.

Śivāgra yogin says that this doubt is raised by the Advaitin. The Advaitin asks how we can know the existence of a plurality of souls. Is it by sense—perception or inference? The Siddhāntin's reply is that plurality is established by sense-perception, inference and verbal testimony. Each individual has the cognition 'I exist.' Besides, souls are many, because births and deaths are witnessed differently.

It may be objected that origin and death are with regard to the body and not with regard to the soul. The Siddhāntin says that birth and death are witnessed of the soul as united to the *liṅga-śarīra*. The gross body of the form of 'anna' (matter) is a derivative, being the product of *liṅga-śarīra*. Non-eternality is with regard to the gross body. *Liṅga-śarīra* accompanies the soul up to release, enters the womb with the soul and leaves the body when the soul leaves it. Therefore, origin and destruction are spoken of the soul taken along with the *liṅga-śarīra*.

It may be said that the soul which is the dweller in the *liṅga-śarīra* has no birth, that the gross body alone has birth. But then there will be no intelligence for that body. Because even new-born babes have intelligence along with their body, the *liṅga-śarīra* has its origin along with intelligence. The cause of the differences between the souls is this *liṅga-śarīra* which has differences of birth and death. Because we accept the origin and death of the *liṅga-śarīra* which is the inherent cause of the gross body, sense-organs etc., and which persists up to release, the origin and death of the soul which is defined by that *liṅga-śarīra* are also acceptable.

The objector says that the *liṅga-śarīra* does not persist up to release, that it is non-existent. But the Siddhāntin replies that the eternally non-existent, like the sky-lotus cannot come into existence. The eternally existent is imperishable. Therefore the *liṅga-śarīra* is existent and non-existent (*sadasat*), existent because it persists up to release, non-existent because it ceases to be after release; likewise, for the soul as defined by the *liṅga-śarīra* (not in its own nature). Because there are birth and death for the *liṅga-śarīra* of each soul, it is not proper to advocate *Ekātmavāda*.¹⁰

The objector suggests that the *liṅga-śarīras* which are of the form of *māyā* are many but the soul one, just as *ākāśa* which is one is found in many different vessels. The Siddhāntin replies that the example is inappropriate. *Ākāśa* found in the many vessels is of a single form, while the intelligence inspiring the many *liṅga-śarīras* is not so. We see at one and the same time, one person having a desire for food, another for travel, a third for sleep; one is characterised by ignorance, another by wisdom, a third by non-attachment, fourth by attachment to objects and so on. It cannot be that one and the same person has opposed and multifarious activities. Thus it is patent that souls are many. It is unsound not to accept differences of souls established by arguments. Besides, Śiva is the creator of products like sprout etc. Because Śiva is pervasive and eternally contented, it is evident that He has not created the Universe consisting of plants etc.,

10. Cf. the following verses of *Śivanegīprakāśam* which set forth the Siddhānta on these points:

ஈசனையு முலகினையு மன்றி வேறே
எண்ணிலுயிர் உண்டென்ப தெவ்வாறென்னின்
மாசதனாற் சிற்றறிவாய் வினைகள் செய்து
வரம்பிகந்த தேகங்கள் மன்னிவேறாய்
ஏசியே நீ நானென்றியம்பலாலும்
எய்து சுகதுக்கத்தின் பேதத்தானும்
தேசறிவுஞ் சிற்றறிவு மாதலாலுஞ்
சிற்றுயிர்களனேகமாம் தேறிலின்னும்
மண்ணாதி யாக்கிய திங்காருக்காக
மற்றதற்கே யெனிற் சடமாமன்றியு மாநிலமேல்
உண்ணாது தன்னைத்தான் ஒருபொருளுமிறைக்கே
உறுமென்னில் பூரணா லுண்டிடவேண்டுவதில்
நண்ணாதிங் கெவர்க்கும் அரன் திருவினையாட்டேயென்னில்
ஞானவுருவோன் பயத்தை நாடாது புரியான்
எண்ணாது நியுரைத்தாய் பரிசேடத்தாலே
எண்ணிலுயிர் இருவினையால் இறை புரிவானென்னே

for His own enjoyment. It may be said that prithivī etc., have been created, each for the enjoyment of the other. They are inert and hence they are the enjoyed rather than the enjoyer. The Lord is omniscient and He will not create without a purpose. By thus excluding God and the material world, we establish the existence of souls that know the bodies that are the locus of enjoyment.

The Sāṅkhya argues for plurality thus:¹¹ "The plurality of spirits certainly follows from the distributive (nature) of the incidence of birth and death and of (the endowment of) the instruments (of cognition and conation), from (bodies) engaging in action, not all at the same time and also from differences in (the proportion of) the three constituents".¹²

But is the pluralist right? It is misleading to refer to Western Pluralism in this connection for, as will be shown in the last chapter of this work, it differs from the Siddhānta in some important respects. But still, it will be useful if we notice briefly the stand taken by one or two prominent Western writers and the general criticism of pluralism. James Ward says, "The whole world is made up of individuals each distinguished by its characteristic behaviour."¹³ Again, "At the outset, this world immediately confronts us not as one Mind, nor even as the manifestation of one, but as an objective whole in which we discern many minds in mutual interaction".¹⁴ This position differs from that of Leibniz who also recognises plurality but not interaction among the different entities. Ward quotes with approval Edward Caird who says, "It may be truly said that we find ourselves in others before we find ourselves in ourselves and that the full consciousness of self comes only through the consciousness of beings without us who are also selves".¹⁵

Examining the case for pluralism in a Symposium, Dr. Mahadevan says, 'The pluralists bank on immediate experience as pro-

11. Professor Hiriyanna who does not accept plurality of souls says 'In themselves, it is hard to see how the puruṣas can differ from one another. There is not even a semblance of expansion here as in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, where each self is stated to be inherently characterised by its own viśeṣa.' *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 280.

12. *The Sāṅkhya Kārika*, p. 5 .

13. *The Realm of Ends*, p. 51

14. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

15. *Op. cit.*, pp. 127-128.

viding the one incontrovertible evidence for the existence of a plurality of selves. What they mean by immediate experience is perceptual knowledge, i.e., awareness acquired through the sense organs'.¹⁶ Observing that not a child's but only an adult's experience can claim to give plurality, he proceeds to examine this claim. He says that in pereceptual experience there is a large element of inference and quotes with approval Blandshard who says, "Adult perception is a stage Falstaff, so padded and puffed out with stuff that has been gathered elsewhere that the original figure is lost". The quotation is significant in that it contains the word 'lost'. We readily grant that there is a large element of inference in perception. But does it mean that there is no difference between perception and inference or that the perceptual element ceases to count and, perhaps, ceases to exist? It is without doubt difficult to distinguish between what is given and what is added thereto! Need that involve us in denying that something is given on the ground that we do not know what exactly is given and refusing to grant validity to perception? Erroneous perception is a fact of experience but that does not mean all perception is suspect. The Siddhāntin, as we saw already, recognises error in perception. But he is no less insistent regarding the validity of perception. "To say that a metaphysical theory has perceptual experience for its support is to say nothing that is materially conclusive".¹⁷ But the Siddhāntin claims that inference and verbal testimony also support his claim. Perceptual experience by itself may not be conclusive—but what is violently opposed to such experience can hardly be said to be any more conclusive! Again inference and verbal testimony are used by both the advocates and the critics of the doctrine of plurality of souls and it is not as if perception (even which is more often correct than not) alone lends plausibility to the case of the pluralists. The 'logical' outcome of denial of plurality is the denial of bondage and release. To say that there is no bondage and no release, because there is only one soul, which is ever perfect, does not seem to be so much a solution as a dissolution or denial of the problem in spite of distinctions regarding points of view (like vyāvahārika and pāramārthika.)

16. Symposium on Soul: One or Many. Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, p. 8.

17. *Ibid*, p. 8.

Bradley points out a dialectical difficulty. 'Plurality and separateness,' says Bradley, 'without a relation of separation seem really to have no meaning'.¹⁸ Again 'without relations these poor monads would have no process and would serve no purpose. But relations admitted, again are fatal to the monads' independence. The substances clearly become adjectival,¹⁹ and mere elements within an all-comprehending whole. And hence there is left remaining for their internal contents no solid principle of stability'.²⁰

Readers of Bradley's famous work, *Appearance and Reality*, are aware of the easy way in which the author disposes of things once he has alleged unintelligibility in the category of relation. He says confidently that the reader who followed him, "will have seen that our experience, where relational is not true, and he will have condemned, almost without a hearing, the great mass of phenomena."²¹ He says that the problem is to find how the relation can stand to the things it relates. If the connection is taken as a solid thing, one has to show (and he says one cannot show) how the other solids are joined to it. If it is taken as a kind of medium or unsubstantial atmosphere, it is a connection no longer. Thus on the one hand relation cannot relate and on the other hand things will cease to be independent if they admit of relation.

One cannot help feeling that the difficulty arises because by independence of things complete exclusiveness and isolation seem to be meant. Either such an independence (which will be difficult to maintain if there are many souls, because plurality involves the relation of separation) or no independence or individual existence at all—these are the alternatives offered for acceptance. Cannot the many retain their individuality even when they have to come together? Expressions like the following "things, go to pieces, crumbled away into relations that can find no terms"²² suggest that the alternative to a rigidity which admits of no relation is a brittleness that inevitably follows from the very touch of relation. But is there no third alternative?

18. *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 117-18.

19. Pringle Pattison remarks that things are not adjectives of one another. 'A shoe is not an attribute of a foot, and a son is not an attribute of his father, though in both cases the one fact transcends itself and carries you to the other.' *Idea of God*, p. 274.

20. *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 117-8.

21. *Ibid*, p. 29

22. *Ibid.*, p. 64

Bradley asserts that the independent reality of the individual is mere illusion and poses the question, what are separate men apart from the community? It is the common mind within him which gives reality to the human being. But surely one may also ask what the community is apart from the men who make it. The reply to Bradley given by Sir Henry Jones is worth quoting: "I cannot admit that the participation of individuals in common elements lessens either their independence or individuality...if my community is to live in me, I must interpret its meaning, I must adopt its traditions and creeds, I must make its ends my personal purposes. And everyone of these activities is personal and in a sense, private and exclusive. In this reaction the material offered by the community is recreated by me; and the recreation at once enriches the communal store and exercises and develops my individual powers'.²³ Again, 'The more a man enters the life of others, the richer his own life. His uniqueness or difference from others is the greater the more he adopts and enlarges and carries out the ends of their common giver.'²⁴

A pluralism which maintains total exclusiveness of each individual without any basis for co-operation among themselves or common allegiance to a supreme authority, is untenable. But the Siddhānta which argues for a plurality of souls is never tired of repeating that these souls are dependent on the Lord. It has the advantage of not denying facts of experience or leaving them in isolation but presenting them in as coherent a manner as is possible. Thus it is not a final and unmediated pluralism or a doctrine of ultimately self-subsistent or unrelated reals. The Siddhāntin's insistence on the supremacy of the Lord provides the corrective to mere pluralism while his acceptance of a plurality provides the corrective to monism. After all, what is undesirable is not selfhood but selfishness. Neither metaphysically nor ethically is the case for the independent existence of a plurality of souls fraught with more difficulties than is the rival case—to put the Siddhāntin's case at the lowest.

Nature of the Soul:

The Siddhāntin examines the views of the followers of other schools regarding the nature of the soul, before he states his own

23. A Faith that Enquires p. 320.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 323.

view. The Paripāmavādins say that souls come into existence as the modification of Brahman, have cognitive, conative and affective activities and exist in an identity-in-difference relation to Brahman, like fire and heat (which exemplify the relation between a substance and its quality). If Brahman becomes the souls, how is it that souls do not have knowledge in the absence of accessories like the sense-organs? If the souls are Brahman, they must be able to cognise without the aid of accessories. Since souls cognise only with the help of accessories, they are not Brahman.

The Sāṅkhyas say that souls exist as sheer intelligence (not having intelligence as an attribute). The organs of the body function in the proximity of the soul and give rise to cognition, conation and affection. The Siddhāntin (who like the Sāṅkhya, recognises a plurality of souls and conceives the soul to be omnipresent) replies that in sleep and death, though there is no lack of proximity of the soul yet there is no consciousness. So, the Sāṅkhya view cannot be accepted.

Śivāgra yogin says that the Sāṅkhya has to accept one of two alternatives, neither of which is free from defect. (i) The soul is of the nature of intelligence without having cognition, conation and affection. But this position is untenable, because for enjoyment there should be sequence of jñāna, iccha and prayatna and if there is not this sequence there can be no enjoyment. (ii) Cognition, conation and affection come into existence by the activity of buddhi, manas and ahaṅkāra. When they do not come into existence, it is because buddhi etc., are inactive. If this position is accepted, then the original position that these arise in the body in the presence of the soul is abandoned and pratijñābhāṅga results.

The Sāṅkhya might say: we do not mean by proximity mere pervasiveness. Proximity is a particular quality that is helpful for the body to function in the presence of the soul, like iron-filings in the presence of magnet. The Siddhāntin replies that magnet performs a single function—it attracts iron-filings—it does not repel them. But how is it that the soul gives rise to different functions like thinking, forgetting, running etc.?

Again, a magnet attracts but does not repel a needle; the needle moves towards the magnet—it cannot resist such a movement. If the relation between puruṣa and prakṛti is the same as that between magnet and needle, then the states of sleep etc., become impossible. Puruṣa cannot free itself from prakṛti and attain release.

It is the soul which uniting with *manas*, thinks about things and controls *manas*; which, occupying the feet and assisted by wind, causes running etc. Occupying the sense-organs, it apprehends objects; residing in *ahaṅkāra*, it causes the awareness "I am the enjoyer", "I am the sufferer"; occupying *buddhi* it produces the subjective consciousness, "I know."

Following Śivāgra yogin, we may briefly state the Sāṅkhya view and the objections to it. The soul is a witness. It is an intelligence. It is neither an enjoyer nor an agent; nor is it a modification of *prakṛti*. Non-attachment and indifference are its characteristics. In its presence, *prakṛti* evolves into the seven, *mahat* etc., and the sixteen evolutes (*manas*, five sense-organs, five motor organs and five elements). It is in *prakṛti* that we find the play of the three *guṇas* and their derivatives ranging from *buddhi* to *prithivī*. It is *buddhi* that has agency and enjoyment. Because the soul does not know that it is different from *prakṛti*, it does not separate itself from *prakṛti*. Thus, it is involved in *samsāra* and by reason of merit and de-merit goes to the upper and lower regions respectively. Release consists in the discrimination of *puruṣa* from *prakṛti*.

The Siddhāntin says that the Sāṅkhya's chief mistake consists in taking *prakṛti* to be the primal cause. *Prakṛti* is born of *aśuddha nāyā*. It cannot function without being impelled by an intelligence. If it is maintained that it does not require an intelligence for functioning, then a pot or a wall must also be able to function. What is not-intelligent cannot have enjoyment or agency. If it be urged that an intelligent entity has bondage because of ignorance, and release, with the acquisition of knowledge, the Siddhāntin replies that what is intelligent cannot be ignorant without a cause. If ignorance is caused (i.e., if it has a beginning) in what is intelligent, then the absurd contingency arises that even after release, ignorance may be caused again. Should it be conceded that it is beginningless, then, it is really *āyava* which the Siddhāntin has been maintaining all along to be what obscures the intelligence of the souls.

Besides, on the Sāṅkhya view, body (which is the locus of enjoyment), organs (which are the means of enjoyment) and enjoyment (which is of the form of pleasure and pain) cannot be of any use to the *puruṣa*. So, non-agency results for the *puruṣa*. In the absence of agency, there cannot be enjoyment. The non-

intelligent parkṛti cannot, without being controlled by an intelligence, function as the cause of the evolutes. Thus, both the means of enjoyment and the means of release set forth by the Sāṅkhya turn out to be the fictitious products of a deluded understanding.

The Paurāṇikas say that the soul is corporeal. If this were the case, another corporeal entity must be seen within the body. It must enter the womb. Besides, whatever is corporeal will be like the elements—which are subject to changes and destruction. It may be said that though corporeal, the soul is invisible. But this is to forget that what is corporeal must be visible. That which is invisible and free from modifications cannot be corporeal,

The soul may be said to be an entity existing in a subtle form unlike the elements which are visible and which exist in a gross form. The Siddhāntin says that this subtle thing is the inert puryaṣṭaka body which gives rise to the gross form. Can the soul be said to be that which exists in a very subtle form in the puryaṣṭaka? No; that is the perfect body (पर्यायलक्ष), constituted of tattvas beginning with kalā and ending with prithivī. All these are non-intelligent and non-real. How can the soul which does not have a similar nature be any of these?

If the soul be said to be incorporeal, what happens to the purāṇic declaration (which is consistent with verbal testimony) that Yama violently pulled puruṣa who is of the size of his own thumb? The ākāśa in the centre of the lotus of each person's heart is of the size of that person's thumb. So, the puruṣa who is defined by that is also said to be of the size of his thumb. The statement is not otherwise true. All corporeal things are brought into existence by some one and they are all subject to destruction.

The Kauṣas say that the soul is corporeal-incorporeal. But the corporeal cannot become incorporeal (prithivī cannot become ākāśa) any more than the incorporeal can become corporeal (ākāśa cannot become prithivī). The same thing cannot have two opposed qualities. If, to illustrate their position, they mention the presence of fire in fuel, the reply is that fire is not seen to the extent fuel is seen and when fire is seen both fuel and fire are destroyed. Thus the analogy fails.

Another example is given to illustrate the contention that the soul is corporeal-incorporeal. The moon is corporeal-incorporeal. On the new moon day, it has only one digit and is thus incorporeal. As days go by, the digits increase until at last on the full moon

day, it appears corporeal with sixteen digits. They say that likewise, the soul is incorporeal when it enters the womb but that it grows up into the body and thus becomes visible. The Siddhāntin replies that on this view, the soul which is intelligent, eternal and subject to bondage and release would become non-intelligent, an evolute of the elements and the body itself which is bondage.

The Pātāñjalas say that the soul is formless and immutable like ākāśa. This is not correct. The soul occupies the body, moves it, makes it get up, walk and roll on the floor. How can the soul, if it is immutable and incorporeal, induce all these changes?

Śivāgra yogin states the view of the Pātāñjalas in syllogistic form and shows its invalidity.

The soul is immutable
because it is formless,
like ākāśa.

Here the probans is subject to the defect of *kālātyāpadiṣṭa* because change is perceptible and changes could not be induced if the soul were incorporeal. The example also is defective. Ākāśa is inert and so immutability is possible; but the soul is of the nature of intelligence and activity and so immutability is not possible. Therefore the soul is to be considered mutable though incorporeal.²⁵

Śivāgra yogin thus boldly interprets the verse he is commenting on to mean that the soul is mutable, although mutability may be considered to be inconsistent with the nature of the soul. Jñānaprakāśar, on the other hand, says that the soul being of the nature of the resolve of Cit-Śakti, induces changes in the body by unchanging non-moving change,²⁶ thereby meaning evidently that that the soul induces changes by mere volition, without itself changing.

The inert cannot become the intelligent nor the intelligent become the inert. So, the view of the Vaiśeṣika that the soul is inert and that it cognises the objects only when united to *manas*, cannot be accepted. Two opposed qualities cannot be found in

25. Nirambavaḷagiar also says that the soul is mutable.

26. His words are:

சிற்சத்தியினது சங்கற்ப ரூபமாய்த்திரிவற்ற அசைவற்ற
விகாரத்தினாலே

the same substance. For this reason, the view of one sect of Śaivites that it is intelligent-inert (*cidacit*) is rejected. The Bhāṭṭas say that the soul is an intelligence which does not unite with instruments. But because the soul cannot cognise without instruments, this view is also rejected.

The Pāñcarātras say that the soul exists in the body in the form of an atom. This is unacceptable because if the soul were atomic, it could get out of the body through any one of the many holes in the body. If it were atomic, either it would not allow itself to be bound or to be made to bear the weight of the body. As inert, it would be like one of the elements and be destroyed.

What, then, is the meaning of the Vedic declaration that the soul is atomic? When the soul existing in the heart as de-limited by the internal organs, perceives objects through the eyes, it goes out through a vein which is one hundredth of the tip of a grain of rice. Because of this limitation it is said to be atomic. It is not true otherwise. If the Pāñcarātra maintains that the soul is atomic, as atomic, it will become liable to destruction and there will be no difference between this view and the Bauddha view.

The followers of the Smṛtis say that the soul exists in the heart assuming the size of the tip of a blade of grass while its intelligence, like the light of a lamp extends everywhere. This view of the soul is also materialistic. For, if the soul were corporeal, though it may be ever so small, all the defects urged against corporeal things, would apply equally well to this. Besides a quality cannot extend beyond the substance of which it is a quality, much less everywhere. Again, the light of a lamp is the subtle form of the lamp, not its quality. Thus, this cannot be an example. Even if it were, there are the following difficulties. The flame hurts only if we touch it, not otherwise; whereas the soul is able to perceive touch, whatever the part of the body touched. The lamp is at a particular place, but it illumines all the surrounding objects. The soul does not perceive things through all the sense-organs and at the same time. Even where it appears so, it is because the interval between the functioning of one organ and another is too small to be noticed.

The Jaiṇas say that the soul extends to the size of the body and cognises objects. If so, then, there must be cognition in the sleep state, and through all the sense-organs at once. Intelligence must depend upon the size of the body. If one part of the body

be injured, the soul also would be injured in part. Destruction would overtake the soul also when the body is destroyed.

Aikyavādins say that the soul is all-pervasive like the Lord and cognises objects. How could we, on this view, account for the several states of the soul and its journeys to and from the world? How is it that the sense-organs do not cognise at the same time? How does the all-pervasive soul come to be confined to a body?

It may be argued that though the soul is pervasive and can cognise objects, the products of māyā veil its intelligence and that therefore, it becomes subject to the states of sleep etc. The products of māyā are the means whereby the soul cognises objects; as such, they cannot obscure the soul's intelligence. If māyā bound what was till then a pure soul, there would be the contingency of bondage even after release.

Śivāgra yogin says that if the soul were an eternally pure intelligence, it would never be bound. It would be eternally free and self-luminous. The Lord is of such a nature but not the souls.

What is the nature of the soul, according to the Siddhānta? The soul is not all-pervasive like the Lord; neither is it (as He is) the extremely subtle intelligence. It pervades whatever it occupies. It is the gross intelligence having its cognition, conation and affection beginninglessly obscured by āṇava.

According to Śivajñāna yogin, attempt is made in the foregoing to distinguish the soul which is incorporeal and pervasive from the Lord. He says that the former is gross intelligence and the latter subtle intelligence. Maraijñāna Deśikar, Śivāgra yogin and Nīrambavaḷagiār suggest that the attempt is to distinguish the soul from pāśa. Śivajñāna yogin says such an interpretation is inappropriate. Jñānaprakāśar says that the soul is not incorporeal or pervasive in the manner of pāśa. He goes beyond this and says that in release, the soul pervades and is pervaded by the intelligent incorporeal. The soul has śivatva, consisting in eternal and indestructible omniscience and omnipotence. But because of relation with mala, it is rendered ignorant and non-active: wherefore it is called paśu. While Śivajñāna yogin emphasises the difference between the soul and the Lord, Śivāgra yogin stresses the similarity between the two and Jñānaprakāśar makes the soul the equal of the Lord.

Śivāgra yogin says that the Siddhāntin refuted so far the following views—that the soul is corporeal, incorporeal, corporeal—incorporeal; that it is intelligent, non-intelligent, intelligent—non-intelligent; that it is parviscient, partly pervasive, that it is atomic, of middle size (*madhya parimāṇa*): that it is non-changing, non-active, non-enjoying pure intelligence. The Siddhānta is that it is pervasive like Śiva. Whatever is pervasive cannot be corporeal. If all souls are pervasive like Śiva, they would be omniscient and all-pervasive. But don't we see that they are not so? The reply is that because of a de-limiting adjunct their omniscience is non-manifest. *Āṇava* has been beginninglessly obscuring the eternal cognition and conation of souls, thus making them *paśu*. Omniscience etc., cannot become manifest until *paśutva* is removed by the grace of the Lord. Śivāgra yogin says that some deny the special nature (*asādhāraṇa svarūpa*) of the soul and assert that it is of the nature of whatever it exists with. This is *anekānta vāda* and *arha mata*. Elsewhere, we found Śivāgra yogin saying that is *puruṣa tattva* which reflects the colour of its environment and which as such is *sadasat*. The soul is really an intelligence and not *sadasat*.

What is the Siddhāntin's view regarding the nature of the soul? The following statement calls for examination. 'This view that the essential part of the soul remains constant, and that only its outer form is subject to change, causes one to think that the career of the soul merely consists in changing its outer garb, which in the *kevala avasthā* is of *asat*, in the *sakala avasthā* of *sadasat* and in the *śuddha avasthā* of *sat*. This leads to the absurd conclusion that in the *śuddha avasthā*, Śiva is content with a change of form on the part of the soul. Its essential nature may be *sadasat*, but its outer garb should be pure *sat*. If so, is the state of the soul in release in any way different from that of a "whited sepulchre, which indeed appears beautiful outward, but is within full of dead men's bones and of all uncleanness"?'²⁷ This is criticism of the Siddhānta in very strong language. What is the justification therefor? We have a reference to a statement of Schomerus that the soul's inmost nature in all the states is *sadasat*.²⁸ The statement that the inmost nature of the soul in all states is *sadasat* is not only misleading but definitely wrong. We

27. Śaiva Siddhānta, p. 150

28. Schomerus, pp. 204-205.

may state the Siddhānta as follows, drawing freely from the standard commentary on the Śivajñāna Bodham for our purpose.

The Siddhāntin says that intelligences are of two kinds. One kind (indeed of this class; there is only one intelligence viz., the Lord) capable of knowing things independently and another kind (of this class are the numerous finite souls) capable of knowing only in dependence on that with which it is associated.²⁹ However, as one entitled to enjoy the whole of the Lord's bliss as its own, even as the prince is entitled to the whole of the king's wealth, the finite soul is taken to belong to the same class as Śiva.³⁰ As capable of being in a relation of non-difference (advaita) with the objects with which it is associated, the soul is classified in six ways as bhutātma, antarātma, tattvātma, jīvātma, mantarātma and paramātma. But of these six, the first five are indicative of the artificial states of the soul, characterised by delimiting adjuncts. It is only the sixth that reveals the essential nature of the soul on account of the soul belonging to the same class as Śiva.³¹ 'Ātman' means pervasive, eternal intelligence and the Vedas and Āgamas declare the soul to be pervasive.³² The finite soul is not an attribute of a substance or adjectival but is itself a substance like the Lord.³³ Its identity with intelligence is beginningless (not achieved or brought into existence at some particular time).³⁴ It is because it is an intelligence that Vedas and Āgamas were brought into existence (for its edification.)³⁵

29. Māpāḍiyam, pp. 385-6.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 416.

31. Māpāḍiyam, pp. 380-1.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 321, cf. also p. 445.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 392.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 413, cf. the following: two verses of the *Tirumandiram* which indicate that the soul's essential nature is intelligence and its obscuration is caused by āṇava.

அறிவு வடிவென்றியாத என்னை
அறிவு வடிவென்றருள் செய்தான் நந்தி
அறிவு வடிவென்றருளால் அறிந்தே
அறிவு வடிவென்றறிந்திருந்தேனே
அனாதி சிவரூபமாகிய ஆன்மா
தனாதி மலத்தாற்றடைப்பட்டு நின்றது
தனாதி மலமும் தடையற்றபோதே
அனாதி சிவரூபமாகிய வான்மா.

35. Māpāḍiyam, p. 411.

The soul is really an intelligence; it is only figuratively that it is called inert³⁶ (as associated with puruṣa tattva which takes on the colour of its environment). While the internal organs are intelligent as compared with what is lower than themselves and inert as compared with what is higher than themselves, the finite soul is everywhere (யாண்டும்) or in all contexts, intelligent.³⁷ Though it is essentially intelligent, there is difference between itself and the Lord, because as explained earlier, the former requires to be informed for its knowledge whereas the latter does not. We may perhaps illustrate this by reference to geniuses and ordinary men. They belong to the same class as human beings, but so far as their intelligence and grasp of things are concerned, there is as much difference between them and ordinary human beings as there is between an ordinary man and an animal. Likewise, the finite soul's way of grasping things and the Lord's way indicate the difference between them. The former has, so to speak, to merge in the objects to understand them (அழுந்தியறிதல்) whereas, the latter knows all things as they are without such merging.³⁸

What is the justification for calling the soul *sadasat*? The soul which is *sat* is obscured by *āvara* with which it has no affinity; and because its capacity is rendered ineffective, it exists like *asat*. When at release, obscurity is removed, its capacity is made manifest, and without ever after being obscured again, it has a right to the enjoyment of Śiva's bliss, never changing in its nature afterwards. Hence, it comes to be called *sadasat*.³⁹ Again, the finite soul is not like the Lord who knows everything at once as it is. Neither is it *asat*, because it is not like the Universe which, being inert, cannot know and have experience. When the soul has a manifest, it has knowledge and, as an intelligence is therefore *sat*; when it does not have a manifest, it does not have knowledge and is therefore *like asat*.⁴⁰

This is not *anekāntavāda*, because we are not predicating opposite qualities simultaneously. Soul's condition in the state of bondage indicates its general nature: and its condition in the

36. Māpāḍiyam, p. 196.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 311.

38. Māpāḍiyam, p. 6 and p. 492.

39. Māpāḍiyam, p. 357

40. *Ibid.*, 612, cf. also

‘அசத்தைச் சத்துடனின் று நீக்குந்தன்மையாற்சதசத்து’

Ibid., p. 416.

state of release shows its special or essential nature.⁴¹ In the state of release when it joins Śiva, its essential nature of knowing in a non-demonstrative way (சுட்டிந்து அறிவது) is made manifest.⁴² It is the general nature of the soul to reflect its environment, like a crystal. When the soul realises its general nature to consist in taking on the characteristics of its environment and discriminates itself from the organs etc. with which it is associated, it realises that it is servant of the Lord, a realisation which in its turn enables it to free itself from its general nature (and be restored to its special nature).⁴³

Is not the soul still in an artificial condition and not true to itself, if it places itself under the influence of Śiva? How can it be said that associating itself with and reflecting the characteristics of *asat* is an artificial state caused by *mala* and that associating itself with and reflecting the characteristics of Śiva is the natural state of the soul? Śivajñāna yogin says that only those who say that 'knowing as of the nature of the thing associated with' (சார்ந்ததன் வண்ணமாயறிதல்) is artificial will consider coming under Śiva's influence also as artificial.⁴⁴

Has the soul no nature of its own? Should it always reflect whatever it is associated with? If it has no special quality but only takes on the quality of other things, a substance being nothing other than its qualities, in the absence of its own quality, the soul will cease to be as a substance also. So, we must say that apart from taking on the colour of its environment, there is the special quality of knowing that environment while existing as of the nature of that environment.⁴⁵

It will be now clear that according to the Siddhāntin, the essential nature of the soul is *sat*, that though it belongs to the same class as the Lord as *sat*, yet it differs from Him by being a dependent intelligence (and not an independent intelligence like Him), that though it associates itself with *asat* and appears to be *asat* itself, this is not its natural condition but an artificial condition,⁴⁶ brought about by obscurations caused

41. *Ibid.*, p. 155.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 444-445.

43. *Māpāḍiyam*, p. 443-4.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 395-6.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 385.

46. *Māpāḍiyam*, 483.

by mala. How the essentially intelligent soul came to be obscured is more than we can tell. It is a fact that it is so obscured. Yet, the Siddhāntin feels confident that the obscuration will be removed and the soul regain its essential nature. Neither does the soul merely change its outer covering from *asat* to *sat*, remaining as *sadasat* within, nor is Śiva taken in by the shiny exterior to bother Himself about "all uncleanness" within. It will be "absured" only if the soul is not essentially *sat*. We have quoted sufficiently from a standard commentary to show that the Siddhāntin considers the soul to be really *sat*. We have also indicated what exactly is meant by calling the soul *sadasat*.

In what follows, the Siddhāntin says that the soul is gross *cit* and proceeds to show that of the three entities, *Paṭi*, *paśu*, and *pāśa*, it is *paśu* which has to work for release.

Who is it that can discriminate between *sat* and *asat*? The Śivādvaitins say that Śiva, who is *sat* knows *pāśa*, which is *asat*. Śiva is a pervasive intelligence. He knows everything at once, not each at a time. Hence it cannot be Śiva. It may be said that though Śiva is a pervasive intelligence, He dwells in the instruments and organs (which are *asat*) and cognises things one by one for the sake of the souls. But this cannot be, because *asat* cannot exist before *sat*, just as darkness cannot exist before light. The Śivasāṅkrāntavādins say that in the presence of the changeless soul instruments which are *asat* exist as Śiva's instruments and know Him. We have already said that *asat* cannot persist before *sat*. Besides, *asat* exists as instruments for some one else to know. It is not itself intelligent. Thus *asat* cannot know *sat*. Since *Paṭi* and *pāśa* cannot know each other, it must be the third, *paśu* that knows both of them. The Siddhāntin makes it clear here that the soul is essentially an intelligence—a knower.

By saying that *asat* cannot persist before *sat*, what is meant is that it cannot be known by the Lord in the way in which objects are known (as 'This is a pot' 'This is a cloth') to our demonstrative knowledge.⁴⁷ The Siddhāntin does not mean that it is destroyed. Śivāgrya yogin states the *pūrvapakṣa* thus: The

47. Maraijāna Deṣīkar says that 'cit' and 'acit' are interchangeably used for 'sat' and 'asat' respectively occasionally and that as there is no difference between them the usage is not wrong.

Śivādvaitin recognises the intelligent and the inert only and contends that it is not consistent with reason to affirm the existence of souls as different from Śiva and the Universe. He urges that it is opposed to verbal testimony. If he is told that perception shows the existence of many souls, the Śivādvaitin replies that because of tattva, bhuvana and kaṣā adhvās as de-limiting adjuncts Śiva appears as many souls. Śivāgrā yogin raises a few questions and answers them. How is it that, whereas in the Śivajñāna Bodham, which is the original, Śiva and the Universe are said to be cit and acit, it is stated here that they are sat and asat? He replies cit is sat and acit is asat. They are used as synonyms. Are āṇava, māyā and karma which are acit, asat also? These are sat only upto release (what he evidently means is that though these may continue to exist, they do not matter to the released person). So, these are also asat to the vision of one who has attained release through a knowledge of scriptures. If all souls are Śiva Who is of the nature of sat and cit, how is it that without knowing that One, souls are caught in samsāra and made to suffer? It may be said that this ignorance is brought about by māyā which is asat. But asat cannot persist before sat, even as darkness cannot persist before light. It may be said that in the presence of Śiva, māyā's evolutes engender ahaṅkāra and mama-kāra, consisting in feelings like 'I am the enjoyer', 'I am the sufferer.' The Siddhāntin replies that the evolutes of māyā (asat) cannot persist before Śiva (sat). The soul has the evolutes of māyā as its instruments for working. Māyā's evolutes, being inert, cannot do anything by themselves.

Jñānaprakāśar makes the following observations: If Śiva is Himself the intelligent and inert Universe, He cannot perform the five different functions in respect of Himself. The Śivādvaitin and the Vedāntin will have to attribute pleasure, pain, suffering and enjoyment to Śiva and Brahman. Because it is said that everything outside Brahman is false, the suffering also would be false and saying that they are false, would also be false. Though the inert Universe appears for the sake of others' enjoyment, purposes etc., it does not appear so for its own sake. It would appear as a bare existent to Śiva. It may be said that the internal organs (which belong to the inert universe) cognise external objects and experience pleasure, pain and delusion appropriate to them, existing the while in the presence of the intelligent. But this is to overlook the fact that these, even if they exist before Śiva

would be inert like a horn or any material object. As the eye sees, helped by the light of the lamp, the intelligent soul, which is *sadasat* and different from *Śiva*, is helped by *asat* to experience things. *Asat* cannot have experience.

It is the soul that cognises *sat* and *asat* which cannot know each other. But the soul is neither *sat* nor *asat*. It does not manifest itself in and exist as equal to either of these. Nor is it a void by not manifesting itself. It exists in these just as smell resides in the flower without completely manifesting or withholding itself. The soul has the characteristic of reflecting its environment and in their presence, it expresses itself in a subdued way. It is not known separately, but is cognised in the process of knowing the other two.

Maraijñāna Deśikar explains the position by saying that the soul is not like the universe which appears in a specific way nor like *Śiva* Who does not appear in a specific way. Without having a beginning or an end, it is intent on its own welfare.

Śivāgra yogin (who repudiated the characterisation of soul as *sadasat* (or *cidacit*) says that the soul in bondage and release is subject to the *states* of *acit* and *cit*. When there is the onset of *Parāśakti*, the soul is of the nature of unobstructed *Cit-Śakti*, like *Śiva*. In the *āṇava kevala*, it is like the inert because its intelligence does not shine. Thus it becomes subject to the states of *cit* and *acit*. How can the soul be said to be eternal when, as being born with a *liṅga-śarīra* constituted by *māyā*, it must die also? The soul is not born from *māyā* when the *liṅga-śarīra* arises from *māyā*. In the *praḷaya* state, the soul exists in the middle of the *māyā* regions. With the coming into being of *liṅga-śarīra*, its cognition, conation and affection become manifest. The beginning of the *liṅga-śarīra* is figuratively taken as marking the beginning of the soul. Even though smell is a different entity, the coming into being of a flower is treated as marking the beginning of the smell also. Thus it is with the soul. Hence the soul is not destructible but eternal.

Jñānaprakāśar offers elaborate comments. He says the soul cognises *Śiva* and the Universe for its own purposes viz ; to attain release and enjoyment. The soul has *Śivatva* of the nature of omniscience and omnipotence; and *paśutva* of the nature of ignorance and inactivity. Of these natural and adventitious qualities (*Śivatva* & *paśutva*), it is the natural and adventitious sub-

strate. Paśutva and śivatva cannot appear together at the same time just as darkness and light cannot appear together. Then, is the soul like a sky-flower? No; paśutva disappears after purification bearing the mark of Śivaśakti. Then śivatva becomes manifest. The objector may say that if śivatva, not seen in the soul previously becomes manifest later, satkāryavāda would have to be thrown overboard and asatkāryavāda espoused. The Siddhāntin replies that it does not follow, for it is like the smell of the flower existing in a subtle condition and becoming manifest later. The following words of the *Tirumandiram* சிவனுக்குள் னே சிவமணம் பூத்தது show that śivatva which is veiled by mala becomes manifest on the removal of mala. If śivatva becomes manifest by evolving as Sadyojāta, would it not be subject to change, non-eternality and inertness? No, says the Siddhāntin. It is not as though śivatva was (absolutely) non-existent in the activity of the soul's intelligence and later became manifest. It was non-existent in the sense that it existed in a subtle form. Now it shines forth. Thus mala has to be invoked to explain the intermediate submergence of śivatva.

Mala's energy is twofold, as obscuring and as withdrawing the obscuration. Mala's obscuration is removed by purificatory rite. By this rite the inner impurity of the soul is removed and there is the transformation into sat. There are two stages leading to release; one is the removal of mala and the other is the manifestation of śivatva. When a china-rose is in the proximity of a crystal, the latter appears red. When this de-limiting adjunct is removed, the crystal shines in its pristine splendour. On the restoration to śivatva, there comes about omniscience natural to śivatva and its invariable concomitant—omnipotence. Thus there is nothing newly introduced but only a restoration of the original state. Having instruments etc., and being subject to changes are due to the residual impressions of mala. With the removal of these impressions, changes cease. With the cessation of changes, śivatva becomes manifest. Thus non-eternality (resulting from being subject to changes) would not apply to śivatva. Omniscience ever exists the same. Ignorance, which is the negation of omniscience and omnipotence, is natural to mala. This eternal negation of knowledge deludes the soul and causes the soul's knowledge to appear previously non-existent. Hence this previous non-existence of knowledge is adventitious to the soul. Ignorance is not real in respect of the soul but false: This false

entity (i.e., false so far as its relation to the soul is concerned) can be removed by the manifestation of jñāna, which is brought about on the removal of mala and its residual impressions. The manifestation of knowledge is the removal of ignorance. As a certain precious stone or mantra or medicine can cure a disease and make the patient whole, Śivamantra, characterised by its capacity to purify, removes mala, and enables the soul to evolve into sat. There is no non-eternality for mala (dharmi) or mala śakti (dharma) though mala has avṛtti, nivṛtti and svavṛtti.

The objector may say that though mala is one, yet its energies are many, according to the number of souls, and that the energies being non-intelligent and many, are non-eternal. The Siddhāntin replies that because they are qualities of mala which is eternal, they cannot be non-eternal. The objector can say that as plurality enters into the very conception of a substance with a number of qualities, the substance itself becomes non-eternal. In short, non-eternality applies to the substance.

The Siddhāntin meets this argument by drawing a distinction and abolishing it later. Though māyā and mahāmāyā appear as single existents to us, they appear as energies, many and non-intelligent to the Lord, and therefore are non-eternal. Since the energies of māyā, unlike mala śakti which exists in its own nature, change and are transformed, māyā and mahāmāyā are non-eternal. The Siddhāntin does not accept this; even these need not be non-eternal. The energies are not completely transformed as milk is turned into curds, but are only partially transformed, as ghee is partially hardened. The objector could say that then there would be partial destruction. The Siddhāntin denies even this. He says that the energies which are partially transformed are now in a manifest form. These which are now manifest as effects were formally in a potential condition as causes. Hence both cause and effect are eternal.

Then why should the energies of mala be said to non-eternal while affirming that the energies of mala are partly eternal? It is because there is difference between an entity existing in its own nature and an entity being transformed, that we make this distinction. In their own real nature, they are all eternal. In saying that the smell is resident in the flower, it must be noticed that the smell is already there and is not something produced all of a sudden. So also, Śivatva is already existent in the soul; but it is made manifest later. Hence it must not be said that the

soul is like Śiva when it is with Him and like pāśa when it is with it (pāśa). Jñānaprakāśar makes it clear that the soul's essential nature is śivatva and paśutva is adventitious. So, in being like pāśa, in the state of bondage, it is not natural—not true to itself.

Of the three eternal verities, though Pati and paśu are similar to each other in a general way, both being eternal, pervasive and intelligent, Śiva is the extremely subtle intelligence and the soul only a gross intelligence. So, asat cannot persist before Śiva. But it can persist before paśu. Souls (sadasat) have existed as beginninglessly as the Lord. Pāśa has beginninglessly been clinging to the souls, just as, though the sea and water are pure, salt clings to the water rather than to sea. (By sea is meant, evidently the ākāśa or space wherein the water of the sea is contained).

Maraijñāna Deśikar says that purity is as beginningless to Śiva as impurity is beginningless to souls. What is the reason for the difference? There is no reason, just as there is none for crystal and copper being what they are.

Śivāgra yogin says once again that the soul is called cidacit because in āṇava kevala it is like acit and in the śuddha state, it is of the nature of cit. Śivāgra yogin states in the form of a dilemma difficulties involved in maintaining on the one hand that Śiva is pervasive, and on the other hand, that paśu and pāśa are also real. If Śiva is pervasive, there is no ground for affirming the existence of souls and pāśa as other than Śiva. If they exist and are other than Śiva, He cannot be pervasive. Śivāgra yogin replies that the Lord is like the ākāśa which gives the space for the waters of the sea. Though Śiva is pervasive, though in Him paśu and pāśa exist, the Vedas and Āgamas declare that the qualities of these do not affect Him.^{47a}

The soul cannot cognise without its intelligence being made manifest. It knows only as informed. After knowing, it exists as indestructible. Hence it is called gross cit and sat.^{47b} Since it is the Lord who removes its mala and is the manifester of its intelligence, He is the extremely subtle cit and sat. He does not not require anyone to manifest His intelligence.

47a. Jñānaprakāśar says that the defects of unconscious delusion முந்தா மோஹம் and conscious delusion பிரஞ்ஞமோஹம் are found in the soul. These are removed by being brought into the proximity of Śiva.

47b. Śivāgrayogin says that the soul is of the nature of obstructed intelligence.

Jñānaprakāśar says that the soul is of the nature of sat-cit-ānanda like the Lord. In the sakala state, the Lord hides Himself in the succession of deities existing in tattvas like kalā, controls these deities and informs the soul according to their capacities. In the Śuddha state, the Lord, by purification, removes mala and mala's residual impressions, manifests Śivaṭva and informs the soul. When the soul comes to this state, it gives up its habit of ever turning to Śivaśakti for light, exists as self-luminous, and without having the nature of enjoyment and without being the enjoyer, intuitis Śiva and all things, always and as they are. It is eternally real.

SOUL IN THE STATE OF BONDAGE

Because of paśutva, the soul is reduced to the kevala state which abounds in ignorance. Then it occupies the causal body given by Ananta from that part of aśuddha māyā which He agitates. At this stage, the soul's cognition, conation and affection become manifest in a general way and without distinctions. After this, it occupies the coat constituted by the products of māyā, kalā etc. Now, what appeared in a general way and without distinctions, becomes specific and manifests its difference. And lastly, it occupies the guṇaśarīra (constituted by the three guṇas in which exist the internal organs etc. in a latent form) and enters into commerce with the objects brought to it by the subtle and gross bodies.

Śivāgra Yogin adds the following discussion: The cause of ignorance was stated earlier; now the cause of parviscience is given. The cognition, conation and affection of the soul which are of the nature of the soul's cit-śakti are rendered partial by association with kalā, vidyā, rāga. It is not the soul that is rendered partial, but its intelligence. The partial nature of the quality is figuratively ascribed to its substance. The soul is said to be in a part of māyā just as we speak of the akāśa in the pot when akāśa is inside and outside the pot. How can the soul which is pervasive and intelligent be said to have partial luminosity of intelligence? The tree occupies a certain amount of space. But fire can be produced only when friction is applied to that part of the tree which is free from moisture. Similarly intelligence becomes manifest to the extent āṇava is removed. Kaṭā etc. which are the first evolutes of aśuddha māyā constitute the first bondage of the soul. This māyā, called Hā vibhūti mouni is removed at the onset of the Lord's energy. With the removal of

this, the soul becomes like Śiva. The internal organs like buddhi which link themselves with the three guṇas and perform enquiry, determination etc. (suitable to these three guṇas) and which constitute the subtle body are the second bondage of the soul. The organs of the physical body constitute the third bondage. These bind the soul. Is this done by obscuring or limiting? Since the soul is pervasive, it cannot be obscured. Hence it is limitation. How is this done? The soul's cognition, conation and affection are pervasive only to the extent to which the tattvas the soul occupies are pervasive. This is like ākāśa being found in a pot which pot itself is in a room surrounded by ākāśa. When the soul is bound by the tattvas like kalā (which are the cause of partiality and parviscience), it becomes limited by these products of māyā, though it is pervasive; is informed by another, though it is omniscient; requires the tattvas like kalā for help in knowing and doing, though it has independent cognitive and conative energies; comes to have births etc. (by association with another), though it is itself without these; becomes heteronomous because of activity, though it is autonomous; brings about the perception of objects to the sense organs and itself learns about objects through these organs, though it is of the nature of non-changing intelligence; on the maturation and removal of mala, it comes to have a greatness that transcends thought and qualities that are novel (both these being different from similar worldly possessions) by reason of nirvāṇa Śiva-pada-sāmrajya which Śiva confers upon it.^{48a}

The soul, after getting the three superior bodies (kāraṇa, kañcuka and guṇa śarīras) occupies the subtle body, visits all regions, performs karma and experiences the fruits thereof. Then it occupies the gross body, visits all regions, performs karma, experiences the fruits thereof and thus becomes subject to the five states.

The soul has no body in the kevala state. It exists along with āṇava and has the characteristics of āṇava. In the sakāla state, it has five kinds of bodies all arising from māyā, the first cause. Kāraṇa, kañcuka, guṇa, sūkṣma and sthūla śarīras are called āṇava, vijñāna, mano, prāṇa and anna maya kośas respectively. In the order mentioned now, each of the kośas is grosser than the previous one, so that the last is the grossest of all.

48a. Jñānaprakāśar says that āṇava is like darkness, the soul like the eye and māyā like a lamp.

In the kevala state, the cognition, conation and affection of the soul are dormant. When the soul, on association with the part of *māyā* that is agitated, has its cognition, conation, and affection manifested in a general way, it feels a certain delight (or thrill) as a result of the delusive knowledge obtained and exists in the nature of this delight. Hence, the name of *ānandamaya kośa*. The soul travels to the nether and upper regions ceaselessly like the (imaginary) circle created by swinging a firebrand continuously or like the kite. To illustrate this, the Veda symbolises the five sheaths as five birds and as the face etc. of one of these birds. Knowledge of the five *kośas* is helpful in knowing the nature of the soul.⁴⁹

The Lokāyata, Arhata, Ahaṅkāravādin, Bauddha and Vedāntin take the *anna*, *prāṇa*, *mano*, *vijñāna* and *ānandamaya kośas* respectively to be the soul.⁵⁰ Of these *kośas* each is subtle and more pervasive than the ones preceding it. *Annamaya kośa* supports the other four but it is not their first cause. The soul which is essentially incorporeal is bound by these *kośas* but pervades them within and without.⁵¹

The first cause of the *kośas* is *śuddha māyā*; *aśuddha māyā* is the cause of the gross body, (which is of the nature of *anna* and *prāṇa*) and of the subtle body (which is of the nature of *manas*). *Śuddha māyā* is the cause of the *kāraṇa śarīra* (which is of the nature of *vijñāna* and *ānanda*). When the soul exists in the gross body, it exists within; when it cognises the gross body by associating with *manas* and *prāṇa*, it is within *manomaya kośa* and external to *annamaya kośa*. When it exists in *vijñānamaya kośa*, it is within this but external to *manomaya kośa*. It is external to *vijñānamaya kośa* when it cognises that with the aid of *Śivajñāna*. When *Śiva* is manifest in the soul it becomes all pervasive and is within and external to all these.⁵²

The soul identifies itself with each of its bodies and causes them to function. It impels *annamaya kośa* in the manner of a charioteer driving a chariot; it impels *prāṇamaya kośa*, like a

49. Śivajñāna yogin says that the Sarvajñānottara, to indicate the tendency of the soul to live in accordance with its environment, classifies the soul according to its distinctive environments as *bhūtātma*, *antarātma*, *tattvātma*, *jivātma*, *mantrātma* and *paramātma*.

50. Maraijñāna Deśīkar and Jñānaprakāśar make this statement.

51. Maraijñāna Deśīkar.

52. Śivāgra Yogin.

person who puts a doll through certain movements: it impels manomaya kośa like a person who manipulates a leather doll; vijñānamaya kośa, like those who enter another body; and ānanda maya kośa, like an actor playing the role of a brahmin etc.

It may be noticed here that the soul exists as one with the body it occupies and it impels it more or less intimately as the analogues suggest. That is, the soul has recourse to more external accessories where the body impelled is gross; and fewer accessories as the bodies become subtler and subtler. It is also evident that though the soul lives in bodies that are limited, it is pervasive because it controls them.⁵³

The soul resides in the five kinds of sheaths, causes them to function, existing non-different from them. Still, just as even when we say "my town," "my wife," etc., (as though these were non-different from us), they are really different from us, things denoted as "my body", "my sense organ" etc. are different from us. The objector may say: "It is all very well in the case of things external to me, like my wife, house etc. But how could my body which does not exist apart from me, be different from me?" Nail, hair, etc which we identify with ourselves referring to them in the possessive case as "my hair," "my nail," etc. are removed (without any loss to the self.) Likewise when the time comes for it, the body also will be removed.⁵⁴

When we put on gold ornaments, robes, garlands etc., we treat them as though they were part of us. When these are taken off, we realise that they are different from us. Similarly, we must try to find out our true self as different from the body, organs etc.

As Jñānaprakāśar says we must realise by means of self-conscious perception, our self as intelligence and our body as inert.

53. Other commentators emphasise difference of the soul from the body it occupies.

54. Explaining this further Śivāgra Yogin says: When we remove our hair or nails which we possessively call ours, orthodox ceremonial rules require us to wash our hands, if we touch them. When one's father or mother dies, the corpse is referred to as the person deceased but still it is cremated.

Jñānaprakāśas says that as the five sheaths are what the soul possesses, they are different from it.

It is proper to say that the soul is not the body, organs etc., but how could the vijñāna and ānandamaya kośas be denied to be the soul? It is because these are also perceived to be as different from the soul as the other kośas and because these are all understood to be possessed by some one. Then, when I say, "my soul", am I and my soul different? No; this usage is indulged in by those who have not attained to an indubitable realisation of the self. This usage is much like the expression, 'Rāhu's head', which indicates non-difference.

Jñānaprakāśar takes up the matter for discussion. Knowledge is twofold, as indeterminate and determinate. Of these the first is the cognitive activity of Cit-Śakti, existing non-different from it. Then, there is the psychosis of buddhi, existing non-different from it. The objector may grant that the latter is different from the former and from the self, but he may seek to know how the former (the knowledge of Cit-Śakti) be different from the self. Since we say "my knowledge," knowledge cannot be equated with the self. Though Śakti and its activities are not divisible, elders say that they are distinguishable. How can the difference be maintained? The soul is the substance and the self-knowing intelligence. Cit-Śakti is the quality and the other-knowing intelligence. "My" implies the other-knowing intelligence which is the quality; "soul" implies the self-knowing intelligence which is the substance and which possesses the śakti. So in saying "My", the quality is referred to and in saying "soul", the substance is indicated. The substance and its quality, the self-knowing and the other-knowing intelligence, exist in a reversible relation. Though they are not different externally, internally they are distinguishable—though not divisible.

Sometimes buddhi is called manas and manas, buddhi; the soul is called citta, and citta, the soul; the Lord is called the soul and the soul, the Lord. These are figurative usages. Besides the expression, "my soul", by a figurative usage, stands for something which has some affinity to it. Thus, this way also the argument of the objector fails.

Because souls occupy the five sheaths (which are different from the souls), the Upaniṣads name these sheaths also as souls. This is like calling a lamp post also as a lamp. The soul that resides non-differently in the organs etc. and cognises objects, is different from the objects so cognised.

The soul passes through the five states by discarding the five sheaths one after the other; and when it comes back to the waking state, it unites with all the five and narrates the experiences gained in the five states. The soul understands what happened in the other states only when it comes back to the waking state: it cannot know its experiences while it is in the other four states. If the sheaths were the soul, the experience of each state ought to be understood then and there. So, we must realise that the soul which knows all these states is different from the five sheaths.

In sleep,⁵⁵ the soul exists like a corpse, being without activity and enjoyment but having its breathing function alone. The body, sense-organs and vital air are not the soul; the soul is different from these. The objector may deny an eternal soul, united to the five states and affirm that sleep is the destruction of the soul and waking is the coming-into-being of another soul. But since on waking, the soul narrates its dream experiences and says, "I slept well", experiences pleasures and performs activities, the objector's denial is given the lie direct. Then how is the soul's activity etc. revived when it has been without these in the atita? The Lord's Cit-śakti causes the soul to experience pleasures and pains, suitable to its karma, in the waking state; in the dream state, it causes the soul to experience the pleasure of the subtle body; and when the karma of neither of these bodies is ripe, it leads the soul to the sleep state. As favourable to the ripening of the karma of these two bodies, it causes the soul's intelligence to shine forth, which intelligence cognises objects through the channel of instruments and sense-organs.

If the finite soul were a pure intelligence like the Lord, it would not depend upon the products of māyā for cognition. As a matter of fact the soul is able to cognise only with the help of the products of māyā, as the king functions only with the help of his ministers. The soul is beginninglessly bound by āṇava and is incorporeal.

The king goes out for his state-drive accompanied by his ministers, generals and others. When he returns to his palace, he leaves them (behind) at their respective places in the palace and goes alone to his chamber. In like manner, when it does not

55. Śivāgra Yogin.

cognise things, the soul separates itself from the several organs, causes the vital air to guard life and passes through the five states. Maraijñāna Deśīkar and Jñānaprakāśar are of the view that the foregoing indicates the primacy of the soul in spite of its mala-bound condition and that the instruments are not so important.

Śivāgra Yogin says that the soul reaches the atīta state where it is alone (with puruṣa) as the king is alone in his chamber with his consort. The soul is like the king, manas like the chariot, airs (like the vital air), like the chariot horses, buddhi like the minister, ahaṅkāra like the charioteer and the sense and motor organs like the infantry. With these, the soul goes out through the external organs and on returning descends from the centre of the fore-head to the throat, thence to the heart and thence to the navel, discarding the several tattvas at each of these places.

After the soul withdraws from the cognition of external objects and before it goes to the sleep state, it remains along with the thirty five tattvas: viz., the ten organs (sensory and motor), the five objects of the five senses (like sound), the five like speech, ten airs (like the vital air) the four internal organs and puruṣa in the fore-head (i.e. between the eye-brows). This is the waking state. Then the soul descends to the throat and passes into the dream state. Here it discards the five sense organs and five motor organs and remains with twenty-five tattvas. In the sleep state the soul descends to the heart, discards twenty-two tattvas and remains with three only (the vital air, citta and puruṣa). The soul in the turiya state remains in the navel along with the vital air and puruṣa alone. And, last of all, in the turiyātīta, the soul goes to the svādhiṣṭhāna sthāna where it remains with puruṣa alone.

The state of jāgrat etc. are classified in two ways, according as they consist in the soul withdrawing by descending to the atīta state or in its manifesting by ascending back to the jāgrat state. The first of the two consists in the soul going downwards from the brow. This is done in order to remove the fatigue resulting from activity. When fatigue is gone, there is strength to function again. Thus, this withdrawal really leads to performing deeds and generating the seed for births. When the soul returns from turiyātīta to the working state, it is in a position to experience the fruits of karma. By this means, karma is worked out and the

axe applied to the root of births. Yogic states consist in the soul going up from the heart to the twelfth abode and down from Brahmarandhra. When the soul goes down, the attraction of the universe grows less; and the cessation of it is helpful in cutting off births. When the soul goes up, attraction of the universe comes about, leading to births.

Yogic states referred to here are *pratyāhāra*, *dhāraṇa*, *dhyaṇa*, *savikalpa samādhi* and *nirvikalpa samādhi*. *Sakala kevala*, *sakala sakala* and *sakala śuddha* are indicated here.

Reference was made to the five states (*jāgrat* etc.). In the first of these, viz., *jāgrat*, all the five may be seen again. In the act of cognition, they are present like an under-current. Keen observation serves to verify this. Even those who, with the dawning of wisdom become eligible for release are subject to these five states, the difference being that these states belong to the *śuddha* condition of the soul (whereas in the other case it is either *sakala* or *kevala*).

How many *tattvas* are present in each of the five states? In the waking state, all the five (*śuddha vidya*, *Maheśvara*, *Sādākhya*, *Śakti* and *Śiva*); in the dream state, four leaving out the first: in sleep, three leaving out the first two: in *turiya*. *Śakti* and *Śiva* only; and in *turiyātita*, *Śiva* alone. These *tattvas* impel (wherever the *kalās* function) the instruments of cognition. This is *sakala sakala* i.e., *madhyāl avasthā*.⁵⁶

The soul becomes subject to the aforesaid *kāryāvasthās*. These *kāryāvasthās* have *kevala*, *sakala* and *śuddhāvasthās* as their cause. In the *kevala* state, the soul is characterised by the absence of consciousness. When it comes into contact with the instruments, organs etc., given to it by Lord, it passes into the *sakala* state. In this state, its cognition, cognition and affection are partially manifest. In the *śuddha* state, the soul is free from the five *malas*; it unites with *Śiva* and its cognition, conation, and affection have infinite range.

56. The commentators differ in the number of *avasthās* they accept and in identifying them. *Jñānaprakāśar*, e.g., mentions eight *avasthās*; three *kāranā-vasthās* and five *kāryāvasthās*, (these five being: (i) *kilāl avasthās*, (ii) *melāl avasthās*, (iii) *madhyāl avasthā* (iv) *prerakāvasthās* and (v) *nirmalāvasthās*).

Maraijñāna Deśikar says that in the kevala state the soul is like a diamond dropped into an ink-bottle (the diamond's lustre is temporarily lost because ink covers it). In the śuddhāvasthā, the soul, having been freed from impurity (by dīkṣā) and from births, is pure as it originally was.

In the kevala state, the soul has no intelligence, no corporeal form; it is eternal; it has no connection with the eight qualities of buddhi; nor with the kalās; no activity, no mark by which it could be distinguished, no agency, no independence, no desire for enjoyment—yet it was pervasive before it became bound by mala. By 'incorporeal', 'eternal' and 'pervasive' the prior nonexistence of bodies, of changes etc. and of limitation are meant.

In the sakala state, the soul has knowledge resulting from the four modes of speech, has a corporeal form, becomes subject to changes of appearance, associates with the bhogya kāṇḍa (i.e., with kalās etc.), has activities, desires, functions in respect of objects of sense, like sound, experiences pleasures and becomes limited.

In the śuddha state, there is iruvīṇaioppu for the soul (i.e. the soul looks upon the fruits of good and evil deeds with detachment); it has the onset of grace, the grace of the preceptor and the means of attaining jñāna. It is freed from the three malas and from the feeling resulting from the experience of sound etc. It comes to have wisdom that removes the evil effects of pāśa. When the soul is brought to this state, it is in a position to commingle with the Lord.

Since iruvīṇaioppu is mentioned here we shall state the views of the commentators.

Maraijñā Deśikar: When good and evil deeds are balanced, experience becomes impossible for the soul. The soul receives, dīkṣā from the preceptor and settles down to jñāna yoga. As a result of this jñāna yoga, the three malas are cast off, even as light dispels darkness. Parviscience etc. give place to other qualities like omniscience etc. even as Śiva has these. The soul attains the feet of the Lord.

Śivāgra Yogin: Tirodhāna impels the energies of mala. When merit and de-merit become mature simultaneously, the soul has to be in heaven and hell at the same time. And when the

remaining karma and mala become mature, there is the difficulty that two opposed fruits of equal strength cannot be experienced at the same time. So Tirodhāna changes into grace and resides in the soul. Just then, out of His love, Śiva appears as the preceptor, purifies the five kalās and subjects the soul to jñānayoga. As a result of this jñānayoga, the three impurities which have been beginninglessly clinging to the soul and their effects viz., parviscience etc. are removed. The soul enters into a non-dual union with Śiva (Who is the Lord of the soul) and experiences Śiva. This is Śuddhāvasthā. This is twofold owing to the difference between jīvanmukti and paramamukti. The śuddhāvasthā referred to here is the paramamukti kind. Some śāstras say that there is onset of Grace when the fruit of great de-merit like killing a brahmin and the fruit of great merit like performing aśvamedā yāga exactly balance each other. How then can it be said here that with the equality of two opposed deeds, the maturation of all karma and the ripening of āṇava, there is onset of Grace?

Karma is threefold as (i) dr̥ṣṭa janma bhogya (ii) adr̥ṣṭa janma bhogya and (iii) niyatakāla bhogya. The first of these is that which takes effect in the present birth e.g., the homa done with the soma-creeper for long life, putrakāmeṣṭi etc. The second is that which takes effect at the end of this birth, whether in heaven, hell or in another birth. Of the third, the chief of merits is aśvamedā, the chief of de-merits is killing a brahmin. Are not the rest niyatakāla bhogya? When the merit of aśvamedā or de-merit of killing a brahmin is not ripe, but other merits and de-merits are ripe the latter begin to take effect. By the dominance of its mala each karma takes effect in precedence of those that are less powerful than it. So, these are niyatakāla bhogya. The less powerful deeds begin to fructify after the more powerful ones have fructified. If two deeds (a merit and a de-merit) are equally strong, then, if another merit is ripe, it helps the first merit to exclude the de-merit and manifest its fruit: likewise in the case of de-merit, if two deeds are equally strong and ripen at the same time and if other deeds are not ready to manifest their fruits, then both these cancel each other in the manner in which Sunda and Upasunda slew each other for the love of Tilottama, and other deeds take effect. If all deeds are ready to bear fruit at the same time but āṇava has not ripened yet, all the deeds perish and the agent becomes a vijñānakevala. When āṇava also ripens, there is the onset of Grace.

Aśvamedha and brahmin-killing are the cause of one going to heaven and hell respectively. They are mutually opposed, are of equal strength and the cause of merit and de-merit hereafter. In this life, de-merit and merit are the causes for bringing into existence, eunuch and man respectively, and they cancel each other.

Jñānaprakāśar: Iruvinaiooppu is the sense of detachment (or indifference) to the fruits of merits and de-merits alike. This sense is brought about by the ripening of mala. With mala cast off, parviscience and limited activity cease; Sivatva of the nature of omniscience and omnipotence, become manifest and the soul is united to its energy which is equal to Śiva's energy.⁵⁷

57. Nirambavaḷagiār: Kevala denotes the sarva saṁhāra period when all the souls, freed from māyā, mahāmāyā and karma are covered by āṇava. Sakala refers to the period between creation and destruction when the souls become subject to births (84 hundred thousand wombs) and deaths according to their karma. Śuddha indicates paramamukti.

CHAPTER VI

MEANS OF RELEASE

Having established the soul as an intelligent entity which has the capacity to know the Lord (as informed by Him), the Siddhāntin proceeds to show that the soul will not be tempted to exercise this capacity until it is shown the value of knowing the Lord, how to know Him etc.

A prince, in ignorance of his parentage, joins some gipsies loses his independence and dignity and allows himself to be brought up in gipsy ways, unbecoming of a prince. He does not realise that he is a prince and that his father is a king, until the king finds him, takes him away from the gipsies and restores him to his rightful place. Similarly, the soul forgets its essential nature, gets lost in the whirl of the senses, loses its intelligence and suffers, on account of not knowing itself and the Lord. When the soul as a result of certain austerities becomes fit, Śiva, who is the eternal, free, pure intelligence assumes the form of a preceptor, teaches it, destroys the efficiency of mala (so that the soul may get rid of its subjection to the senses) and restores it to its essential state.

The soul's subjection to the three impurities is not open to perception. So, its subjection to the senses is shown, so that the way may be prepared for showing its subjection to the impurities.¹

Śivāgra Yogin says that the objects of sense engross the soul and steal its intelligence. As a result of this, the soul is deluded and remains ignorant of itself and the Lord. He interprets the last line of the verse exactly as it is, 'the soul is brought to the feet of the Lord,' saying that unless this is taken so, the soul

1. Tiruvīṇṇam says that the Lord's way of forcibly taking the soul from the senses is comparable to the practice set forth in Tamil Classics (அகத்திணை-களவொழுக்க மணம்). He cites Māṇikkavācagar's Tiruṇṇam, balakkovai and Kanda Purāṇam (Vallī's Wedding) as illustrating the same.

Maraijñāna Desikar poses a question. Can it be said that the soul was free from pāśa when it was with Śiva and that it subsequently came to be associated with pāśa? No; like the prince, ignorant from his very birth of his position and his parents, the soul is beginninglessly ignorant of itself and Śiva and is beginninglessly associated with pāśa.

is likely to be taken as equal to Śiva and not as different from Him. Because the Lord has feet everywhere, the perfect Lord is the pervader, and the soul, the pervaded. Does not the soul pervade the Lord even after release? Śiva can never be pervaded because whatever the soul pervades becomes inert. Hence Śiva is always the pervader. How, then, can the soul be said to be all-pervader? It is because it pervades and cognises the whole world. Śiva alone is the absolute pervader.

Jñānaprakāśar wonders why those who say Śiva causes souls to come under His pervasion fail to notice that thereby souls will become inert. He asks why those who speak of non-difference between Śiva and the soul by taking the latter to be the pervaded, do not realise that what results thereby is still difference, not non-difference. According to him, non-difference consists in the unity of belonging to the same class. He takes the Siddhānta mahāvākya as a part of Śiva-dīkṣā. According to him, (the Lord's) "feet", must be taken to be Cit-Śakti. Śiva makes the soul cognise, first external objects and then itself, existing as outward-turned and inward-turned Śakti therefor.


Souls are called vijñānakalas, praṇayākalas and sakalas according as they have āṇava alone or āṇava and karma or āṇava, karma and māyā respectively. On becoming indifferent to the fruits of karma, sakalas become fit for the onset of Grace which takes place in four ways-mandatarā, manda, tīvra, and tīvratarā). Śiva appears in the form of a preceptor, performs purificatory rites and removes mala. This is sādharma dīkṣā. The praṇayākalas, being fit for the onset of Grace in two ways, Śiva appears to them in a superhuman form, performs purificatory rites and removes mala. The vijñānakalas, being fit for the onset of Grace, Śiva resides in their intelligence and informs them. In both these cases, there is nirādhāra Śiva-dīkṣā.

Maraijñāna Deśikar likens the appearance of Śiva, when sakalas become indifferent to the fruits of karma, to the act of a marksman who shoots at a suspended object that oscillates, only when it comes to rest. Śiva grants svānandānubhūti to the most fit, giving to others the status of Vidyēśvaras, Mantreśvaras and Rudras.

Śivagra Yogin asks if there is not reciprocal dependence if it is said that the manifestation of Cit-Śakti is dependent on the ripening and removal of mala and the removal of mala on the manifestation of Cit-Śakti. He replies that as sunrise and the

disappearance of darkness are simultaneous without either of them being earlier or later than the other, the manifestation of intelligence and the removal of mala are simultaneous. Vijñānakalas reside above adhomāyā; praḷayākālas in the middle regions of māyā and sakālas in the lower regions of māyā. How can the soul which is pervasive be said to be limited by māyā? So long as souls have not received the grace of Śiva, they are limited by the products of māyā. Ripening of mala is the cause of the onset of energy for all the three classes of souls. The onset of Energy is four-fold thus: The onset of nivr̥tti Śakti is mandatara. The discrimination of the eternal from the non-eternal takes place, followed by the giving up of attachment to sense-objects. The onset of pratis̥ṭha Śakti is manda. The discrimination and non-attachment that arose earlier are then confirmed. With the onset of vidyā Śakti, Śivajñāna shines forth. This is tīvra Śaktinipāta. The onset of śānti śakti is tivrātara. Serenity results from indeterminate knowledge. The onset of Energy stimulates the intuitive vision of the soul. Tirodhāna Śakti which impels mala to make the souls turn towards objects, ceases to do so. Just as a person who has got back his sight yearns for objects of sight, the soul hankers after vision of the Lord's Feet. It is on the lookout for a preceptor who will give it a vision of the Lord.


As the ripening of mala varies for the various souls, the purificatory rites performed by the preceptor are also of various kinds thus:²



2. The commentators give a wealth of details. Maraijñāna Deśīkar, after giving details, refers the reader to *Varuṇa Paddhati*. Regarding the eligibility for the several dikṣās, he says that purification is of many kinds, according to the caste of the person and the extent to which his mala has ripened. He says hautri is not suitable for people of low castes and mentions other kinds suitable to them.

Of these *hautri dikṣā* is that which is unique and possesses all other *dikṣās* as its parts, It is twofold as *jñāna hautri* and *kriyā hautri*. The first is performing the rites by mentally assembling the several things. The second is actually getting the things required and performing the rites.

Śivajñāna Yogin's classification differs from that of the others thus :



Śivagra Yogin gives the following details. *Nayana dikṣā* is of three kinds: (1) *Srñgāra*—as in the case of one who has achieved identity with *garuḍa* by yogic powers, treating a person bitten by snake, by looking at him and drawing off the poison and bathing him in *amṛta kalā* by identification with the moon, to remove fatigue. *Nigrahāvalokana* is performed by the preceptor to remove identification with *pāśa* by his identification with intelligence. *Anugrahāvalokana* is performed for the satisfaction of the soul. *Sparśa dikṣā*—The preceptor performs certain rites to remove the pupil's bondage to make him like Śiva, just as base metals are transmuted into gold. *Vācakadikṣā* is teaching the five sacred letters according to the caste of the pupil. *Mānasa dikṣā* is the preceptor starting from his *recaka* air, and through the pupil's *pūraka* air, reaching the pupil's heart; taking the pupil's intelligence up to the twelfth abode (*dvādasānta*), and in his own heart, mingling it with Śiva's intelligence, imagining this union to be like the mingling of salt with water, and reinstalling the pupil's intelligence in the pupil's body.

Sāstra dikṣā is teaching the nature of *Pati*, *paśu* and *pāśa* in conformity with sound tradition and teaching the union of Śiva with souls.

Yoga dikṣā is teaching the pupil to practise *nirādhāra Śiva Yoga*.

Jñāna hautri is mentally entering the pupil's body, finding in his navel the pit containing Śivāgni and purifying the six *adhvās* by *homa*.

Kriyā hautri is twofold as *sabija* and *nirbija*.

Nirbija dīkṣā (i.e. without *bijākṣara*) is done to people, whose *mala* is ripe but who are unable to perform the religious rites to be done regularly after purification: they are enabled to perform their daily duties according to their capacity, by purifying and removing their *karma* and religious duties. The people referred to here are children, boys, old people and persons addicted to all sorts of enjoyment.³ But these are not entitled to perform *naimittika* and *kāmya karma* (*naimittika karmas* are the rites performed on special occasions like eclipse; *kāmya karmas* are those done to gain a specific purpose). Hence their *dīkṣā* is called *niradhikāra dīkṣā*. Of the three varieties of *dīkṣā-samaya*, *viśeṣa* and *nirvāṇa*, the first two are one (because they are both *nirbija* and *niradhikāra*). *Nirvāṇa dīkṣā* is twofold as *asatya* and *satya*; the former gives release at death, the latter immediately. *Samaya dīkṣā* is initiating a person into a particular religion. *Viśeṣa dīkṣā* is making the person so initiated to do *pūja* etc. *Nirvāṇa dīkṣā* is completely removing bondage and helping the soul to reach God.

Those whose *mala* is ripe and whose life, in addition to being characterised by knowledge of the Scriptures conforms regularly to ethical codes, are eligible for *sabija dīkṣā*. These people are required to do their religious duties only; their *karma* etc. are removed. This *dīkṣā* is called *sādhikāra* because persons undergoing this are eligible for *nitya*, *naimittika* and *kāmya karma*. Because of differences in this *dīkṣā*, those undergoing this are called *sādhakas* and *ācaryās*. *Sabija dīkṣā* done without the removal of the tuft which is of the form of *Tirodhāna śakti* is called *lokadharmini*. This is done for those leading a worldly life. The tuft of those who have renounced worldly life is removed when *dīkṣā* is done to them. This *dīkṣā* is called *Śivadharmini*. These two⁴ are called *bhautika* and *naiṣṭhika dīkṣā* also. *Samaya*,

3. Jñānaprakāśar says that children are susceptible to the onset of Energy but they cannot perform religious rites. They are not widely read and are under sixteen years of age. Youths, inspite of the onset of Energy, are not-well read. Old people, though they may have read, are unable to perform the daily rites. They are above seventy years of age. Women also, inspite of the onset of Energy, are unable to read well and perform all the rites. Some others well-read and subjected to the onset of Energy, are unable to resist the temptation of the pleasures of life.

4. Maraijūāna Deśikar says that they give *apara* and *para mukti* respectively. *Lokadharmini* removes demerit alone; *Śivadharmini* removes merit also. *Sabija* is done along with pursuance of religious duties.

viśeṣa, nirvāṇa and abhiṣeka are included in the two, nirbīja and sabīja.

Śiva comes in the form of the preceptor and performs dīkṣā. Disciples are threefold as uttamas, madhyamas and adhamas. Either by jñāna or kriyā dīkṣā, Śiva purifies the six adhvās for the sake of these. Thus removal of mala is brought about. He informs their intelligence so that He may shine therein; He destroys births. The adhvās are mantra, pada, varṇa, bhuvana, tattva and kalā. The first of these is absorbed by the second, first and second by the third, and so on. Kalā is absorbed by Tirodhāna śakti which is absorbed by Śiva. When Tirodhāna śakti subsides, the soul is freed from mala, births etc., and comes to have knowledge of Śiva.*

Śivāgra Yogin speaks of kriyā, jñāna and sāmabhava dīkṣā. By kriyā dīkṣā, the bondage of karma is removed. Jñāna dīkṣā is performed by *contemplation* done with Cit-Śakti. Sāmabhava dīkṣā is done with Cit-Śakti alone. In this way, adhvās are purified. What is meant by purification of adhvās? Karma (as sañcita) resident in the six adhvās is destroyed.⁶ When karma is destroyed, māyā is removed. The obstruction of āṇava is also removed. By grades of dīkṣā, tattvas are removed, one by one and the soul is restored to its real nature, consisting in pervasiveness and omniscience. It is not as if by the paths (adhvās), the soul moves from one locality to another. Merit and de-merit are acquired (i) by properly pronouncing mantras with the necessary softness, loudness, etc. or failing to do so, (ii) by splitting words with a knowledge of grammar or by splitting without such a knowledge; (iii) uttering the sounds of letters according as they are long, short or lengthened according to the context or failing to do so; (iv) by worshipping the Lord of the world or abusing Him; (v) by helping others with one's sensory, motor and internal organs, enjoying

5. Marajāna Deśīkar. When ignorance leaves the soul, the eight qualities like omniscience are made manifest so that Śivajñāna may be intuited without distinctions. Hara is so called because He destroys (அறிப்பது) the bonds of all souls. It may be noted here that when āṇava is removed, its seven qualities are removed and the eight qualities of the Lord are manifested in the soul.

6. Jñānaprakāśar says that unripe sañcita is discarded and ripe sañcita is made prārabdha, so that, it may be experienced and worked out. The removal of sañcita is the purification of the adhvās.

great (well-earned) riches or doing harm to others and enjoying ill-earned riches; (vi) by worshipping the five śaktis that reside in the five kalās or by not worshipping these.

Mantra, pada and varṇa are the products of śuddha māyā; so they are called śuddhādhvā. Tattva is the product of śuddha and aśuddha māyā. Hence it is called miśrādhvā. Bhuvana is called śuddha, miśra and prakṛti adhva because it is the product of these three māyās. These three adhvas expand into the five, mantra, pada, varṇa bhuvana and tattva. Two mantras (sadyojāta and hṛdaya), twenty-eight padas (om namo nama to Māhādeva), one letter (kṣa), one hundred and eight worlds (from Kālāgnirudra bhuvana upto Virābhadrā and Virābhadrakālī bhuvana) and one tattva (prithivī) are absorbed in nivṛtti kalā (the first of these being absorbed in the second, both in the third and so on). The deity of nivṛtti kalā is Brahmā. In pratiṣṭha kalā two mantras (Vamādeva and Śīras), twenty one padas (Māheśvara to Arūpin), twenty four letters (l to ṭ), fifty six worlds (Anareśa to Śrīkṛṣṇa) and twenty three tattvas (from ap to prakṛti) are absorbed. Viṣṇu presides over pratiṣṭha kalā.

Nivṛtti kalā is the name for Śiva Śakti which helps souls to free themselves from bondage. Pratiṣṭha kalā is Śiva Śakti which establishes souls thus freed from bondage, in the released state.⁷

Two mantras (aghora and śikha), twenty padas (Vyāpin to Dhyānakārāya), seven letters (jña to va), twenty seven worlds (Vāma to Aṅguṣṭharudra) and seven tattvas (puruṣa to māyā) are absorbed in Vidyā kalā, each of these absorbing what precedes it. Rudra is the deity of Vidyā kalā. Two mantras (Tatpuruṣa and Kavaca), eleven padas (nitya yogini to Vyomavyobini), three letters (ga, kha and ka), eighteen worlds (Vāma to Sādākhyā) and three tattvas (Śuddha Vidyā, Īśvara and Sādākhyā) are absorbed in Śānti kalā. Māheśvara is the presiding deity.

Vidyā kalā is Śiva Śakti which helps the soul to get intuitive experience (anubhava jñāna) in addition to inferential and scriptural knowledge. Śānti kalā is Śiva Śakti which brings about calm where the souls who have had intuitive experience have desires, aversions and resolves.⁸

7. Māpādīyam, p. 175.

8. *Ibid.*

Three mantras (Īśāna, Hastra and Mūla mantra), one paḍa (om), sixteen letters (a to ḥ), fifteen worlds (nivṛtti to sāntyatīta 5, indika to anāśṛta 10) and two tattvas (Śakti and Śiva) are absorbed in Sāntyatīta kalā. We find eleven mantras (Sadyojāna etc.), eighty one padas (Śivāyanama etc.), fifty one letters (kṣa etc.), two hundred and twenty-four worlds (anāśṛta etc.), thirty six tattvas (prthivī etc.) and five kalās (nivṛtti etc.) in all.

Śāntyatīta kalā is Śiva Śakti which helps the soul to get rid of the desires etc. which were previously kept in a calm state.⁹

The Lord removes āṇava mala and āgāmi karma by His Jñāna Śakti; this is like light removing darkness. In order to cause āṇava to ripen, He makes the souls experience karma, done with their thoughts, words and deeds, which now exists in the six adhvās. When the souls become fit, the Lord appears as the preceptor, destroys sañcita and purifies the adhvās. To sum up, āṇava and āgāmi are removed by jñāna Śakti; sañcita and the products of māyā which support sañcita are removed by kriyā śakti; and prārabdha is removed by being experienced.

The Siddhāntin proceeds to state how, because of association with pāśa, souls undergo births. Because the five malas (āṇava, māyā, karma, māyā's products and Tirodhāna Śakti) reside in the souls, these in accordance with them and on the command of the Lord, pass through countless births, visiting heaven, earth and hell, like an unsteady kite and fire ring (which in a moment revolve countless times).

Souls are born from eggs, sweat, seed and womb. We can classify them as (i) celestials, (ii) human beings, (iii) animals, (iv) birds, (v) those that crawl, (vi) those that live in water and (vii) plants. From these seven kinds emerge 84,00,000 variations;¹⁰

9. Māpāḍiyam, p. 175.

10. Nirambavaḷagiār accounts for them thus:

Egg	—	25	hundred thousands
Sweat-born	—	10	” ”
Seed-born	—	19	” ”
Placenta-born	—	30	” ”
	—	84	” ”

Maraijñāna Deśikar says that souls begin their career as plants and go through progressive births as insects, birds, animals etc. and finally as human beings.

and from these, countless more variations. If a soul is able to avoid all other births and is born as a human being, it is like a person crossing the ocean by swimming. Birth as a human being alone gives the opportunities to put an end to the endless cycle of births and deaths.

Even if one is born as a human being in a land where there are similar beings, it is rare to be born in a place where the Vedas and Āgamas are in vogue. If one is so born, it must be as a result of great merit. Even then, it is rare to be born in a high caste which will afford facilities to perform penances, etc., and not in any of the low castes. Even if one is so born in a high caste, it is rare to follow the perfect faith and not any of the outer faiths.

Though born in a good family and in a high caste, it is very rare to be an adherent of the Śaiva religion, avoiding conceit likely to be engendered by high birth, youth, erudition, wealth and authority (note this insistence on avoidance of pride of high birth etc. while indicating their value) and escaping the opposite of these. Those who, instructed in the great Siddhānta worship the Lord Who wears the crescent, get rid of their mala and attain release.

A special birth, (in human form) is required to worship Śiva Who is bathed with the five things.¹¹ He is contemplated by the mind; praises are uttered with words; He is worshipped by exercising the body in a certain manner. Such a worship is not possible in any other birth. The celestials, like Viṣṇu, come to this world, because Śiva cannot be worshipped in this manner elsewhere. Those born as human beings, seldom realise the uniqueness of their birth and the facilities it offers for release. As Śivāgra

We are reminded of the following lines of Tiruvācagam :

புல்லாகிப் பூடாய்ப் புழுவாய் மரமாகிப்
பல்விருகமாகிப் பாம்பாய்ப் பறவையாய்க்
கல்லாய் மனிதராய்ப் பேயாய்க் கணங்களாய்
வல்லகராகி மனிதராய்த் தேவராய்ச்
செல்லாநின்ற இத்தாவரச் சங்கமத்துள்
எல்லாப்பிறப்பும் பிறந்தினைத்தேன்.

11. Instead of the usual list of cow-dung etc, another, consisting of milk and its products, has been suggested in an article in *Sentamil Celvi* (15, 6), The writer of the article finds support for his view in the hymns of *Tevāram* where there are frequent references to ஆனைந்து.

Yogin reminds us, they donot realise that if release is not sought for in this life, it will be rare to attain it everafter.

Though birth as a human being is so rare, when it does occur, we find that its duration is uncertain, like that of a bubble. Death may occur while still in the womb; or soon after birth; there may be growth for a time, followed by death; one may grow into a boy and die; or die as a youth; or live up to old age and die. Thus, if the human body is ever threatened with destruction from the pre-natal state, it is only those who know its impermanance that can resist its charms and try to attain release while they have the body wherewith to make the trial.

The intelligence in the body cognises objects one by one, not all at once. Even that one is cognised with interruptions, not continuously. Even this cognition is non-existent in sleep and the swoon state. Moreover, riches acquired for the sake of the body perish soon after acquisition or intermittently just like an illusion or a dream. Those who realise the impermanence of intelligence and wealth can resist their charm.

The 'great ones' who use sandal paste, etc., wear sweet smelling garlands and are followed by their retinue, while they are borne on palanquins, to the accompaniment of the beat of drums, etc., are like the dead, because filled with their own self-importance they remain speechless and have parted company with good sense. Those who realise this, can resist the charms of wealth and high position in worldly life.

The Siddhāntin proceeds to draw a contrast. If Śiva is worshipped even once, He will give His worshippers such imperishable riches that even the celestials will have to bow to them. As contrasted with this, there is material wealth gained for the sake of the extremely shortlived physical body. Man spends his intelligence and energy for the sake of this wealth. People who realise this truth, avoid the humiliation of going after the rich who are like corpses, in order to earn money. When people follow the rich (who are carried and who conduct themselves as though they are dead), they are like the walking dead!

We may note in passing that the Siddhāntin has expressed forcefully the need to make the most of our human birth which affords us a unique opportunity to work out our salvation. This is sufficient answer to those who find in the Hindu doctrine of

countless births no urgency to use present life to advantage but a tendency to encourage postponement of endeavour to win release, to a future life.

The Siddhāntin says that human beings have to pass through numerous births before they are born as Śaiva Siddhāntins. They resort to the outer faiths, the inner faiths, the Smṛtis, āśrama-dharmas, penances; they study the several sciences, Vedas, Purāṇas, Upaniṣads, before they become Siddhāntins. Even as Siddhāntins, they have to pass through the stages of caryā, kriyā, and yoga before they attain jñāna whereby they reach Śiva. So it is clear that salvation is worked out by stages, not all at once.

Jñānaprakāśar takes a catholic view. He says that though for supreme release, Śaiva Siddhānta is necessary, the followers of other faiths also can achieve this end, because release depends on the ripening of mala which is an essential condition. The temporal sequence relating to faiths, is not a condition of release.

Release for the followers of other faiths consists in their attaining the tattvas from prithivī to nāda. For the Lokāyatas, heaven is tasting the pleasures of sex-life with a sixteen-year old girl. For the Mimāṃsakas, it is enjoying the pleasures of svarga (hereafter) by performing yāgas. etc., in this life. The Sautrāntikas say that it is a total destruction of the five skandhas; the Jains, that it is the attainment of eight qualities, like infinite wisdom; the Vaiśeṣikas, that it is being like a stone; the Sāṅkhyas, that it consists in discrimination; the Śīvasamavādin and others say that it is graded release as in attaining Śīvarūpa (which is their real form).¹² Release, according to the Siddhāntin who

Ātmavādins, ranging from the Lokāyata on one side to the Vedāntin on the other, are all engaged in the activity of finding out the self. Knowledge of self is the basis for the knowledge of Śiva, sought by the Śivavādins. The time for the Ātmavādins to attain supreme release consisting in equality with Śiva and resulting from the ripening and removal of mala is measurable, i.e., these Ātmavādins are within measurable distance of the goal. Hence, the means employed by them for attaining release are fruitful, not unavailing.

Faiths and books dealing with release are many and opposed to one another. Which is the best of these faiths and what is the work dealing with it? Faiths other than Śaiva Siddhānta are like the blind people who went to see an elephant. Each feeling a particular part of the elephant's body came to the conclusion that the elephant was like the part he had touched. To one who is not blind, it will be evident that each of these was right partially and that the truth of the matter comprises all the details given by each. Even so, that faith, which without rejecting the findings of other faiths, embraces them all is the true faith. Vedas and Āgamas brought into existence by the Lord have as parts of themselves, the findings of other faiths partial though they may be. Hence, the Vedas and the Āgamas are the important scriptures. They are dependent on Śiva.¹³

Śivāgra Yogin says that the knowledge given by the Vedas and the Āgamas culminates in Śivajñāna which is perfect knowledge. Because Śaivism is supported by the Vedas, it is called *Vaidika Śaivism*. Because it deals with sāyūjya it is called *Uttara Śaivism*. Because there is no other faith to object to this, it is called *Siddhānta Śaivism*.

Books are classifiable under the following heads: (i) original (முதல் நூல்), (ii) based on an original (வழி நூல்). (iii) drawing

13. Maraijñāna Deśikar says that the Vedas and Āgamas contain statements of primary and not secondary validity-hence-they have a distinctive value.

Jñānaprakāśar says that compared with Śiva Śakti which is knowledge, Śivāgama itself is imperfect as depending on words etc. Nīrambavaḷagiar says that the true faith is that which declares the twenty seven other faiths to have been originated by the Lord to meet the demands of souls of various stages of spiritual development. Śaivism, Vedas and Āgamas and, Śaiva Siddhānta are the important among faiths, scriptures and philosophies respectively.

from both the original and what depends on the original (சாந்நுநூல்) and (iv) books dealing with *prima facie* views. People, unable to understand the Vedas and Āgamas fully, take over only so much of these as they are able to understand and they develop them into systems with questions and answers. Since these systems belong to faiths other than Śaivism, they are called *pūrva-pakṣa* works. Smṛti, purāṇa, kalās (technical works) and upāgamas being works written by persons who have understood Vedas and Āgamas are called *vaṇinul* (வாநிநூல்,—dependent on an original). Āgamas like Garuḍa and Dakṣaṇa and, Vedāṅgas like Sikṣā and Kalpa sūtras being works written to help persons to understand Vedas and Āgamas are called *Cārpunul* (சாந்நுநூல்).

Vedas and Āgamas¹⁴ are the original of all works and were brought into existence by Śiva. For the reason that from them all other works are derived, they alone are given prominence. Why are two originals given out by the Lord instead of one? Because the Lord loves all, He has given two, one for all the people (ordinary people) and the other for those who have been blessed with the onset of Energy. Veda is like a sūtra and Āgama, like its bhāṣya. So, Vedas and Āgamas are treated as general and special, as sūtra and bhāṣya. Śivāgamas deal with subjects required as the necessary complement of the karma kāṇḍa of the Vedas. Works dealing with the *prima facie* views, other than those of the Vedas are called *pūrva pakṣa* works; Āgamas, setting forth the conclusions of the Vedas are the Siddhānta.

The commentators explain this matter at some length. Maraijñāna Deśikar says that even though Śiva's utterances are one, differences as general and special are introduced because of differences in the eligibility of the aspirants. Hence they are treated as fully perfect and partially perfect. This is like the difference between man and cat, the latter being able to see in the night also, although the nature of the eye in both the cases is the same. So, Vedas are meant to be studied by Brahmins and others, the followers of four āśramas and followers of Smṛtis, like Manu's. Āgamas are only for those who have had the onset of Energy in one of four

14. Śivāgra Yogin says that Āgamas like the Kāmika are the original for other Āgamas, because they have been originated by the Omniscient One. Śiva is the one independent author (nirapekṣa); others are authors only as dependent (sāpekṣa) on Śiva and influenced in various degrees by desires, aversion etc., Hence the others are not entitled to credence.

ways, have received *dikṣā*, and are fit for learning the truth. Vedas having many parts, deal with the finite souls, *avidyā* and other things. In the Vedānta, the nature of the faultless Lord is not clearly stated. Āgamas deal with all the three entities.

Śivāgra Yogin says that Vedas are general because they prescribe the worship of all the deities from Sūrya to Īśvara; Āgamas are special in that they prescribe the worship of Śiva only. Vedas are for those who perform sacrifices and their daily duties, desiring *puṇya loka*; Śivāgamas are meant for those who by the onset of Energy are led to desire *sāyujya*. Vedas prescribe worship but do not specify the means of doing it, means ranging from invoking to installing the deity, from festival to bathing in holy waters. They do not consider the views of the Cārvākas and others (*pūrva pakṣa*); neither do they refute them. Śivāgamas consider these and also the faultless hidden meaning of the Vedānta. Thus there is no fundamental difference between Vedas and Āgamas. Śivāgra Yogin says that it is the duty of the preceptor to explain without contradiction the (seeming) differences between Āgamas and the Vedas.

Jñānaprakāśar says that Vedas and Vedānta are *pūrva-pakṣa*. Āgamas deal with matters beyond the reach of the Vedas and topics of the Vedānta¹⁵ that do not conflict but accord with the Siddhānta.

Śiva comes in the form of a preceptor and subjects mature souls to purification by look, etc. He immerses them in the ocean of wisdom and enables them to have Śivānanda. Even in this birth, he removes their malas, makes them *jīvanmuktas*, prevents further births and finally helps them to attain His feet. It is through the Siddhānta that all these can be achieved. Upamanyu and Agastya have said in their Vāyu Samhitā and Śiva Gitā that Siddhānta is the direct means of release. There are people who

15. By Vedānta, the Upaniṣads are meant, not any school of Vedānta. Maraijñāna Deśikar says that the *jīvanmukta* is always immersed in the Ocean that is *svānandānubhūti*.

Śivāgra Yogin: Soul does not pervade Śiva but Śiva pervades the soul. Śiva protects the soul even after release. He states the Śivasamavādin's view. It is only up to release that the soul remains dependent on the Lord and is protected by Him; at release it becomes independent and does not require to be protected; there is manifestation of Cognitive Energy but no experience of the bliss of Śiva.

Jñānaprakāśar says that the Lord makes the souls owners of Energies which are equal to His Energy, that is pure and unexcellable.

do not realise it and consequently with false notions arrive at false conclusions. The result is that because of such a sin, they go to hell. They suffer from a huge delusion.

Śiva alone has omniscience, omnipotence, and infinite grace. That He has infinite wisdom is evident from the fact that He is the author of the Vedas and Āgamas. He is omnipotent because He metes out pleasures and pain to those who follow the Vedas and Āgamas and those who do not. Because He destroys good and evil karma by making souls experience pleasures and pain, we infer His Grace. The Lord Who has three attributes natural to Him, is capable of causing a soul to become a jivanmukta in one birth and making it attain release by purifying it by a look, immersing it in the ocean of wisdom and granting it bliss.¹⁶

The way of attaining the feet of Śiva is fourfold: dāśa mārga, satputra mārga, saha mārga and sanmārga, these being known as caryā, kriyā yoga and jñāna also. These lead to sālōka, sāmīpa, sārūpa, sāyūjya.¹⁷ The first three are called graded release (partial release). Release attained by jñāna is sāyūjya (complete or perfect release).

Śivāgra Yogin says that the best of the four is satya neṛi (sanmārga), as the others occasion rebirth after a long time.

Dāśa mārga enjoins the following observances; cleaning the temple, smearing the floor of the temple with cow-dung, weaving garlands of different kinds of flowers for adorning the idol of Śiva, uttering the praises of Lord,¹⁸ lighting the temple lamps, maintaining flower gardens and offering one's services to any devotee of Śiva. Those who do these merit śivalōka (sālōka-living in the same world as Śiva).

Putra mārga prescribes worship in the following way. Getting ready flowers, incense, light, water, (for bathing the idol),

16. Jñānaprakāśar says that some Vedānta Śaivites speak of omniscience, omnipotence and infinite grace as constituting the nature *per accidens* of Śiva. The pure Śaiva Siddhāntin affirms that these constitute His nature *per essence*.

17. Jñānaprakāśar says that each of these has four (sālōka-sālōka etc.), thus there being sixteen in all.

18. Maraijñāna Deśikar says that praises of Śiva are to be sung both in Sanskrit and in Tamil in rāgas suitable to the hour of worship (like bhūpāla);

food (for offering), etc., the devotee has to perform the five kinds of purification.¹⁹ Then a seat has to be made out of mūlamantra for Śiva to occupy. He is to be contemplated as having occupied it, externalised (as of the form of light), worshipped with true devotion and willingly praised. Homa is to be performed daily. The fruit of such worship is the attainment of sāmīpa (nearness to Śiva). Worship here relates to the form-formless aspect of Śiva.

Pursuit of saha mārga requires fulfilment of the following: The senses are to be turned away from their objects; inhaling and exhaling must be controlled, vital air must be directed along suṣumnā when activities of manas cease; the sequence of mantras for the six ādhāras like the mūlādhāra must be learnt; the deities presiding over these ādhāras are to be worshipped. Ajapā, existing in the form of Śiva can be seen in the six ādhāras. Uniting with the deities like Vināyaka, one must go up from mūlādhāra to Brahmarandhra. The lotus in Brahmarandhra must be made to blossom. The nectar flowing from the lower part of Candramaṇḍala is to be circulated within the body; and contemplation of light that takes within itself every splendour is to crown all these. Those who thus perform yoga, having eight parts in order to destroy karma attain similarity to Śiva's form.

Finally, we come to sanmārga. One has to study all the arts, purāṇas, karma kāṇḍa in the Āgamas and the literature of other faiths before arriving at the conclusion that these are all inferior. Then one has to study by oneself the jñāna śāstras which set forth the nature of Pati, paśu and pāśa defined *per accidens* and the nature of Pati defined *per essence*; hear the truths about these expounded and reflect on them. One who without distinctions into knower, knowledge and object of knowledge, has knowledge of unity with the impartite, eternal, pervasive, existent, intelligent and blissful Śiva non-differently attains sāyujyā which is supreme release.

Śivāgra Yogin says that knowledge is to be attained by studying the Vedas and understanding the import of Vedānta. Women, Sūdras and Brahmins merely by birth, not being eligible for Vedic studies are to read the purāṇas. Those who have received Śiva

19. Jñānaprakāśar says that they are related to ātman, sthāna, dravya, mantra and linga.

dīkṣā can study śāstras like the Kāmikāgama and learn about faiths like Cārvāka. By the preponderance of jñāna, souls obtain experience of Śiva to their lasting benefit. The author of the *Siddhi-yār* exhorts us to follow sanmārga so that we may also have such an experience.

Jñānaprakāśar raises an important point. Is there abolition of the distinctions into knower, knowledge and object of knowledge in dhyāna? He refers to Patañjali who says that samādhi is not svarūpa śūnya but is *like* svarūpa śūnya. In dhyāna, these three exist but are not cognised explicitly. Śivatva previously obscured by mala becomes manifest. It constitutes the essential nature of the soul.

There are five ways of worshipping Śiva: (i) karma yāga, (ii) tapa yāga, (iii) japa yāga, (iv) dhyāna yāga and (v) jñāna yāga. The first four are productive of enjoyment. Studying philosophical works, causing others to study them, causing others to hear, hearing them oneself and learning their import—these constitute jñāna yāga. This alone leads to supreme release. Those who know this truth practise jñāna yāga.

Of the aspects of jñāna yāga mentioned here, learning, causing another to learn, to hear—these occur even without a preceptor. Hence real jñāna relates to hearing, reflecting, coming to a conclusion and becoming subject to trance. Those who observe this sequence attain release. Those who, without observing these, have the adhvās purified for them by dīkṣā and fulfil only the first three aspects of jñāna (learning etc.) experience pleasures by reason of their accumulated merits and have graded release. When, however, their merits are exhausted, they are re-born in good families and with the help of a preceptor, attain release by fulfilling the conditions of jñāna yāga.

Śivāgra Yogin gives the following details: *Hearing* the nature of Pati, paśu and pāśa expounded by the preceptor, *examining* along with one's fellow-pupils, the definitions given so as to ascertain if they are free from the defects of non-pervasion, over pervasion and inconsistency; *resolving* after determining the nature of the three substances that pāśa must be removed, Pati attained and that the soul must part company with pāśa and attach itself inseparably to Pati; *gaining* bliss by uniting inseparably with Pati—thus the exercise of jñāna is fourfold. Those who have missed

this state go to prakṛti maṇḍala; having the merit to attain sālōka-sāmīpa and sārūpa, they experience pure pleasures. Though they have such experience, their mind is not set on pleasures. They have trance experience there, owing to the Grace of Śiva, and remain as jīvanmuktas up to praḷaya, when they attain supreme release. If they are unable to have trance there, on account of their enjoyments, they are re-born in a Śaivite family and with the help of a preceptor, attain sāyūjya — unity with Śiva non-differently.

Jñānaprakāśar says that it is not proper to say that some souls return to this world. Since there is the saying, 'There is a preceptor in each and every world', there is no return to this world. Remaining in the worlds they reach, they are looked upon with favour by Śrīkaṇṭharudra guru, Sadāśiva guru and others and thus enabled to attain supreme release.

Those who give gifts, perform yāgas, bathe in sacred waters, perform the duties of their station, engage in penances and expiatory rites, fulfil vows and do karma yoga, go to the celestial regions, experience pleasures and return to this world. Paśu puṇya thus is not productive of lasting benefit. Those who follow the caryā, kriyā, and yoga mārgas (conformity to these constituting Śiva puṇya) attain graded release. They remain in this state for a long time. If, at the time of destruction, the Lord does not grant them grace, they will have to return to this world, follow jñāna mārga and attain supreme release. It is clear therefore that the fruits of caryā, kriyā and yoga are not graded release merely but supreme release ultimately.

Some follow the path of devotion instead of the path of injunctions. The gift they give to Śivajñānis, though ever so small, is capable of becoming infinitely big. Thus they are enabled to attain sālōka etc. and experience the pleasures thereof. They are rescued from the ocean of births and deaths, by the hand of Grace and freed from their bondage. They are enabled to take birth in a high family that will help them to perform penance. They pass through the stages of caryā etc. easily and quickly until they come to jñāna mārga. Following this, they attain release which is being united to the Feet of the Lord.

It is said here that souls pass through caryā etc. quickly and easily. To say that they can dispense with these altogether is to run counter to the earlier statement that jñāna mārga is reached

through caryā, etc. As the fire hidden in fuel becomes manifest and hides the fuel when friction is applied to it, Śiva's cognitive and conative Energies concealed in the soul illuminate the soul's cognitive and conative Energies and shine therein, when the soul fulfils the duty of hearing the scriptures etc.²⁰

The four Vedas, eighteen purāṇas and twenty eight Āgamas declare that jñāna alone is the special means of attaining release. It is difficult to convince those who treat dikṣā or the five yāgas and similar karmas or bhakti as the means of release. Whatever is not jñāna is ajñāna, and by ajñāna, not release but bondage results. Ajñāna loses its efficiency in the presence of light. When ajñāna is removed, bondage is removed—this is the state of release. Thus, it is jñāna that is the unique means of release. Even in jñāna, jñāna advocated by the Sāṅkhyas, Māyāvādins and others are pāṣa and paśu jñāna. So, these also bind instead of liberating. The jñāna of Śiva's feet alone is jñāna capable of leading to release.

Maraijñāna Deśikar gives references for the declaration that release can be gained by jñāna: in the Rig (the Rudrasūkta); in the Yajur Veda (the Bṛhadāraṇyaka); in the Sāma (the Chāndogya). In the Atharvaśiras, release is said to be gained by the intuitive realisation of Íśvara. The Śaiva purāṇas and Sūtasamhita as well as Suprabhedha and Śivadharmottara declare jñāna to be the means of release. How can jñāna be said to be the means of release, when it is denied and karma affirmed instead in Āgamas like Sarvajñānottara and purāṇas like the Skānda—when these say that release is through Śiva dikṣā? Everything going by the name of kriyā is instrumental to the dawning of jñāna. Āgamas like the Parākhyā and Devikālottara say that caryā, kriyā and yoga are subsidiary to jñāna. The view stated here is the same. The wise ones say that supreme jñāna is attaining the Feet of the Lord, having omniscience manifested and experiencing svānandānubhūti.

Explaining the Siddhāntin's position, that mokṣa is through jñāna, not through caryā, kriyā or yoga, Śivāgra Yogin criticises the Pūrva Mīmāṃsakas who say that release is through yajñas

20. Śivāgra Yogin observes that even without performing caryā etc. Śivasāyujya which is the means of getting Śivaprakāśa, can be gained by giving gifts to Śivajñānis. This is evidently to praise the greatness of Śivajñānis.

etc., and the Pūrva Śaivas who say that it is through dikṣā karma, as people of inferior intelligence. In his opinion they are not likely to get happiness. The karma that they advocate is done with the products of māyā which is ajñāna.

The presence of the sun causes the burning glass to emit fire. When the preceptor appears to impart knowledge, the soul comes to have knowledge. With the dawn of knowledge, Pati appears in an indeterminate way; paśu appears indeterminately in Pati; and pāśa of the form of the world appears indeterminately in paśu. The state of the Lord as the atom of atoms and the universe of universes is made manifest.

When, on the ripening of mala there is onset of Energy, the knowledge gained by hearing, ripens. The seeker after release hears either from his preceptor or from an elder fellow-pupil of his, the order in which he has to practise reflection about what he learns. Entering into the spirit of the subject he practises reflection with appropriate reasons and examples. Those who desire to do this and attain to a state of trance are devoid of likes and dislikes. They treat a potsherd and a piece of gold alike. They are like jīvanmuktas. Because the Infinite Intelligence and finite intelligence merge in Śiva in an advaita union,²¹ in the manner in which the light of the sun and the light of the eye mingle, they intuit Śiva alone in a way that is mid-way between savikalpa and nirvikalpa.

If, by the grace of the preceptor, knowledge and ignorance, which are both pāśa are removed, knowledge to be gained by hearing is properly gained by one's intelligence; if it is reflected upon in the proper way and if there is withdrawal from the internal organs, then the nature of the Lord will appear different (from that of the soul), because of difference in substance, at the time of hearing. It will appear non-different from the different things of the universe, at the time of reflection, because it pervades all these different things. When clarity is attained, (after hearing and reflection), the Lord's nature will be seen to be neither of these but, because He is the atom of atoms and the

21. Maraijñāna Deśīkar calls this union anādyanta samavāya. Jñāna-prakṣar: The knowledge that existed as the very breath of the soul comes out as the peerless preceptor to save the soul. Jīvanmuktas treat potsherd and gold as alike coming from prakṛti. In their union, not their's but Śiva's intelligence functions. The soul intuits nothing whatever of the universe; its intuition is wholly of the blissful nature of Śiva.

universe of universes, (smaller than the smallest and bigger than the biggest), it will be seen as united to all these while, at the same time it is unattached to any of these and therefore different from all.²²

Śivāgra Yogin says that Śiva who, in the soul's state of bondage is like ghee in milk manifests His nature, like ghee in curds. Though he appears in the soul, He is not supported by it. Śiva is intuited in the soul through Parāśakti, not as different but as non-different from it. In this state, there is no union with paśu karaṇas, neither is it a stage without any knowledge as in kevala. Its positive feature is that associated with Śiva karaṇas, the soul desires Śivānanda.

Merit causes the soul to go to heaven to enjoy pleasure; de-merit causes it to go to hell to experience pain. By jñāna pūja consisting of deeds like studying philosophical works, reflecting on them etc. there results clear understanding with whose aid merits and de-merits (which bring about limitation of the pervasiveness of the soul) are to be destroyed. When the cause is thus destroyed, there are no more journeys to heaven or hell. Ceasing to be under the influence of the instruments, the soul mingles with the pervasiveness of the Lord. Where the sun rises is a matter of

22. The lines of the text are:

அறியாமை அறிவுகற்றி அறிவினுள்ளே
அறிவுதனை அருளினுலறியாதே யறிந்து
குறியாதே குறித்தந்தக்கரணங்களோடும்
கூடாதே வாடாதே குழைந்திருப்பையாகில்
பிறியாத சிவன் தானே பிரிந்து தோன்றி
பிரபஞ்ச பேதமெல்லாந்தானாய்த் தோன்றி
நெறியாலே இவையெல்லாமல்லவாகி
நின்றென்றுந் தோன்றிடுவனிராதாராயே.

Cf. its striking similarity to the following;

அறிவறியாமை இரண்டுமகற்றி
செறிவறியாய் எங்கும் நின்றசிவனைப்
பிறிவறியாது பிரானென்றுபேணுங்
குறியறியாதவர் கொள்ளறியாரே

Tirumandiram

It is the first half of the former verse that has been praised by St. Tāyumanavar thus: பாதிவிருத்தத்தால் இப்பார்விருத்தமாக உண்மை சாதித் தூர் and by the author of the *Śivabhoga Sāra* as follows:

பார்விரித்த நுலெல்லாம் பார்த்தறியச் சித்தியிலே
ஓர் விருத்தப் பாதிபோதும்.

It is presumed from St. Tāyumanavar's verse elsewhere (under the Mouna Guru section), that it was Siddhiyār, he was taught at the time of his initiation. See Muthia Pillai's commentary, pp. 387-8.

indifference to such a soul.²³ It attains jivanmukti in the present life. With the destruction of its body (which is like a vessel that retains the smell of asafoetida previously stored in it) it becomes (in the state of supreme release) like unto the Lord in its pervasive intelligence, even as when dirt is removed, the whiteness of cloth pervades all the cloth.

To those who have achieved jñāna niṣṭha, there is neither good nor evil. Even if they engage in activity, they do so without caring for its results. They need not perform the ceremonials prescribed by their religion. They need not perform penances. Conformity to resolves and to the duties of their station in life is not necessary in their case. It is not necessary that they should practise contemplation etc. Their citta is not agitated. They need not put on the insignia of their faith. Seizing or giving up of sense objects, is alike unnecessary. They need not control their internal organs. Subordination of rajas and tamas and the exercise of sattva are not necessary. Concentration on any particular object is not obligatory. Practice of the dharma of their community can be dispensed with. Coming to have the qualities of children (who wholly fail to do these), mad people (who do these fitfully) and people possessed by spirits (who are actuated by something foreign to themselves), they may even give themselves up to singing and dancing by reason of their ecstasy.²⁴

Though śivajñānis may, with ease and without the necessary place, time, seat etc., perform difficult deeds; though they may be subject to the changes of walking and standing, sleeping and waking, eating and fasting, sitting and lying down, purity and blemish, poverty and riches, pain and pleasure, sexual enjoyment and anger, desire and aversion and similar opposed activities inducing changes in them, they remain unaffected by the changes and

23. cf. the line of Tiruvācagam

இங்கிப்பரிசே ஈமக்கெங்கோன் நல்குதியேல்
எங்கெழிலென் ஞாயிறெமக்கேலோ ரெம்பாவாய்.

Tiruvembavai.

Nirambavāgiar says that the sun will change the direction of its rise if vice increases in the world. This change will affect the ordinary people, but not the jivanmuktas.

24. Śivajñāna Yogin says that there is nothing obligatory the jñānis have to do or prohibitory that they have to desist from doing, because whatever they do is penance (தவம்). Yet jñānis are seen to conform to certain practices so as to set an example to the people of the world.

never get away from the Feet of the Lord (because what they do is really different from them).²⁵

Śivāgra Yogin says that jīvanmuktas are like the wind which whether it blows as the cool, sweet, south wind or as a terrific gale, never goes away from the sky. Because prārabdha is of various kinds, it is difficult to determine the nature of jīvanmuktas. Some of them may appear to be short-tempered some free from desires, others lustful and so on.²⁶

Because of the influence of habit, some may not be able to do away with the distinctions of 'external' and 'internal' and attain to a state of trance wherein everything is perceived as the same (i.e. without distinctions); they may not be immersed in the Lord's perfection. When such people perceive the world as something external, they must try to realise at the same time that the Lord is both internal and external to the world. If this is also impossible, they must control their internal organs and with the help of their preceptor, direct them on a single object and thus intuit the Lord. When He is so intuited, paśu karaṇas are to be treated as Śivakaraṇas. They must endeavour to bring about in this sakala jāgrat state, characterised by the functioning of the instru-

25. of the following:

பேய்போற்றிந்து பீணர்போற்கிடந்திட்ட பிச்சையெல்லாம்
நாய்போலுருந்தி நரிபோலுமுன்று நன்மங்கையரைத்
தாய்போல்கிணந்து தமாபோல் அனைவர்க்குந் தாழ்மை
செய்போல் இருப்பர் கண்டிர் உண்மை ஞானந் தெளிந்தவரே
படிமுழுதும் விண்முழுதும் தந்தாலுங் களியா
பாலரோடு உன்மத்தார் பிசாசர்குணம் வருமே
Tāyūmānavar.

26. The following verses bear a close resemblance to the ideas expressed by the Siddhāntin.

காமமாதிகள் வந்தாலும் கணத்திற்போம் மனத்திற்பற்றா
தாமரைமயிலை தண்ணீர்போல் ஜகத்தொடுங் கூடிவாழ்வார்
பாமரரெனக் காண்பிப்பர் பண்டிசத்திறமை காட்டார்
ஊமகுமாவருள்ளத்துவகையாம் ஜீவன்முத்தர்

Kaivalya Navanitam.

பேதகன்மத்தால் வந்த பிராரத்துவம் நானாவாகும்
ஆதலா லின்பதுன்பம் அவரவர்க்கானவாகும்
மாதவஞ் செயினும் செய்வர் வாணிபம் செயினும் செய்வர்
பூசலம் புரப்பர் ஐயம் புகுந்துண்பர் ஜீவன்முத்தர்
சென்றுது கருதார் நாளைத்தோர்வது நினையார் கண்முன்
நின்றது புசிப்பார் வெயில்கிலவாய் விண்விழுது வீழ்க்கும்
பொன்னினசவம் வாழ்க்காலும் புதுமையாதொன்றும்பாரார்
நன்றுத்தென்றார் சாட்சிநடுவானஜீவன்முத்தர்.

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ments, nirmala turiyātīta wherein no instruments function. If they so endeavour, they may have experience of Śiva as their experience. 'Śivānubhavam suvānubhūtikamām' (words of the text) means that Śiva's experience becomes one's own experience.²⁷

Those who have reached atīta even while they are in the jāgra state (because in this jāgra, their paśu karaṇas are treated as Śivakaraṇas) are equal to those others who, discarding the instruments have attained trance. It is not possible to estimate the merits earned by these people in their previous life. Because even in this life, they have got rid of their attachment to life and have united with Śiva (by existing non-different from Him), they are themselves Śiva (worthy of being worshipped as Śiva). Even if such people rule the world as crowned kings and derive pleasure from the company of women, they are inwardly free from all attachment. Hence they are not to be treated like the people of the world with whom they share the functions of eating etc. On the other hand, those who have not removed this inner attachment, but have removed external attachments,²⁸ become subject to births because their karma never decreases. By external renunciation, there is no release.

It is necessary to note here that the word 'even' is significant in the statement. 'Even if such people rule the world' etc. It does not mean that jīvanmuktas do conduct themselves in such a manner. It only means that even if they were to do so, they will have no real attachment.²⁹ The construction 'even if they do so' really warrants the meaning that they will not do so.

Maraijñāna Deśikar says that even as the fishes do not acquire the quality of salt even though they live in the sea, jīvanmuktas

27. *Maraijñāna Deśikar* : Union with Śiva lasts for the space of a wink or the time taken to milk a cow or by an arrow to reach its destination. When trance is successfully achieved, there arises in the soul bliss equal to that of Śiva. He explains Śivānubhūti thus :

அநு—பின்புண்டாக ; பூதி—ஆனந்தமாயினும்ஐசுவரியம் என அறிக.

28. cf. the strong language of the Gītā :

Karmendriyāni samyamya ya, āste manasā smaran

Indriyārthān vimuḍātma mithyācaraṇ sa ucya-te-III, 6.

29. It is a peculiarity in Tamil language which warrants a negative interpretation, as when Parimelaḷagar interprets the Kuraḷ couplet “மறப்பினும் ஒத்துக்கொளலாகும்” to mean that there is to be no forgetting. ‘மறத்தலாகாது என்னுங் கருத்தான் “மறப்பினும்” என்றார்’

are without attachment to their bodies even though they are associated with them. He cites the case of Saint Sundaramūrti who was free from attachment, though outwardly he seemed to live a life of sensual pleasures. Śivāgra Yogin emphasises the idea of service to humanity. Jīvanmuktas, though free from bondage, exist in this world and act for the benefit of humanity. Jñāna-prakāśar expresses this idea by saying that jīvanmuktas hinder hindrances to release.

It is difficult to describe the sexual happiness that two people experience. Those who actually experience it know what it is, but a virgin cannot know it. Only those who have the Lord's grace know themselves and the Lord in a way transcending the use of instruments. Immature people who cannot know in this way, do not know that happiness either. So, there is no way of making them understand it. (Like the crystal that loses its clarity when it is in the vicinity of many colours), the soul that, deluded by the nature of tattvas from kalā to prithivī, does not know its own nature, cannot know Śiva who is the soul of the soul. Hence, the position of the Śivasāṅkrāntavādin who says that with the help of the instruments treated as Śiva's instruments, Śiva can be known is untenable. It may be said that without instruments nothing can be known by means of grace alone. But so long as the instruments which are limited, persist, limited perception also remains, births will not cease—nor āṇava, the cause of births be removed.

Maraijñāna Deśīkar says that supreme bliss consists in the soul, after it gets the grace of the Lord, mingling with Śiva. Unless there is the realisation that assumptions as to the nature of Śiva taught by the preceptor for contemplation are not real, unless there is the knowledge that what is non-assumptive, what is permanent and what transcends turiya is the supreme bliss, the travail of births and deaths will not cease, nor will āṇava be removed. Śivāgra Yogin takes the pūrvapakṣin here to be the follower of Kaṇāda (who does not know the bliss of release). The pūrvapakṣin says that when dissociated from instruments, the soul is like a stone. Repudiating this view, Śivāgra Yogin proceeds to state the Siddhānta with an illustration. Though a girl of sixteen (like a full moon with all its sixteen digits) may be beautiful and well—read in 'Kāma śāstras', she does not know the delights of sexual relation. Unlike this (unilateral condition), where we have reciprocal love as between husband and wife, there is the realisation of the pleasure of sex. Even then, just as a

dumb person cannot describe his dreams to others, there can be no description of these pleasures. Similarly, there can be no experience of bliss except where the soul and Śiva unite. That bliss is known only to the wise ones who have experienced it; others cannot appreciate it. Śivāgra Yogin stresses the need for Śivajñāna to intuit Śiva and the soul. Can not ātmajñāna serve this purpose, just as well? There is a resolve in saying, 'I shall know by ātma jñāna'. So soon as there is a resolve, there is doubt. Doubt is not non-difference. How else is there intuition of Śiva and the soul? The soul realises non-difference from Śiva, through svarūpajñāna (when Śiva's parāśakti informs the soul and the soul's cognitive psychosis absorbs Śiva and jīva).³⁰

Crystal reflects the colour of its surroundings. The soul, likewise, identifies itself with the senses with which it is associated. In either case, there is identification with the respective general qualities. When the soul learns to discriminate its general from its specific quality (as when the crystal shines in its own splendour instead of reflecting other objects) by realising that the nature of the senses is only its general quality, there is the attainment of Śiva Who manifests Himself in the soul's nature. The soul is never more embodied³¹ even as a river that breaks its bank mixes forever with the sea.

The Siddhāntin states here clearly that reflecting pāśa is only the general quality of the soul, that its special quality consists in remaining in its own nature as intelligence which is similar to Śiva's intelligence. Maraijñāna Deśikar specifically says that the beauty of the soul is in remaining pure. In the light of the mid-day sun, the crystal shows itself as different from its surroundings. So, also the soul sees itself as different from the senses when it attains the Feet of the Lord.

30. Jñānaprakāśar says that when paśu karaṇas are moved, there result intuition of the self, Śiva and the elixir of perfect Śiva intuition through Śiva karaṇas consisting of the soul's Cit-Śakti illumined by Śiva Śakti as the illuminator. This cannot be achieved by the intellect.

31. Maraijñāna Deśikar quotes Tevāram கலந்த பின் பிரிவுமில்லை (which occurs in the verse beginning தொண்டலாற் றுணையுமில்லை) to emphasise the soul's non-return to saṃsāra.

Śivāgra Yogin says knowledge perishes in three instants. So it is nonreal. One can intuit one's real nature which is of the form of intelligence through Śivajñāna.

Jñānaprakāśar states the position very clearly. The qualities per essence of the crystal are whiteness etc. but the crystal exhibits redness etc. which are the qualities of a China rose that may be near it — these being its qualities *per accidens*. The soul has paśutva (i.e. being bound by mala) and (Śiva's) Śivatva as its qualities *per accidens*; and it shows these as if they were its qualities per essence. The realisation of their difference comes about when Śiva-Śakti manifests itself in the soul's Cit-Śakti. It would be Māyāvāda to maintain that the qualities of the five senses are false. These are the soul's qualities *per accidens* and are unlike Śivatva etc. which are its essential qualities. Paśutva, jivatva etc. are the essential qualities of pāśa. The discriminator of Śivatva must realise that these qualities are adventitious to the soul but natural to mala etc. It is not proper to speak of occupation, separation and association in connection with incorporeal substances. There is identity-in-difference relation between Śiva and the soul. The relation to Śivatva is a relation that obtains between two entities belonging to the same class. Thus there is relation between Śiva and the soul. There is no recurrence of paśutva and (Śiva's) Śivatva as delimiting adjuncts. The saltiness of water is due to adjuncts, while (the soul's own) Śivatva is not due to adjuncts. The water has to go to the sea or some salty place to become saltish; while the soul comes to have Śivatva, even where it is; hence the simile is not on all fours. Jñāna prakāśar thus tries to square up to an extent, the analogy of the river mingling with the sea with the natural pervasiveness of the soul. It should be noted in this connection that Jñānaprakāśar treats Śiva's Śivatva also as different from the soul's Śivatva and therefore as adventitious to the soul as paśutva.

If the soul and its instruments are all Śiva (there being thus non-difference between Śiva and souls), there need be no attempt on the part of the soul to leave the sakala state characterised by association with instruments, and attain the Feet of the Lord. If it is maintained that not everything is Śiva, that will be a detraction of the Lord's capacity to pervade and control everything. So, it is like neither of these. Śiva is like the soul that occupies the body. Although soul exists alike in all the five senses, the other four senses cannot, like the sense of sight, pervade distant things; they can pervade only such things as come under them. Likewise, though Śiva pervades everything He manifests Himself in the soul but does not do so in the instruments. The soul must give up the knowledge given by instruments and attain the Feet

of the Lord. This, when achieved, is like the eye regaining its light as well as the light of the soul when the defect obscuring its sight is removed. Thus the Lord appears as the life of the soul's intelligence, not as the life of the partial knowledge given by the senses.³²

The Siddhāntin is quite alive to the problem of how Śiva's infinity or pervasiveness can be held consistently with the independent existence of other things and shows with an illustration that pervasiveness means control over things and not exclusive existence.

Śivāgra Yogin states the pūrvapakṣa thus : If Śiva is all-pervasive, there need be no fresh union with Him. If He is the inner dweller, how is it He is not intuited ? The Siddhāntin replies that defect in vision is removed by collyrium or by the grace of God. Then both the light of the eye and the sun become manifest. It need not follow that the inert universe by reason of Śiva's presence should become intelligent. Only the soul can cognise ; inert entities cannot. Though an intelligence, the soul, too, cannot cognise by itself. By the grace of Śiva's jñāna śakti, the soul's (cognitive) psychosis functions in respect of objects of sense. This knowledge will not lead to release. This is like a staff given to a blind man. It helps the soul through kalās, etc. to perceive objects of sense.

The Siddhāntin proceeds to reply to the question whether the soul will reunite with the senses once it has known the Lord. Those who desire to unite with Śiva with unceasing love and attain atīta, remain for ever in śuddhāvasthā. When a stone is flung at the moss-covered surface of a tank, the screen is temporarily removed but it covers the surface again the next moment. Similarly, mala, māyā and karma leave the soul when it contemplates Śiva but come back to it when the soul ceases to contemplate Him. This is due to residual impressions (of pāśa) Because of these residual impressions, the souls oscillate between Śiva and instruments.

It has been said that release is attaining Pati and that the means thereto is jñāna. The Siddhāntin proceeds to show how jñāna is to be achieved.

32. Maraijñāna Deśīkar says that because of equality in respect of good qualities, there is affirmation of samarasibhāva which is like the mingling of milk with milk. Because this union goes with difference the union is compared to that obtaining between the light of the eye and the light of the sun.

The Supreme Lord cannot be intuited by *pāṣu jñāna* or *pāśa jñāna*. He can be contemplated in one's intelligence only by *Pati jñāna*. When He cannot be so contemplated and when the soul is unable to remain at His feet, the soul must realise that the universe which is responsible for creating attachments (to objects of the universe) is of the nature of a mirage. When the soul sets aside the universe with this reflection, it gains *Pati jñāna* and is restored to His feet. Even when *pāśa* is thus removed, its residual impressions may have their influence on the soul. To counteract this influence, the soul must take to uttering the five sacred letters which remove *pāśa* and vouchsafe *Pati*. If the soul utters the five sacred letters, Śiva will illumine the soul's intelligence and give Himself to it.

It must not be forgotten in this connection that the universe is compared to a mirage only for the purpose of weaning the soul from attachment to it. Besides, the *Siddhānta* is that the universe in its state *as effect* (consisting of the inert many) is non-real.

What is *pāśa jñāna*? It is the knowledge occasioned by the universe of sounds (manifestations of *vaikharī*, like the Vedas, Śāstras, *smṛtis*, *purāṇas* and *ajapā*) and the universe of things like the *tattvas* from *prithivī* to *nāda*. This knowledge is limited. *Pāṣu jñāna* is the knowledge of the soul, expressed in the proposition, "I am Brahman". The soul, after realising that it pervades the objects of *pāśa jñāna*, comes to this conclusion, as a result of the arrogance engendered by such a realisation.³³ This is *Śiva-samavādā jñāna* in as much as the soul (which is *ādimukta*) is taken as equal to Śiva (Who is *anādimukta*). Why should the soul be not treated as equal to Śiva? The soul is subject to the embodiment of gross, subtle and perfect bodies. It knows things only through a study of books. It perceives objects through the several sense-organs, not all at once but one at a time. Hence the soul is an *ādimukta*. Śiva who needs none to inform Him and is eternally free from association with sense-organs is *anādimukta*.

33. Śvāgra Yogin says that when *pāśa jñāna* is removed there is an endeavour to eliminate everything that is not the self and to find out the self. It is not realised that intuition of the self takes place only through *Pati jñāna*. Since the intuition of the self cannot be removed, there arises a feeling, 'This is myself; since there is nothing above this self, I am Brahman.'

Is the study of philosophical works useless, then? No; the study is of help in the manifestation of Patijñāna.³⁴

Granting that the knowledge, 'I am Brahman' does not lead to release, cannot the absence of instruments constitute release? If this be the case, then because souls are without instruments when they occupy spawn, eggs, wombs and trees, they must also be said to have attained release. Thus the Pāṣāṇavādin's position is untenable. Release may be said to be the withdrawal of the intelligence from the self instead of allowing it to function through the sense-organs. This is like the shadow of a man falling under his feet at noon. Even this view is defective. For in death, sleep, swoon, control of birth and unconsciousness induced by poison, there would be release on this view. This is clearly not the case. The two views examined here also constitute paśu jñāna. The souls must intuit themselves and Śiva Who destroyed the three towns³⁵ (i.e. the three malas) if they want to get rid of pāśa. Those who do not do this, cannot cast off their bonds.

Śiva cannot be attained by means of vāk or kāya (these constitute pāśa jñāna). The soul wonders whether it is skin or blood or flesh or nerve or bones or ovum or semen or an aggregate of the sense-organs and thus fails to realise its own nature in a perfect way. This constitutes paśu jñāna. Patijñāna is that which is self-luminous and reveals both itself and others. Patijñāna removes the soul's doubt regarding its nature. It is by Patijñāna that Śiva can be intuited.

The eye which illumines other objects does not know itself or the internal organs. The external instruments like buddhi and vidyā tattva (which is the internal instrument) illumine other objects but do not know themselves or the soul which informs them. The soul which knows other objects knows neither itself nor the Lord Who informs it. Śiva without any help, knows both Himself and the souls as they are. Śivajñāna is both self and

34. Patijñāna is explained by Maraijñāna Deśikar as the vision of those who have received the divine light.

35. cf the following lines :

அப்பனி செஞ்சடை ஆதிபுராதனன்
முப்புரம் செற்றனன் என்பர்கள் மூடர்கள்
முப்புரமாவது மும்மலகாரியம்
அப்புரம் எய்தமை யாரற்றவாடு.

It must be noted here that Śiva is said to destroy the *effects* of the three malas.

other-luminous. It requires no instruments and is itself the illuminator. If this Śiva-jñāna is taken as illuminator and Śiva is worshipped, pāśa will be removed. Even were pāśa to reassert itself, it will suffice to practise contemplation of Śiva and be united to the knowledge of His Feet.

Jñānaprakāśar explains thus : It is Patijñāna that reveals the three entities—Pati, paśu and pāśa. Śiva's Śakti is the natural eye of Śiva and the artificial eye of the soul. This Śivaśakti illumines the natural eye of the soul and reveals the nature of Śiva and also His nature as the life of the soul. Śiva is in a relation of inherence with His Śakti which is the manifestor of the soul's Cit-Śakti. Hence Śivaśakti is the eye of the soul in a figurative sense. The soul's Cit-Śakti must be made to shine like Śivaśakti and must be supported by it.

How is Pati-jñāna to be gained? Merging oneself in a symbol indicated by the preceptor, one treats the objects of enjoyment in the eight worlds (i.e. words from Kālāgni to Anāśṛta) abounding in aṣṭa siddhi which is eight times greater than the aṣṭa siddhi of the paisāca pada, as vomited food and despises them because these have been already experienced. When the shape of the wall is observed, the figure drawn on it is not observed. So also when the three kinds of universe that fall under the six adhvās are covered up in their cause, viz., māyā, they are to be treated as gross non-reality. If such a vision of things persists He Who has nothing above or below Him, Who has no quality whereby He could be determined, Who cannot be felt by anyone, Who has no attachments and Who is of the nature of intelligence will manifest Himself in the intelligence of the soul. When the Lord so appears to the soul, great love is felt for Śiva (just as a poor man will love with all his heart, wealth unexpectedly given to him). At this stage, Śiva also helps the souls without desiring anything for Himself. Śiva causes svānandānubhūti to arise in the soul's Cit-Śakti.

Śivāgra Yogin gives details. If non-attachment to the world arises, Śiva Himself will grant grace. The soul stations itself in Śivapada and despises the wealth, etc. of Brahmā and others because they are the evolutes of upper and lower māyā. The eight psychic powers relating to the padas from Pāśupada to Brahma-pada, relating to the eight tattvas (prithivī, ap, tejas, vāyu, ākāśa, manas, ahaṅkāra and buddhi) are also spurned. Śiva creates an unquenchable desire in souls to experience Him (Śivarāga) and

through this desire manifests Śivānanda which excels the pleasures of all the worlds from the earth to satyaloka, excels all the pleasures from those of men to those of Brahmā. Then He unites non-differently with the soul.

Jñānaprakāśar is very careful not to render the words of the Text வெறும் பொய் as utterly false, as thereby, the eternality of māyā would be compromised. He consistently expresses the view that the world *appears* as false. Other commentators are less alive to this danger. To repeat what we said earlier, the statement that the world is false must be viewed in its context and in the light of the purpose for which it is made.

The soul erroneously cognises itself either as its body or, when its body is removed, as Śiva. But it must realise that it is not pāśa which comprises body etc. which are objects of demonstrative knowledge. It must know that it is not Pati Who transcends demonstrative knowledge. Knowing itself as different from both Pati and pāśa, it casts off the latter. Although as an entity the soul is different from Pati, there must be contemplation of Śiva as the soul (just as the magician identifies himself with the garuḍa in contemplation) in such a manner as to sink difference and merge the one in the other, even as the light of the eye and the light of the sun merge. This can be achieved by reason of the soul's nature to identify itself with the Lord and the latter to unite with the soul. In contemplative identification of the magician with garuḍa, the latter appears non-differently in the former and removes poison caused by snake bite. Even so, Śiva appears non-differently in the soul, removes the soul's impurities and makes the soul pure. It is this contemplation which the ancient Vedānta means when it advocates contemplation expressible as 'That I became' (அது நானானேன்).

In the foregoing, the Siddhāntin treats both, the view that the soul is the body (materialism) and the view that there is only one soul—the Infinite (absolutism)—as wrong.

It is the soul's nature to depend upon something else—if it does not depend upon pāśa, it needs must depend upon Pati. When the soul realises that it is different from Pati, it does not fall back to its old state of claiming an independent existence but subsides in the great intelligence, and depends upon it. Just as the efficiency of the mantras as well as the magician are required for garuḍa bhāvanā, for advaita aimed at in Śivohambhāvanā,

the condescension of the Lord to unite with the soul and the desire of the latter to merge itself in the former avoiding inclination to assert its independent nature, are both necessary. By implication (in the sense that unless they persist there can be neither the dependence of the soul on Śiva nor the union of Śiva with the soul) we have in the advaita state the existence of the cognitive activities of both Śiva and the soul, without either or both of them ceasing to exist.⁸⁶ There are some who are unable to understand the true advaita state wherein Śiva and the soul exist inseparably. Some of them explain "That I become" by saying that one thing is lost and becomes another. Some others advocate Kevalādvaita — that "I" and "It" have exclusive — non-exclusive implication. That is, when we say that the same person who was a bachelor in Madura is a recluse in Benares, we exclude the different places of abode and the different stations of life in which we find the same man but affirm his identity. Even so, excluding the de-limiting adjuncts of the finite self and of Īśvara, Brahman is affirmed to be the sole real. There are yet others who say that Pati denoted by 'It' is varied, all such variations refer only to the One which gets differentiated into the finite selves and the universe. These are variations of Pati, like different qualities of one substance. Each quality can be spoken of as a subject of a figure of speech. These people accept soul and pāśa as different from God. They interpret advaita to refer to the existence of only one God. They are called Viśiṣṭādvaitins.⁸⁷ All these people accept the Vedāntic declaration. "That I become" and advaita as ex-

36. Śivajñāna Yogin quotes the following lines in which the poet has expressed his wonder at the uniqueness of this relation :

உன்றன் குலமிரண்டென் குலமிரண்டுங்

குறுக்டாவண்ணம் இன்பமாயென்பாற் கூத்தையுங்

கொண்டதெப்படி

Ulakuḍai Nāyanār.

37. cf. the following: "Since Rāmānuja identifies the relation here involved (i.e. that between soul and God) with that between the body and the soul, his conception of the Absolute may be described as that of an organic unity in which as in a living organism, one element predominates over and controls the rest. The subordinate elements are termed viśeṣaṇas and the predominant one viśeṣyas. Because the viśeṣaṇas cannot by hypothesis exist by themselves separately, the complete whole (viśiṣṭa) in which they are included is described as a unity. Hence the name Viśiṣṭādvaita. (Viśiṣṭāntara bhāva eva aikyam) Hiriyanna. *Outlines of India Philosophy*, p. 299.

The same writer says of Rāmānuja that "his teaching is more like what is described as Brahma-paripāma vāda than Brahman-vivarta-vāda." *ibid* p. 353.

plaining the relation between the two. To show that 'advaita' is not to be understood in any of the senses in which these people understand it, Śivajñāna Yogin says, that it must be understood as it is set forth by the Siddhāntin. To those who study Vedānta and Siddhānta properly it will be evident that there are three entities, Pati, paśu and pāśa. The first two, though separated by pāśa can unite when pāśa is removed and when paśu whose nature is to reflect its environment takes Pati as its environment. The relation with pāśa can be sundered but not that with Pati. By garuḍa in the example, not the bird, but the mantra svarūpa that is the presiding deity of garuḍa is meant.³⁸

The soul is dependent on the Lord and the Lord unites with the soul. So as to maintain this relation in Śivohambhāvanā, the soul must realise, in uttering the five sacred letters, its nature as Śiva's possession and Śiva's nature as its possessor. His sacred form also must be known to be constituted by the sacred letters. Aṅganyāsa and karanyāsa must be performed with the five letters. Heart, navel and forehead are to be imagined as the places of worship, homa and contemplation. In the heart, Śiva is to be worshipped with the five letters. In the navel, homa is to be performed with the five letters. Occupying the centre of the eye-brows, Śiva's form is to be contemplated, and depending upon His Grace, the sacred letters are to be mentally uttered. Those who can thus practise Śivohambhāvanā, utter the sacred letters and perform pūja, etc. mentioned above will be able to intuit Pati in their souls. Pati cannot be known by pāśa and paśu jñāna by which only pāśa and paśu can be known. Pati appears to the soul in the same way in which Rāhu and Ketu (which are invisible while the seven other grahas are ordinarily visible) appear during eclipses in the sun or the moon.³⁹

38. Nirambavaḷagiār says that the Siddhāntin shows how tattvam asi can be explained in such a way as to recognise two entities. Śivāgra Yogin says that the Vedic declaration 'soham' is not to be taken to mean the existence of one thing only. By the experience of inseparability, the statement "That I am" is made. It is only dullards (he says) who treat Śiva and soul as equal while these are different.

Jñānaprakāśar draws attention to the need for the practice of Vedānta Sohambhāvanā based on Siddhānta Sohambhāvanā in addition to treating the world as false.

39. Maraijñāna Deśikar quotes the following couplet

ஊனநடனம் ஒருபால் ஒருபாலாம்
ஞானநடன்தான் நடுவேநாடு.

Tiruvārūṇpāyan.

Una naṭana signifies mala and tīrodha. Jñāna naṭana signifies Śiva and His Grace. In between there is the soul. In the pañcākṣara (which refers to

How is Śiva to be worshipped in the lotus of the heart? The lotus is the seat on which the image is to be installed. The bulb is *prithivī* and it is in the navel. The other twenty three *tattvas*, *ap* etc. start from the navel and constitute the tube which is about eight inches high. The *vidyā tattvas* (products of *aśuddha māyā*) and *śuddha vidyā* constitute eight petals. These eight petals have the eight letters of *praṇava*. We have sixty four pollen from *Īśvara* and *Sādākhyā tattvas* which have sixty four variations. *Śakti tattva* is the seed of the lotus and is of the form of the fifty one letters. On this lotus, Śiva as the possessor of *Śakti* is installed. It is Śiva who grants release. Hence He should be worshipped.

When Śiva is said to be of the form of the five letters, as One Who must be worshipped in the soul and as the possessor of *Śakti*, the *Siddhāntin* refers to the gross, subtle and extremely subtle forms of the Lord. He Who is greater than the universe and is beyond the reach of the instruments assumes the smallest of forms and resides in the souls so that they may work out their salvation. Worship in which there is not awareness of this fact is useless.⁴⁰

When a mirror is polished with a certain powder, dust covering its surface will be removed and its brilliance made manifest. Even so, when the soul performs *antaryāga pūja*, Śiva will be manifested in the soul to an ever-increasing extent. Sandal paste, flowers, incense, camphor, bathing the image, food for offering and other articles for worship are to be mentally assembled for this worship. *Arcana*, *homa* and *dhyāna* are to be performed by *jñāna*. When Śiva manifests Himself in response to this worship, the soul's *āṇava* will be removed and the soul will be made pure. Hence this *antaryāga* must be treated as a means of release.

Maraijñāna Deśikar treats this *antaryāga pūja* as *jñāna yoga* which brings about supreme release and interprets the various articles used therein thus: Sandal indicates non-attachment to enjoyment. The eight flowers are non-violence, control of external

Sadāśiva who is *sakalanīṣkala*) the soul comes in the middle. Because Śiva removes the soul's *pāśa* and grants it grace, the soul becomes His possession. *Śivāgra Yogin* explains how the soul is taken to be the servant of Śiva from the fact that it utters the five sacred letters. The meaning of *pañcākṣara* is this: Salutations to Śiva. He Who is saluted is the master and he who salutes is the servant.

40. *Śivāgra Yogin* gives a few details and refers the reader to the *Kriyā Dipikā* for more details.

organs, control of internal organs, compassion, wisdom, truth-speaking, penances and freedom from mental impurities. For offering incense, manas is the vessel, vital air is the fire and garva is the incense. Because the intellect illumines everything, wisdom is light. Bathing the image signifies integrity. Pratyāhāra which is nectar is the food-offering, i.e. making the mind reside in the heart after withdrawing it from the external organs. When Śiva is ceaselessly contemplated, He (Who exists non-differently with the soul) manifests Himself.⁴¹

If, in addition to mental worship, one wishes to worship Śiva externally as manifested in a particular form, one must collect the necessary articles without troubling oneself or others for this purpose. Flowers that have fallen off from trees, water from a lake or a tank and food voluntarily offered, constitute the articles for the worship of Śiva. Those who thus worship Śiva must be free from such thoughts as institute difference between external and internal manifestation of Śiva (difference which most worldly people observe), and such as make one eligible for merits and demerits. The real devotees do not make distinctions but perceive Him in everything and act, inspired by His Grace. External worship is a part of the worship of Śiva.⁴²

41. Jñānaprakāśar explains that removal of mala precedes manifestation of Śivatva. Antaryāga is preceded by self-purification and is at the root of śālamba śiva yoga. Starting on this path, one is led through nirālamba śiva yoga to complete liberation from pāśa. Hence śālamba śivayoga is to be adopted, (then relinquished) then nirālamba śivayoga (wherefrom results final release) is to be taken up.

42. Śivāgra Yogin. Though the soul has been ignorant of Śiva for countless ages, when taught by the preceptor, it knows itself as His servant. External worship is of kṣaṇikalinga or bāṇalinga given by the preceptor. Worship may have defects of superfluity or deficiency in respect of articles of worship, contemplation etc. The devotee must have the feeling that everything is Godgiven and that he has no agency.

Jñānaprakāśar: External worship is necessitated when continuity of trance is disturbed and when one is mentally worried. (This commentator thus stresses the psychological need for something concrete to help concentration, when it is not possible without external accessories. It becomes evident that external worship is not idolatry but is a preparation for and instrumental to, something higher viz. mental worship. Consistent with his Śivasamavāda, he says that the notion of the Lord as ஆண்டவன் (Ruler) refers to worship. In samādhi resulting from nirālamba śivadyāna, the soul is autonomous and equal to Śiva. Description of the soul as servant will not apply to this state).

Śiva is everywhere—He is without the distinctions of internal and external. But His presence is differently perceived by different people. To the worldly ones, He is totally non-manifest like fire in fuel. To those of mandatara malaparipāka, He is partially manifest, remaining hidden but existing as one with them like ghee in milk.⁴³ To those of mandamala paripāka, He is manifest if they carefully observe Him and is with them, like juice in fruit. To those of tīvra malaparipāka, He appears clearly manifest though He exists as inseparably one with them like oil in sesame. It is certain that if He is worshipped everywhere either mentally or externally, He will grant His Grace. Even so, worship in the soul through knowledge of Śiva's Feet (mental worship) is necessary for those who would have the residual impressions of mala removed. If Śiva is thus worshipped, He will manifest Himself, completely remove the residual impressions of mala and grant the soul all the wealth of His great bliss, making the bliss the soul's own, making the soul like Himself, just as fire makes iron appear red.

The eight qualities of the Lord are: (1) independence, (2) flawlessness, (3) natural intelligence, (4) omniscience, (5) freedom from mala, (6) boundless benevolence, (7) omnipotence and (8) bliss. The soul on account of its advaita relation with the Lord, has these eight qualities, in the place of āṇava's seven qualities.⁴⁴

Maraijñāna Deśīkar says that Śiva's pervasiveness is not limited by His manifesting Himself in those that worship Him. When we say that the soul comes to have these qualities, what we mean is that the soul ceasing to subsist as a result of pāśa-transformations, subsists in its own real form.

Śivāgra Yogin observes that 'advaita' is established here with many examples. Śiva removes parviscience and heteromony of the soul and causes omniscience and omnipotence (which are His qualities) to shine, thereby making the soul engage in activities. Thus Śiva leads the soul through the state of jīvan mukti to that

43. St. Appar விதிகில் தீயினன்பாலிற்படு நெய்போல்
மறைய நின்றுளான் மாமணிச் சோதியான்.

44. Qualities: 2 & 3 are sometimes included in 4 and 5 and thus sometimes the qualities are referred to as six. All the eight, however, can be brought under sat, cit and ānanda.

of paramamukti wherein He establishes satya, jñāna etc. (which are His qualities) completely in the soul.

Jñānaprakāśar maintains that the analogies (fire-fuel etc.) are not total but partial only. If they are treated as complete, all the relations referred to therein must be predicated of Śiva. The result will be to make Him mutable and inert. Moreover, such a view will lead to Ekātmavāda. These relations (samyoga) must not be used in respect of Śiva. The analogy of fire and iron is also not complete. It applies only in respect of similarity consisting in the manifestation of Śivatva. If taken as complete, it will lead to Śivāveśa and Kāpāla faiths. That would not be Siddhānta, as that would give us only definition per *accidents* and *not* per essence of the soul. On the removal of mala, Śiva causes the Śivatva of souls to shine forth.

We shall mention some salient points before we close this chapter. Dīkṣā plays a prominent part, as something positive is considered necessary to remove āṇava which for the Siddhāntin is also positive. But the emphasis all the time is on jñāna,⁴⁵ a feature common to the best Hindu thought. Caryā, kṛiyā etc. are considered preparatory stages, leading to but not constituting final release. Even in caryā etc. we find insistence on the development of moral qualities and spiritual fervour.

Whether it is the act of gathering flowers or the art of yogic union (which is called Śiva yoga to distinguish it from haṭha yoga) the prevailing feeling is one of devotion to the Supreme. As exemplars of the four paths, the four samayācāryas are mentioned, though it may not be permissible to think that what Appar, Sambandhar and Sundarar attained was not final release but the preliminary grades. Their worldly life was an example to others of the three paths but not their spiritual life which stood for the highest as could be glimpsed from their hymns. Tevāram and Tiruvācagam, (like the Prabandam of the Ālvars) constitute, if we may say so, the Tamil upaniṣads. They have indicated the paths which, aspirants according to their capacity, eligibility etc. are to follow.

45. Appar sings—

ஞானத்தால் தொழுவார் சில ஞானிகள்
 ஞானத்தால் தொழுவானுனை நானலேன்
 ஞானத்தால் தொழுவார்கள் தொழக்கண்டு
 ஞானத்தாய் உன்னை நானுந்தொழுவனே.

CHAPTER VII

PERTAINING TO RELEASE

Though Śiva resides in the soul as one with it in the state of bondage, He is not seen apart from the soul but unites with and follows the soul's ways. Even so, when the soul unites with Śiva and exists as one with Him, it must exist as non-different from Him (i.e. in such a way that it cannot be seen apart from Śiva) and follow the ways of His grace. If it can achieve this union with Śiva, then there will be no egoism. Śiva will take upon Him self all the good and evil done by the soul that unites with Him. Because the soul is in the service of Śiva, it is free from heteronomy consisting in being influenced by the sense-organs. Śiva takes the good and evil done to the soul as done to Himself, in order that the soul may be freed from births. Because the soul serves God by being with Him, the good as well as the evil it does, becomes service of God. Again, the good and evil done by this soul are auxiliary causes leading to an increase of merit and demerit acquired by others through doing good and evil to this soul. As accumulation and experience of karma, no longer bind the souls *sañcita*, *māyā āṇava* cease to affect the soul.

By presumptive implication we understand that this man's good and bad actions are auxiliary to the increase of merit and de-merit of others who have done him good and evil. Those who have missed the drift of this argument say that the good and evil done by the soul are transferred to those who do it good and evil. On this view, what happens to others' own good and evil karma? So, this is not correct. Moreover the law that each should experience the fruits of his deeds will fail. Such a view will conflict with statements which praise the good acts of a Śivajñāni, that even a mustard grain of such acts will be equivalent to a mountain. To make it clear that it is only in the sight of the worldly people that the soul's deeds appear as good or evil, the author of the *Siddhiyār* says, "all the good and evil he has done in the *world*".

Śivāgra Yogin gives an entirely different interpretation. As could be seen from his *Śivaneṭiprakāśam*, he says that of the many ways to release, the most important are *jñāna*, *prapatti* and *bhakti*

(bhakti is twofold, as inward and outward). He takes up prapatti for consideration here. He says prapatti is giving up agency for deeds and acting under the influence of Śiva. In the manner of a kitten depending upon a cat, he who surrenders himself to Śiva, acts feeling that not he, but Śiva, is responsible for his actions. Even if the soul that has surrendered itself commits heinous crimes, knowing them to be such, Śiva treats them as having been done on His command. It is true that karma acquired is not exhausted except by being experienced. Paddy cultivated by one oftentimes is not used by that one but by some one else. Even so, the good and evil done by the soul that has surrendered itself to Śiva, affect those who do it good and evil.

Jñānaprakāśar observes that merit and de-merit arising in buddhi as the result of good and evil done by the samādhimān are fruitless like seeds sown on barren soil. Merit and de-merit of others earned by doing good and bad deeds in respect of the samādhimān were figuratively said to come to those who do him good or evil. To say instead that they attach to others will be suicidal for the Siddhāntin who will be furnishing a helpful example to the Saṅkrānatvādin who holds that Śivaśakti attaches to the released soul.

There will be reflection characterised by Śiva (as in Soham-bhāvanā) and carried out with the awareness that Śiva comes first and that the soul will live as equal to Him and as under the influence of Śiva according to the Śivavacana.

Samādhi samatāvasthā jīvātma paramātmano.

When the soul achieves Śivasamādhi prescribed by Śiva, it remains as Śiva. It is not proper to say that on account of dāśānuṣṭāna practised by the soul, it ceases to act of its own accord and its individuality is destroyed. Even in samādhi, the individual persists in the background, though as free from the psychoses of ahaṅkāra and de-limiting adjuncts; pāśa is removed and Śivatva manifested. Even what is forbidden, when done by such a soul, becomes what is prescribed as it happened in the case of Caṇḍeśvara.

When egoism (like "I did this", "Others did this" and "This is mine"—ahaṅkāra and mamakāra) engendered by mala is removed by jñāna consisting in treating the soul as one with Śiva and when the soul places itself under the control of Śiva, the Lord

manifests His real form and appears directly before the soul. Merit and de-merit will cease to affect the soul, and becoming service of the Lord, they will serve as auxiliary causes to increase the merit and de-merit of those who do good and evil to the soul. On the other hand, to the soul that feels itself responsible for its action, there will be no manifestation of Śiva. It will be made to experience the fruits of its karma and accumulate āgāmi even in experiencing these fruits. Unless there is separation from finitude caused by being united to the instruments of māyā, egoism will not be removed.

Some say: It is enough to have a vision in which the soul is itself the cogniser, cognition and the object of knowledge. Why should the soul remain as one with Śiva in addition to this? The Siddhāntin's reply is that release can be attained only by remaining one with Śiva and thus removing egoism.

Jñānaprakāśar says: Śivabhoga is the result of Śiva yoga. Ignorance consists in feeling oneself to be the agent of good deeds done to another or as victim of another person's evil deeds. The fire that destroys this ignorance is indirect general knowledge of Pati, paśu and pāśa. This knowledge is obtained through śāstras. It is the root of Śivajñāna. Śiva who presents Himself to the soul and stands before it has resolved to be intuited by the Śivayogin: the latter comes into the presence of that resolve.

Servants of the state control the activity of criminals making them heteronomous, by virtue of the king's authority. If the people know this and themselves recognise the authority of the king and follow his mandate, they could make the servants of the state also follow in their foot steps because both of them will be carrying out the king's commands and thus be autonomous. Even so, the sense organs instead of obeying the soul make it heteronomous and bring it under their control. When the soul realises that the sense-organs do so because they obey the order of Śiva, it unites itself to His Feet and places itself in His service. By this means, the soul obtains the grace of Śiva and is able to control the sense-organs and make them obedient to itself. If, on account of habit, the sense-organs try to re-assert their control, the soul must immediately remind itself that since it, as well as the sense-organs, have no independence, every action is inspired by Śiva. If it adheres to its duty of serving Him steadfastly, karma (which conquers the soul through the soul's own action) will cease to affect it and be destroyed. The soul that thus serves Śiva will

never again be dominated by its sense-organs and rendered heteronomous.

Maraijñāna Deśikar explains the matter by saying that the sense-organs, which bring the soul under their control, being inert are actuated by Śiva. The sorrow they cause can be removed by grace.

Śivāgra Yogin speaks of prapatti again. Śiva's ajñāsakti controls the internal organs etc. These are the possession of Śiva; the soul is Śiva's servant. Sometimes the desire for sense-objects will be engendered by prabala prārabdha. Prārabdha is three-fold as (i) tīvra, (ii) manda and (iii) supta. He who follows Śiva dharma is not subject to supta. The Śivajñāni is free from manda. No body is free from tīvra. Tīvra prārabdha is referred to as prabala prārabdha.

Because Śiva actuates the soul, all the good and evil that the soul does are Śiva's action. It is Śiva who actuates other people so that all the good and evil that they do are, again, His action. Those that realise this are aware of nothing but His grace, and completely lose themselves in his Grace.¹ Such people will not be affected by ignorance or karma. Śiva makes people who seek Him as their refuge, pure like Himself and protects them. A snake that is under the spell of mantra and does not take food will yet try to bite whatever comes near it. Even so āgāmi karma of a soul that realises its utter dependence on Śiva will not affect that soul but will act as auxiliary to the merit and de-merit of those who do good or evil to that soul. Śiva directs the soul's āgāmi in this way, causes others who do good or evil to it to experience the fruits of their deeds. Even this is due to His grace. He wants these people also to experience and get rid of their karma. Śiva does not become mutable because of these activities.

Maraijñāna Deśikar observes that Śiva's nature is to help souls without expecting any return. Since He is free from desire and aversion, He has the good of all in view. He causes those that consider themselves responsible for their actions to experience the fruits of their action in exact proportion i.e. without increase

1. Jñānaprakāśar explains it so as to conform to Śivasamavāda. By the withdrawing activity of Cit-Śakti helped by Śivaśakti, sense-organs must be turned away from objects of sense. The word ஆளாகி must be rendered thus-becoming efficient as omniscient and omnipotent. It is wrong to render it as 'becoming a servant'.

or decrease, and spares those that take Him to be responsible for their actions from experiencing the fruits thereof. Jivan muktas exist in the latter way.

Śivāgra Yogin observes that the experience of *tivra prārabdha* may engender desire and aversion as a result of which the soul may do good, and evil deeds. Even so, no āgami will attach to it. Śiva uses the *prārabdha* of the soul that exists non-different from Him to cause experience to those that do such a soul good or evil and thus remove their karma (in addition to sparing the soul experience of the fruits of karma). The soul that realises that 'Śiva's *kriyā śakti* actuates it, is spared the task of extinguishing karma whether by enjoyment or by *prāyaścitta*.²

Those who do not have pure Śivajñāna cannot escape births even though they may visit sacred places and bathe in holy waters, though they may dwell in forests eating roots, fruits etc. perform yoga occupying a cave in some mountain, live without water etc. on account of the efficiency of their yoga and be deathless for a long time. But those who have Śivajñāna will attain release and be ever united to Śiva's Feet, even if they are given to sexual pleasures.

Fire hurts. But those who are able to control fire, escape being scorched, though they may be right in the midst of it. Those who possess the antidote to poisons are not afraid of death by poisoning. Jñānis are able to control sense-organs etc. which give rise to desire or aversion by their functioning. So whatever they do through these organs they will remain free from desire and aversion which are the seed for future. Even *prārabdha* does not affect them. Just as, though a burnt cloth may appear to have some shape, in reality it has none, *prārabdha* will lose its efficiency. Only the residual impressions of *prārabdha* affect the soul a little. But even they cannot cause āgāmi to attach to the soul. This is like the smell left in the vessel in which *asafoetida* was stored. This smell cannot serve the purpose of adding flavour to curries. Likewise, the potter's wheel in motion serves to shape the pot. But the moment this purpose is achieved, the revolutions of the wheel, even if they continue for sometime, slackening to a stop are incapable of shaping another pot. Impressions of mala

2. Nirambavaḷagiār quotes the following verse from Appar :

‘முன்னம் அடியேன் அநியாயமயினால்’ in which
the significant words are தன்னையடைந்தார் வினை தீர்ப்பதன்றோ
தலையாயவர் தன்கடனாவதுதான்—

persist till the body is destroyed. When the body goes, they also cease.⁸

Śivāgra Yogin asks how one can be a Śivajñāni, if in order that he may experience prārabdha, he has to be united to the products of māyā and ānava and replies that the efficiency (śakti) of pāśa is destroyed while residual impressions continue. These bring about association with the senses. When prārabdha ceases, the body and the residual impressions of mala are destroyed.

It is of the nature of the eye to see objects only if something shows it to the eye. The soul not only shows objects to the eye but goes out with the light of the eye to perceive objects. So also the Lord not only enables the soul to cognise objects but also unites non-differently with the soul's intelligence and along with the soul, Himself cognises objects. If the soul (which becomes pure and free from the three malas at the dissolution of the body) realises that Śiva helps it by existing non-different from it, it will unceasingly desire to unite with His feet. When the soul's thought and desire cling to His Feet, on account of the state of non-difference, freedom from mala which usually follows the dissolution of the body results even while the body persists. The soul will give up all activities, cast off its bonds, have its intelligence and desire united to those of Śiva, be united to His lotus like Feet and have the experience of Śiva as its own experience.

Maraijñāna Deśīkar says that on the destruction of the body, the soul is freed from malas and becomes pure like refined gold. Regarding the nature of the souls that reach God's Feet, he says that they are immersed in the bliss of their Energy, which bliss is inseparably and ever present in them. Some say 'Śivānubhava' instead of saying 'svānubhava'. This is not correct—since in the *Śivajñāna Bodham* which is the original and in the other Āgamas and purāṇas, the expression 'svānubhūtimān' is used. Maraijñāna Deśīkar says his preceptor has dealt with this elaborately in his *Paramopadeśa*.

3. Maraijñāna Deśīkar says that vāsana does not cause births. It is like a burnt seed. This commentator says that the efficiency of the energies of mala are destroyed. He observes that what is meant is not complete destruction. They would continue to exist but they would cease to affect the souls. He quotes the following verse of his preceptor.

“உக்கொளியாதொளிக்கு மிருள்உதய சுதிரொளிமுன்னே
பக்குவத்திற் பசுபாச வலியடங்கும பரமசிவன்
நக்கனுயிர்க் கருள்புரிய நசித்ததல வசித்தல
செய்க்கனனீங் குதலென்ன மாயேய நிலைதொலையும்.”

Jñānaprakāśar says that the body that is made to persist by prārabdha dies. When it dies, mala as the capacity that binds-dies. The remnant of mala, left over after dikṣā, is removed without being annihilated. When in release mala's obscurations is removed, the soul needs no help to know things. Although the soul's Cit-Śakti is by its own nature capable of knowing independently (note the Śivasamavādin's insistence on the soul's independence)⁴ yet in the state of bondage, it knows things only if something else shows them to it. That which is made perfect needs help no more. By hearing the Śivāgamas and reflecting upon them the soul has mediate knowledge regarding the three categories and the distinction between Śivatva and paśutva. The mediate knowledge of Śiva as the seer and doer of all is stated in the proposition, 'That is Śiva' (which knowledge is gained through the Āgamas in an indirect way just as the hunger and thirst of another person are only indirectly known to one). In the jīvanmukta state, there is immediate realisation of Śiva, stated in the proposition, 'This is Śiva. This is like a person realising his own hunger and thirst. The soul first realises itself as knowledge, then as knower. It may be noted that the Advaitin and the Siddhāntin differ in this that to the former knowledge without distinction into knower etc. is the final realisation whereas the latter says that the soul exists as the knower.

Those who have with the help of parajñāna, intuited Śiva will be always seeing Him. They will not look at things which may make the impressions of prārabdha affect them. The jñāna by which such things are known is various as perceptive, inferential and scriptural, gained through instruments. They are different forms of demonstrative knowledge. Scriptural knowledge (as heard) is bindu-jñāna originating from the four modes of speech and occasioning doubts etc. As reflected upon and clearly understood (after doubts are cleared) it is bheda and bhāvana jñāna (bheda, because it involves the distinctions into seer, sight and object of sight) and not anubhūti jñāna. Thus, only Śivajñāna which transcends all these has the excellence of being knowledge free from reference to things (i.e. to things other than Śiva). So, jīvanmuktas who have this knowledge always perceive the

4. The usual Siddhānta is expressed by Śivāgra Yogin who says that alike for the soul's perception of the inert world and the manifestation of His nature to the soul, Śiva has to inform the soul. There is no reference to the independent capacity of the soul.

Supreme One and never the objects that subject them to the residual impressions of *prārabdha*.

Jñānaprakāśar does not accept this interpretation that souls do not see objects in the state of release. He says that because of ignorance such wrong interpretation is given. A low state of *saṁādhi* is wrongly identified with supreme release characterised by the fruition of *Śiva*-intuition in which all things are latent.⁵

Like a ceaselessly flowing stream, body beginninglessly accompanies the soul, appearing and disappearing according to the karma of the soul. As it is improper to say that such a body is destroyed (at release), release must be understood as getting an eternal, pure, auspicious and divine body by the grace of God. This is the view of the *Rūpasamavādin*.⁶ If the body were to remain, *māyā*

5. Maraijñāna Deśikar says that *jivan muktas* are engrossed in the object of knowledge. They do not occupy themselves with the objects of the world, just as one who has tasted nectar will not desire to taste poison. He quotes the following :

உலகுளார் பெருது துஞ்சுமொருள் விழித்தயோகி
உலகுளார் விழித்த பண்டத் துறங்குவனூருவமாக
உலகெலாமொன்றி வேறற்றொளிரு மொப்பிலிதன் நோன்தாள்
அலர்தலைக்கணிந்தேயாகிக் கவனலானேயமியாதே.

Cf. its similarity to the following :

yā niśā sarvabhūtānām
tasyām jagartim samyami
yasyām jāgrati bhūtāni
sā niśā paśyato mune—The Gītā II, 69.

Śivāgra Yogin observes that in determinate cognition, there are the triple factors—the experiencer, the experience and the experienced. Knowledge of objects is determinate. *Jivanmuktas* give up this knowledge and through *Śivajñāna*, they have indeterminate knowledge seeing everything as *Śiva*. *Nirāmbavaṇagiar* observes that *jivanmuktas* intuit *Śiva* in their dreams as well as in their waking state till they finish experiencing *prārabdha* accumulated unknowingly and by residual impressions.

6. Śivāgra Yogin takes the *pūrva-pakṣin* as the *Bhairavatantravādin* who says that after completing *caryā* and *kriyā*, yoga is practised. *Śiva* out of His grace, grants an eternal form to the soul which thereafter inhabits *Śivaloka* as a *siddha*. Body, organs etc. are given to the soul so that it may experience pleasures etc. When *aṇava* becomes ripe for removal, the body also is cast off.

Muthiah Pillai remarks that *Śivasāmavādins* can be distinguished into *Rūpaśivasamavādins* and *Ārūpaśivasamavādins*. The former hold that the soul is similar to *Śiva* by coming to possess a body similar to His. The latter say that souls become like Him by having the eight qualities and fivefold functions of *Śiva*.

(which is the cause of the body), karma (which is the cause of pleasure and pain experienced by the soul) and āṇava (which brings karma and soul together) will also remain. Such a condition will be productive of evil. In referring to this as release, it must be understood that it is only a grade of release. Moreover the body which originates from the puryaṣṭaka, consisting of manas etc. has a beginning and must not be treated as beginningless. It is a remedy for removing the beginningless association with mala. So when mala is removed the body also will disappear.

When true knowledge which is difficult to obtain dawns upon the soul, Śiva will shine forth. When Śiva shines forth, the soul becomes a jīvanmukta. As the clearing nut precipitates the dust in water, as great radiance keeps off darkness and as antidote keeps poison in check, jīvanmukta's state involves not the destruction of sahaja mala (āṇava which is connate to the souls) but its energy. Āṇava persists in the form of residual impression till the body is destroyed. When the body is destroyed, āṇava ceases to cause births and leaves the soul.⁷

The clearing nut analogy shows that if, for some reason, āṇava śakti, which is dead in the soul that has gained parajñāna, raises its head, it will be kept down (by parajñāna). The light analogy shows that as in the presence of light, darkness appears impossible and remote, so is āṇava in the presence of Śiva's light. As poison held in check by antidote awaits the weakening of the latter to assert itself, mala awaits the weakening of the jīvanmukta state to show its influence.

Śivāgra Yogin says that the energies of mala are destroyed, not the malas themselves. As light enables those who are near it to have a clear view of things, though those farther away are denied this, the jīvanmukta is free from the bondage of āṇava on account of having experience of Śiva. The jīvanmukta is able to keep himself uninfluenced by objects though he mixes with them. Thus he is free from the bondage of māyā. Just as a man who gets bitten by a snake will not be affected by poison after he takes the antidote, if one contemplates Śiva, one will not accumulate

7. Nīrambavaṇagiar observes that poison, darkness and dirt are not destroyed by antidote, light and clearing nut—only their energies are destroyed. So also āṇava is not destroyed—nor is its eternality in any way impaired. Its energies which obscure the soul, are destroyed.

merit and de-merit, even if one were to give oneself up to enjoyment. Thus karma also ceases to bind the soul.

Jñānaprakāśar expresses the view that at the dissolution of the body, mala will be of such a nature as to attach itself to or detach itself from the soul (āvṛtti nivṛtti svabhāva). It will not be destroyed.

Aṇava is beginningless and eternal. If āṇava be destructible, the soul also will be destructible. Thus the eternality of the soul will be compromised. So, argues the Paśāṇavāda Śiva and says that even in release, the connate impurity of the soul will not be removed. According to him, the soul being associated with mala, will be ignorant like a stone. The Siddhāntin does not accept this view. He says that just as when a mercury pill is brought into contact with copper, the verdigris of the latter is removed and copper shines different from verdigris, contact with true knowledge results in the separation of the soul from āṇava and the continuance of the former independently of the latter. The Bhedavādins say that the removal of mala (with the advent of true knowledge) is itself release; no union with Śiva's Feet is necessary for release. The Siddhāntin replies that sun light alone will not dispel darkness. Until the light of the eye blends with sun light, darkness will not be removed. Even so, acquisition of true knowledge must be accompanied by association with Śiva's Feet. Without association with His Feet, there can be no release.

Jñānaprakāśar calls the pūrvapakṣin Malampommuttivādin (மலம்போம் முத்திவாதி), who says that mala will be removed when there is association with the resolve of Śiva's kriyā śakti which is manifested in dīkṣā performed for release. Jñānaprakāśar says that there are two kinds of dīkṣā, one for the removal of mala and the other for manifestation of Śivatva. Even after the first dīkṣā, mala's residual impressions remain, although mala has been removed and there is absorption into mahāmāyā. To remove these residual impressions, the second kind of dīkṣā is performed. One may ask whether the second kind is not non-different from the first because both aim at removal, and how the second kind of dīkṣā could manifest Śivatva. The reply is that there is no manifestation of something which was not there. Just as the very removal of the China-rose from the vicinity of the crystal serves to manifest the clear radiance of the latter, the complete removal of mala-impressions and all — is the manifestation of Śivatva.

We have seen the shoot, bran and husk (these three being natural to rice) of a grain of rice pass away while the grain itself remains. But from this grain, no other grain can be produced (as another grain can be produced from a grain having husk etc.) So it is clear that bran, husk etc. do not continue to exist in a grain of polished rice. Even so, māya, karma and āṇava which are beginninglessly connate to the soul leave it in the state of release. Though they leave the soul, their eternality is not jeopardised because they continue to exist in the bound souls. Some may say that verdigris is concealed in copper that has been brought into contact with mercury pill. To show through anupalabdhi hetu that this is not possible other analogies are used.⁸

At release no less than in the state of bondage, the soul depends upon Śiva to have its cognitive activities manifested and to seize objects. To manifest these activities of the soul, Śiva unites with it; just as 'a' pervades other letters. To direct the cognitive activities towards objects, He controls the soul and going wherever the soul goes, merges in the objects also. So the souls that have cast off āṇava, cannot ever remain apart from Śiva. Śiva's activity in uniting with the soul and manifesting its cognitive activities is the help of seeing. Uniting with the object while controlling the soul is called the help of showing. The soul's activity to function in respect of anything is dependent on Śiva pervading that thing and uniting with the soul. This can be understood by observing the eye to perceive only when its light fuses with lamp light.

The soul cannot ever drift away from Śiva as it can drift away from āṇava.

Offering his comments, Jñānaprakāśar observes that only bound souls do not have autonomy. It is wrong to think that released souls also lack autonomy. Those who make this mistake do not know 'Śuddhādvaita Śaiva Siddhānta' which says that the released soul has pervasiveness that equals Śiva's pervasiveness and that the released soul belongs to the class of Śiva. This

8. Maraijñāna Deśīkar says that the soul assumes its own independent nature.

Śivāgra Yogin observes that it is wrong to deny separateness of two entities existing in beginningless conjunction. That it is wrong is illustrated by the grain, husk analogy. The soul that is freed from pāśa is pervasive; the released soul does not become a paśu as before.

is what is meant by saying that the soul exists without drifting away from Śiva and that it merges in Him. Some think that this statement is meant to correct those who hold that it is possible to remain apart from Śiva. With this in mind, they take up the Viśiṣṭādvaita position and say that the soul remains non-differently united to Śiva. Because there is equal pervasiveness for aṇādi-mukta Śiva and the soul, no body will say that they remain apart (in the manner suggested). Even though they remain non-separate, it must be remembered that there is no touch contact between incorporeal entities. The Śivāgama says that the Lord pervades everything but He is not attached to any of them. This is the Siddhāntin's Śivādvaita Śivasāmya, declared by Śiva Himself. This is different from the sāmya set forth by the Śivasamavādin. Hence those who rail against the Siddhānta do not realise that they are indulging in abuse of Śiva. It is only Śiva that can perform expiation for them (says Jñānaprakāśar).

If the Lord mixes with everything and helps (souls) by abiding in everything, then, every one must be able to see Him. How is it that this is not so? Even as the sun also is dark to the blind, the Lord's presence is not noticed by those who do not have the spiritual eye given⁹ to them by the Lord's grace. The sun causes only the mature lotuses to blossom. In the same way, this eye is given only to those who are ripe enough to receive grace. Only those who, by virtue of their fitness, come to possess this eye, can see the Lord as the light of their intelligence and feel His help in existing non-different from them.

Maraijñāna Deśikar remarks that the Lord is not partial in revealing Himself to some and concealing Himself from others (who are not fit to see Him). By the contact of Śivasakti, the souls are made pure and are enabled to have vision of God. By saying that the soul is given the 'spiritual eye' it is not meant that it is given something which it did not have before. The obstruction to its cognitive activities is removed by Śivajñāna and Śivatva is manifested.

Śivāgra Yogin explains the matter thus. Because Śiva is of the form of intelligence, He can be seen only by the eye of

9. cf. the Gītā

na tu mām sakyase draṣṭu
manenaiva svacakṣuṣa
divyam dadāmi te cakṣuḥ.

intelligence which will be given by His grace to the soul if it is fit to receive it. After giving this eye to the soul, He manifests Himself as non-different from the soul's intelligence and with great brilliance.¹⁰

Īśvara avikāravādin says: It need not be said that Śiva grants the spiritual eye to the soul and then reveals Himself. Like the shade given by a tree, the Lord remains immutable. As a way-farer goes to the tree for its shade, the soul gets the spiritual eye and goes to Śiva when it becomes fit. This view is unacceptable for the reason that on this analogy, Śiva like the tree, does not have autonomy while the soul, like the way-farer has it. The Pariṇāmavādin says that the soul is destroyed and that it becomes one with Śiva's feet. If the soul is destroyed, how can it be said to unite with His feet? If it really unites, it is not destroyed; and if it is destroyed, there is nothing to be released. If annihilation is release, that will be giving up the eternality of the soul. The Aikyavādin says that the soul unites with Śiva as water unites with water. This is not tenable because Śiva and soul are not equal like two drops of water.

Maraijñāna Deśikar says that in sāyūjya, the soul exists as Śiva's servant and not independently of Him. Śivāgra Yogin examines some other views about release. Commenting on the analogy of the small tank bursting its banks and uniting with the water of the big tank, he says that the soul and Śiva are not of the same nature. If they are, they will constitute one entity. Thus instead of three entities, (Pati, paśu and pāśa), there will be only two (Pati and pāśa). What was previously meant by the analogy of water mixing with water was the sweet water of the river mixing with the salt water of the sea. What happens, then to the Āgamic declaration that the soul unites with God just as water mixes with water, milk with milk, ghee with ghee? The first analogy has been explained already. At the time of homa, if milk and ghee run short, goat's milk and ghee are mixed with them. Goat's milk and ghee become eligible for purposes of homa, the moment they are mixed with cow's milk and ghee. Even so, when the soul casts off its pāśa and unites with Śiva, it comes to be of the nature of Pati Who is all—pervasive and omniscient.

10. Jñānaprakāśar says that Śiva is imperceptible to those who have not performed Śivayoga. To those who have attained Śivaśāksatkāra, He is perceptible.

So long as verdigris remains in copper, the latter does not become gold (so say the Śivasamavādins). But it is not right to say that after verdigris is removed, copper becomes gold. Śiva must not be compared with gold which cannot, by its contact, convert a piece of copper into gold—He must be compared with the mercury pill which has the power to transmute copper into gold. But this mercury pill also cannot be gold. Though Śiva purifies the soul and brings it to His feet, it is eligible only for experience of Śiva, not for the fivefold activity of the supreme Lord.

Maraijñāna Deśikar says that purified souls do not have any function but that of being absorbed in svānubhūti. Can the soul never function? Those who have attained imperfect release are invested with Śiva's authority to be agents under Him. What is wrong in saying that those who have attained supreme release engage in activities of creation etc.? That would lead to Anekaś-varavāda. Moreover, there is only one Śuddhamāyā. Therefore they cannot engage in these activities.¹¹ Śivāgra Yogin says that released souls are mere experiencers of Śiva-bliss—they are not creative agents. When they are said to perform creation etc. what is meant is that they are controlled by Śiva. In the state of supreme release, soul and Śiva are not separated and seen as different. Thus there is no occasion for enquiring whether the released souls engage or not in these activities.

Jñānaprakāśar's view is that released souls also engage in activities. But though their resolve is not independent of Śiva's resolve and does not manifest different fruits, their resolve arises not out of grace, like Śiva's but because they cannot but so resolve. The released soul is not itself the Śivabhoga but only the experiencer of Śivabhoga.

Soul and Śiva are both intelligences. So it is not proper to say that the soul is entitled only to experience of Śiva. Why not say soul and Śiva become one? The Siddhāntin does not accept this view. Śiva is the intelligence that grants grace. The soul is the intelligence that receives this grace. Śiva is the intelligence

11. Maraijñāna Deśikar quotes his preceptor.

போக்குமோ மற்றொரு செம்பிற்களிம்பைப் பொன்

நிக்குவரோ நங்கினர் நோய்கீசு

படைப்பதுஞ் செய்யார் தலைப்பார் பற்றற்றூரீசன்

அடிக்கீழ்த் தஞ்சத்தினியின்பம்.

that stops the re-birth of souls and grants them enjoyment and release; the soul is the intelligence that is subject to these. Śiva is the intelligence that knows by itself; the soul is the intelligence that knows only as informed. Thus, even if they merge, they will be non-different without becoming one. As light, the light of the eye and the light of the sun are the same. But whereas the former requires a manifestor, the latter is itself the manifestor. As intelligence, both the soul and Śiva are the same. But inwardly there is difference between them, so that even when they unite, they unite non-differently without becoming one. Though the soul and buddhi are both called intelligence, the latter does not become the former. But as buddhi is called inert compared with the soul, the soul (though intelligent as compared with all other tattvas) can be called inert *as compared* with Śiva. Nira mbavaḷa-giar remarks that description of the soul as inert is only for the occasion when it is compared with Śiva. It is not tenable otherwise.

Jñānaprakāśar emphasises absence of clash between intelligent entities. He says they are identical without clashing. If the union of soul and Śiva has a beginning, it will be non-eternal; if it does not have a beginning there can be no marks of difference between them. We do find some marks of difference (as shown above). Sāyūjya does not mean soul and Śiva becoming one substance. Soul is similar to Śiva (and this is its essential nature in the state of release).

The tree-wayfarer analogy was criticised. To show that Śiva does not become mutable by His activity, it is said that as the magnet draws iron towards itself, Śiva draws souls to Himself. The Pariṇāmavādin says that the destruction of the soul is release because then it becomes one with God. Here it is said that just as fire destroys the rust in the iron and makes the iron like itself, Śiva destroys the soul's mala and makes the soul like unto Himself. The Aikyavādin said that the soul and Śiva unite like one drop of water and another. The Siddhāntin says that as the salt put into water gives its taste to water and makes it salty, Śiva uniting with the soul impresses His eight qualities on it and causes it to be like Himself. The Śivasāmavādin says that like water coming into contact with salt becoming salty, the soul uniting with Śiva becomes like Śiva (is able to perform the five functions). The Siddhāntin says that just as the mercury pill transmutes copper into gold but hides within itself the nature

of gold, Śiva gives the eight qualities to the soul but keeps these eight qualities under His control and within His pervasion so that their nature is not independently revealed. Thus though souls come to have the eight qualities like Him, it is He Who performs the five-fold activity. When the juice of sugar cane, honey, milk, fruit, nectar, sugar-candy, sugar etc. are mixed together it is difficult to determine the taste of each separately from the mixture. Similarly, when Śiva unites with the soul, He, being of the nature of bliss, cannot be determined, He transcends intelligence. Thus there is nothing wrong in saying that the soul is eligible only for experience of Śiva.¹²

Śivajñāna Yogin explains that the iron rust analogy is meant to illustrate, not the destruction of the soul but its association with mala.

Śivāgra Yogin gives the following⁷ details :

1. Magnet-iron analogy illustrates Śiva bringing the soul under His control.
2. Fire-iron analogy illustrates Śiva purifying the soul by giving intuition of Himself to the soul.
3. Faggot-fire analogy illustrates Śiva destorying mala and making it like Himself.
4. Salt-water analogy illustrates Śiva giving His nature to the soul.
5. Mercury pill analogy illustrates Śiva causing the soul to enjoy His bliss non — differently.
6. The expression 'uniting' மேனித்து emphasises union with Śiva.
7. தானெல்லாம் வேதிப்பாடு emphasises the soul uniting with Śiva in such a way as to transcend distinctions into knower etc. and remaining blissful.

These seven kinds of jīvanmukti are illustrated by (1) Sugar-cane, (2) Fruit, (3) Milk, (4) Honey, (5) Sugar-candy, (6) Sugar and (7) Nectar. Their characteristics are as follows :

1. Sugar-cane — more of fibrous matter, and less of juice-even so, more of jīva-bhāva and less of Śiva-bhāva. There is experience of sense objects for a longer time then experience of Śiva.

12. Making the soul immutable signifies nirmala jāgrat ; making the soul like Himself in form is nirmala svapna ; making it like Himself in respect of qualities is nirmala suṣṭi ; subduing it is nirmala turiya ; and causing it to be of the form of bliss is nirmala turiyatita.

2. Fruit—more stone and rind than juice—but less hard than sugar-cane—so also more jivabhāva and less Śiva-bhāva.

3. Milk—three parts water and one part milk—but no hardness at all.

4. Honey—sweet and sour juice.

5. Sugar-candy—sweetness pervades the form (i.e. the whole of it is sweet) but it is hard.

6. Sugar—sweet—not being hard melts quickly.

7. Nectar—pure sweetness—likewise the release it illustrates—Even as nectar and sweetness are not differentiated, Śiva pervades the soul completely.

These can be *known by experience*—not by description, says Śivāgra Yogin.

Jñānaprakāśar is alive to the possibility of criticism that the Siddhāntin takes his analogies from others without giving his own. He says that the analogies apply only partially. Śiva causes souls to cast off their mala and cease to be heteronomous. He makes them similar to Himself. Jñānaprakāśar criticises those who say that the soul has no śivatva of its own and that by uniting with Śiva, it comes to have artificial śivatva.

The three malas prevent the union of the soul with Śiva's lotus—like feet. Even when a soul is completely freed from them, it has to dread them because, like darkness awaiting the destruction of light, they await the destruction of the soul's wisdom so that they may bind it again. It has to attain trance so as to resist their onslaught. It must consort with the devotees of Śiva. To stabilise this experience, it must treat the devotees and the temples as Śiva Himself. Worshipping them as Śiva, it sings and dances in ecstasy. Comparing itself with those who have not attained this state, it feels conscious of being inferior to none. Because it has attained His feet, it feels its superiority to all. Realising the greatness of those who have attained His feet, it treats itself as their servant. These are the characteristics of a jīvan mukta.

Śivāgra Yogin says that devotees are judged worthy of worship not on account of their birth or qualities but because they wear the sacred ashes and rudrākṣa which symbolise Śiva. Jñānaprakāśar says caryā is necessary when trance is disturbed.

A person's love for a girl can be judged by the love that person has for her relatives. Likewise one's love for Śiva's

devotees is a sign of one's love for Śiva. So those who profess love for Śiva when they do not love His devotees, really pretend to love Śiva. Because Śiva exists in all souls, those who love Him will really love all souls. Those that have no love for Śiva and His devotees do not seek for themselves lasting happiness. Contact with those who are connected with the object of one's love feeds one's love. Hence that contact gives pleasure to one. The jīvan mukta who has unvarying experience of Śiva and is at His feet, must consort with those who will feed this 'experience. He must do their work as his own without feeling egoistic and with great pleasure. Those who are in love hate to move with those who are not in love, fearing that contact with them will kill their love. Even so, contact with those who spoil one's experience of Śiva will lead to births and deaths for one. Hence their company must be given up. The jīvan muktas must use pleasant words realising their lowliness and the greatness of Śiva's devotees. With the aid of Śivajñāna they must live non-differently in an advaita state and because of the happiness they possess, they must worship, clap their hands and dance in sheer ecstasy.

Śivajñāna Yogin observes that these injunctions suggest the means for the removal of mala even as milk, taken for its taste, helps to remove excess of bile.

Jñānaprakāśar says that the view of oneself as servant may erupt into the state of contemplation. The caryā one must do then is contemplation of Śiva, not the external caryā of collecting flowers etc.

It is difficult for people to know Śiva. So as to enable them to achieve this, the Lord gives His form with sacred ashes etc. to His devotees. He exists as the light of the souls' intelligences and mixes with them because of His grace (i.e. out of love for them). Thus those who play His part (by putting on His form) are Śiva. Because they practise identity with Śiva, they are clearly seen to be Śiva. Sometimes He is contemplated in the form of a certain mark in the heart and attained by souls. Thus also they (who do this) are Śiva. At the time of union, both the mark (which symbolised Śiva) and the souls cease to claim existence. Thus also they are Śiva. Hence in order to give up contact with those who are attached to pāśa, worship these souls (as though they are Śiva Himself).

Jñānaprakāśar insists again that to the practice of contemplation of identity with Śiva, contemplation as Śiva's servant is

opposed. If the latter erupts into the former, it can still be made fruitful. By *sākāra Śivasamādhi* where Śiva is contemplated as a flame, as the basic sound, as having parts, as not having these, as both having and not having parts etc., the soul comes to belong to a class like Śiva's; in *nirākāra Śivasamādhi*, it becomes a Śiva and is like Śiva.

The followers of *caryā* path do not distinguish between a symbol and that which it symbolises. Hence they worship Śivaliṅga etc. installed in temples, as Śiva Himself. To them, Śiva grants release without revealing Himself to them. The followers of the *kriyā* path conceive the formless Śiva to have the form of Śivaliṅga constituted by mantras like *Īśāna* and worship Him in this form. To them, He appears (at times of worship and in the form in which they worship Him), just as fire appears when friction is applied to faggot. The yogins consider Śiva who resides in *manas* to reside in this form (Śivaliṅga) also and worship Him in this form. To them Śiva appears at the time of worship as milk appears when cow is milked. The *jñānis* do not limit Śiva's presence to any one thing or place; they worship Him in love. Just as milk, not seen in any part of the cow's body other than its udder, begins to flow at the thought of its calf, Śiva manifests Himself in the form of love and is ever manifest to the *jñānis*. So He should be worshipped as the *jñānis* do.¹³

The activities of *caryā*, *kriyā*, *yoga* and *jñāna* are all service of Śiva. The *jñāni* is eligible for all the four: the *yogin* for three excluding *jñāna*; the *kriyāvān* for *kriyā* and *caryā*; the *caryāvān* for *caryā* only. So, only the *jñānaguru* who can be the preceptor for the followers of all four paths is the chief preceptor. The stationary and moving objects referred to earlier are not different from the preceptor. Hence the preceptor must be worshipped.

Just as one eligible for intimate functions is eligible for external functions but not vice-versa, the *jñāni* is eligible for all the four but it is not so with the others. The preceptor also must be worshipped as Śiva because the stationary and moving objects are not different from the preceptor.

13. Maraijñāna Deśikar says that the temple is the gross liṅga and Śiva jīṅga is the occupant of the body. By Śiva, Śadaśiva is meant. Śiva's body is threefold as *vyaktaliṅga*, *vyaktavyaktaliṅga* and *avyaktaliṅga*.

Śivāgra Yogin observes that the preceptor is none other than Śiva Himself. Hence He is the One who can teach about the three categories and the four paths. The yoga indicated here is not haṭhayoga but Śiva yoga. The spiritual preceptor alone has Śivajñāna and is free from pāśa and paśu jñāna. The jñāni has no varṇāśrama. Jñānaprakāśar says that caryā, kriyā and yoga are sālamba Śivayoga and that jñāna is nirālamba Śivayoga.

To do as required by sciences relating to mantras, medicine yoga, mercury pill and other sciences, to have a knowledge of works like the Vedas and Āgamas, of the past, present and future and of the attainment of the eight supernatural powers, the help of the preceptor is not necessary. But the knowledge of Śiva can never come about without the preceptor. As through his help everything can be achieved, he must be worshipped as the Lord.¹⁴

The varieties of Śiva-svarūpa Śiva, taṭastha Śiva, those who have parajñāna, stationary forms like the Śivaliṅga and the forms in which Śiva manifested Himself for the sake of the sixty-three saints and other devotees of Śiva—all these are the preceptor. Hence the preceptor must be worshipped. He will make one become like Śiva by sparśa, bhāvanā and cakṣu dīkṣā. These dīkṣās can be illustrated by the hen brooding over and hatching eggs (sparśa), the tortoise thinking of its egg and bringing forth its little ones (bhāvanā) and the fish creating its little ones by mere look (nayana or cakṣu).

Śivāgra Yogin says that by sparśa, mānasa and cakṣu dīkṣās māyā, karma and āṇava respectively are removed and the soul is made Śiva Himself. Śivatādātmiya is meant here.

The *Siddhiyār* ends on a note of the supreme importance of the preceptor for one's spiritual life. Except in the case of those very few who are born religious geniuses it is difficult to say how invaluable is a preceptor to the generality of mankind. We have seen that a preceptor does not force things down the indifferent throats of his pupils but instructs them according to their capacity

14. Śivāgra Yogin says that Śiva-sāyūjya can be had only by the grace of the preceptor and never by any other means. Jñānaprakāśar says that by the teaching of nirālamba Śivayoga guru, one will attain Śivatva and also a knowledge of Siddhānta mahāvākya which relates to the object of nirālamba Śivayoga.

and makes them examine the truth of the teaching for themselves. The distinguishing feature of the Siddhānta is that in all cases it is Śiva who is the preceptor, appearing in a form to those who require such a manifestation and informing others who are on a higher level by existing as their Inner Light.

What happens to mala at the time of release? One answer is that while it leaves those who have attained release, it exists in others who are still in bondage.¹⁵ This does not mean that some souls are ever bound. The whole trend of the Siddhānta is that all souls will attain release however long it may take them. There is nowhere any mention of eternal damnation. If all souls attain release, will not mala come to be destroyed? The Siddhāntin explains that expressions like “destroyed” are to be understood, not in the sense of the utter annihilation but as meaning the subsiding (or keeping down) of the energies of mala. The real significance of *Kaṇḍa Purāṇam* consists in its being an epic of the soul, a popular presentation of Śaiva Siddhānta. We have already observed that Vaḷḷi stands for the human soul, sought after, wooed and won by the Lord. Sūrapadma stands for āṇava, which being eternal, cannot be destroyed. Hence to show that it exists but is powerless to assert itself, it is represented as the vāhanā of the Lord. In the *Bodham*, the expressive analogy of clouds obscuring the sun is given to illustrate āṇava obscuring the soul. Even as when the clouds drift away the sun shines forth, when āṇava is removed, the soul regains its essential nature. Śivajñāna Yogin explains that the analogy reinforces the Siddhānta that mala is not destroyed but that its energy is rendered ineffective by being kept down.¹⁶

In a well-known verse, the Siddhānta is stated thus: In the state of release the three eternal entities are present, the Lord granting enjoyment to the soul, the soul experiencing this enjoyment and mala making the enjoyment possible.¹⁷ Tiruvīḷaṅgam

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15. பிறந்த நாள்மேலும் பிறக்கு நாள்போலும்
துறந்தோர் துறப்போர் தொகை— Tiruaruṭpayan
16. ‘மலும் நசித்தலாவது தனது மறைத்தற்சத்தி
மடங்கிக் கீழ்படுதன்மாத்தரையே பிறிதன்
றென்பதாஉம் உவகையாற் பெறுதும்’ Māpāḍiyam p. 501
17. முத்திதனில் முன்றுமுதலு மொழியக்கேள்
சுத்த வதுபோகந்துய்த்தலணு—மெத்தவே
இன்பங்கொடுத்தல் இறை இத்தைவினைவித்தல் மலம்
அன்புடனே கண்டுகொள் அப்பா Uṇmai Viḷakkam

explains the position regarding mala by saying that even in supreme release, it is mala which prompts the awareness, “I experience.” It does not revive paśu or pāśa jñāna but enables the soul to have the bliss of supreme knowledge. Muthia Pillai explains that by mala making experience of bliss possible, what is meant is really the absence of mala. Because mala is absent there is experience of bliss; mala is not capable of causing pleasures even as darkness cannot produce its opposite—viz, light.¹⁸

Schomerus says that ‘the soul is a slave from eternity to eternity; (a slave either to mala or to the Lord) and is never a free personality. It is difficult to feel even pity for such a creature.”¹⁹ It is difficult to understand what exactly is meant by such criticism. Is it not a fact of experience that one either goes the way of the senses or the way of the spirit? Is there a third alternative? Of the two, surely going the way of the spirit is preferable! Of spirits, shall we not follow the Supreme Spirit? If following the Supreme Spirit is bondage, all that we can say is, may the soul never be freed from such bondage!

The Siddhāntin has no false sense of independence. Nor does he recognise false authority. Compare the expression பொய் அடிமை இல்லாதவர் “Ours wills are ours, to make them Thine” is his motto. In fact, Meykaṇḍār says explicitly that it will be unforgivable if the soul were to forget what it owes to the Lord Who made such a poor thing as itself like unto Himself. Previously It had the excuse of ignorance and now, after spiritual illumination it can have no excuse for forgetting what it owes to Him. Its strength consists in adoring Him.²⁰

In the state of release the soul lacks nothing of what is its supreme good, viz., experiencing the bliss of Śiva. All other things are as nothing compared with the enjoyment of this bliss.²¹ “All

18. He quotes the following couplet from the Tirukkuṟai

கெடுப்பதூஉம் கெட்டார்க்குச் சார்வாய் மற்றுங்கே

எடுப்பதூஉம் எல்லா மழை

where மழை கெடுப்பதூஉம் means மழைஇன்மைகெடுப்பதூஉம்.

19. Der Caiva Siddhānta, p. 428.

20. தன்னையறிவித்துத் தான்றானைச் செய்தானைப்

பின்னைமறத்தல் பிழையலது—முன்னவனே

தானேதானைச் செய்துந் தைவமென்றுந் தைவமே

மானே தொழுகைவலி.

—See Māpāḍiyam, p. 517.

21. Māpāḍiyam, pp. 389-90.

things betray thee, who betrayest Me" says the Hound of Heaven. The soul running away from the Lord seeks shelter in one worldly hope after another. Anon, all these failing it, as they are bound to, ("all things fly thee, for thou fliest Me!"), the soul is overtaken by the Hound which says:

How little worthy of any love thou art!
Whom wilt thou find to love ignoble thee,
Save Me, save only Me?
All which I took from thee I did but take
Not for thy harms
But just that thou might'st seek it in My arms.²²

22. Francis Thompson, *The Hound of Heaven*.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Some general considerations are called for, before we conclude our survey of Śaiva Śiddhānta. We may take up first the validity of religious experience which we took for granted in our discussions. Some deny totally the validity of religious experience. We shall examine some of the reasons given by them.

The most usual criticism of religious experience is that it is subjective and that it has no objective validity. But as Elton Trueblood remarks¹ it is a *non sequitur* to make the recognition of subjective factors tantamount to a denial of objective factors. He quotes G. K. Herbert who says: 'There are precisely the same reasons for doubting the existence of the pillar-box that I can see down the street as for doubting the existence of God. In both cases vast assumptions have to be made ...and in both cases the doubt is simply a doubt whether our own natural faculties are instruments that tell the truth, whether our own apparent experiences may be trusted as real and actual.' Galloway shows that even in the world of science, the so-called 'facts' pre-suppose a process of ideal construction. They are never the mere "given."² The fear of the "subjective" was introduced into Philosophy by Kant and ever since his day, anything that can be shown to be in the least subjective, has become suspect.

Granting the occurrence of religious experience, some critics argue that in interpreting it there are such irreconcilable contradictions that the value of such experience is reduced to nothing. They may remark in triumph that in the sciences, there are no such contradictions at all. As against the ordered progress in the sciences, there is nothing but contradiction and confusion in religion. Such critics conveniently forget that all is not progress in science. There have been revolutionary changes in the sphere of the so-called 'exact science.' Maeterlinck observes that science has been aptly termed 'the charnel house of hypotheses.'³ Besides,

1. The Trustworthiness of Religious Experience, p. 26

2. The Philosophy of Religion, p. 192

3. The Magic of the Stars, pp. 42-43

what do differences in the interpretation of religious experience prove? We may just as well argue that, because a mountain seen from the north looks very different from the same mountain seen from the south either that there are two mountains or that the mountain changes or even that the mountain does not exist.⁴ Examining specific objections under the following titles—lack of universality, lack of sensory quality, lack of describable content and religious wish (ful) thinking, Elton Trueblood, comes to the conclusion that they are groundless, observing, 'As scientist checks scientist, so saint checks saint. The objective character of Augustine's experience is verified by its fundamental repetition in the life of Pascal.'⁵ He goes so far as to say that while the science of a thousand years ago seems ludicrous and even that of a century ago seems quaint, men who report religious experience can speak to one another across chasms of time without difficulty.⁶ In an anthology of religious verses, it is sometimes difficult to say whether a particular piece is by a Hindu or a Muslim or a Christian. No doubt many features in experiences recorded by the followers of various religions are unique but the presence of unique factors does not entail the absence of common factors. What St. Paul calls 'the fruits of the spirit' are in the opinion of many competent students of religious experience, remarkably similar in all lands.

Some critics consider religious-mindedness as a sign of a diseased mind. (Freud goes to the extent of treating this not merely as a disease but also as an illusion, in his *Future of an Illusion*). To call a religious genius a paranoiac is to be offensive without being truthful. Quite apart from religious-mindedness not being a disease, it is considered a certain cure for diseases otherwise incurable. C. J. Jung, as competent a psychologist as any other, says that the trouble with a majority of patients treated by him coming to him from all parts of the world was that 'they fell ill because they had lost that which the living religions of every age have given to their followers, and none of them has been really healed who did not regain his religious outlook' remarking at the same time that this has nothing to do with a particular creed or membership of a church.⁷ Religion, then, in the words of L. P.

4. R. B. Henderson—Belief in God, p. 29

5. The Trustworthiness of Religious Experience.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 44

7. C. J. Jung quoted by F. B. Castle in his *The Undivided Mind*, pp.

Jack, is rather that which defends us than that which we have to defend.*

Some make a few half-hearted or ill-conceived or ill-directed attempts to find God and not succeeding, roundly deny the success of others. We trust the result obtained by a trained experimenter as likely to be correct rather than that of a novice in the field of science. The same should hold in regard to religion. Sages and saints down the ages have given us results, agreeing in their essentials. Need we reject them because some indifferent beginners have failed to confirm them?*

We may proceed to meet another kind of criticism—if not of religious experience, of religion. But our difficulty is in understanding how there can be Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. To treat God as an appearance is to empty religious consciousness of significant content. One is over-awed by the eminence of absolutist thinkers, to offer any criticism of their views. But one must confess one's inability to understand their views. In words that are familiar to every student of Philosophy, Bradley says, "We can see at once that there is nothing more real than what comes in religion. To compare facts such as these with what is given to us in outward existence, would be to trifle with the subject. The man who demands a reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness, seeks he does not know what." Yet one is startled to find that sentences that immediately follow tell a different story! What are we to make of a sentence like the following: "And man and God as two realities, individual and ultimate, 'standing' one cannot tell where, and with a relation 'between' them—this conjunction, we have seen is self-contradictory and is therefore appearance."¹⁰ The most memorable and puzzling of Bradley's sentences is this, "Hence, short of the Absolute, God cannot rest, and having reached that goal, he is lost and religion with him."¹¹ Anything one may say in criticism of such a master-mind as Bradley may seem cheap, but surely it is the limit to talk of God being "lost"! No theist would deny that God is *more than* what He reveals Himself to man. It is one thing to accept this and an entirely different thing to treat God

8. Religious Perplexities, p. 43

9. See *Belief in God*, R. B. Henderson, pp. 62-63

10. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 398

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 395-96

as an appearance. We venture to think that the following observation states the position accurately. "In God religion and moves and its being. Without Him religion dissolves into illusion and without the idea of God, no philosophy of religion or theology can be articulated."¹²

Dialectical difficulties come in the way of recognising God and soul as numerically distinct. Hence, the reality of both is denied, in favour of an Absolute, which in the attempt to be shown as the true Infinite becomes rather the Indefinite. As for the difficulties, we are reminded of L. P. Jack's classification of religious perplexities into two kinds: perplexities which overcome religion and perplexities which are overcome by religion.¹³ The man of religion is "perplexed-yet not unto despair". The mystics have no difficulty of the type (regarding relation, etc.) mentioned by Bradley. Tāyumanavar is clear in his utterance of the eternality of both God and soul but he recognises at the same time that the soul is the servant of the Lord.¹⁴ The mystics maintain that the crown of their experience is the "Unitive" life. But this does not warrant the conclusion that there is absorption.

We have had occasion to observe already that the logical conclusion of denying reality to souls, granting them only phenomenal or relative reality (it is difficult to understand what value this concession has) is to deny bondage and release. If the One alone is, there is no bondage, neither is there release. No doubt, the view that recognises these is not without difficulties. Why or how did the souls get bound? Is pāśa an eternal necessity to the Lord? These are questions the answers to which may not prove acceptable to all. But using the very test of coherence and harmony advocated by the Absolutists, we feel that a pluralism which is God-centred is preferable to a Monism that denies God and souls alike. The view is rather strongly expressed by Evelyn Underhill who speaks of the 'soul—destroying conclusions of pure monism, inevitable if its logical implications are pressed home.'¹⁵

12. T. M. Watt. *The Intuition of God*, p. 49

13. *Religious Perplexities*, p. 71

14. 'என்று நீ அன்றுநான் உன்னடிமை அல்லவோ ?'

—Tāyumanavar

15. In an Introduction to *An Anthology of the Love of God* from the writings of Evelyn Underhill, Bishop Lumsden Barkway says (pages 22-28) that as a philosopher she rejected Monism as an explanation of Reality and quotes

She quotes Kabir who sings, "Brahmā and the creature are "ever distinct, yet ever united." She says in her preface to an edition of Kabir's songs, "The soul's union with Him is a love union, a mutual inhabitation; that essentially dualistic relation which all mystical religion expresses, not a self-mergence which leaves no place for personality. This eternal distinction, the mysterious union-in-separateness of God and the soul is a necessary doctrine of all sane mysticism; for no scheme which fails to find a place for it can represent more than a fragment of that soul's intercourse with the spiritual world.¹⁶ She goes on to say that this affirmation was one of the distinguishing features of the Vaiṣṇavite religion. Her remarks are applicable to the Śaivite religion also. Pascal's protest is famous: The God of Christians is not a God Who is simply the author of mathematical truths or the order of elements, that is the view of Heathens and Epicureans.....; but the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob. The God of Christians is a God of love and of comfort, a God who fills the soul and heart of those whom He possesses.¹⁷ The hymns of the Śaivite and Vaiṣṇavite saints are no less insistent on this character of the Lord. While the Hindu saints record the intimacy of their relationship with God, they do not fail

from a letter she wrote to the Spectator the following words that her aim in writing the book *Man and the Supernatural* "was to set out a philosophy of religion able to give content to all the characteristic experiences and activities of man's spiritual life: its outward and inward, its historical and metaphysical aspects. Such a philosophy must be based on the fundamental distinction between Creator and creature. Monistic mysticism simply does not give content to these observed facts of the spiritual life. It means a view of reality which is indistinguishable from pantheism: an immanentism so extreme that both prayer and worship become meaningless. An even more serious defect is that such a 'mysticism' leaves no place for love."

16. One Hundred Poems of Kabir, Ed. by E. Underhill and Rabindranath Tagore. The matter is taken from the Preface.

17. God and Philosophy by E. Gilson, pp. 91-2. Cf. the following verse of Sundarar with a striking similarity of sentiment.

கற்றமிழ்வல்ல ஞானசம்பந்தன் நாவினுக்கரையன்
 காளைப்போவானும்
 கற்ற சூதன் நற்சாக்கியன் சிலந்தி கண்ணப்பன் கணம்புல்லன்
 என்றிவர்கள்
 குற்றம் செய்யினும் குணமெனக்கருதுங் கொள்கைகண்டு
 நின் குரைகழல் அடைத்தேன்
 பொற்றிரள் மணிக்கமலங்கள் மலரும் பொய்கைதழ்
 திருப்புன்கூருளா னே.

to record His transcendent character, simultaneously. The pairs of opposites that vainly compete with each other to describe this transcendent—immanent character remind us of the remarks of Nicholas of Cusa. “I have learned”, he says, “that the place wherein thou art found unveiled is girt round with the coincidence of contradictories.”¹⁸ We come across numerous such verses in *Tevāram* and *Tiruvācagam* and in the *Prabandham*, in the verses of Nammālvār, especially.

We shall proceed to make a few observations about Śaivism in general and Śaiva Siddhānta in particular. We have observed already in the introductory chapter that Śaivism dates back to a very remote past. Sir John Marshall says, “Among the many revelations that Mohenjo-daro and Harappa have had in store for us, none is perhaps more remarkable than this discovery that Śaivism has a history going back to the Chalcolithic Age or perhaps even further still, and that it thus takes its place as the most ancient living faith in the world.”¹⁹ While in some quarters this conclusion is considered “not proved”, it is still an indication of the antiquity of Śaivism.

L. D. Barnett says that in some of the early references, the conception of Śiva is full of horror and that the Hindu applies neither the aesthetic nor the ethical criteria of ordinary life to his gods. However, the same writer admits that in the south, Śiva has been worshipped since immemorial times with extra-ordinary affection. Śiva is a national god dwelling in the hearts of the people.²⁰ In this connection we may refer to Macnicol’s remark about the strange and repellent symbols that are employed to represent the deity (he goes on to say that in spite of such symbolism there is in śaivite hymns a genuine theistic experience, as genuine as it is intense).²¹ So far as aesthetic standards are concerned, we have numerous references in *Tevāram*, describing the Lord as a Beautiful Person அழகன். He is represented as wearing a garland of skulls, etc. But what is the meaning of it all? We have *Tevāram* hymns entitled *Vināvurai* which pose certain questions as to why the Lord wears skull, garlands, etc. This is evidently to make us think of the symbolic significance of His ornaments.

18. Quoted by Evelyn Underhill in her *Abba*, p. 49

19. Mohenjo-daro, *India*—1, vii

20. *The Heart of India*, pp. 75-6

21. *Indian Theism*, pp. 125-26

etc. We are similarly to consider the significance of certain acts also of Śiva (cf. திருச்சாழல் in Tiruvācakam). That all these have a symbolic significance is indicated in the familiar vers of Tirumandiram which says that the unwise ones say Śiva destroyed the three towns whereas what He destroyed was the product of the three malas. While on this point we may mention the symbolical significance of Hindu art as found in temples, etc. The Hindu mind tries to represent metaphysical conceptions which, on the surface, are likely to appear crude.

Śaiva Siddhānta, it may be stressed once again is based on, and is a systematic formulation of, the experiences of Śaivite saints. To take one of the commentators, Śivāgra Yogin, we find that he says definitely that what he sets forth is the outcome of his preceptor's grace as well as his own experience.²²

It is misleading to describe Śaiva Siddhānta as a 'pluralism' for, as this term is used in Western Philosophy, it may stand for a radical Pluralism in which God is merely *primus inter pares*.²³ We have seen that while the Siddhānta accepts paśu and pāśa as eternal, God is not just a co-ordinate reality, but the Lord of these—the Master of souls, the ground of its being and the goal of its prayer; and the Owner of the world, etc. Again Theism is taken in some quarters to represent the immanent character alone of God and in some other quarters to stand for the transcendent character alone. But no true theism can ignore either of these aspects. If, however, a term which can stress both aspects is thought necessary, Supertheism may be suggested to indicate transcendence and immanence together. Similarly it is misleading to characterise the Siddhānta as 'realism'. No doubt it recognises pāśa (which includes matter) as an independent principle. But the Siddhāntin's definition of substance as the aggregate of its qualities reveals an idealist tendency.

It will be seen, thus, that though it is usual to characterise the Siddhānta as a 'realistic, pluralistic theism' it is more than this description would suggest. True to its claims to be the consumma-

22. "குருசரணருள் புரிந்தவாக்கு மெம்பாற்
கூடு மனுபவந்தானுமாகமத்தே வருபொருளும்..."

—Śivaneṭiprakāśam

23. See Pringle Pattison. The Idea of God, p. 316

tion of all systems, it combines, not merely juxtaposes, elements of truth found in all other systems. Its affinity with Advaita has been indicated in an article²⁴ by the late Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. Its affinity with Viśiṣṭādvaita is no less pronounced.

So far as the distinctive contribution of Śaiva Siddhānta to Hindu thought is concerned, we may mention the Siddhāntin's happy use of the term 'Advaita.' Advaita we saw, means for him, not mere non-difference as it does for the Kevalādvaitin but a 'union-in-separateness'. Again only where the reality of the souls is conceded, there is point in moral and spiritual endeavour. While studying the different commentaries, we found Jñānaprakāśar going farther than the orthodox Siddhāntin in claiming for the released souls equality with the Lord in respect of the five functions also on the ground that no longer having selfish desires, their resolves also issue in the same results as the Lord's resolve. This is a bold attempt to accord to the souls the highest status consistent with the supremacy of the Lord. He has rendered a distinct service by showing that spiritual entities *can be many* since they do not clash like corporeal entities by co-presence.

"Śaiva Siddhānta is not a living religion but only a natural philosophy which gives a metaphysical setting to religious categories" is the conclusion drawn by Schomerus at the end of his work.²⁵ But is this conclusion correct? Whether it is only a natural philosophy, how much of genuine metaphysics it has, etc. are questions the answers to which will be obvious to any one who takes the trouble to study this unique system of thought. We shall take up just one point here for consideration. Is it fair to say that Śaiva Siddhānta is not a living religion? The answer to it is found in the hymns of the Śaiva saints whose experiences are recorded for our edification. We shall mention some features which are too often overlooked or are not as widely known as they deserve to be.

First of all, do the saints who are the examples of the Siddhānta condemn the human body outright as is often alleged? It will be seen that they condemn births etc. only in so far as

24. The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. II

25. Der Caiva Siddhānta, p. 430

these delude us. But they point out that human birth affords a unique opportunity for release. The words of Tirumular deserve to be widely known: "If the body perishes, the soul also comes to grief; there will be no enlightenment either. Hence knowing how to take care of my body, I tend it thereby tending my soul",²⁶ Appar sings of the human body as the temple of the Lord.²⁷ The saints who usually dread the cycle of births as responsible for our separation from the Lord, welcome it if thereby they would be vouchsafed vision of the Lord; Kāraikkāl Ammaiār, a woman-saint prays, "Grant me freedom from births; but if I am to be born, grant that I should ever think of You." The same note is struck by Appar who sings, "Even were I to be born a worm, grant that Your Feet will be ever lodged in me". We may note in passing that Vaiṣṇavite saints also welcome birth even as a fish etc. if thereby they could be in the presence of their Lord. Appar's song that human births is to be welcomed if thereby one is privileged to see the sweet-smiling Lord is well-known.²⁸

Do the saints work for release desiring thereby perpetuation of their selves and fear to lose themselves in the Lord? We have shown already that selfhood centred in God is welcomed and this is very different from selfishness. We may quote the saints now. Gauḍapāda says in his Māṇḍūkya Kārikā^{28a}, that even yogis see fear in that which is without fear (i.e. in the state of non-difference; abhaya necessarily implies for the Advaitin, abheda). Quite apart from the desirability of doing away with difference so as to be without fear, do those who work for release really fear release if it takes away their selfhood and long for perpetuation of their selves? What the saints want is not happiness in heaven or freedom from misery on earth but opportunities for worship and adoration. Giving a general description of the Śaiva saints, the author of *Periapurāṇam* says that treating gold and potsherd as alike useless, they worshipped the Lord in the fullness of the love that welled forth in them and were of a resoluteness which

26. "உடம்பை வளர்த்தேன் உயிர் வளர்த்தேனே "

" உடம்பினை முன்னம் இழுக்கென்றிருந்தேன்
உடம்பினுக்குள்ளே உறுபொருள் கண்டேன் "

27. காயமே கோயிலாகக் கடிமனம் அடிமையாக—

28. ' குனித்த புருவமும் '—note the line மனித்தப்பிறவியும்
வேண்டுவதே இந்த மாநிலத்தே.

28a. *Gauḍapāda Kārikā*, III, 39

did not care even for release.⁸⁰ Another saint sings: “Even if the Lord does not take away my troubles and does not show me mercy, even if He does not indicate the path I am to pursue, I shall never cease loving Him”.⁸⁰

The saints exemplify not only such a lofty strain of self-less love and devotion, but reveal for the benefit of frail mortals, the possibility of a relation that admits of petitions to the Lord for help in difficulties. Appar says that ignorant ones may not realise that the Lord is merciful if He does not help His devotees who are in distress⁸¹ There is a note of urgency in the appeal of Sundarar, “If you put off showing mercy to us, from day to day, what shall we do if death over takes us? Does cotton pierce the container in which it is stored?” Again, in distress, he sings, “You do not realise our sorrows. What is the good of doing anything in the hereafter, to those who worship You here?”⁸² Reminiscent of the Lord’s prayer (in the Bible) (‘Lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil’) is his verse; “He forgives me my sins and prevents me from further sinning.”⁸³ What can be more touching than Māṇikkavācagar’s description of the Lord’s love as excelling even the love of the mother for her infant, the mother who is ever mindful of the baby’s needs and satisfies them by kind forethought?⁸⁴ Is the soul condemned to the cycle of births, unredeemed by a Saviour? Is karma everything? No; even were fuel heaped skyhigh, a flame can reduce it to ashes.

29 கூடும் அன்பினில் சும்பிடலேயன்றி
வடும் வேண்டா விற்றலின்விளங்கஞர்

—*Periyapurāṇam*

விமலன் குஞ்சிக் கமலம்கும்பிட
வேண்டுவா வேண்டா வின்மினச உலகே

—*Cidambara Ceyyup Kovai*

30. இடர்களையாரேனும் எமக்கிரங்காரேனும்
படரும் நெறிபணியாரேனும்—சுடருருவில்
என்றாக் கோலத்து எய்யாடும் எம்மானர்க்கு
அன்பருதென் நெருசவர்க்கு

—*11th Tirumūgai*

31. என்போலிகள் உமைத்தெளியார் அடியார் படுவதிதுவேயாகில்

32. நஞ்சியிடையின்று நாளையென்றுமை நச்சுவார்
துஞ்சியிடடாற் பின்னைச செய்வதென் அடிகேள் சொலீர்
பஞ்சயிடப் புட்டில கிறுமோ பணியிரருள்.....

இளைப்பறியீர் இம்மை ஏத்துவார்க்கம்மை செய்வதென்.

33. பின்னை என்பிழையைப் பொறுப்பானை, பிழையெலாந்தவிரப்
பணிப்பானை.

34. பானினைந்தூட்டும் தாயினும் சாலப்பரிந்து.....

Even so is the utterance of the Lord's Name to destroy one's sins.³⁵

Such is the record of evidence given by the Śaiva saints. Can it be a guide for the present and the future? Can it help us both as individuals and as members of society to lead a good and godly life?

This is in a way a question that concerns all religions. How can religion help us in practical life? The answer depends upon what religion means to us. If religion stands for something handed down to us by our ancestors as a sort of bequest to which we attach a sentimental value as we would to any precious heirloom, then it is not going to help us much. If religion becomes an intellectual affair, the establishment of one conclusion as against another, it will not be deep-rooted and will, as likely as not, give place even to an opposite conclusion. Such a religion may dazzle the intellect but it will not touch the core of one's being. If, again, religion consists in emotional outpourings, it will lack stability like a house built on sand. It must be grounded in the will,³⁶ purified and strengthened by Divine Grace. Of course, this is not to ignore the part played by the intellect and the emotions. The intellect seeks to provide rational explanation, and the emotions will have their legitimate satisfaction. Religion involves the whole personality and calls into play each of its vital functions. Such a religion is of inestimable value to man.

As an individual beset with problems and difficulties which seem to be as insoluble as the problem of squaring a circle, the religious man has an access of power, a clearness of vision and a tranquillity of emotions which are the envy and admiration of his less fortunate fellow-beings who have no religion. Even in trying circumstances the religious man does not quail. His head is "bloody but unbowed"—not because he is the captain of his soul but because God is the captain of his soul.

As for society here again, genuine religion has a good deal to offer. The poet may be reduced to despair at the sight of 'nature

35. விண்ணுற அடுக்கிய விறகின் வெவ்வழல்
உண்ணிய புகிலவை யொன்று மில்லயாம்
பண்ணிய உலகினில் பயின்ற பாவத்தை
நண்ணி நின்றறுப்பது நமச்சிவாயவே.

36. A study of Screwtape Letters by C. S. Lewis will make this point clear,

red in tooth and claw' or 'man's inhumanity to man'. The humanitarian's faith in human beings whose lot he is out to improve may not survive successive returns of ingratitude or lack of public recognition. He may even swing to the other extreme, and, embittered by ingratitude, may become a misanthrope. But the man who says, "Not my will but Thy will be done" will go through life, making it one long course of selfless service for the glory of God and the happiness of his fellow-men. He who is blessed with such faith in God fears nothing, and has nothing to fear.⁸⁷ Neither global nor even cosmic catastrophe can unnerve him.⁸⁸ Fortified with Faith, he goes on doing his duty, though the heavens might fall. The heavens will not fall—such is his Faith!

37. அஞ்சுவதியாதொன்றுமில்லை அஞ்சவருவதுமில்லை.

38. மண்பாதலம்புக்கு மால்கடல்முடி மற்றேழுலகம்
விண்பால் தசைகெட்டு இருசுடர் வீழினும் அஞ்சல் நெஞ்சே
திண்பால் நமக்கொன்று கண்டோம் திருப்பாதிரிப் புலியூர்
கண்பாவு நெற்றிக் கடவுட் சுடரான் கழலிணையே.

APPENDIX

There is a reference on page 185 of this work to the righteous indignation felt by Swami Vivekānanda when the doctrine of karma was misinterpreted. Here are the full details as given in the complete works of Swami Vivekānanda, Volume VI, pp, 404-406. (1921 Edition).

‘An enthusiastic preacher belonging to the Society for the protection of cows came for an interview with Swamiji.

Swamiji — What is the object of your Society?

Preacher — We protect the mother-cows of our country from the hands of the butcher. Cow-infirmaries have been founded in some places where the diseased or decrepit mother-cows or those bought from the butchers are provided for.

Swamiji — A terrible famine has now broken out in Central India. The Indian Government has published a death-roll of nine lakhs of starved people. Has your Society done anything to render help in this time of famine?

Preacher — We do not help during famine or other distresses. This Society has been established only for the protection of mother-cows.

Swamiji — During a famine when lakhs of people, your own brothers and sisters, have fallen into the jaws of death, you have not thought it your duty, though having the means, to help them in that terrible calamity with food?

Preacher — No. This famine broke out as a result of men's karma, their sins. It is a case of ‘like karma, like fruit.’

Hearing the words of the preacher, sparks of fire, as it were scintillated out of Swamiji's large eyes; his face became flushed. But he suppressed his feeling and said, “Those associations which do not feel sympathy for men, and even seeing their own brothers dying from starvation do not give them a handful of rice to save their lives, while giving away piles of food to save birds and beasts, I have not the least sympathy for them, and I do not

believe that Society derives any good from them. If you make a plea of karma by saying that men die through their karma, then it becomes a settled fact that it is useless to try or struggle for anything in this world; and your work for the protection of animals is no exception. With regard to your cause also it can be said that mother-cows through their own karma fell into the hands of the butchers and die, and we need not do anything in the matter.”¹

1. I am thankful to Swami Svāhānanda of the Ramakrishna Math, Mylapore and Dr. Bhaskaran Nambudripad, for kindly locating this quotation.

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